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India started on a program of reforms, both in its external and internal aspects, sometime
in the mid-eighties and going on into the nineties. While the increased exposure to world
markets (‘globalization’) and relaxation of domestic controls has undoubtedly given a
spurt to the GDP growth rate, its impact on poverty, inequality and employment have
been controversial.
This book examines in detail these aspects of post-reform India and discerns the changes
and trends which these new developments have created. Providing an original analysis of
unit-level data available from the quinquennial National Sample Surveys, the Annual
Surveys of Industries and other basic data sources, the authors analyze and compare the
results with other pieces of work in the literature. As well as describing the overall situation
for India, the book highlights regional differences, and looks at the major industrial sectors
such as agriculture, manufacturing and tertiary/services. The important topic of labor market
institutions – both for the formal or organized and the unorganized sectors – is considered
and the possible adverse effect on employment growth of the regulatory labor framework is
examined carefully. Since any reform of this framework must go hand in hand with better
state intervention in the informal sector to have any chance of acceptance politically, some
of the major initiatives in this area are critically explored.
The book is based on the results of a collaborative research project carried out at the Insti-
tute for Human Development (IHD), New Delhi, which is an autonomous institution special-
izing in labor markets, employment and human development issues. The Munk Centre for
International Studies (MCIS) of the University of Toronto provided administrative support
for the project funded by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Ottowa.
Overall, this book will be of great interest to development economists, labor econo-
mists and specialists in South Asian Studies.
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1 Introduction
An overview of globalization, reforms
and macro-economic developments 
in India
The process of economic reform and globalization in India
India embarked on a policy of liberalization and globalization in the latter part
of the last century. There has been some discussion in the literature as to when
India took steps to move away from the regime of comprehensive state control
of the economy and dismantle the restrictive structure. A distinction has been
made in this connection between ‘reforms’ and ‘globalization’. Strictly speaking
the former is supposed to emphasize the process of easing control of the
domestic economy, while the latter refers to the attempts at liberalization on the
external account. It is useful to keep the two sets of policy distinct, and will be
referred to below.
In practice the former entails the latter. As Nayar (2006a, p. 10) observes: 
Economic liberalization within a country creates pressures to integrate the
national economy with the world economy . . . Say, for example, a country
commences economic reform and removes restrictions on production by the
private sector to accelerate growth. Eventually the state would have to allow
imports of capital goods and intermediate goods to increase production –
and that means integration into the world economy. And if it allows imports
of these goods, then it must also promote exports in order to pay for them –
further integration into the world economy.
In fact the process is more extensive than suggested in the above quotation.
External liberalization also involved removing a good deal of restrictions on the
import of consumer goods, not just capital and intermediate goods to aid produc-
tion. The motivation for this was to promote competition in the domestic
economy, and bring the efficiency levels in the Indian economy nearer the levels
of the world economy.
It is clear that reforms of the domestic economy started earlier in India.
Rodrick and Subramanain (2004) date the beginning of this process to the return
of Indira Gandhi to power at the beginning of the 1980s. They ascribe the new
direction to an ‘attitudinal’ shift in the perception of the leaders after the Con-
gress Party had been ‘chastened’ by its electoral defeat in the earlier election of
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the late seventies. They also find a ‘structural break’ in several key indicators
including GDP growth in this period. When the party was returned to power in
January 1980 it became more inclined to support growth with the help of a more
dynamic private sector. Nayar (2006b) maintains that the reform process started
earlier in 1975–1976 during the regime of Indira Gandhi herself. The leadership
was jolted partly by the turmoil created by the excesses of the ‘dirigist’ policy
followed in the years 1969–1973 (including large-scale nationalization of
banking and industry), and partly by external shocks (including war, droughts
and oil price inflation). Besides adopting deflationary policy to stabilize the
economy, the Gandhi administration undertook deregulation and export-promo-
tion measures on top of the earlier devaluation (Joshi and Little 2000, p. 56).
While the period of ‘creeping liberalization’ might have been a prolonged
one, it was not till the economic crisis of 1991 that there was an open endorse-
ment of ‘paradigm shift’ embracing a policy of integration with the world
economy and recognition of the need to follow the path of the South-East Asian
growth strategy. It involved a sharp devaluation of the rupee; removal of quanti-
tative restrictions on imports; reduction of import tariffs; and a unification of the
exchange rate as the rupee was made convertible for current-account transac-
tions. On the domestic front of the reform process the system of industrial
licensing was removed and the list of items reserved for the small-scale produc-
ers was shortened considerably. The program also saw fiscal reforms though the
maintenance of important subsidies, particularly on the agricultural front, con-
tinued to plague the budget (Ahluwalia 2002; Joshi and Little 2000).
The removal of quantitative restrictions on imports (QRs), an important
feature of the controlled economy, came gradually in the decade of the nineties.
QRs on intermediate and capital goods were removed in 1991, but they
remained significant on a range of consumer goods. Over the next ten years, a
series of international negotiations, starting with the ‘Uruguay Rounds’ of the
WTO, saw a gradual whittling down of these barriers. Tariffs do, however,
Table 1.1 Custom duty rates in India and other developing countries, various years
All goods Agriculture Manufacturing
India 2001/2002 (CD only) 32.3 41.7 30.8
India 2002/2003 (CD only) 29.0 40.6 27.4
India 2002/2003 (CD + SAD: est.) 35.0 47.1 33.3
India 2003/2004 (CD + SAD: est.) 32.7 46.8 30.7
Brazil 2000 14.1 12.9 14.3
China 2000 16.3 16.5 16.2
Korea 2000 12.7 47.9 6.6
105 developing countries (1996–2000) 13.4 17.4 12.7
Source: World Bank (2003). ‘India: Sustaining Reforms, Reducing Poverty’, Development Policy
Review, 14 July, Washington, D.C.
Notes
Unweighted average rates, CD = custom duty, SAD = special additional duty, est. = estimated.
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remain as a deterrent to imports on a variety of goods. Table 1.1 is taken from a
World Bank Report (Dahlman and Utz 2005) give the extent of the tariff barrier
relative to some comparators in the early years of the century.
India’s tariff rates remain high by the standards of other developing coun-
tries (Table 1.1). But a fair amount of integration with the world economy has
been achieved. The following paragraphs briefly discuss the extent of the
integration both in terms of the current and capital account of the balance of
payments.
External trade
India’s merchandise exports had a steep decline during the autarkic regime
going down from 2.17 percent of world exports in 1949 to 0.44 in 1980. It
hovered around 0.50 percent throughout the decade, and started going up only
after 1991. Liberalization of trade has certainly had the impact of starting an
upward trend and the share had reached a high of 0.8 in 2004. The share still
remains quite low relative to comparator countries in Asia. China increased its
share from under 2 percent in 1990 to close to 6 percent in 2003. Even a much
smaller country like Korea had a share of 2.8 percent at this date (Table 1.2).
Manufactured exports have been a substantial part of the Indian export
growth – reaching 74 percent in 2004 (government of India, Economic Survey –
2005–2006). India seems to have performed relatively better in service exports.
The gap between India and comparator countries in service exports, particularly
vis-à-vis China, is not as large. India’s progress in exports in computer and com-
munications services has been much more than China’s – which has done better
in travel and related services (Figure 1.1).
Table 1.2 Export growth and share in world exports of selected countries
Percentage growth rate Share in world exports Value 
(US $ billion)
1995–2001 2003 2004 2001 2003 2004 2004
China 12.4 34.5 35.4 4.3 5.9 6.6 593.0
Hongkong 3.6 11.9 15.6 3.1 3.0 2.9 259.0
Malaysia 6.6 6.5 26.5 1.4 1.3 1.4 125.7
Indonesia 5.7 5.1 11.2 0.9 0.9 0.8 71.3
Singapore 4.1 15.2 24.5 2.0 1.9 2.0 179.6
Thailand 5.9 17.1 20.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 96.0
India 8.5 15.8 25.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 71.8
Korea 7.4 19.3 30.9 2.5 2.6 2.8 254.0
Developing 7.9 18.4 27.1 36.8 38.8 40.7 3,685.1
countries
World 5.5 15.9 21.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 9,049.8
Source: IFS statistics, IMF.
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Import volume has generally kept slightly ahead of export volume (Table
1.3). India has been helped in its current account by the terms of trade tilting in
its favor in a majority of the years (though in very recent years there is a threat
of significant deterioration of the TOT). But in any event the balance of pay-
ments position has been helped, increasingly so in recent years, by substantial
inflow of foreign funds. This is due to another aspect of India’s globalization –
the substantial emigration of its nationals and the inflow of remittance from the
overseas residents of Indian origin.
Foreign-capital inflow other than remittance has in fact not been significant.
In fact India has been a significant laggard in attracting foreign direct invest-
ment. Even though the actual value of FDI in India has increased several times




































Figure 1.1 Merchandise and service exports, India and comparators, 2002 (source: World
Bank staff analysis using World Bank internal database).
Table 1.3 Performance of the foreign-trade sector (annual percentage change)
Year Export growth Import growth Terms of trade
Value (in Volume Unit Value (in Volume Unit Net Income
US dollar) value US dollar) value
1999–2000 7.7 10.6 8.4 8.3 12.4 7.2 1.5 11.7
1990–1995 8.1 10.9 12.6 4.6 12.9 7.6 5.0 16.5
1995–2000 7.3 10.2 4.3 12.0 11.9 6.9 –2.0 7.0
2000–2001 21.0 23.9 3.3 1.7 –1.0 8.2 –4.5 18.3
2001–2002 –1.6 3.7 –1.0 1.7 5.0 1.1 –2.1 1.5
2002–2003 20.3 21.7 0.3 19.4 9.5 10.7 –9.4 10.3
2003–2004 21.1 6.0 8.5 27.3 20.9 –0.1 8.6 15.1
2004–2005 26.2 13.2 8.9 39.7 8.8 25.7 –13.0 –2.0
Source: The Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, India.
At its height in recent years it has perhaps been no more than 1 percent of GDP
– compare to 4.7 percent in China in 2001 and 4.4 percent in Brazil. In value
terms India received $4.26 billion in FDI in 2003, compared with $53.5 billion
for China (Dahlman and Utz 2005, pp. 30–31). Dahlman, however, reports that
according to the Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index (by A.T. Kearney)
India’s attractiveness to foreign investors is rapidly rising – although it has been
well below China’s for sometime.
It is clear from this capsule account that globalization in the sense of integra-
tion with the world economy has been significant both on the trade and the capital
account. It is equally clear that it has been accompanied by a spurt in the growth
rate of GDP. Further, the efficiency of the economy has increased in the aggreg-
ate. The slow growth of India’s constant price investment ratio (increasing from
around 22 percent in the 1970s and the 1980s to no more than 24 percent at the
end of the 1990s), while GDP growth was accelerating suggests that the marginal
capital–output ratio must have been rising significantly. According to one author
this ratio was a meager 0.12 in India’s worst decade 1965–1974, but it had
doubled to 0.246 in the decade of 1991–2000 (Berry 2006, p. 3).
In spite of this positive effect of globalization, doubts are widespread about
the success of the economy in achieving greater equity and acceptable levels of
poverty reduction. In the next section we shall review, equally briefly, the major
thrust of the literature speculating on the possible links between growth and
equity. While this review of the theoretical literature is not to provide exact
guidelines to our empirical investigation to follow, some of the ideas explored
might help to illuminate or emphasize specific results in the chapters to follow.
Labor markets, poverty and inequality in the growth process
The theoretical discussion on the changes in the incidence of poverty and
inequality in the growth process of agrarian economies from low levels of
income has been a major topic in development economics. The impact of growth
is delineated through the labor market, and any predictions about the impact on
poverty and inequality must be based on some implicit or explicit view of the
structure of labor markets and their functioning.
Homogeneous labor
The classical view on economic development and its impact on inequality is
found in the Lewis model and its elaboration in the early work of Kuznets and of
Ranis-Fei. All these models consider the growth process to be driven by a shift
of labor from the ‘traditional to the developing sector’, (variously identified as
‘rural and urban’, ‘subsistence and capitalist’; ‘agricultural and industrial’).
Ranis and Fei in their work on Taiwan formalized the three different elements in
this story which together determine the dynamics of inequality over time. First,
there is the ‘reallocation effect’ of labor moving out of agriculture to the sec-
ondary and tertiary sectors. This shift will tend to increase inequality if the
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distribution is less equal in the latter. Second, we have the ‘functional distribu-
tion effect’ in the ‘commercialized’ sector (the income accruing to the agricul-
tural sector is best treated as mixed income comprising returns to both labor and
capital in family farms). An increase in the share of wages will typically
increase equality. Before the ‘turning point’ in the labor market in the Lewis
sense, the unlimited supply of labor at constant wages should induce techno-
logical change in labor-using direction and should prevent any increase in
technology in a capital-deepening way that shifts the functional distribution
towards capital. But after the ‘commercialization point’ in the labor-surplus
economy the trend in the functional distribution of income depends on the nature
of technical progress. Thus we have the third element in the dynamics: the
‘innovation-intensity effect’ that might be sufficiently biased against labor to
decrease the share of labor over time and tend to increase inequality. The course
of inequality through time depends on the relative strength of all these three
effects. In fact the ‘innovation-intensity effect’ depressing the share of wages in
the commercialized sector might not be delayed till after the ‘turning point’ as
suggested by Ranis and Fei, but might already be working in a labor-saving way
if entrepreneurs in the commercialized sector choose to adopt imported capital-
using technology for a variety of reasons.
The Kuznets hypothesis of the U-shaped pattern of inequality dynamics
follows from a theory embodying the above three elements. In the early adages
of development the reallocation effect is strong and the share of labor also
might, fall inducing a rising inequality. The trend is reversed when the realloca-
tion effect weakens and the rise in wages overwhelms any effect coming from
continuing bias towards capital-using technological progress.
Since the reallocation effect shifts labor from the low-income sector, the pre-
diction is that in the early stages of the Kuznets process poverty should decline
but inequality has an upward trend. We draw particular attention to this predic-
tion because this is the trend we see in a number of developing countries in
recent development history – including China and India.
Labor with different skill-levels
The basic model: skilled and unskilled labor
The economic literature in the last decade has paid a great deal of attention to
the reason for rising wage inequality in a number of developed countries
(including the USA). A feature of the increase in inequality has been the sharp
rise of wages of ‘skilled’ workers relative to the ‘unskilled’. The reversal of the
trend towards narrowing wage differentials, which had been going on for much
of the twentieth century, coincided with the increase in the share of manufac-
tured exports going from the developing countries to USA and Japan in particu-
lar. It was natural for a number of US economists to jump to the conclusion that
the critical role in this phenomenon was being played by the increase in imports
of labor-intensive goods. A well-know theorem within the framework of the
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Heckscher–Ohlin model states that when trade is opened up, since each country
tends to export the commodity using the more abundant factor, the relative price
of the more abundant factor in each country will tend to increase. In developed
countries, which shift to more skill-intensive products, the relative price of
skilled labor would increase. The corollary of this proposition is that in develop-
ing countries the opposite will happen – the wages of unskilled labor would
increase relative to those of the skilled, and wage inequality could be expected
to fall.
The last corollary is less persuasive than would appear at first sight. The
assumption of a homogeneous labor market, which transmits the impulses origi-
nating in the tradable manufacturing sector throughout the economy-wide labor
market, even if partially acceptable in a developed economy, is wide of the mark
in developing countries. The manufactured exports from developing countries
originate in the formal sector. The extent to which this sub-sector is linked to the
informal manufacturing sector varies from country to country, and in any case it
is a small part of the labor market properly considered, which is dominated by
the self-employed. We will come back to this point later on. But for the moment
let us confine ourselves to some additions to the model as it is applied to the
wage-labor market.
Extensions of the model: technological progress
THE DEVELOPED-COUNTRY SCENARIO
The static Heckscher–Ohlin theory is formulated in static terms with trade
impacting the economy with an unchanged production function. But the recent
decades have seen not only a great deal of technological progress, but of such
progress being biased towards skilled labor.
Apart from considerations based on general observations, economists have
noted that all explanations of rising wage inequality in the ‘North’ ‘leave unex-
plained the rising skill intensity in non-traded goods as traded goods sector. In
spite of having to pay more for skilled workers, employers in almost all sectors
(traded as well as non-traded goods) chose to hire more skilled workers’
(Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997, p. 649). ‘Only technological change is consis-
tent with rising skill intensity in the face of rising skill prices’ (ibid., p. 650).
Daron Acemoglu (2002) has recently surveyed the vast literature on the tech-
nical progress and rising wage inequality in the North. The broad facts are clear.
While the past 60 years have seen a vast increase in the supply of more educated
and skilled workers, the returns to education in the U.S. among other countries
fell during the seventies, but have begun a steep rise during the 1980s. This styl-
ized fact is consistent with either a slowing down of the rate of increase of the
supply of more skilled workers with a constant pace of technological progress,
or alternatively with an accelerated pace of skill-intensive technical progress
since the 1980s. It might indeed be a combination of supply and demand side
factors.
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Acemoglu hypothesizes that technical change is to a very large extent
induced by factor market conditions. In the nineteenth century when the North
had a plentiful supply of unskilled labor, technical change (e.g., during the
industrial revolution) was directed to saving the use of skilled labor. With the
rapid growth of education, the supply of skilled labor took a jump in its rate of
growth, and the inducement for technical progress shifted towards saving the use
of unskilled labor. The skill premium could be held in check as long as the pace
of technical progress did not exceed that of the growth of skilled labor. But it is
to be expected that with the vast growth of educated labor, its rate of growth in
the North had to slow down. In fact, it is possible that the large expansion of
international trade might have been a factor in increasing the pace of skill-biased
technical progress. As the basic trade model noted, expansion of exports of skill-
intensive products from the North tend to increase the relative price of such
goods, leading to a search for technology biased towards increasing the produc-
tivity in such industries.
THE DEVELOPING-COUNTRY SCENARIO
What have these developments in the North got to do with wage-inequality
trends in the South – the developing countries? The availability of a large pool
of unskilled labor could be expected to promote technological progress that will
economize on the use of skilled labor, as in the nineteenth century North. But
there are several important factors which might suggest why this has not hap-
pened as a widespread phenomenon. 
First, and foremost, it is clear from recent economic history that R&D expen-
diture is heavily concentrated in the North, and it seems to have the highest pay-
off in the advanced economies. Thus a more plausible scenario is that, rather than
each country and region developing its own technology, new technology is
developed in the leading economies of the North and spreads across countries.
Second, we need to emphasize that the techniques of production are not
determined only by the relative supplies of different types of labor, but also by
the quality of product which the market accepts. It has been noted in the liter-
ature that techniques which make use of less capital and less skilled labor often
produce a final product which has attributes catering to the demand of low
income consumers (Little et al. 1987, chapter 13). When a developing country
enters export markets in a big way, the final consumer is located in the affluent
North, and the technique of production has to be geared to producing items with
superior attributes in the quality spectrum. Often these superior quality ranges
would need more mechanized techniques with more skill-intensive labor. The
point is reinforced by the need to achieve timeliness and homogeneous quality in
the batches exported.
Third, it is useful to think in terms of different stages of production for the
market. The stage of physical production might indeed be allocated to dis-
persed units using techniques which make use of labor of the type that is in
plentiful supply (of low or traditional skills), but these have to be integrated
8 Introduction
with organizational, financial and marketing units to be able to supply the
export market effectively. The garment industry, which has played such an
important role in the export expansion from the South in recent decades, is a
case in point. The tertiary activities needed in this export activity often use
labor of high or non-traditional skills, which might be in short supply.
Fourth, the last point brings into focus an important part of the story of export
expansion from the South. This is the role of outsourcing. Feenstra and Hanson
(1999) among others have emphasized that the change in the degree of inequal-
ity or the relative wage of unskilled to skilled labor should be analyzed in terms
of a foreign outsourcing model, which emphasizes trade in intermediate prod-
ucts, and not exclusively in terms of trade in final products which the H–O
model stresses. The production of a final manufactured good can be broken
down into several stages which can be arranged in ascending order of the skill
intensity of the activity. Outsourcing from the developed country means that the
some of the lower ranges of skill intensity in this chain are shifted out to devel-
oping countries. But these activities which are shifted, although they are of relat-
ively low skill intensity in the North, are relatively in the higher rung of skill
intensity in the South. The net effect of the outsourcing is then to reduce the rel-
ative demand for less skilled workers in the North, but to increase the demand
for more skilled workers in the South. Thus while we can expect the skill
premium in the North to increase, wage inequality in the South would also tend
to increase, contrary to the predictions of the simple H–O model. This kind of
outsourcing effect will, of course, be particularly important when the increase in
manufactured exports from the South is being driven by direct investment by
Northern businesses.
Extensions of the model: several grades of skill
Another dose of realism could be added to the basic H–O model by extending the
model to accommodate more than just two types of labor – skilled and unskilled,
with the former being complementary to capital in twentieth century technology.
Adrian Wood (1994) makes a distinction between at least three types of labor:
labor without any modern industrial skill – ‘raw labor’ which is found in agricul-
ture or low services, but not adapted to work in modern factories or businesses;
labor with some basic skills for factory work; and labor with higher skills to
perform more complicated tasks in the modern sector. Wood believes education
is the basis of this classification – he calls the first category NO-ED, the second
BAS-ED (those with at least primary or low-secondary education) and SKILD
(with higher levels of education) the third category of labor. But the distinction
need not be defined by levels by schooling alone. It is known that a significant
wage gap exists in favor of labor of low skill in the ‘modern’ sector even in the
face of plentiful supply of labor in the traditional sector (see the section below on
‘segmented labor markets’). Wage inequality within the large-scale industrial
sector might be squeezed but the over-all wage inequality increases because of
the wage of BAS-ED labor increasing relative to that of NO-ED labor.
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Even this limited prediction might be thwarted, if technological progress is
skill-biased as discussed above, or alternatively, if we introduce factors of pro-
duction other than labor and capital. Another strand in Wood’s set of hypotheses
is that factors of production in addition to labor and capital are critical in the
comparative advantage of an economy – most notably land and the availability
of natural resources. Countries with relatively large endowments of natural
resources will tend to export more land-intensive products, while those with a
shortage of such resources will tilt towards more manufactured activities. But
the land-intensive primary products lead into processing industries which use
less skilled labor than other industrial products. Thus expansion of industrial
exports in land-abundant countries ceteris paribus would tend to dampen wage
inequality, and to increase it in resource-poor economies. This is, of course, only
the demand side of the story. The final outcome depends on the relative supply
of educated or skilled labor over time – which is to large extent the result of
autonomous state policies.
Extensions of the model: shifting boundary of the non-traded sector
In the original discussions of the H–O model there was an implicit assumption
that the boundary between the traded and non-traded sectors coincided with that
between the manufacturing and the tertiary sector. (For some theorists the
implicit assumption was extended further to the distinction coinciding with that
between the formal (modern) and informal (traditional) sectors.) Recent devel-
opments in the world economy have made this distinction quite unrealistic. For
one thing, the services sector has emerged as a major exporter. Second, some
products of the non-traded service sector are in close relationship to the traded
sector.
Liberalization of the external sector, including devaluation which might
accompany it, increases the relative price of traded goods and pushes more
resources into the traded sector. But two other effects need to be considered. The
first is that some non-traded goods might be complementary to the export sector.
Such for instance might be infrastructure, including transport and some support-
ing services. An increase in the developing countries’ exports, even if they are
more low-skill intensive than the exports from developed countries, induces
complementary expansion of infrastructure which is more skill intensive. Thus
the net impact on the demand for labor of different skill levels is uncertain.
Second, we should allow for substitution on the consumption side. Consider a
developing country with abundant supply of unskilled labor, in which low skill
services are close substitutes for the more skill-intensive traded goods (e.g.,
washing machines). Liberalization reduces the relative price of the latter, leading
to a lower demand for low-grade services, and hence a lower demand for low-
skill labor, which might offset the increase in demand for such labor induced by
the expansion of labor-intensive exports.
The upshot of this discussion is that when the basic trade model is extended
by successive doses of realism no definitive prediction about the movements of
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relative prices of skill, and hence the direction of change in the degree of wage
inequality, is possible. This is not to say that empirical analysis would not yield
patterns which are uniform over sets of countries or regions. Some work which
has been done already has contained the intriguing suggestion that greater open-
ness has decreased wage inequality in East Asian experience in the seventies in
the expected way of the simple model, but that in several Latin American coun-
tries the opposite has been the case in the eighties. Commenting on this possible
generalization, Wood (1997, p. 47) offers a hypothesis apparently based on a
suggestion by Jeffrey Sachs: 
It might be the case that all manufactures were import substitutes in Latin
America, but only skill-intensive manufactures were import substitutes in
East Asia. In that case, non-traded sectors (of a given skill intensity) might
be more skill-intensive than import-competing sectors in Latin America and
less skill-intensive than import competing sectors in East Asia. Hence, if
greater openness (through substitution in consumption) caused non non-
traded as well as export sectors to expand (and import-competing sectors to
contract), the net effect might be to increase the relative demand for skilled
labor in Latin America, but to decrease it in East Asia.
Education policies and the supply of skilled labor
While the evolution of the demand for skilled labor is important, countries
differ enormously in the way the formal educational system develops over time.
Even if skill formation is heavily influenced by on-the-job training, basic
formal education is a critical variable. The impact of education on wage
inequality has two different effects. The growth of educated population has a
‘compositional effect’ which yields an inverted U-shaped pattern à La Kuznets.
Until a certain proportion of the population belongs to the more educated (and
higher wage) groups, an increase in the proportion of the latter will increase
inequality, but after the critical point is passed inequality falls as a larger pro-
portion already belongs to the high wage group. The rising inequality in the
earlier part of this process will be moderated if the rate of return to education
does not increase, and a fall in the returns of sufficient magnitude will in fact
reduce inequality. The latter possibility in fact turns on the supply of educated
labor running ahead of the inversing demand as the modern sector develops. It
has been noted in the literature that the decrease in wage inequality in Korea
and Taiwan during their process of export-led industrialization could be traced
in large measures to the prior investment in secondary education (see, for
example, Gindling and Sun on Taiwan, and Fields and Yoo on Korea). The
experience in these East Asian economies contrasts strongly with the develop-
ment in Thailand, where post-primary education was neglected till the nineties.
Thus over the period 1976–1988, Thailand had a strong upward trend in the
inequality index as the export-led boom of the latter eighties put strong pressure




The discussion so far has concentrated on the wage-labor market, and for the
most part on labor markets differentiated by levels of measurable skills (e.g.,
education). But in developing countries much of the labor force is self-
employed. Even within the wage-labor market discussions in the mainstream
literature are generally concentrated on the formal part of the market – which
typically excludes the small and micro sectors, if only because the informal
sector is poorly served by regular statistical surveys on wages. If labor markets
were reasonably homogeneous, trends in the formal wage-labor market would
indicate trends in other parts of the labor market as well. But typically labor
markets in such economies are segmented. Labor with the same measurable
human capital earns significantly different incomes in different segments of the
market. The trends in earnings might also diverge as between the different seg-
ments of the market.1
A schematic picture of the labor market in a developing country looks like
Table 1.4 (A and B refer to the formal and the informal sectors respectively).
There are large gaps in the levels of earnings between the segments of the labor
market shown in the table. These gaps persist even after we have controlled for
measurable human capital differences between the workers found in the different
Table 1.4 A schematic picture of the labor market in developing countries
Urban Rural
UA. The formal sector: RA. The formal sector:
1 Public-sector employees 1 Public-sector employees
2 Employees in private large enterprises 2 Regular (round-the-year) workers in 
larger farms, plantations or non-
agricultural enterprises
UB. The informal sector: RB. The small-scale farm sector:
1 Wage labor in small firms 1 Wage workers, daily and round-the-year
2 Self-employed workers 2 Self-employed: owners and tenants
(outside the professions) 3 Part-time workers in non-farm sector
3 Casual wage workers
RC. Non-agriculture:
1 Self-employed
2 Casual wage employees
Notes
i The urban informal sector is generally demarcated by somewhat arbitrary, but not unreasonable
statistical criteria. For example UB1 is defined as enterprises employing less than five workers or
those not covered by the official Industrial Census of the large-scale sector. UB2 excludes those
with more than middle secondary education.
ii In the rural labor market there is widespread prevalence of multiple occupations. Thus the distinc-
tion between RB3 and RC (1 and 2) has to be fixed arbitrarily in statistical sense. Usually workers
in the farm sector receive some of their income from the farm activities, and some from the non-
agricultural sector. If the proportion of the latter exceeds 50 percent they are placed in the non-
agricultural sector.
sectors. The extent of the earnings differences would of course vary from country
to country, and one of the tasks of country studies would be to quantify the more
important of the wage gaps.
The impact of liberalization or other aspects of globalization on the over-all
distribution of income would depend on:
a the distribution of labor between the different segments and the way it
changes in response to the developments in the external sector;
b the direction and extent of the changes in the inter-sectoral wage gaps (dif-
ferences in mean earnings) over time; and
c the change in the distribution of earnings within each sector.
First, the observed levels of employment and earnings in each segment of the
stylized classification given above are the product of the intersection of demand
and supply curves of labor in that segment. Thus one should be aware that
factors affecting the derived demand for labor, as well as the supply conditions
of labor, would be instrumental in affecting the outcomes in the segment.
Second, it should be apparent that the movements of these variables over time
would be influenced, not only by the way markets for labor of different skills
behave over time, but also by the working of the markets of co-operant factors,
particularly land and capital. Thus the earnings of the self-employed will be
more equally distributed if they are able to accumulate capital more easily over
time. A more restrictive capital market would on the other hand both depress
their mean earnings relative to those in the formal sector, and also perhaps lead
to a more unequal distribution in this sector. For those in the farming sector, the
distribution of land and of the basic inputs like fertilizer and water are of crucial
significance.
Accounting for the earnings difference between the formal and the
informal sectors
The formal–informal sector divide in the labor market cuts through the entire
range of non-agricultural industries – both in the tertiary and secondary
sectors, and in some economies even in agriculture where there is a large con-
centration of large Farms or plantations. In view of the importance of this phe-
nomenon it might be useful to review the various hypotheses accounting for
the gap in the levels of earnings between the two. In general these hypotheses
are not mutually exclusive. They might co-exist in different degrees in any
particular economy.
The institutional hypothesis 
An important strand in the literature has asserted that labor in the formal sector is
‘protected’ in the sense that its wage level cannot be undercut by competition
from outside labor. This type of ‘protection’ might be supported by institutions
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like labor laws or trade unions working independently or working hand-in-hand
with the state’s labor-regulatory framework. In this case, in so far as wage levels
are significantly above alternative earnings outside, entry into the sector is rationed.
There is an elastic supply of job seekers but only a fraction can be admitted.
The wage–efficiency hypothesis
The literature has recognized for sometime that the wage–efficiency relationship
sets a floor to the wage rate in the formal sector. The most straightforward
version is the nutritional one. Efficiency increases with the level of wages
because better-fed workers are able to work harder. Thus no employer with a
stable body of workers will offer a wage below a level at which efficiency
decreases proportionately more than wages. Such a floor to wages is undermined
in the informal sector because of a number of factors which include: (i) casual
labor without attachment to specific employers; and (ii) self-employment
working from households in which earnings of different working members are
pooled together. Further, if we do not interpret the wage–efficiency relationship
strictly in nutritional terms it will vary with the type of work, quality of
machinery used and of goods produced, and the organization of labor. In fact it
may become a hazy notion depending very much on the perception of employ-
ers. Large formal-sector employers, wary of possible labor unrest or adverse
laws protecting job security, might opt for a labor system in which a small elite
body of workers produces at a high rate of efficiency in exchange for stable
employment at high wages. In any event a significant difference in wage per
man is established between the formal and the informal sector although the dif-
ference in wage cost per efficiency unit of labor might not be that large. The
extent of the differential clearly depends on the quality of labor supplied in the
market as well as the institutional setting of the formal labor market.
How does this set of factors affecting the wage differential with respect to the
informal sector relate to the discussion above about the skill/education related
differentials? The mechanism discussed here in fact establishes a higher wage in
the formal sector for all levels of education/skill. This does not, however, mean
that formal-sector employers would not use education as a screening or signal-
ing device for the selection of their workforce. If this happens we might find
that the educational distribution of the workforce in the formal sector is much
more skewed to the higher groups than in the informal. In addition to the
wage–efficiency mechanism it would be a supplementary influence enhancing
the premium enjoyed by skilled workers in the formal sector.
Constraints in the supply of co-operant factors in the informal sector
As indicated the self-employed constitute a major component of the workforce in
the informal sector. Their earnings are in the nature of mixed income, consisting
of returns to labor as well as to the co-operant factors used, principally capital
(perhaps more of working than fixed capital). It is well known that credit
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constraints are more severe for the players in the informal sector. Thus the
earnings profile in this sector would be critically influenced by the supply function
of capital in this sector. It would affect not only the level but the shape of the
earnings distribution in the informal sector. The differential with respect to formal-
sector earnings is likely to be different for different parts of the distribution – and
would also vary from country to country depending on the severity of the credit
constraint in this sector.
Regional differences in earnings and employment
In recent work on post-reform developments spatial differences have come to
the forefront of discussions. In fact the basic problem of uneven economic
growth spatially is in some sense the heart of the subject of development eco-
nomics. Post-reform developments in the rapidly growing economies like China
have drawn renewed attention to the problem. Globalization is heavily directed
in the first place to limited areas where producer links to external markets can be
most advantageously established and entrepreneurs can exploit important exter-
nal economies of scale. In fact the concern about unequal development exists
equally in a relatively closed economy where major innovations might favor
some regions more than others in a cumulative way – as might have happened in
the spread of the green revolution in Indian agriculture.
It would be wrong to assume that processes of economic growth necessarily
worsen inter-regional inequality. Even if the growth process is concentrated in
some regions or enclaves to begin with, rising costs and links to other internal
markets can and do produce incentives for producers to diversify to other areas.
The net outcome in the dynamic process depends on the relative strength of
these centrifugal forces and the process of cumulative causation favoring
increased localization.
Plan of the work
The brief review of some of the more important theoretical ideas in the last
section provides a background to the empirical investigation of the impact of the
reform process and globalization on labor markets, poverty and inequality in
India. The major data sources of the data utilized are the ‘Thick’ rounds of the
National Sample Survey (NSS) which are conducted every five years. The latest
round available for analysis is the 55th round for 1999–2000. At the time of the
completion of this work the subsequent ‘thick’ round for 2004–2005 is not avail-
able for analysis with the unit-level records. But we are able to indicate some
broad trends form the published reports issued by the NSS on a limited set of
tabulations. This is done in the Epilogue. For the most part the bulk of the work
relates to the period ending at the close of the last century.
The book is in four parts. Part I discusses the broad trends for the economy as
a whole. Part II focuses on differences between major states and ‘broad regions’
of the country. Part III carries the analysis to the major sectors – agriculture,
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manufacturing and the tertiary industries. Part IV discusses issues in labor
institutions – both in the formal and the informal sectors.
The analysis for All-India begins with the changes in the incidence of
poverty – contrasting in particular the trends in the pre-reform years between
the two thick rounds of the NSS before the 55th, and the post-reform period
between 1993/1994 and 1999–2000. We discuss, within the framework of a
decomposition model, the relative importance of rural–urban shift of labor,
growth of the two sectors of the economy and changes in inequality within
each. The varying experiences of the urban areas of different population-size
groups as well as of the major states in the process are also discussed.
Chapter 3 presents the basic trends in employment and earnings over the
period covered, contrasting the post-reform years with the previous periods. It
goes on to document the emerging trends in inequality, both for wage earners
and all wage- and non-wage-earning households together. We also document the
increase in ‘rural–urban dualism’ in the post-reform years, which had already
been suggested by the poverty analysis of Chapter 2.
Part II turns to the analysis of regional differences. This topic is of vital inter-
est in a large country like India. We can do this regional analysis in two ways.
First, we can look at differences between major states. This is important because
states are political units with a good deal of autonomy in the implementation of
economic policies. They are, however, not homogeneous areas in terms of agro-
ecological areas. The latter are of great importance in Indian conditions as they
have significant impact on productivity and incomes in the large agricultural
sector in particular. From this point of view, working with NSS regions which
are more homogeneous in character would seem to be more pertinent. We
pursue the analysis at both levels. Chapter 5 is a contribution to the analysis of
inter-state differences in labor-market outcomes. In the following chapter we
work with NSS regions and look at differences in rural poverty in particular.
Since the number of NSS regions is large, an attempt is to group them into seven
‘broad regions’ defined in terms of agro-economic conditions and geographical
contiguity. This attempt at the analysis of rural poverty in terms of grouped NSS
regions is, we believe, the first such attempt at regional analysis, and will
undoubtedly be improved upon by other researchers.
Part III of the book shifts attention to individual industrial sectors of
the economy. The problem of labor absorption at reasonable levels of earnings
in agriculture is discussed in Chapter 7. Two important questions related to the
performance of the agricultural sector are also addressed. The first is the rela-
tionship of agricultural productivity to off-farm activities; and the second is
the trends in household welfare of different classes of farmers, especially in the
post-reform period. The unit-level data available from the NSS are analyzed to
throw light on these major issues. The last three chapters in Part III are on the
performance in the non-agriculture sector. Chapter 8 is a detailed analysis of the
low elasticity of employment with respect to output in the formal manufacturing
sector. The fact that the (relatively) high productivity formal sector has been
able to create only a low rate of employment growth, in spite of the fairly high
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rate of output growth, has meant that labor going into the manufacturing sector
has been largely absorbed in the low-productivity informal sector. Chapter 9 in
fact shows that the developments in Indian manufacturing have been somewhat
more complicated than that. Apart from the labor absorption in the truly infor-
mal sector – consisting of household enterprises employing none or only a few
hired workers, employment has been disproportionately concentrated at the
small end of the formal sector, in units employing 6–9 workers (the so-called
DME sector). The bi-modal distribution of employment in Indian manufacturing
(with concentration at the smallest and the highest size-groups) has given rise to
the problem of dualism in Indian manufacturing. This issue is discussed in detail
in Chapter 9 – where we analyze the adverse impact of the phenomenon of the
‘missing middle’ on healthy manufacturing growth, and also the causes leading
to its origin and persistence. Chapter 10 takes on the tertiary sector which has
been the major source of labor absorption from agriculture.
In the last part of the book – Part IV – labor-market institutions are studied. A
critical evaluation of labor laws affecting the formal sector is followed by a
review of on-going initiatives to tackle the difficult question of state intervention
to improve the conditions of the large numbers of workers eking out a living in
India’s informal sector.
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2 Poverty, growth and inequality in
the pre- and post-reform periods
and the patterns of urbanization
in India
An analysis for all-India and the major
states
This chapter1 attempts to assess the impact of the economic reforms (including
liberalization) on the incidence of poverty in India. It does so by comparing the
changes over the period 1993–1994 to 1999–2000 with the course of poverty
decline in the previous quinquennial 1987–1988 to 1993–1994. These are the
two periods covered by the six yearly (‘thick’) rounds of the National Sample
Survey (NSS) household expenditure surveys.
A number of researchers have already worked on these particular data sets.
Major contributions have been published by Sundaram and Tendulkar (2000,
2001 and 2003) and by Deaton and Dreze (2002). Our work builds on and
extends these important pieces of research.
In the first section of the chapter we outline the methodology of decomposition
changes in the incidence of poverty used elsewhere by Mazumdar and Son (2002).
It seeks to quantify the components of the change between any two periods
between those due to growth in mean income (or expenditure), those due to distrib-
ution of income, and those due to a shift of population between sectors of the labor
market (e.g., the rural and the urban sectors). The first section also undertakes a
reassessment of the data on measured poverty for the NSS rounds in question. As
is well known from the work referred to above, there are two important issues in
the empirical use of the NSS data. First, we have the problem of the correct assess-
ment of the poverty line for different sectors, dates and regions of India. Second,
we have the problem of comparability of the measured household expenditure per
capita over time due to some changes in the recall period in the successive NSS
surveys. In the first section we extend the Deaton and Dreze method of assessing
the poverty lines, and the Sundaram–Tendulkar approach to deriving consistent
estimates of the average per capita expenditure (APCE) of households at different
dates. New estimates of the incidence of poverty are presented.
The second section discusses the main results for all-India. An important
extension to previous work is the explicit distinction made in the analysis
between metro and non-metro towns.
The third section contains a detailed analysis of the state-level data, and some
progress is made in the unraveling of critical inter-state differences in the
changes in the incidence of poverty over the periods studied.
The final section presents the major conclusions of the work.
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The decomposition of poverty
The conventional method of understanding the dynamism of changes in poverty
is done through various inequality measures including that of Lorenz curve and
various Entropy measures. The decomposition exercise undertaken here does not
require us to specify an inequality measure. It uses an idea of shift in that part of
the Lorenz curve, which affects the poor.
A brief exposition of decomposition methodology
To get better understanding about dynamics of changes in poverty, the change in
the incidence of poverty can be broken down into three elements: (i) any shift in
population between the different segments with different degrees of poverty;
(ii) the growth in income in each of the segments; and (iii) the change in the
distribution of income, particularly at the lower end where the poor households
are located. The methodology of such decomposition is set out in Appendix 1.
To summarize the result, the percentage change in poverty for the whole
economy can be expressed as:
= Growth Effect + Inequality Effect + Population Shift (1)
where fi and Pi are the population share and poverty index of the ith group
respectively;
the subscript m denotes the change in poverty due to mean income growth and
the subscript I gives the measure of poverty change due to change in inequality.
The first term in equation (1) measures the effect of growth within each group
on overall change in the poverty incidence, when the distribution within each
group remains the same over time. This first term can be further decomposed
into two terms:
(2)
The first term on the right-hand side of above equation measures the effect of
growth on percentage change in poverty under the counter-factual that all groups
enjoyed the same uniform growth rates and the second term in the right-hand
side measures the effect of differential growth rates within groups.
So substituting (2) into (1), we get a decomposition that expresses the per-
centage change in the poverty incidence as the sum of four components:






































































(1) overall growth effect when inequality in the distribution does not change;
(2) effect of differential growth rates in different groups; (3) effect of change in
inequality within different groups; and (4) effect of changes in population shares
between groups. This is an exact decomposition and, therefore, there will not be
any residual term.
The database
The database used in this analysis is the ‘consumption expenditure survey’ of
various quinquennial rounds of National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO).2
The purpose of this study is a comparison of the incidence in poverty between
the pre- and post-liberalization periods in India. We have done our analysis
on the basis of the three quinquennial rounds, i.e., 43rd (1987–1988), 50th
(1993–1994) and 55th (1999–2000). We intend to capture the impact of liberal-
ization by comparing the change in poverty for the first period (1987–1988 to
1993–1994) with that in the second period (1993–1994 to 1999–2000). The
decomposition exercise for the Head Count Ratio (HCR), the poverty gap ratio
(PGR) and the squared poverty gap ratio has been carried out for 16 major states
and for all India (16 states combined).
Adjustment made in the database
We have used average monthly per capita consumption expenditure (APCE) as
the proxy for per capital income. However, certain adjustments were made to
APCE for the year 1993–1994. Expenditures of all consumer items of
1987–1988 and 1993–1994 are based on a 30-day recall period, known as
uniform recall period (URP). For 1999–2000, all but five items are based on the
30-day recall period. The expenditures on the five remaining items are based on
365-day recall periods. These items are clothing, footwear, education, institu-
tional medical expenses and consumer durables. So for 1999–2000, the refer-
ence period is known as the mixed reference period (MRP). In the year
1993–1994, for these five consumer items, expenditure data were collected for
both 30-day and 365-day reference period. To make 1993–1994 data compara-
ble with 1999–2000 data we replaced 30-day expenditures of these five items
with 365-day expenditure.3 In this fashion, we could change 1993–1994 URP
(uniform reference period) expenditures into MRP (mixed reference period)
expenditure. A comparison of APCE on these five items by the 30-day and the
365-day reference periods for the year 1993–1994 showed that in both rural and
urban areas the change of the reference period from 30-day to 365-day made
substantial difference largely in clothing.
We could not convert 1987–1988 consumer expenditure data into MRP in a
similar fashion because the expenditure data on the above-mentioned five items
were not collected for both the 30-day and the 365-day reference periods. Hence
the decomposition analysis for changes in poverty for the period 1987–1988 to
1993–1994 (pre-liberalization period) will be based on URP and for the period
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1993–1994 to 1999–2000 will be based on MRP. We will surely lose continuity
of poverty estimates in this fashion but avoiding this important issue would
otherwise lead to an upward bias in the reduction of poverty in the post-liberal-
ization period relative to the pre-liberalization one.
It might be objected that flow expenditure on low-frequency articles like
durables might be reported differently by poor people than by rich consumers for
the two alternative recall periods. In fact experiments performed in the ‘thin’
samples of the 51st to the 54th rounds showed that on the 365-recall period,
lower-income households reported higher annual rates compared to the 30 day
recall method, but richer households had exactly the opposite bias. At the same
time there is an expectation that there has been a large increase on durables affect-
ing all classes. A comparison of the change in APCE based on the 30-day recall as
for the first period might not be strictly comparable to the change in the second
period based on the 365-day recall. One might be missing less at the mean in the
first change than in the second change.4 An examination of the detailed data on
consumption by items and income groups, however, showed that the major dif-
ference for poorer groups in the reported expenditure by the two recall periods was
in clothing, not in all durables. In the lowest eight income groups, ranging up to
the 35–40 fractile, in the 1993–1994 (50th round) survey, the highest difference
was Rs.2.5 for durables compared with Rs.17.25 for clothing (the full data are
given in Mazumdar and Sarkar 2004). Thus the income-related bias in reported
flow of expenditure on durables might not quantitatively of great importance in the
two periods of comparison with different recall periods.
Choice of poverty line
In choosing the poverty line we deliberately did not choose the official poverty
line as given by the Planning Commission of India. Historically, the rural–urban
price differential as incorporated in the official poverty lines at all-India level
was around 15 percent level. But the 1993 Expert Group Report recommended
separate rates for each state (based on studies of interstate price differentials)
and did not explicitly consider the urban to rural differentials. As a result, in
1999–2000, the urban to rural differential implicit in the official lines was
around 39 percent and it is astonishingly large for some states (Deaton 2003).
The effect of the adoption of the Expert Group lines was to raise measured
poverty in urban relative to rural areas. The poverty-line figures, by state and
sector, are calculated by using the Tornqvist price index presented by Deaton
(2003).5
Following Deaton’s procedure, the starting point for calculation of poverty
indexes is the official rural all-India poverty line for the 43rd round, 1987–1988.
The figure is Rs.115.7 per capita per month. First, rural poverty lines for states
are obtained by multiplying this base poverty line by rural price indexes for
each state relative to all India. Urban poverty lines, for each state as well as for
all-India, are calculated from the rural poverty lines by scaling up by the respec-
tive urban relative to rural price indexes.
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Similarly, for the 50th round (1993–1994), the all-India rural poverty line of
115.7 of the 43rd round is scaled up by the index for all-India rural for the 50th
round relative to the 43rd round. The figure thus calculated is 196.5. Rural
poverty lines for states are obtained by multiplying this base poverty line by
rural price indexes for each state relative to all-India. Urban poverty lines, for
each state as well as all-India, are calculated from rural poverty lines by scaling
up by the respective urban relative to rural price indexes (see Mazumdar and
Sarkar 2004 for the table of poverty lines by states and rural–urban location).
Results for all-India
We first discuss the pattern of poverty decline in the two periods for the whole
of India – based on the new figures for the 16 states considered. The results for
the decomposition analysis are presented in Table 2.1.
According to our estimates the head-count ratio (HCR) was reduced at a per-
ceptibly higher rate in the more recent period – the decline was about 20 percent
higher. This apparent acceleration is, however, largely due to the smaller base of
the HCR at the beginning of the second period. The absolute decline in HCR
was 6.3 percentage points in 1987–1993 and 5.3 in the 1993–2000 periods. Thus
our figures support the conclusion of Deaton and Dreze that ‘poverty decline has
been fairly evenly spread between the two sub-periods (before and after
1993–1994) in contrast with the pattern of acceleration in the second sub-period
associated with the official estimates’ (p. 3734).
Growth of mean consumption accelerated in the second period, and played a
larger role in the poverty reduction in this period. It can be seen that the inequal-
ity effect overall (i.e., taking the rural and urban areas together) continued to
play a contributory role to poverty reduction, but the share of this factor in the
reduction was much reduced.
Important changes, however, emerged in the relative importance of the rural
and the urban areas in the process of poverty reduction. The share of the urban
areas in the overall poverty decline increased in the later period (from 12 percent
Table 2.1 Decomposition of poverty change of HCR in rural and urban areas of India
Uniform Differential Mean Inequality Population Total
growth growth growth shift
India (1987–1988 to 1993–1994)
Rural –10.67 0.85 –9.82 –3.54 –2.21 –15.57
Urban –2.39 –0.45 –2.84 –0.41 1.27 –1.83
Total –13.06 0.40 –12.66 –3.95 –0.94 –17.40
India (1993–1994 to 1999–2000)
Rural –18.83 6.62 –12.21 –4.69 –0.37 –17.27
Urban –4.35 –2.15 –6.50 1.66 0.19 –4.65
Total –23.18 4.47 –18.71 –3.03 –0.18 –21.92
Source: Unit-level data of consumption schedules of 43rd, 50th and 55th rounds of NSS.
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of the total percentage decline to 21 percent). This bigger role of the urban
sector in poverty decline was, however, not due to accelerated population shift
to the urban sector. In fact, the ‘population shift’ effect, while playing a minor
role in both periods, actually decreased significantly in the 1993–2000 period.
The crucial element was the higher growth rate in the urban sector. Both the
sectors increased the rate of mean growth, but it can be seen from the third
column of Table 2.1 that the differential effect of growth rates reduced the inci-
dence of poverty significantly in the urban areas, but increased it in the rural
areas. If the latter had grown at the same rate as the rest of the economy, poverty
reduction in the 1993–2000 periods would have been 30 percent higher.
The impact of the differential growth rate was balanced to some extent by the
impact of changes in inequality in the two sectors. While inequality (in the rele-
vant range of the Lorenz curve) decreased in the rural sector, it deteriorated
somewhat in the urban sector, thus canceling out some of the poverty-reduction
effect of the differential growth in the sector. But the inequality effects were not
as strong as the differential growth effect. This explains the larger role of the
urban areas in poverty reduction in this period.
Elasticity of poverty decline and the poverty gap ratio
We have seen that both the growth rate of mean consumption and the rate of
decline in the headcount ratio of poverty accelerated in the second period of our
study. The elasticity of the change in HCR with respect to the growth in con-
sumption is of interest. Table 2.2 shows the numbers for the two periods. The
values of the elasticity in the rural and urban areas are very close together. In
both sectors there has been a significant fall in the elasticity in the post-reform
period. The results of the decomposition analysis given in Table 2.1 suggest
that the reasons for this decline are different in the two sectors. In the rural
economy the inequality effect increased its negative value, suggesting that
ceteris paribus the effect on HCR of growth would be strengthened. But there
was a significant fall in the shift of the labor force out of this sector, which
weakened the impact on poverty. By contrast the urban areas – where the change
in HCR benefited from the fall in the intake of labor – suffered from an adverse
distributional effect.
The HCR of course only measures the number of people below the poverty
line, and does not take account of the economic distance of the poor from the
poverty line. This is addressed in the group of measures called the ‘poverty gap
ratio’ (PGR) and its variants. Table 2.3 shows the values of the elasticity of
Table 2.2 Elasticity of head-count ratio with respect to mean consumption growth
Period Rural Urban
1987–1988 to 1993–1994 –3.41 –3.49
1993–1994 to 1999–2000 –2.52 –2.58
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PGR with respect to mean consumption growth in the two periods. It is seen
that the elasticity of the PGR with respect to growth is much higher than that of
the HCR in both periods and both sectors. This partly reflects the fact that the
absolute value of the initial PGR is much lower than that of the HCR. But it
also draws attention to the substantive point that the growth process has
affected people further below the poverty line strongly – not just those slightly
below the threshold.
A second interesting point to note is that as with the HCR the elasticity of
PGR fell in the second period in both sectors. However, the decline in elasticity
in case of PGR seems to have been much stronger in the rural areas suggesting
that the poorest of poor were worse hit.
Table 2.4 gives the results for the decomposition analysis for the poverty gap
measure. The different components of the poverty reduction appear to behave in
much the same way for this measure as for the HCR. As already pointed out the
percentage decrease in PGR is larger than in the HCR, but qualitatively the role
of all three components of poverty decline is the same in the two cases. In the
post-reform period the role of population shift is much reduced. The urban areas
gain in the strength of the growth effect, but inequality increases, offsetting the
effect of growth to some extent. The relative slowdown in growth in the rural
sector is partly countered by a favorable inequality effect.
There are differences in the relative magnitudes of the various effects. One
interesting difference is that in the recent period the inequality effect on the PGR
seems to be stronger than on the HCR in the rural areas, but the other way round
Table 2.3 Elasticity of poverty-gap ratio with respect to mean consumption growth
Period Rural Urban
1987–1988 to 1993–1994 –5.33 –4.14
1993–1994 to 1999–2000 –3.21 –3.47
Table 2.4 Decomposition of change in poverty-gap ratio in rural and urban areas
Uniform Differential Mean Inequality Population Total
growth growth growth shift
India (1987–1988 to 1993–1994)
Rural –14.05 1.37 –12.68 –7.67 –2.14 –22.49
Urban –2.72 –0.53 –3.23 –0.23 1.15 –2.32
Total –16.77 0.84 –15.91 –7.90 –0.99 –24.81
India (1993–1994 to 1999–2000)
Rural –23.23 8.26 –14.98 –7.83 –0.35 –23.17
Urban –4.74 –2.48 –7.23 1.15 0.19 –5.90
Total –27.97 5.78 –22.21 –6.68 –0.16 –29.07
Source: Unit-level data of consumption schedules of 43rd, 50th and 55th rounds of NSS.
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in the urban sector. In the rural sector the inequality effect is 38 percent of the
growth effect in the HCR decomposition, but 52 percent in the PGR analysis.
The offsetting effect of increased inequality is, however, weaker for the PGR in
the urban areas (15 percent of the growth effect as against 25 percent for the
HCR decomposition).
We are inclined to agree with the Deaton–Dreze conclusion that very little
additional insight is to be gained from the detailed analysis of the poverty- gap
ratio or its further refinements over and above what we learn from the simple
analysis of the HCR (Table 2.5). In view of this we will make no further refer-
ence to the measures other than HCR in the subsequent discussions.
Metro and other urban areas
An interesting question pertains to the relative importance of metropolitan
(population > one million) and other urban areas in poverty reduction.
The decomposition of HCR was done for metro and other areas separately.
Out of the 16 major states considered for the decomposition analysis, only seven
states had a metro city in the year 1987–1988, ten states in the year 1993–1994
and 11 states in the year 1999–2000. So to maintain uniformity, we analyzed
seven states separately that had a metro city throughout our period of analysis.
However, separate analysis was undertaken for the three states that had a metro
area only since 1993–1994.
The incidence of poverty is as expected higher in the non-metro areas. We
studied changes in the incidence of poverty over the two sub-periods between
1987–1988 and 1993–1994, and 1993–1994 and 1999–2000 and these have
been worked out on the basis of both the URP and the MRP criteria (Mazum-
dar and Sarkar 2004, Table II.3).
For the seven states the decline in poverty incidence in absolute terms does
not differ much between metro and non-metro areas in the 1987–1993 period.
This implies that in proportionate terms the decline is much more in the metro
areas. But the trend seems to have been reversed in the later sub-period.
Table 2.5 Decomposition of change in squared poverty-gap ratio in rural and urban areas
Uniform Differential Mean Inequality Population Total
growth growth growth shift
India (1987–1988 to 1993–1994)
Rural –15.83 1.59 –14.24 –10.94 –2.09 –27.27
Urban –2.83 –0.57 –3.40 –0.05 1.09 –2.36
Total –18.66 1.02 –17.64 –10.99 –1.00 –29.63
India (1993–1994 to 1999–2000)
Rural –25.33 9.06 –16.28 –11.10 –0.35 –27.73
Urban –4.99 –2.55 –7.54 0.47 0.17 –6.90
Total –30.32 6.51 –23.82 –10.63 –0.18 –34.63
Source: Unit-level data of consumption schedules of 43rd, 50th and 55th rounds of NSS.
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The absolute decline is much smaller in the metros as the HCR seemed to be
nearing the floor level, though the difference in percentage terms is not all
that much.
Our decomposition analysis was applied to the data for the metro and the
non-metro areas in the same way that we had done for the rural and the urban
areas as a whole. The results are set out in Table 2.6.
It is seen that a major change in the more recent period was registered by the
non-metro urban sector. Differential growth rate favored poverty reduction in a
more pronounced way in the non-metros. The non-metro sector also suffered
relatively much more from an increase in inequality which seemed to have
affected the urban areas as a whole. Combined with a more positive contribu-
tion from population shift to poverty reduction, almost the entire decrease in
urban HCR in the 1993–2000 period was accounted for by the non-metro
sector.
The urban sector by size classes of towns
For some purposes it might be better to classify the urban sector by more size
classes than just two. We distinguished three sub-groups: towns with a popu-
lation of less than 50,000 (small); those larger than this but with less than ten
lakhs or one million (medium and large); and those more than one million
(metro).
For the country as whole, there is a remarkable difference between the two
periods. For the 1987–1993 period the rate of growth of APCE was directly
related to the size of towns, the largest towns having the highest growth rate.
Accordingly the rate of decline in HCR was also varied directly with the size
groups – and in fact this positive relationship was much stronger. In the post-
Table 2.6 Decomposition of poverty change of HCR in metro and non-metro areas
Uniform Differential Mean Inequality Population Total
growth growth growth shift
India (1987–1988 to 1993–1994) for 7 states
Metro –3.60 –0.60 –4.20 –0.40 0.48 –4.18
Non-metro –16.44 1.54 –14.85 –1.72 –1.05 –17.62
Total –20.04 0.94 –19.05 –2.12 –0.57 –21.80
India (1993–1994 to 1999–2000) for 7 states
Metro –5.73 0.53 –5.20 1.65 3.23 –0.32
Non-metro –29.89 –7.46 –37.35 8.35 –7.14 –36.14
Total –35.62 –6.93 –42.55 10.00 –3.91 –36.46
India (1993–1994 to 1999–2000) for 3 additional states
Metro –3.00 –1.60 –4.57 4.36 –0.15 –0.36
Non-metro –28.60 –9.50 –38.02 3.03 0.29 –34.70
Total –31.60 –11.10 –42.59 7.39 0.14 –35.06
Source: Unit-level data of consumption schedules of 43rd, 50th and 55th rounds of NSS.
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reform years 1993–2000 the relationship has been reversed remarkably. The
reversal again is much more prominently revealed in the variations in the rates
of decline of the HCR. The small towns had a rate of decline 50 percent higher
than the largest group.
This interesting result poses the question: what aspect of the post-reform
growth process has been responsible for this reversal of the fortunes of the small
towns relative to the larger ones? It is possible to hypothesize that the result
might be the consequence of either a strong ‘trickle down’ effect powered by a
decentralization of non-agricultural activities in the urban sector. Alternatively
the smaller towns might have enjoyed a stronger growth rate (and poverty reduc-
tion) in the post-reform years because of the impact of the growth and commer-
cialization of the agricultural economy. It is probable that both influences have
been present in the process observed.
It should be noted that some of the individual states show trends different from
the one just mentioned for all-India. There are, in particular, five states in which
the rate of growth of APCE and HCR are directly related to the size class of
towns – the opposite of the result for India as a whole. These are: Gujarat; Kar-
nataka; Maharashtra; Rajasthan; and Tamil Nadu. As it happens, these are the
states which have been the largest recipients of Foreign Direct Investments. Since
it is well known that FDI goes almost exclusively to metro cities, the hypothesis
suggested strongly is that FDI has given an uplift to the growth rate of metro areas
in those states where it has played a significant role – and that this impact has
raised the growth rate of mean consumption sufficiently induce a higher rate of
poverty decline than would be expected by looking at the average for all-India.
The relevant data on FDI per capita in metros by states are plotted along
with the rate of growth of APCE in the individual states for the 1993–2000
































Growth in APCE 1993–1999 in metro
Figure 2.1 Relationship between FDI and growth rates of APCE in metro areas. 
Note
See full names of different states like WB, MP, AS, etc. in first column of Table 2.8.
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This result suggests that there are two different aspects to the impact of the
post-reform developments including globalization on growth and poverty decline
in the urban metro sector. On the one hand, there has been a distinct trend
towards decentralization of economic activities to smaller towns and cities. This
has led to the inverse relationship between growth and the size of towns observed
in many states and in India as a whole. There are, however, a group of states in
which the role of FDI is strong, and the impact is seen in a high growth rate in
metro areas, so that a direct relationship between growth (and poverty reduction)
and town size is observed. The only exception to this two-way classification of
states is Rajasthan. The inflow of FDI per capita in metros in this state is low, yet
it shares the characteristics of the high FDI states in having a relatively high
growth rate in the larger towns (see Figure 2.1). It is, however, well known that
even if the inflow of FDI is small Rajasthan has participated in the globalization
process strongly through the promotion of international tourism in particular.
The implication of the argument of the last paragraph is that the ‘trickle down’
effect on smaller towns has been more important in the states with a lower level of
international connection. The reform process has encouraged decentralization in
these states. But what about the impulse to growth in small towns coming from the
rural sector? Figure 2.2 plots the growth rate of APCE in small towns (with popu-
lation of less than 50,000 ) against the growth of APCE in rural areas of individual
states. There is indeed a positive relationship, but it is a relatively weak one.
Trends in the rural–urban dualism
An important issue in the development literature is the rural–urban gap in levels
of income (and consumption) and in the incidence of poverty. Post-reform
developments and globalization are sometimes viewed with concern as acting














































Growth of APCE in rural areas
Figure 2.2 Relationship between growths of APCE in small towns and rural areas.
Note
See full names of different states like WB, MP, AS, etc. in first column of Table 2.8.
We tried to throw some light on the variations in the gap between the inci-
dences of poverty between rural and the urban areas across states. The variable to
be explained is the ratio of the HCR in rural areas to that in the urban areas. Since
the rural economy is large in all Indian states, a higher level of development in a
state would generally imply a higher rural APCE. Also, with economic growth
urbanization increases. A little reflection shows that the net impact of both these
variables on the relative rural–urban gap depends on whether or not ‘trickle
down’ is confined to the sector in question, or extends to the other sector. Take
the expected sign of APCE (rural) first. If the impact is largely confined to the
rural sector, then the relative gap would be reduced (the sign would be negative),
but in so far as it reduces the level of the urban poor through higher demand for
urban goods and services, the sign of the variable would be positive. The final
outcome depends on the relative strength of the two forces. Similarly a higher
rate of urbanization would mean a larger relative gap if urbanization has only a
limited effect on rural incomes at the lower end of the scale, but would go the
other way if the urban to rural linkage is strong. Second, as far as urban poverty
is concerned, the size distribution of cities also matters since the incidence of
poverty is inversely related to city size. We can use the summary measure of the
share of metro population in the urban sector as a variable to capture this effect.
The prediction about the sign of this variable, as with the other variables, depends
on the relative strength of the linkage with the economies of sectors outside the
metros. Generally, the incidence of poverty is lower in metro cities, so a greater
preponderance of metro population would imply a higher relative gap in poverty
incidence between the rural and the urban sector. But if ‘trickle down’ in states
with a larger metro population is weak, the higher development of metro towns
would have a limited effect on poverty incidence in non-metro urban areas, thus
pushing up the HCR in the urban sector as a whole, i.e., the rural–urban ratio in
HCR could be lower. The regression model with these variables is fitted to inter-
state variations in the rural–urban HCR ratio for different dates of the NSS
rounds, and the results are reported in Table 2.7.
The results show that in the pre-reform years, between 1987–1988 and
1993–1994, the impact of the rate of urbanization is significantly negative:
‘trickle down’ extends to the rural economy. But the sign of the variable measur-
ing the share of the metro in urban population is significantly positive: the
growth of metro towns apparently reduces HCR in the urban sector as a whole,
not so much in the rural areas. The sign of APCE (rural) is positive but not very
significant.
In the post-reform years both the urbanization and metro share variables
lose their significance, and the APCE is even less significant. Evidently
factors other than those connected with the rural–urban ‘trickle down’ process
discussed above now explained inter-state variations in the poverty gap. We
have already seen that in the post-reform years urban growth was more
important in reducing poverty across a wide range of states. This process
reduced the inter-state variations in the relative poverty-gap even as it reduced
the overall value of this gap.
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Table 2.7 Regression of relative rural–urban poverty across major 16 states in different years
Sl. Year Independent Regression results
variable
I 1987–1988 Relative gap =216.79+ 1.87 APCEru –19.50 UR +8.87 SHMET ;R2= 0.435
in poverty (1.04) (1.54) (–2.94)*** (2.02)*
II 1993–1994 Relative gap =314.86+ 0.53 APCEru –11.82 UR +5.18 SHMET ;R2= 0.411
URP in poverty (2.67)** (0.71) (2.65)** (1.76)*
II 1993–1994 Relative gap =341.43+ 1.20 APCEru –26.68 UR +11.36 SHMET ;R2= 0.424
MRP in poverty (1.46) (1.44) (–2.81)** (1.84)***
IV 1999–2000 Relative gap =384.78– 0.30 APCEru –4.62 UR +3.38 SHMET ;R2= 0.311
in poverty (3.80)*** (–0.90) (–0.99) (1.30)
V 1999–2000 Relative gap =378.88– 0.47 APCEru –1.98 UR +0.01 FDIurpc ;R2= 0.439
in poverty (4.16)*** (–1.82)* (–0.72) (2.20)**
Notes
1 Relative gap in poverty is defined as the ratio of rural to urban HCR; APCEru is level of APCE in rural areas; UR is the urbanization rate from respective NSS
rounds; SHMET is share of metropolitan population in urban population and FDIurpc is cumulative FDI approved (1991–98) urban per capita.
2 ***, ** and * denoted significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level and figures in parentheses () are t-values corresponding to estimated coefficients.
We have also seen that within urban areas there was a distinction between the
states which received a relatively large flow of FDI and those who did not. In the
FDI states, it will be recalled, the pattern of poverty decline in urban areas by size
of towns was different. It was inversely related to the size group of towns and
was lowest in the largest cities. The relationship between HCR and town size was
just the reverse in ‘non-FDI’ states. We tried to see if this difference was in any
way related to the pattern of inter-state variability of the rural–urban poverty gap.
The last equation of Table 2.7 shows that it is indeed so. FDI (urban) per capita is
the only significant variable in the estimated equation and is positive, implying
that those states which have a large FDI inflow have a significantly lower inci-
dence of urban poverty relative to the rural sector. In other words, the effect of
metro towns in increasing the relative poverty gap – which was true of the entire
range of states in the pre-1993–1994 years – is now significant only in the FDI
states. It draws attention to the point that FDI is an important player in the
poverty scene in spite of the total inflow being much smaller in India than in
other countries like China. FDI inflow reduces poverty significantly in the largest
cities, but its ‘trickle down’ effect is limited outside the metro areas.
Differences by states
It is well known that Indian states differ substantially in the incidence of
poverty. Also the distribution of population among the different states is uneven.
The trend in the all-India measure of poverty, such as the HCR, will then be
affected by the way the pattern of the difference in poverty reduction between
more and less populous states. It has been hypothesized that growth rates and
hence the rate of poverty reduction have not been generally stronger in the states
with a larger share of the poor. The following paragraphs explore this hypothesis
in more detail for the two periods we are considering.
Table 2.8 gives the shares of the individual states in the total count of those
below the poverty line for the three dates (corresponding to the 38th, 50th and
the 55th rounds of the NSS).
Seven states – Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa,
Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal – accounted for over 70 percent of the total poor
in the rural areas in 1999–2000. Just three states – Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and
Uttar Pradesh – accounted for over 40 percent of the rural poor. It is interesting
to note that the same states to a large extent account for the bulk of the urban
poor as well. The only difference between the two sets is Orissa which accounts
for only 2.6 percent of the urban poor, reflecting the relative underdevelopment
of the state. Looking back to 1987–1988 it is seen that there is not much dif-
ference in the spatial distribution of the poor – the same states account for the
bulk of the rural and the urban poor. Perhaps the concentration of the poor in
these states was a little higher in the earlier period.
It is interesting to see which states fell behind the all-India average in APCE
growth rate in the most recent post-reform period. Because of its weight we look
especially at the rural areas. The lagging states are: Assam, Andhra Pradesh,
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Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal
(for details see Mazumdar and Sarkar 2004, pp. 24–25). These states coincide
with the set accounting for the bulk of the rural poor. The only state with large
HCR missing in the set is Maharashtra – which is fairly close to the growth
rate rural all-India. We conclude that the spatial pattern of growth rates in the
1993–2000 period was not favorable to the cause of poverty decline in the
rural sector.
Poverty decline in the two periods
Further light can be shed on the experience of inter-state differences in poverty
decline in the post-reform period by looking directly at the changes in the HCR.
In Figures 2.5 through 2.8 we present the scatter diagrams of the state-level
changes in the HCR over the two time periods between the NSS surveys –
1987–1988 to 1993–1994 and 1993–1994 to 1999–2000. We plot the change in
Table 2.8 Distribution of persons below poverty line across states (percentage of total)
State 1987–1988 1993–1994 (URP) 1993–1994 (MRP) 1999–2000
Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban
Andhra Pradesh (AP) 6.9 8.1 6.8 7.7 6.9 8.3 7.7 7.1
Assam (AS) N.A. N.A. 3.4 0.8 3.2 0.8 4.6 1.3
Bihar (BI) 16.4 8.6 17.9 7.6 18.5 7.5 17.9 9.5
Gujarat (GU) 4.3 4.6 4.2 5.3 4.2 4.8 3.1 2.7
Haryana (HA) 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.1 0.9 1.0 0.3 1.0
Himachal Pradesh (HP) 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.1
Karnataka (KA) 5.2 7.2 5.6 7.4 5.3 7.3 4.5 5.5
Kerala (KE) 2.1 2.7 2.0 2.5 1.8 2.9 1.4 2.6
Madhya Pradesh (MP) 8.9 6.2 9.0 7.1 8.8 6.6 11.4 7.8
Maharashtra (MA) 8.7 12.7 9.9 14.1 10.4 14.6 8.1 15.6
Orissa (OR) 5.6 1.7 5.7 1.6 6.1 1.8 7.9 2.6
Punjab (PU) 0.4 0.8 0.4 1.2 0.4 1.1 0.3 0.9
Rajasthan (RA) 4.8 3.9 3.8 4.6 3.5 4.1 2.7 2.9
Tamil Nadu (TN) 7.4 10.2 6.4 10.2 6.8 10.4 6.1 8.7
Uttar Pradesh (UP) 15.8 15.8 15.6 15.1 15.1 15.1 13.3 17.8
West Bengal (WB) 7.2 8.3 5.9 7.1 5.9 7.1 7.7 5.5
India 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Share of 16 states 94.6 91.8 98.0 93.4 97.9 93.5 97.1 91.4
in all-India
Number of poor 2,335 462 2,181 431 1,787 342 1,582 270
All-India (in Lakh)
Source: Unit-level data of consumption schedules of 43rd, 50th and 55th rounds of NSS.
Note
URP is uniform reference period and MRP is mixed reference period.
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the HCR on the y-axis against the level of HCR in the initial year of the respec-
tive period on the x-axis. The graphs are drawn separately for the rural and the
urban areas.6
We would expect that the decline in HCR would be higher in the states where
the absolute value of the HCR is higher. The percentage decline in HCR is given
by the ratio of the two magnitudes. Convergence between states in the incidence
of poverty will occur only if the percentage decline increases with the initial
value of the HCR – i.e., the relationship between the two magnitudes in the
scatter diagram is non-linear. The graphs (Figures 2.3 to 2.6), however, show
that there is at best a linear relationship between the decline in HCR and its
initial value. There is no evidence of inter-state differences in poverty incidence
to converge over time in either sector.
Second, it is seen that while the slope of the line relating the initial HCR to its
absolute change is more or less the same in the urban areas, it has definitely
become flatter in the rural areas in the post-reform years. For the rural sector as a
whole we can no longer say that the percentage decline in poverty is directly
related to the absolute value of HCR in the rural areas of the state in the
1993–1994 to 1999–2000 period. The reason for this is that several of the states
suffered from a deceleration of poverty decline in their rural sector in the post-
reform areas. There is naturally an overlap between the states lying significantly
below the regression line of Figure 2.6 and those identified earlier in this section
as being laggards in rural APCE growth. They include Andhra Pradesh, Assam,
Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal.






































Figure 2.3 Poverty (HCR) and declines in HCR from 1987–1988 to 1993–1994 (rural)
across states.
Note
See full names of different states like WB, MP, AS, etc. in first column of Table 2.8.






































Figure 2.4 Poverty (HCR) and declines in HCR from 1993–1994 to 1999–2000 (rural)
across states.
Note





































Figure 2.5 Poverty (HCR) and declines in HCR from 1987–1988 to 1993–1994 (urban)
across states.
Note
See full names of different states like WB, MP, AS, etc. in first column of Table 2.8.
their changes over the two periods might help to throw some further light on
state-level changes in rural poverty decline. The groupings are from I to IV in
descending order of poverty decline. Table 2.9 confirms that the flattening of the
regression line in Figure 2.4 is largely due to four states slipping from Category
I (high HCR decline) and category II (middling decline) in the pre-reform period
to category IV in the post-reform one. This adverse effect is balanced to some
extent by Maharashtra moving from IV to I, and Karnataka from IV to II.
Further details on the change in the HCR between the two periods for indi-
vidual states is provided in Table 2.10 which reproduces the results of the
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decomposition analysis applied to the data for each state. The total percentage
change in poverty for the state as a whole (rural and urban combined) is given
in column 10, while the components of this statistic are found in the six
columns preceding it. The column of %D gives the component due to differen-
tial growth, while %I is that due to change in inequality. The differences
between HCR change and the sum of %D and %I in each sector are the sum of
two elements: (i) ‘Uniform growth’ – the hypothetical growth if the APCE in
each sector had grown at the same rate as in the state as a whole; (ii) the effect
of the rural–urban shift (the latter has been small in most states). The last two
columns of Table 2.10 give the percentage change in HCR in each of the two







































Figure 2.6 Poverty (HCR) and declines in HCR from 1993–1994 to 1999–2000 (urban)
across states.
Note
See full names of different states like WB, MP, AS, etc. in first column of Table 2.8.
Table 2.9 Patterns in decline of rural poverty among four groups of states over two
periods
1987–1993 /1993–1999 I II III IV







IV MA KA HA AS
Table 2.10 Decomposition of percentage change in head-count ratio (HCR)
Group Year State Rural HCR Of which Urban HCR Of which Total HCR % change in HCR
change change change
%D %I %D %I Rural Urban
1 1993–1999 Bihar –25.0 0.0 –9.5 –0.5 0.4 0.1 –25.5 –25.9 –14.9
1 1987–1993 Bihar –9.4 3.6 –8.2 –3.0 – 0.1 –12.4 –10.9 –30.0
1 1993–1999 Gujarat –32.8 2.5 2.3 –10.3 – –0.4 –43.2 –39.7 –62.8
1 1987–1993 Gujarat –19.6 7.5 1.2 0.8 – 6.8 –18.8 –17.0 –10.3
1 1993–1999 Maharashtra –30.2 3.1 –5.9 –5.3 – 2.0 –35.4 –36.2 –29.5
1 1987–1993 Maharashtra –7.5 5.3 –2.4 –0.6 – 0.2 –8.1 –3.1 –14.4
1 1993–1999 Karnataka –23.8 10.9 0.0 –9.3 – 2.5 –33.0 –29.8 –48.8
1 1987–1993 Karnataka –5.2 3.0 –1.9 –3.8 – 0.2 –9.0 –7.0 –17.5
1 1993–1999 Haryana –59.9 –0.4 –7.5 –5.5 2.1 7.1 –65.4 –71.9 –35.5
1 1987–1993 Haryana 14.4 3.4 19.9 1.7 – 4.0 16.2 25.3 –10.8
1 1993–1999 Punjab –24.9 7.4 10.0 –16.5 – 7.3 –41.4 –36.5 –50.4
1 1987–1993 Punjab –7.2 3.5 –26.0 6.8 – 3.2 –0.3 –7.7 18.2
2 1993–1999 Tamil Nadu –12.9 18.4 6.4 –10.3 – 6.8 –23.2 –17.0 –46.9
2 1987–1993 Tamil Nadu –16.3 –4.5 –0.8 –4.8 2.0 –1.6 –21.1 –21.5 –20.4
2 1993–1999 Rajasthan –32.0 12.6 –30.6 –10.1 – –1.1 –42.1 –40.0 –53.1
2 1987–1993 Rajasthan –32.0 –6.0 –9.0 0.4 2.2 –0.8 –31.6 –34.7 –7.8
2 1993–1999 Uttar Pradesh –26.9 2.9 –14.0 –2.8 – 0.7 –29.7 –31.1 –21.6
2 1987–1993 Uttar Pradesh –16.7 0.0 1.7 –3.3 – –0.9 –20.0 –18.6 –26.0
2 1993–1999 Kerala –31.1 –2.1 13.9 –5.6 0.2 6.7 –36.7 –38.2 –31.1
2 1987–1993 Kerala –21.6 0.0 4.3 1.1 – –1.3 –20.5 –17.2 –26.7
3 1993–1999 Andhra Pradesh –10.4 12.5 –1.3 –5.7 – 1.6 –16.1 –9.1 –38.5
3 1987–1993 Andhra Pradesh –17.8 –1.3 –7.2 –1.5 0.7 –3.7 –19.3 –16.6 –24.3
3 1993–1999 Madhya Pradesh 4.2 10.9 –2.4 –3.1 – 2.5 1.1 3.2 –20.8
3 1987–1993 Madhya Pradesh –18.3 –1.8 –2.8 0.8 1.2 –0.7 –17.6 –16.2 –11.3
continued
Table 2.10 continued
Group Year State Rural HCR Of which Urban HCR Of which Total HCR % change in HCR
change change change
%D %I %D %I Rural Urban
3 1993–1999 Orissa 0.7 –3.0 –0.6 1.4 0.2 –0.8 2.1 5.1 0.8
3 1987–1993 Orissa –13.9 1.5 –7.5 –1.0 – –0.2 –14.9 –13.5 –26.6
3 1993–1999 West Bengal 6.6 18.6 –2.0 –7.8 – –0.7 –1.1 5.3 –45.4
3 1987–1993 West Bengal –25.0 0.0 –0.5 –5.5 – 0.9 –30.5 –30.9 –30.3
3 1993–1999 Assam 13.8 7.5 6.3 0.2 – 1.5 14.0 14.4 5.3
3 1987–1993 Assam –4.2 1.9 –23.7 0.7 – 0.1 –3.5 –2.1 –3.9
1993–1999 India –17.3 6.6 –4.7 –4.7 – 1.7 –21.9 –19.8 –32.9
1987–1993 India –15.6 0.9 –3.5 –2.0 – –0.4 –17.5 –15.8 –21.6
Note
D and I denote the differential growth effect and inequality effects.
We can use the table to classify the states into three groups in terms of the
percentage change in HCR over the two periods we are considering (taking the
rural and the urban sectors together):
1 states which accelerated the decline in HCR in the post-reform period
markedly (more than doubled the percentage decline): Bihar, Gujarat,
Maharashtra, Karanataka, Haryana, and Punjab;
2 states which had a less spectacular, but still substantial, decline in HCR rel-
ative to the earlier period: Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and
Kerala;
3 states which suffered retardation in HCR decline (or actually registered an
increase in HCR) Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, West Bengal
and Assam.
It is to be noted that the list in group 3 is identical to the group already men-
tioned earlier as the laggards in rural poverty decline. It shows the quantitative
importance of the rural sector in the overall trend in poverty reduction.
While the growth of the rural sector is naturally the dominant influence on
the overall decline in HCR (the share of the rural sector in the incidence of
poverty being so much more), it is important to note that the urban sector
became a much more important player in several states. We have already seen
in section II that this is true for all-India in the post-reform years. But some
individual states stand out. The urban sector of Gujarat, Karnataka and Punjab
among the group 1 states, and Tamil Nadu and Rajasthan among the group 2
states contributed to the total HCR decline of to an extent of a third or more
of the contribution of the rural sector. In all these states the differential rate of
growth was higher in the urban sector, contributing to the HCR decline (%D in
the urban sector was negative).
Of the states in which HCR declined Bihar and Uttar Pradesh are the only
ones in which the rural sector increased its contribution to the decline. Rural
growth also contributed strongly to HCR decline in Kerala, but it was offset to
some extent by a substantial increase in inequality in the sector, so that the con-
tribution of the urban sector increased in the 1993–1999 period. In the case of
Bihar (and to some extent Uttar Pradesh, in so far its Eastern districts are really
an extension of the economy of Bihar) the strong rural growth in APCE causing
poverty decline is less due to the growth rate of its domestic rural economy, as
it is to the remittance sent back home by migrant labor participating in the rural
economy of the North-Western states and in urban areas scattered all over
India.
We have already underlined in the third section the point about the increased
inequality in the urban sector in the post-reform period for India as a whole. Its
relative impact in retarding poverty decline is significant, but quantitatively not
substantial. The state-level data reveal that the inequality effect has been
more important in some states. Running down the column (9)–%I for the urban
sector – it is seen that this has been so in Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, Haryana, Kerala
Poverty, growth and inequality 41
and Punjab. It should not, however, be concluded that inequality increased only
in the urban economy of some states. There was substantial inequality increase
retarding poverty decline in the rural sector of a few states as well. These
include Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Punjab, and to some extent Gujarat. It is interesting
to note that these states are also the ones which experienced the adverse inequal-
ity effect in the urban sector as well.
It is important to comment on the experience of the group 3 states. Andhra
Pradesh suffered from a slight retardation in the rate of decline in HCR, but
the incidence of poverty actually increased in the other states in this group. It
is seen that all these states suffered from adverse movements in the HCR in
the rural sector. The figures of column (5) reveal that the crucial problem was
the differentially lower growth in the rural economy which contributed to an
increase in HCR. In the case of three of three states – Andhra Pradesh,
Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal – the poverty incidence would have been
worse but for the stronger performance of the urban sector. Assam stands out
in registering an increase in inequality both in the rural and the urban sectors.
An increase in urban inequality also contributed to HCR decline in Madhya
Pradesh, but its relative importance was much less than that of the slow-down
in rural growth.
Conclusions
In this chapter we have contrasted the change in poverty incidence in the
1987–1993 period with that in the 1993–1999 years. The second period could be
seen as one in which the impact of the reforms tied to liberalization of the
economy could be expected to have had some impact. We have based this com-
parison from several angles on the ‘consumption expenditure survey’ data
generated by the NSS for three quinquennial rounds: the 43rd (1987–1988), the
50th (1993–1994) and the 55th (1999–2000). We have addressed the methodo-
logical problems involved in the surveys, and produced a new set of consistent
data on mean consumption of the survey households, and the incidence of
poverty. The differences between our estimates and those of other researchers
have been spelled out in the first section and the Appendices.
We have a used a decomposition analysis of the percentage change in poverty
over the two successive periods. This method used elsewhere by Mazumdar and
Son (2002) enables us to quantify the relative contribution of three elements to
the overall change in poverty incidence: mean growth of consumption, popu-
lation shift between defined sectors and the change in inequality. The analysis is
applied to the economy as a whole and to its rural and urban sectors. It is done
for all-India and for the individual states.
The more important conclusions are the following:
1 At the all-India level the absolute change in the HCR was about the same in
the post-reform period as in the previous one, but the rate of change was
higher because the initial base was smaller. However, the growth rate of
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APCE increased rather more so that the elasticity of poverty change with
respect to income fell. This is true even more for the poverty gap measure.
2 The share of the urban sector in poverty reduction increased in the second
period. This was not due to a larger shift of population to urban areas – in
fact the rate of this shift decreased. The major reason for the change was the
higher differential growth rate of the urban sector. It was offset, but only
partially, by an increase in urban inequality. However, the relative impact of
rising urban inequality in retarding poverty decline in the late nineties was
quantitatively not substantial.
3 Turning to poverty decline by size of towns there are two different aspects
to the impact of the post-reform developments including globalization. On
the one hand, there has been a distinct trend towards decentralization of
economic activities to smaller towns and cities. This has led to the inverse
relationship between growth and the size of towns observed in many states
and in India as a whole. There are, however, a group of states in which the
role of FDI is strong, and the impact is seen in a high growth rate in metro
areas, so that a direct relationship between growth (and poverty reduction)
and town size is observed, as was the case generally in the urban sector as
whole in the previous period.
4 State-level analysis showed that the states could be divided into three
groups when we compare the change in HCR in the post-reform years with
the period preceding it:
group 1 are those which accelerated the decline in HCR in the post-
reform period markedly (more than doubled the percentage decline):
Bihar, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karanataka, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh
and Punjab;
group 2 states had a less spectacular, but still substantial, decline in
HCR relative to the earlier period: Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan, Uttar
Pradesh and Kerala;
group 3 states suffered retardation in HCR decline (or actually regis-
tered an increase in HCR): Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa,
West Bengal and Assam.
It is seen that the unhappy performance of the group 3 states is largely due to
retardation in the rate of growth of the rural economy of these states. The
growth of the urban sector, however, played a significant role in the poverty
decline of group 1 and group 2. We have already seen that at the all-India
level, urban growth in the post-reform years was higher than rural growth.
Although the urban economy is still a small part of the economy, its contribu-
tion to poverty reduction started being important in several states. The urban
sector of Gujarat, Karnataka and Punjab among the group 1 states, and Tamil
Nadu and Rajasthan among the group 2 states contributed to the total HCR
decline to as much as a third or more of the contribution of the rural economy.
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5 Increased inequality seems to have been associated with the higher growth
rate in the urban sector in the post-reform period for India as a whole. Its
relative impact in retarding poverty decline is significant, but quantita-
tively not substantial. The state-level data reveal that the inequality effect
has been more important in some states. They include Tamil Nadu,
Gujarat, Haryana, Kerala and Punjab. It should not, however, be con-
cluded that inequality increased only in the urban economy of some states.
There was substantial inequality increase retarding poverty decline in the
rural sector of a few states as well. Theses include Tamil Nadu, Kerala,
Punjab, and to some extent Gujarat. It is interesting to note that these
states are also the ones which experienced the adverse inequality effect in
the urban sector as well.
Appendix 1
Poverty-decomposition methodology
Let us divide the total population into k mutually exclusive socioeconomic and
demographic groups. For decomposable poverty measures, then, we can write




where fi and Pi are the population share and poverty index of the ith group,
respectively. Further, define the change in poverty between two periods as
∆P = P2 − P1 (1)
where and ., P1i and P2i being the poverty incidence
in the group in years 1 and 2, respectively, and f1i and f2i are the population
shares of the ith group in years 1 and 2, respectively.
Equation (1) can be written as
which shows that the change in total poverty can be written as the sum of two
components. The first component measures the effect on total change in
poverty due to changes in within-group poverty and the second component esti-























The percentage change in total poverty, thus, can be written as follows:
(2)
where and .
Note that the first term in Equation (2) estimates the percentage change in
total poverty explained by changes in poverty within groups. The second term
estimates the percentage change in total poverty due to a shift in population
between groups. The shift in population is deemed pro-poor if the second term is
negative because it leads to a reduction in poverty. This situation is likely to
occur if migration occurs from rural to urban areas. If migration takes place
from urban to rural areas, on the other hand, the second component is likely to
make a positive contribution to poverty. In this case, the population shift is not
pro-poor.
Kakwani (2000) has proposed a decomposition, which explains the percent-
age change in poverty as a sum of two components: one is the growth effect,
measuring the change in poverty when mean income changes but inequality
remains fixed and the other component is the inequality effect, which measures
changes in poverty when inequality changes but the mean income remains con-
stant. This methodology can now be applied within each group.
A general poverty measure is characterized as
where z is the poverty line, µ is the mean income of society, and L(p) is the
Lorenz curve. The Lorenz curve measures the effect of inequality on poverty.
Following from Kakwani (2000), the percentage change in poverty can be
written as
∆P = (∆P)m + (∆P)1 = Mean effect + Inequality effect (3)
where (∆P)m is the change in poverty if mean income changes from µ1 in period 1
to µ2 in period 2 but the Lorenz curve remains fixed. Thus, (∆P)m can be written as
where L1(p) and L2(p) are the Lorenz curves in periods 1 and 2, respectively.
Note that in deriving the mean effect, we can either fix the Lorenz curve for the
initial period or for the terminal period. Because we do not know a priori which
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period of the Lorenz curve we should fix, we have taken the average of the two
periods.7
Similarly, the inequality component can be derived as
which estimates the change in poverty if inequality measured by the Lorenz
curve changes from L1(p) in the initial period to L2(p) in the terminal period but
mean income is fixed between the two period. The sum of the mean and inequal-
ity effects gives rise to the total changes in poverty.
We apply the decomposition in (3) within each group, which results in
for i = 1, 2, 3, . . . . . . . ., k. (4)
where
and
ith group in year t (t = 1,2).
From (2) and (4), the percentage change in total poverty can be expressed as
= Within Group
Growth Effect + Within Group Inequality Effect + Population Shift (5)
The first term in equation (5) measures the effect of growth within each group
on overall change in the poverty incidence, when the distribution within each
group remains the same over time. This first term can be further decomposed
into two terms:
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(6)
where
and µ2i = µ1i(1 + g) where g being the average growth rate of the whole popu-
lation is the mean income of the ith group in year 2 if the income of the ith
group were growing at the same rate as the average growth rate of the whole
population.
The first term in the right-hand side of (6) measures the effect of growth on per-
centage change in poverty under the counter-factual that all groups enjoyed the
same uniform growth rates and the second term in the right-hand side measures
the effect of differential growth rates within groups. Thus, substituting (6) into (5),
we arrive at our poverty decomposition that expresses the percentage change in the
poverty incidence as the sum of four components: (1) overall growth effect when
inequality in the distribution does not change; (2) effect of differential growth
rates in different groups; (3) effect of change in inequality within different groups;
and (4) effect of changes in population shares between groups. This is an exact
decomposition and, therefore, there will not be any residual term. This decomposi-
tion does not require us to specify an inequality measure. It uses the idea of shift in
that part of the Lorenz curve, which affects the poor.
The first component will always be negative if there is a positive growth in
the economy. The second component can be either negative or positive. If it is
positive (negative), the disparity in growth rates of different groups has con-
tributed to an increase (decrease) in total poverty. The third component can
again be either positive or negative. If it is positive (negative), it indicates that a























































the total poverty incidence. Finally, the fourth component measures the effect of
migration of population between groups on the total poverty incidence.
Appendix 2
This appendix compares our calculation of HCR based on the adjustments made
to the NSS figures on Average Per Capita expenditure (APCE) with others in the
literature. We campared the APCE by fractile erxpenditure groups in rural and
urban areas for the year 1993–1994 as given by Sundaram and Tendulkar 2003a
(S&T) and our own calculation. It was observed that some differences exist only
in highest fractile (95–100) but not for other lower fractiles. The effect on esti-
mation on Level of HCR would be minimal.
In this regard, it is interesting to note that Sen and Himanshu (2004), follow-
ing the S&T procedure, found all-India HCR for all areas to be 35.9 percent
using URP and 30.6 percent using MRP for the year 1993–1994. S&T in their
revised estimates found the corresponding figures to be 37.35 percent (URP) and
32.15 percent (MRP). This is probably because S&T use a somewhat different
poverty line than the official poverty line. Sen and Himanshu (2004) further cor-
rected the 55th round estimates of food and intoxicants for possible ‘contamina-
tion’ from the 7-day questionnaire. They used information from early NSS
rounds to arrive at some estimates. At the lower bound, the extent of such conta-
mination was found to be small but even then the authors calculated that the
55th round all-India poverty incidence using MRP was 27.8 percent as against
the official figure of 26.1 percent. Thus they found the measured decline
between 1993–1994 (MRP) and 1999–2000 (MRP revised) to be at most 2.8
percent implying an increase in the absolute number of the poor by five million.
Their results are quite opposite to the official calculation of poverty decline (in
HCR) by 9.8 percent implying a fall in the number of poor by 60 million and to
the S&T revised estimates showing a fall of 4.83 percent denoting reduction in
number of poor by 13 million in the period.
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3 Trends in employment 
and earnings 1983–2000
In Chapter 2 the focus was on households. We looked at trends in household
welfare – and the changes in the incidence of poverty at the household level in
particular. But household welfare is the result of the working of factor markets,
and for households near the poverty line, trends in labor markets are of para-
mount importance. In this chapter our attention shifts to individuals. We begin to
address the question: are the observed developments in the labor market consis-
tent with and illuminate the results obtained in the previous chapter on house-
hold-level poverty trends?
Trends in aggregate employment
The Task Force on Employment Opportunities appointed by the Planning
Commission reported a sharp decline in the labor-force growth rates between
the 1980s (1983 to 1993–1994) and the 1990s (1993–1994 to 1999–2000). Its
estimates from the NSS showed that the growth rate fell from 2.05 percent per
annum to 1.03 (GOI July 2001). Taken in conjunction with the increase in
measured rates of open unemployment, this slow-down has been widely inter-
preted to have been the result of ‘discouragement’ of potential workers from
entering the labor force. There are, however, two basic problems with this
estimate: (i) is the question of using the correct age-structure of the popu-
lation; and (ii) the question of appropriate employment category on which the
estimates are based.
On (i) it has been maintained that the survey-based age-structure, on
which the weighted employment rates of the NSS are based is less reliable
than the age-structure reported by the nearest Census of population figures;
and on (ii) the Planning Commission estimates of employment growth are
based on the UPSS figures of the NSS, and does not distinguish adequately the
supply side aspects of the labor force from the effects originating from
changes in the demand for labor. Research on both these questions has been
extensive, and we shall begin by summarizing the major conclusions from this
research.
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The age-structure issue
Sundaram and Tendulkar (2006) have looked carefully at the NSS-based age
distribution and compared it with the data reported by the Censuses of 1981,
1991 and 2001. They reported that
using the survey-based age-distribution results in a sharp slow-down in the
growth of prime-age (15–59) population in the nineties . . . . [But] in
the context of the observed slow-down of population growth reflecting the
decline in fertility – from 2.09 percent per annum (pcpa) to 1.97 pcpa – over
the same period, equally problematic is the acceleration in the growth of
population in the 0–9 age group – from 1.17 to 1.33 pcpa – between the two
periods that shows up with the use of the survey-based age distribution.
It is generally accepted by researchers that, while surveys like the NSS are
more reliable at getting at participation or employment rates for different
age–sex groups, the age-structure of the population itself is better measured by
the Population Censuses. Sundaram and Tendulkar thus use the age–sex-sector
specific worker-population rates produced by the NSS and re-weight them by
the appropriate demographic structure obtained from the Population Censuses.
This adjustment has the effect of substantially moderating the slow-down in the
growth rate of the labor force: from about 2.06 percent in the 1980s to 1.58
percent in the 1990s.1
The problem of measuring the labor force
The NSS distinguishes those who participate in the labor market on the basis of
several criteria. A major difference is the estimate on the basis of Usual Principal
Status (UPS – the activity in which the individual spent most of his time in
the reference period of the last 365 days) and of the Secondary Status (SS – the
activity defined in terms of some part of time spent in the reference year). Usual
Principal and Secondary Status (UPSS) workers are then the principal workers as
well as part-timers of various kinds. Clearly the number of SS workers could vary
with changes in conditions affecting the supply of secondary workers as well as
the demand for them. There is no way of judging from the numbers per se if any
change observed is due to predominantly supply or predominantly demand con-
ditions. This is particularly true of secondary women workers who form a sub-
stantial but varying part of the UPSS labor force reported by the NSS (Rustagi
2005). This important issue will be analyzed in detail in the next chapter.
Trends in employment by industry
Economic Development, in the history of both today’s developed economies, and
in the recent growth of developing economies, has been associated with a relative
increase of employment away from the agricultural sector. This process is
associated with an increase in labor productivity because the relative productivity
is generally lowest in agriculture. Our first task, then, is to see how far India has
been following this traditional pattern of transformation in recent decades.
Multiple occupations
We need to clarify at the outset the issue of multiple occupations in the Indian
economy. How do we trace the changing structure of employment by industry or
occupation when a significant number of households have members who pursue
more than one occupation? There are in fact two distinct aspects of this issue.
First, households would contain more than one earner of ‘usual principal status’
(UPS at the individual level). Second, a ‘principal status’ earner might have more
than one activity. The first possibility creates a difference between the occupa-
tional or industrial classification of households (in terms of the activity of the
‘main earner’, defined as the main contributor to the household pot), and the occu-
pations or industrial classification of individuals. The second point creates a dis-
tinction between the occupational classification of individuals based on the UPS
and the UPSS status. The issue of occupational distribution by households is of
importance when we are considering household income levels in different occupa-
tions. Since income (or expenditure) is available for the household as a whole we
would need to define the occupation of the household by the activity of the main
earner. We have done this in our work on the tertiary sector (Chapter 10). It is
seen that the difference in changes in occupational classification over time by the
household and the individual definitions is marginal. Here in this chapter we
discuss the changes in the distribution for individuals only by the two alternatives
of UPS and UPSS.
Trends in the industrial structure of individuals
It is apparent from the data in Table 3.1 that agriculture has indeed been shed-
ding labor and it would appear that the process seems to have accelerated in the
post-reform years of the 1990s. It is equally clear that the absorption of labor in
manufacturing has been quite slow – even though it might have increased a bit
in the nineties – and much of the increase in the labor force has been accounted
for by the various types of tertiary activities, as well as construction.
We can infer from the discussion above that the decline in the share of the
labor force in agriculture might have been exaggerated with the UPSS defini-
tions because of the inclusion of secondary workers in the count. This category
of workers might be disproportionately represented in agriculture which has a
larger component of the self-employed. In so far as this reduction is partly due
to supply-side changes affecting secondary workers or indeed due to fluctuations
in the pace of technology spread in agriculture (see Chapter 7), the basic shift
away from agriculture in the nineties might be overestimated. We therefore
looked at the industrial distribution for labor defined on the UPS criterion. This
might provide an estimate of the lower limit of the shift from agriculture.
Employment and earnings 1983–2000 51
52 Poverty, inequality, employment, earnings
A comparison of the two sets reveals that the UPSS definition does show a
substantially larger decline in the incremental share of labor absorbed by agri-
culture. The UPS definition gives the decline in the incremental share in agricul-
ture from 42.07 in the first period to 27.55 in the second. But even confining
ourselves to principal workers, as the UPS definition does, the data confirm that
there was a significant decline in labor absorption by agriculture in the nineties
compared to the eighties. The gain of the tertiary sector in the incremental share
under the alternative UPS definition was from 37.49 to 45.41.
Unemployment
What can we say about the level and trends in the rates of open unemployment in
the Indian economy? The NSS data can be used to calculate unemployment rates
based on either the CDS or UPS status of the labor force. The CDS estimates
measure the rates of person-days which are being spent as ‘not working but avail-
able for work’, measured in half-day units over the reference week (see Appendix
2). These rates differ from the unemployment rates based on the UPS counts
describing the ‘usual status’ of workers. (Note that subsidiary workers are by def-
inition employed, still there can be estimate of UPSS rates of unemployment dif-
ferent from the UPS rates.) We can say that the CDS rates capture open
underemployment during the week – as distinct from disguised unemployment on
family farms or businesses (when some members of the household workforce are
‘unproductively’ employed but not declaring themselves available for work). The
unemployment rate provided by the UPS measure will be necessarily less than
Table 3.1 Industrial distribution of UPSS workers (percentage of total)




0 Agriculture 68.5 64.0 60.4 44.8 5.6
1 Mining and quarrying 0.6 0.7 0.6 1.3 –1.9
2–3 Manufacturing 10.7 10.6 11.0 10.4 16.4
4 Electricity, gas, etc. 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.7 –0.6
5 Construction 2.3 3.3 4.4 7.4 21.8
6 Trade, hotels, etc. 6.3 7.6 10.2 13.0 49.8
7 Transport, etc. 2.5 2.8 3.7 4.3 16.2
8 Financial services, etc. 0.7 1.0 1.2 2.2 4.4
9 Personal, business and 8.2 9.6 8.3 15.9 −11.6
community services
Tertiary (6 to 9) 17.6 21.0 23.4 35.4 58.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Calculated from unit-level data of employment and unemployment schedule of NSS rounds
of 38th, 50th and 55th rounds.
the CDS rate since it measures the proportion of the labor force which is ‘usually’
unemployed during the major part of the year.
The rates of CDS unemployment in 1999–2000 was 7.2 percent in the rural
areas and 7.7 percent in the urban. The UPS unemployment rates were, however,
only 1.43 and 4.65 respectively (Government of India (2001), Tables 2.7 and
2.10(a)). It is apparent that underemployment, rather than round-the-week open
unemployment is the real issue in rural areas. The difference, although significant,
is less striking in the urban economy in the post-reform years between 1993 and
1999. It increased substantially in the rural sector – from 5.6 to 7.2. (The increase in
the urban sector was hardly apparent – of the order of 0.3 percent.) A part of the
increase could be attributed to the increased ‘casualisation’ of the labor force – the
rise in the proportion of casual labor relative to the self-employed. It cannot be
maintained that this is necessarily the result of deteriorating labor-market con-
ditions. It might be partly the result of increased commercialization, as marginal
farmers shifted more to wage labor. The income levels of the latter are often higher.
In any event the evidence suggests that even CDS unemployment is very much a
problem of the youth, perhaps a result of waiting and job searching in the labor
market. The unemployment rates for both sectors and for all rounds fall off sharply
for age groups 30 and above. The increase of the unemployment rate between the
50th and the 55th rounds, after a fall between the 38th and the 50th in most age
groups, perhaps does indicate a slight deterioration of labor-market conditions, but
the phenomenon is one of lesser importance than other issues discussed in the book.
Trends in labor productivity by industry
The data given in the last section shows some movement outside agriculture –
even though it has not been as fast as in many other Asian countries during the
process of their economic transformation.
Another special feature of the changing employment structure in India has
been the overwhelming importance of the tertiary sector in the absorption of
labor outside agriculture. This at once raises the question: is the transformation
of the employment structure – slow as it is – has really been of the type that has
increased earnings of labor. A detailed examination of this point is attempted in
the later part of this chapter and also in the chapters on individual major sectors
in Part III. Here it is sufficient to note the relative mean productivity per worker
in the major sectors and their changes over time – based on the figures given in
the National Account estimates.
It is clear from the mean value of labor productivity that they are between
2.5 and 3.5 times higher in the manufacturing and tertiary sectors relative to
those in agriculture – even if we take the more moderate estimates based on
the UPS estimates (i.e., excluding the secondary workers who are relatively
more abundant in agriculture), and even if we are looking at the less productive
sub-sectors within tertiary activities (Table 3.2). Further, the productivity dif-
ferential with respect to agriculture seems to have increased over time. This
first cut at the data does strongly suggest that the movement of labor away from
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agriculture – at a slow pace as it has been – has in fact in the direction of
enhancing earnings of worker. We will see later in this chapter if this tentative
conclusion is borne out by more direct evidence on wages and earnings levels.
Is India out of line with the experience of other Asian economies?
The exceptional nature of the absorption of labor moving out of agriculture in
the tertiary rather than the secondary sector is seen to have been a feature of
Indian development in recent decades. At the same time we have found that
aggregate figures show that the relative income per worker in the tertiary sector
is relatively high. Can we learn something from international experience if the
Indian pattern of change is out of line with the observed pattern of development
and, if so, in what way?
Papola (2005) discussed in detail the theory in the literature about sectoral
shift of GDP and employment. Classical economists like Fisher and Clark
explain the shift from industry to services by the changing demand patterns pre-
dicted by Engel’s law. Fisher argued that services are ‘luxuries’ with more than
a unitary elasticity of demand and so at a higher level of income increasing
share of expenditure is absorbed by them and thus leads to high share of services
in output and labor force. He assumed that the increase in the share of services
in final demand proportionately lead to increase in the share of employment.
However, Clark attributes the increase in the share of service employment
Table 3.2 Labor productivity by broad sectors 1983–2000 (Based on UPS estimates of
employment)
Industry code and Labor productivity (UPS) Labor-productivity 
description index (UPS)
55th 50th 43rd 38th 55th 50th 43rd 38th
0 Agriculture 13,349 11,752 10,116 10,223 100 100 100 100
1 Mining and 129,579 73,754 64,802 62,920 971 628 641 615
quarrying
2–3 Manufacturing 46,999 34,444 27,547 24,801 352 293 272 243
4 Electricity, 239,870 139,433 111,410 93,247 1,797 1,186 1,101 912
gas, etc.
5 Construction 34,406 34,492 25,551 37,543 258 294 253 367
6 Trade, 42,838 36,593 32,298 31,866 321 311 319 312
hotels, etc.
7 Transport, etc. 60,537 48,310 42,871 38,468 453 411 424 376
8 Financial 303,895 259,820 184,626 171,029 2,276 2,211 1,825 1,673
services, etc.
9 Personal, 47,729 27,137 26,387 22,588 358 231 261 221
business and 
community services
Tertiary (6 to 9) 61,216 44,144 37,985 33,950 459 376 375 332
Source: National accounts (various years) and NSS (own calculations from unit-level data).
additionally to low relative productivity in services relative to manufacturing.
Later economists like Bamoul and Fucho ascribed the rise in the share of service
employment primarily to productivity differentials between industry and ser-
vices resulting from technological, scale and geographical concentration of pro-
duction in services. Further, increase in the share of service employment is also
explained by the increased tendency of industry to outsource intermediate inputs
used by industry to the service sector.
Popola refers to the experience of some Asian economies for comparison
with India. The data for the shares of both employment and GDP and their
change over the second half of the last century are given in Table 3.3.
It can be seen from the table that the share of workforce in industry
increased along with is share of GDP in all countries including India, but it pro-
duced a much larger share of GDP in all other Asian developing countries other
than India. It shows that the relative sectoral productivity of labor in India has
been strikingly low by international comparison. By 2002 the tertiary sector in
India contributed more than half the GDP in India but its contribution to
employment was only 22 percent. It shows that service-sector growth has been
productivity led but not employment led, contradicting views of some econo-
mists that employment grow in services because of low productivity vis-à-vis
industry.2
The picture presented in Figure 3.1 of relative productivity in services vis-à-
vis industry in the comparator Asian countries brings out the striking point that
it is only in India – among all the countries represented – that the relative pro-
ductivity in services has increased over the 40-year period. A second important
point to note is that – with the exception of Thailand in 1960 when it had hardly
any industry at all – the productivity in services exceeds that in industry only in
India in both years, and that by a substantial percentage.
It shows that service-sector growth in India has been productivity led and not
employment led, contradicting views of some economists that employment grew
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Table 3.3 International comparison of GDP and employment share
Country GDP share (in %) Share in employment (in %)
Agriculture Industry Services Agriculture Industry Services
1960 2002 1960 2002 1960 2002 1960 2002 1960 2002 1960 2002
China* 30 15 49 51 21 34 69 47 18 21 13 31
Indonesia 50 18 25 45 25 38 75 44 8 17 17 39
Thailand 40 9 19 43 41 48 84 46 4 21 12 33
Malaysia 39 9 18 47 43 44 40 19 12 32 48 50
India 55 24 16 25 29 51 74 60 11 18 15 22
Source: Papola (2005). The original source is the World Development Report (various years).
Note
* The figure for China in the first year is for 1980.
56 Poverty, inequality, employment, earnings
in services because this sector has been a repository of low income labor
‘pushed out’ of agriculture. The heart of the employment problem in India
would thus seem to be not an excess absorption of labor in the tertiary sector,
but the relatively low productivity of the manufacturing sector, and its persis-
tence over time. It is this low performance of manufacturing which has pre-
vented it from being the dynamic sector playing a central role in productivity
growth as well as the reallocation of labor as in other countries in the history of
successful economic development.
How much of this productivity differential in favor of the tertiary sector is
due to the recent developments of the information technology sector? The
answer would appear to be not very much. For one thing the productivity dif-
ferential in favor of the tertiary sector was substantial even in 1960 when the IT
sector was non-existent. Second, in terms of the numbers employed the tertiary
sub-sector dealing with IT is quite small even in recent years. Table 3.4 gives
an estimate of employment in this sector based on enterprise surveys, and Table
3.5 provides the estimate from the household surveys of the NSS. The Manu-
facturing sub-sector includes hardware, central processing units (CPUs), com-
munications equipment, electronic components and industrial control and
supervision equipment manufacturing (not including medical equipment). The
tertiary segment includes telecommunications services, computer and related
services (IT and software), research and development services and also start-up
companies.
The estimates show that the total employment in the IT tertiary sector is of
the order of 400,000 to 600,000 (Tables 3.4 and 3.5). Considering that the total
































Figure 3.1 Relative productivity in services and industry, various Asian countries
1960–2000.
150 million, the percentage of tertiary employment in the IT sector was at best
0.4 per cent.
It is necessary to turn our attention to the denominator of the ratio and con-
sider the possible reasons for the low labor productivity of the manufacturing
vis-à-vis the tertiary sector in India.
Table 3.6 draws attention to the ‘dualism’ that exists in Indian manufacturing.
The household enterprises (not employing any hired labor) contribute more than
half of manufacturing employment whereas establishments with 500 and above
employees contribute more than two-fifths of gross value added but employ less
than one-tenth of employment. Consequently there is a tremendous difference in
relative labor productivity between these two size groups and it is this which
leads to very low level of labor productivity in the manufacturing sector. Such a
situation does not exist in other developing countries in Asia, as will become
clear from the evidence presented in Chapter 9. Unless there is substantial
growth of small (10–100 employees) and medium (100–500 employees) that are
relatively labor-intensive and have substantially higher labor productivity than
household enterprises leading to substantial increase in the share of manufactur-
ing in GDP with some increase in employment share in the Indian economy, we
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Table 3.4 Employment in the IT sector on the basis of enterprise survey
Sector Organized Unorganized All
Manufacturing 241,199 60,502 301,701
Trade 4,143 4,143
Telecommunication 227,822 35,542 263,364
IT and enabled services 36,071 115,799 151,870
ICT sector 509,235 211,843 721,078
Source: Sarkar and Mehta (2006). Original source is Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) and
Employment Review of DGE&T.
Note
Manufacturing refers to the year 2000–2001, organized-service sector refer to the March 1998
and unorganized-service sector refer to the year 2001–2002.
Table 3.5 Employment in the IT sector on the basis of household survey (1999–2000)
Sector Rural Urban Total % share of rural
Manufacturing 54,766 416,305 471,071 11.63
Trade 1,151 34,644 35,795 3.22
Telecommunication 118,390 199,135 317,525 37.29
IT and ITES 13,688 249,393 263,081 5.20
Total 187,995 899,477 1,087,472 17.29
Source: Sarkar and Mehta (2006). Original source is National Sample Survey, Unit-level data, 55th
round (1999–2000).
Note
Employment includes that of Usual Principal Status (UPS) workers only.
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are unlikely to follow the sectoral pattern of growth as other countries experi-
enced in the development process.
Further discussion of this important issue will be found in Chapters 8 and 9 in
Part III of this work.
Employment in the organized sector
It might be useful at this point to put the size of the formal or organized sub-sector
in manufacturing in the context of total employment in the formal sector. In
Chapter 10 we will examine the formal–informal distinction within the tertiary
sector in detail. But for the present purposes the official estimates of different types
of employment within the formal sector put out by the Ministry of Finance of GOI
will suffice. These are given in Table 3.7. The stagnation of manufacturing in the
formal sector is apparent from this table, as is the relatively small share of manufac-
turing in total formal sector employment. The total including all sectors is itself
very small in 2001 – only about 7 percent of all employment. The public sector still
dominates the scene in formal employment in spite of India having embarked on a
process of encouragement of the private sector since the early 1980s.
Table 3.6 Share of household enterprises (OAME) and of establishments with 500 plus
workers in manufacturing employment and GVA
Variable and size 1984–1985 1989–1990 1994–1995 2000–2001
Employment
Household enterprises 62 57 54 56
500 and above 8 7 8 7
Value-added
OAME 17 13 9 10
500 and above 40 41 43 42
Relative labor productivity, 
OAME = 1
500 and above 17 24 33 33
Source: Calculated from respective years ASI and NSS unorganized manufacturing data.
Table 3.7 Employment in the organized sector (millions)
1981 1991 2001 2003
Private-sector total 7.4 7.7 8.7 8.4
of which manufacturing 4.5 4.5 5.0 4.7
Public-sector total 15.5 19.1 19.1 18.6
of which manufacturing 1.5 1.9 1.4 1.3
Private and public sectors 22.9 26.8 27.8 27.0
of which manufacturing 6.0 6.4 6.4 6.0
Source: Employment Review of DGE&T.
Patterns of urbanization and the quality of employment
A feature of economic growth has been the increasing absorption of labor in the
urban sector. The rate of urbanization has been slow in India – consistent with
the slow transformation of the employment structure. There has been some
concern in the literature if the reallocation of labor to higher-quality jobs in non-
agriculture has been disproportionately achieved only in the urban economy. We
can also refer at this point to the finding in Chapter 5 that there have been
important changes in recent decades in the size structure of towns, with a redis-
tribution of population to smaller towns. How does in the change in the indus-
trial structure of employment differ between small and large towns – as well as
between rural and urban areas? To throw light on this question we present in
Table 3.8 the way the incremental flow of labor in each of the three broad
sectors was distributed between the rural, and the three classes of towns. The
data are presented separately for the 1980s (1983 to 1993/1994) and the nineties
(1993/1994 to 1999/2000), but the classification by size of town is not available
for the earlier period. Of particular interest is the relative importance of the
flows of new employment in the secondary and the tertiary sectors. The import-
ance of the secondary sector even in the most recent period is higher in the
urban areas as whole, and in large towns. In 1990–2000 the share of manufactur-
ing was 27 percent in large towns compared to 19 percent in small towns and
only 7 percent in the rural areas. But it is apparent from the figures on incremen-
tal flows in Table 3.8 that a redistribution of employment in the secondary sector
has been taking place in the recent period in favor of small towns, and also the
shares of the rural and the urban sectors in the new employment has been almost
the same. The importance of the small towns in the tertiary sector has, however,
been increasing faster. The small towns have clearly witnessed a substantial
swing away from employment in the primary sector. The redistribution of
employment to small towns, which has been noticed, has been driven by non-
agriculture.
Expansion of education and the quality of employment
The expansion of employment outside agriculture – and the concomitant upgrad-
ing of jobs – is closely related to the expansion of education. It has been main-
tained that the lopsided development of education outside the rural sector has in
fact hindered the diversion of employment in the rural economy (Chadha and
Sahu 2002).
Table 3.9 in particular brings out the point that it is at the education level
‘graduate and above’ that the urban economy plays an overwhelming role in
attracting the educated. But it is also of great importance to note that the major
proportionate shifts in the additional flows of educated labor are to be observed
in the smaller towns in the post-reform period. These towns have been able to
attract a large proportion of educated labor – with secondary as well as college
qualification – in major way in the 1993–1999 period. This is another interesting
Employment and earnings 1983–2000 59
Table 3.8 Distribution of the increment of worker by size of community: broad sectors (percentages)
Industry Period I (1983/1984–1993/1994) Period II (1993/1994–1999/2000)
Rural Urban Small towns Medium towns Large towns Rural Urban Small towns Medium towns Large towns
<50,000 50,000– >1,000,000 <50,000 50,000– >1,000,000
thousand 1,000,000 1,000,000
Primary 62.0 7.0 46.1 –12.5 –56.5 –2.1 –0.5
Secondary 14.6 27.8 29.0 31.6 39.0 31.1 29.2
Tertiary 23.4 65.2 24.9 80.9 117.5 71.0 71.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Calculated from unit-level data of employment and unemployment schedule of NSS rounds of 38th, 50th and 55th rounds.
Note
The data for filling in the flows by size of towns do not exist for the first period.
Table 3.9 Distribution of average annual increment of labor force by educational level and community size (%)
Level of Education Period I (1983/1984–1993/1994) Period II (1993/1994–1999/2000)
Rural Urban Small towns Medium Metro Rural Urban Small Medium towns Metro 
<50,000 towns 50,000– >1,000,000 towns 50,000– >1,000,000
1,000,000 <50,000 1,000,000
Not literate 13.0 10.7 –14.4 0.4 –243.7 –3.2 9.4
Literate and up 29.9 13.9 15.3 –0.5 –272.2 –4.9 13.0
to primary
Middle 24.4 15.6 46.6 27.9 173.5 19.3 26.0
Secondary 26.6 34.0 28.7 24.4 163.9 28.3 17.4
Higher Secondary 12.8 13.5 102.0 15.9 8.9
Graduate 6.4 26.0 10.1 33.9 173.0 44.0 25.2
Not specified –0.2 –0.1 1.0 0.4 3.5 0.6 0.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Calculated from unit-level data of employment and unemployment schedule of NSS rounds of 38th, 50th and 55th rounds.
Note
The data for filling in the flows by size of towns do not exist for the first period.
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part of the increasing role played by the smaller towns in recent years – which
had already been noticed in Chapter 2.
India has made rapid progress in upgrading the quality of its labor force. The
number of workers with less than five years of education has come down steeply
from 80 percent in 1983 to 65.5 in 1999–2000. But even then it is significantly
behind most of the rapidly developing countries in Asia. The average years of
schooling for the population aged 25 and over in China around 2000 were 5.7,
and in East Asia 6.5 compared with 3.6 in India. The proportions with no
schooling were 20.9, 22.8 and 44.5 respectively. Equally damaging is the low
proportion of those with secondary schooling – known to be a critical group in
the development of manufacturing and other modern-sector activities. In India it
is only 17 percent at this date, much lower than India’s income level would
predict. It is only half that of China, and the proportion is worse for females
(World Bank 2007, Table 1.3). It will be suggested in Chapter 9 that its relative
neglect of primary and post-primary education in earlier years might have been a
major cause of the persistence of ‘dualism’ and the slow growth of the dynamic
manufacturing sector in India.
Trends in wages and wage inequality
Wages of casual and regular workers
The wage sector in India is substantial – even in the rural areas. Regular workers
(those with a more permanent contract for varying periods of time) are more
important in the urban areas, and casual wage workers (those hired on day-to-
day contract as work is available) are in a majority in the rural economy.
Regular workers have several days of work during the week – the NSS data
show that the average is between 5.6 and 5.9. Casual workers get work for fewer
days of the week – generally less than four. Part of the difference in the earnings
per worker between the two categories, therefore, reflects the difference in the
number of days of work secured in the week of enumeration. For casual workers
the seasonal element is likely to be of great importance. When making compari-
son between the two groups – which could be used to reflect an aspect of the
formal–informal dichotomy in the labor market – it is important to be clear as to
the objective if the comparison: are we interested in the levels of income of the
two classes or in the returns to a unit of work?
Average wages (earnings) per day
The NSS collected data on the earnings of the workers for the preceding week
(seven days) of the survey, and it also recorded in the same field the number of
person-days the worker was actually at work. These data give us the earnings
per day for both casual and regular workers. The casual–regular wage difference
varies by rural–urban location, by gender and also by occupation (i.e., manual or
non-manual). In the rural areas there were about ten million casual workers
according to the 55th round of the NSS (Census adjusted 15–59 age group) and
only two million regular. The corresponding figures for the urban sector were
1.4 and 2.5 million. Females were a third of the total in the rural casual labor
market, but in all other segments, in the regular category and in urban areas, the
representation of females is much smaller – of the order of 15–20 per cent. It is
to be noted that not all regular workers were classified as non-manual. In fact
both in the rural and the urban sectors almost half of the regular were manual
workers. On the other hand, only 10–15 per cent of the casual workers were
non-manual.
We examined the data from the NSS showing the difference in mean wages
per day for different categories of workers in the 15–59 age group for the 55th
round 1999–2000. For casual workers the manual wage rates are close to the
non-manual, for both sexes, in both the rural and the urban areas. On the other
hand, the difference between the two categories of workers for the regular wage
earners is huge (between twice and three times as high). It shows the importance
of human capital attainments in the determination of regular wages.
It is important to note, however, that even for manual workers alone, regulars
earn nearly double the amount of casuals – except for females in rural areas,
where the differential is more like 50 per cent higher. Since regular workers get
a significantly larger number of days of work in the week (also get paid for the
whole week), the difference in earnings would be even higher. While a part of
this difference – even for manual workers – might reflect measured human
capital attributes, a good deal of the differential really pertains to the formal-
informal sector dichotomy in the labor market. This differential is partly due to
institutional factors (employment in large establishments, or in the public sector)
and partly due to the operation of the wage-efficiency relationship for ‘estab-
lished’ workers with low turnover.
Distribution of wages
The data on wages from the NSS have been analyzed by Puja Vasudeva-Dutta
(2004). Vasudeva noted that the dispersion in wages among casual workers is
much smaller than among regular wages. This is confirmed by the graphs in
Figure 3.2, which also suggests that the dispersion seems to have increased over
time for regular wage workers, but not for the casual. A major reason for the dif-
ference is, of course, is that regular wage workers have a much greater variance in
human capital attributes, particularly education. There is a big difference between
manual and non-manual wage difference for regular workers, but not for the
casual, reflecting the dispersion by skill and education for the former category.
Growth rate of wage rates
The figures 3.3a and 3.3b give a picture of the growth rates of real wage rates for
different categories of labor namely rural male (RM), rural female (RF), urban
male (UM) and urban female (UF).
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Figure 3.3a Growth rate of wage of regular non-manual wage earners.
The wages of regular non-manual workers in the second period increased at
around twice the rate of the pre-liberalization era, but there was little change in
the growth rates of casual manual workers. This is an aspect of the increase in
inequality in the labor market in the nineties.
Trends in wage inequality
It can be inferred from Figure 3.2 that there is strong suggestion from the KDF`
graphs that wage inequality is higher for regular workers and has increased over
time. Vasudeva’s summary measures for wage inequality indicated that, for
regular workers, GE(0) went up from 0.286 to 0.337 between 1983 and 1999,
and GE(2) increased from 0.381 in 1983 to 0.430 in 1999. The level of inequal-
ity was much less for casual workers and it also declined over time. The values
of GE(0) were 0.143 in 1983 and 0.117 in 1999.
It is interesting to note that while inequality among regular workers increased
significantly between 1993 and 1999 – and more so at the upper end as evident
from the larger increase in the GE(2) measure – the ‘between group inequality’ for
educational groups did not change by all that much. Much the more important part
of the inequality increase was accounted for by the ‘within group’ component.
This is in line with the evidence from other countries which have experienced
increase in wage inequality in the globalization era. While returns to formal educa-
tion do increase, it is the differential valuation of the individual worker’s non-
formal attributes which seem to be more important in the increase in inequality.
Vasudeva has used the regression-based methodology of Fields to study the
‘factor inequality shares’ of different explanatory variables in the earnings func-
tions estimated separately for the regular and the casual workers (Field 2000).
The ‘factor inequality share’ gives a quantitative estimate of the total inequality
in the dependant variable (in this case ‘wage earnings’) explained by the differ-
ent explanatory variables in the earnings function.
A semi-logarithmic Mincerian (standard or augmented) wage determining
function can be written as:
(1)
where a = β1.....βj, 1 and Z = Ζ1.....Ζj, ε are vectors of coefficients and explana-
tory variables respectively. An inequality index I can be defined on the vector of
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wages (w). Applying Shorrocks’ theorem the relative factor inequality weights
(i.e., the percentage of inequality that is accounted for by the jth factor) can be cal-
culated as follows:
(2)
where cov[.] denotes the covariance, cor(.) the correlation coefficient and σ(.)
the standard deviation.
The major results from Vasudeva’s exercise can be summarized as follows:
1 As far as regular workers are concerned just over half of the variance in the
log of wages are explained by the earnings function. The same variables
explain much less – a third – of the variance for casual workers.
2 In terms of the explained part of the variance, human capital variables were
most important for regular workers. Age accounted for about a quarter and
education a third of the explained variance in 1999. The other important
factor in line was industry affiliation – contributing another quarter.
3 By contrast, human-capital factors were of much less importance for casual
workers – only age, and not education having any positive contribution, but at
a much lower level of around 7 percent. The single most important explana-
tory variable was geographical difference – the state of residence contributing
no less than 62 percent for casuals as against only 3.5 percent for regulars.
4 Although for regular workers the wage gap between those with graduate
and primary-school qualifications increased between 1983 and 1999 (see
‘Rural–urban differences’ section below), the share of education in the
explanation of the variance declined from 23 to 17 percent. The importance
of age increased as did that of industry affiliation. Further, Vasudeva con-
firms that the increase in the ‘contribution of selection coupled with the fall
in that of education suggest a rising importance of unobservable for regular
workers, possibly linked to the process of trade liberalization’.
Inequality in household welfare
Although substantial wage employment in India is still only a part of total
employment, and a good deal of households are outside the wage-sector –
mostly self-employed. We would want to know if the experience of non-wage
households mirrors that of the wage earners. This section therefore looks at the
trends of welfare of all households irrespective of the type of employment. We
choose as our measure the average (mean) per capita expenditure (APCE) of the
households as recorded by the NSS of successive rounds. Figure 3.4 portrays the
movement of the KDF distribution of APCE over time, separately for the rural
and the urban areas.
It is apparent that while the modes of the distribution have shifted outward in














‘flattening’ of the distribution in the urban sector signifying an increased degree
of inequality.
Table 3.10 gives the measures for overall inequality. Note the large values for
GE(2) which is more sensitive to high incomes. While this measure has decreased
substantially in the rural areas it has increased in the urban.






































Figure 3.4b KDF distribution of APCE, Urban (poverty line: 227.20, at
1993–1994=100).
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Rural–urban differences
The discussion in the last section has suggested that inequality has increased
more strongly in the urban economy, at least in the post-reform era. Thus the
disparity in household welfare between the two sectors has increased, we now
look a bit more intensively at the rural–urban difference. Has the disparity
increased more for some groups rather than others? Can we isolate more con-
cretely the factors responsible for it?
Figure 3.5 brings out clearly the point that the relative difference in household
welfare has increased for higher expenditure groups. We can compute the
‘Blinder–Oaxaca’ decomposition of mean outcome differential between the
rural and the urban sectors, The difference between two groups can be decom-
posed into three parts: i) due to differences in endowment (E); ii) due to differ-
ences in coefficients including the intercept (C); and iii) due to interaction between
Table 3.10 Inequality measures for APCE, 50th and 55th rounds of NSS
Rural Urban
1993 1999 1993 1999
GE(0) 0.111 0.113 0.165 0.191
GE(1) 0.132 0.129 0.184 0.222
GE(2) 0.329 0.207 0.305 0.442





















Figure 3.5 Urban–rural difference in APCE by percentile.
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Table 3.11 Summary of Oaxaca decomposition results for APCE (as %)
55th 50th 43rd
Amount attributable: 30.2 14.5 7.4
due to endowments (E) 21.1 22.7 21.1
due to coefficients (C) 9.1 –8.2 –13.7
Shift coefficient (U) 17.7 28.1 31.7
Raw differential (R) {E+C+U} 47.9 42.6 39.1
Adjusted differential (D) {C+U} 26.8 19.9 18.0
Endowments as % total (E/R) 44.1 53.3 53.9
Discrimination as % total (D/R) 55.9 46.7 46.1
Notes
U = unexplained portion of differential (difference between model constants).
D = portion due to discrimination (C+U).
+ sign indicates advantage to high group.
– sign indicates advantage to low group.
coefficient and endowment (CE). Depending on the model that is assumed to be
‘true’ model (absence of discrimination), the three-fold decomposition can be used
to determine the explained (Q) and unexplained (U). By using the low group (rural
APCE) as the no-discrimination base we calculated Q = E and U = C + CE.
Table 3.11 summarize the results for the ‘Oaxaca decomposition’ for APCE
between the rural and urban areas. The calculations show that there has been
a substantial increase in the ‘discrimination’ factor for urban households in
the post-reform years between the 50th and 55th rounds. The increase in the
rural–urban disparity is due not to the better endowments of the urban workers
but to the higher returns to the human-capital factors secured by them in the
urban economy.
Returns to education
The results discussed above suggest that educational developments have been a
major player in the increase in inequality and in the growing rural–urban disparity.
The increments to income from successive levels of education could be approxim-
ated by the difference in co-efficient to the education dummies in a fitted earnings
functions for regular wage earners. These are reported in Table 3.12 and graphed
in Figures 3.6a and 3.6b separately for the rural and the urban areas.
The difference between rural and urban economies is brought out dramatically
in Figures 3.6a and 3.6b. The lift to the returns to education in the post-reform
years occurs at different levels of education in the two areas. In the rural economy
the sharp increase occurs at the level of secondary education, while in the urban
sector the lift is observed at the college graduate level. The curves for the succes-
sive rounds, however, intersect at lower education levels in both sectors, showing
that at levels less than middle, the returns to education are in fact depressed for the
later years. They are nearly at the same level for middle-school leavers in the rural
sector, and for secondary-school leavers in the urban. All this is consistent with
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Table 3.12 Private returns to different levels of education (in %) of regular wage workers
Rural Urban
Educational level 38th 50th 55th 38th 50th 55th
Literate 5.6 19.9 –8.8 5.5 13.3 4.3
Primary 24.2 14.3 12.4 7.6 0.4 2.9
Middle 17.4 13.2 16.0 14.1 16.3 14.4
Secondary 33.1 35.4 44.8 35.0 33.9 34.7
Graduate 25.7 29.4 27.5 34.5 38.7 43.7
Notes
1 The figures are the difference in coefficients of the successive dummies of education levels used
in the estimation of the earnings function. The base is ‘Illiterate’. Other variables included in the
regression were age, age square, regional dummies, sex dummies.
2 Manual workers are excluded.
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Figure 3.6a Private return to different levels of education (urban).
Note
1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 denote the levels of education namely literate, primary, middle, secondary and gradu-
ate respectively.
expectations about what might happen with the increase in the supply of educated
labor. Demand outstrips supply in the post-reform period in the rural areas for
secondary-school leavers, and for college graduates in the urban.
Analysis of the returns to education by age-groups revealed an interesting
finding about the urban labor market. For the 20–29 group the marginal returns to
secondary education actually fell in the 50th and the 55th rounds while those for
college graduates showed a sharp upward movement. By contrast for the older
30–39 group there was a milder increase for both the secondary and college grad-
uates in both the 50th and the 55th rounds. It is clear that the demand for the
more educated has been soaring in recent years and has affected the new entrants
to the urban labor market more strongly.
The literature has drawn attention to the increased demand for more educated
labor in the era of globalization in a number of countries and has stressed the
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Figure 3.6b Private return to different levels of education (rural).
Note
1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 denote the levels of education namely literate, primary, middle, secondary and gradu-
ate respectively.
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Table 3.13 Distribution of incremental work force by educational level and broad industry
group in urban areas, UPSS (15–59)
Level of Education 1983–1993 1993–1999
Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary
Not literate 17.7 11.6 9.1 56.6 7.9 5.6
Literate and up to primary 31.1 10.2 13.3 41.9 4.3 4.0
Middle 14.2 18.5 14.6 3.6 30.9 23.3
Secondary 24.5 38.9 32.9 –1.7 34.1 33.8
Graduate and above 12.7 20.7 30.2 –0.6 22.3 33.1
Not specified 0.0 0.1 –0.2 0.2 0.5 0.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note
During 1993–1994 and 1999–2000 there is a decline in absolute number of UPSS workers in
primary sector, so negative figures mean positive increase.
and/or the importance of more skill-intensive manufactured goods in international
trade (see Chapter 1 above). But we have seen that the employment expansion in
post-reform India has been concentrated not so much in skill-intensive manufac-
turing as in the tertiary sector. It is therefore useful to ask the question: is the
expansion of demand for educated labor which we witness particularly in the
market for college graduates in the urban areas originating mostly in the tertiary
sector? Table 3.13 gives the distribution of the addition to the UPS workforce by
industry for different levels of educational attainments.
It is apparent that the market for college graduates in particular has expanded
relatively more in the tertiary sector. A somewhat unexpected finding is that this
trend had been going on since the eighties. Equally revealing is the finding that
labor with less than middle level of schooling is now almost entirely absorbed in
the primary sector. The difference between NO_ED and BASE_ED education
stressed in the Introduction to the book would seem to be drawn at the boundary
of primary education in the Indian labor market in the late nineties. Entry into
the non-primary sector would now seem to require post-primary education.
We will discuss in Chapter 10 in particular that the bias in Indian policies
towards tertiary education has encouraged the growth of skill-intensive industries.
It is seen from the evidence presented here that the demand for labor with college
education seems to be outrunning the supply with this pattern of development –
even with the historical bias in education policies. It is very likely that the return to
college education has continued to increase in the years since 1999–2000.
Appendix
Employment estimates based on current daily status (CDS)
Current daily status of all individuals above the age of five is coded in the NSS
for each half-day over the seven days preceding the survey. The activity of each
half-day could be classified as (i) employed (ii) unemployed or (iii) out of labor
force. Even if an individual is not classified as unemployed under the usual
status in the week, some half-days of unemployment are possible if they are
available for work for those units of time. Thus apart from the ‘usual’ unem-
ployed the unemployment days would be contributed by casual workers; the
self-employed who are working generally; and even by those ‘usually’ outside
the labor force. The CDS unemployment rate is calculated by adding up these
person-days of unemployment as a proportion of all days of employment plus
unemployment.
There has been a school of thought in the Planning Commission and other
GOI circles which has favored the use of CDS for the estimates of employment.
This generally produces estimates which are much lower for 1999–2000 than
those calculated on the UPS or UPSS basis. Thus the growth rate of employment
shows a significantly higher rate of decline than the other estimates. For
example, Srinivavsan (2005, Table 4) gives the growth rate of employment in
the 1987–1999 period (between the 43rd and 55th rounds) in the rural areas at
4.59 percent on the CDS basis against 1.48 percent on the UPSS basis. But
Srinivasan comments:
The total number of person-days of employment is not the same as the total
number of employed persons. The reason is that a given total number of
person-days of employment could be distributed among the same number of
persons in many ways so as to lead to different numbers of persons
employed. For example, consider a four person economy in which all four
participate in the work force and together they were employed for ten
person-days in the week. This yields a person-day rate of employment of
10 out of 28 or 36%. If the ten person-days are distributed in a way that one
person is employed for seven days, another for three days and the remaining
two are unemployed, then person-rate of employment is two out of four or
50%. On the other hand, if it is distributed in a way that three persons work
for three days each and one person works for just a day, the person rate of
employment is four out of four or 100%, given the priority given to the
status of employment!
We know that the NSS estimates of the numbers of persons in different
demographic groups are underestimated, so we have to get the population
figures from the Census counts. It is inappropriate to apply the employment rates
based on person-days to the count of persons obtained from the Census of Popu-
lation to arrive at the total number of employed persons.
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4 Accounting for the decline in
labor supply in the 1990s
It has already been mentioned in the last chapter that the Task Force of the
Planning Commission on Employment Opportunities (July 2001) had in its
Report (popularly known as the ‘Ahluwalia Report’) focused attention on the
sharp decline in employment growth. The Committee rightly pointed out that
while a part of the slowdown in employment growth was due to an increase in
the rate of unemployment, much the more important part of the decline has to
be ascribed to a slow down in the growth of the labor force. This is largely
because of a fall in the participation rates (PRs) as measured by the NSS.
The Committee did not take a firm position on the reasons for the fall in
participation rates, but the arguments presented included non-economic
factors. e.g., the expected shift in the activity status of the younger age group
towards education; increase in the share of the population aged 60 and over; a
reversal or ‘correction’ of the increase in PRs of certain age groups recorded
in the 1993–1994 NSS (p. 45). At the same time its assertion that the decline
in the PRs in the prime age group is ‘within the margin of sampling errors’,
while partly applicable to males, is, as we shall see, certainly not true for
females.
A follow-up Report by a ‘Special Group’ of the Planning Commission (May
2002) firmly put its emphasis on a slowdown in the growth of demand for labor
as the culprit on the observed trends in labor force and employment growth.
Noting that the fall in employment growth was accompanied by a higher rate of
GDP growth, the Committee concluded: ‘It means that the capacity for job cre-
ation per unit of output went down about three times compared with that in the
1980s and the early 90s’ (ibid., p. 336). It suggested that the nature of economic
growth had become more capital-intensive, both due to structural changes, and
the ‘rightsizing’ of labor use.
In this chapter we shall go into some detail into the reasons for the fall in par-
ticipation rates which is the main cause of the observed decline in employment
rate. Our major purpose would be to see if we can confirm in any conclusive
way if this is the result more of demand-side developments (as implied by the
‘Special Group’ Report).
The theoretical perspective
The measured labor force at any point of time (and the volume of employment)
is determined by the equation of the demand and supply functions of labor. If
the observed magnitude changes over time it might be because of the shift of the
demand or the supply functions or by a combination of the shifts in both. Thus if
the labor force or employment growth falls over time we cannot conclude that it
is because of a fall in the demand for labor. It might easily be caused more by a
fall in the supply of labor. We cannot measure the contribution of supply and
demand factors to the observed slowdown without a fully specified and esti-
mated model. While this might be difficult to achieve we can at least infer the
relative importance of the two sets of factors qualitatively by looking at trends in
wage levels over the time periods covered. This can be illustrated by Figure 4.1.
The Figure 4.1 shows the supply-and-demand framework for wage determi-
nation in a dynamic setting. The x-axis measures participation rate while the 
y-axis measures the wage per worker. The participation rate in effect measures
the flow of labor per unit of time out of the potential stock. The demand function
is then downward sloping: the lower the wage level the more is the flow of labor
sought by employers from the existing stock. The upward sloping supply func-
tion is propelled by the ‘substitution effect’ of changes in wage levels. A higher
wage will see a higher rate of allocation of time to the labor market at the
expense of other activities, like leisure, household work or education.
As we have seen the post-reform period in India saw a significant fall in the
rate of growth of employment compared to the previous decade. It will be shown
in the next section that this decline was the counterpart of a decline in the partic-
ipation rate In the competitive labor-market framework presented in Figure 4.1,
this must imply that, if this decline has been caused by a shift in the demand
function with a relatively unchanged supply function, the wage per worker must
fall in the second period (situation 2 in Figure 4.1). We have already seen in the
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last chapter that this has not been the case. The real wage has increased in the
post-reform period. This outcome is only possible if the supply function has
shifted upward. Such a shift is possible if the ‘income effect’ of higher welfare
levels causes household members to supply less labor to the market for a given
wage growth. An increasing growth rate of wages could indeed both cause and
sustain such an increase in household income levels.
In the empirical work presented below we shall be investigating the possibil-
ity of such an income effect for different demographic groups and sectors.
It is of course possible that the wage determination in the Indian economy
cannot be interpreted within the competitive labor-market framework in the
post-reform years. The higher rate of wages might have been the result of insti-
tutional factors. In this case the rate of employment growth (and consequently
participation) could fall in response to the higher wage growth, and the gap
between the growth of labor supply and of labor demand would have opened up
leading to a higher rate of unemployment (situation 3 in the Figure 4.1). In fact
the second Report of the Planning Commission hinted at this possibility
without actually analyzing it in detail. There are two objections to this altern-
ative hypothesis. The rate of unemployment did increase in the post-reform
years, but we shall see in the discussion below that the magnitude of this
increase was not really large enough to account for the large fall in the growth
rate of employment. Second, and more crucially, it is hard to believe that insti-
tutional determination of the higher growth rate of wages would be at all realis-
tic in an economy in which the bulk of employment is in the ‘unorganized’
sector.
There is a third possibility which is suggested by the ‘segmented labor
market’ model. Segmentation implies that labor markets in the different seg-
ments are subject to different sets of supply-and-demand factors. In this case
falling demand in one segment causing reduced participation might coexist with
increased demand in other segments putting an upward pressure on wages. If,
then, the observed data refer to participation in the first segment and wages in
the second, we might indeed have the apparently inconsistent picture referred to
above with slackening demand coexisting with rising wages in the aggregate.
Segmentation might be caused by many factors and depending on the focus of
our analysis could refer to gender, formal-informal, caste and many others. In
the context of the current issue the factor we should emphasize is the distinction
between primary and secondary earners. In the methodology of the NSS the
former is called Usual Principal Status (UPS) and the latter Subsidiary Status
(SS). This distinction is important in the context of the issue being discussed,
because as we shall see a substantial part of the fluctuation in participation has
taken place in the market for SS workers, while the wage or earnings data which
are reported are for the markets of UPS workers.
The SS labor market is dominated by females, the majority in self-employed
status, who are generally part of agricultural households and divide their time
between household activity and work on the family farm as required. The
amount of time spent on the latter is not measured by the NSS which only
records the number such workers during the period of the survey. During an
upsurge in economic activity, as might have happened during the introduction of
new technology in paddy in the early eighties, the increase in demand for labor
might be partly met by an increase in workers of secondary status working for
varying lengths of time. Over a period of time as the labor market settles down
to the new level of activity if the technical change is of a lasting kind, a new
deployment of labor would normally be worked out by farmers in which some
of the secondary workers used would be replaced by UPS workers on more
permanent basis. Since the time spent by the latter on economic work is nor-
mally much larger than that by secondary workers, the numbers recorded as
employed by the total (including both UPS and USS workers) might actually fall
although the number of UPS workers might have increased. Thus the total
employment figure might give a misleading idea of the change in demand in the
labor market. We have to look specifically to the numbers in UPS status to see
how the employment change in relate the recorded change in wage levels.
We will follow this line of analysis in the empirical work reported below.
It might be objected that in the discussion above we might have over-
emphasized the importance of wage workers in the Indian labor markets. In so
far there is a large presence of self-employed workers, an analysis focused on
wage trends might be misleading.
How important is wage labor in the Indian labor market?
The share of wage workers in UPS (principal) employment is more than half –
slightly less in rural areas. Some part of wage labor is, however, supplied by
secondary workers. It is important to get an idea about what proportion of the
UPSS employed (principal and subsidiary together) actually participate in the
labor market as wage labor either as a first or a second job. This total gives us
the proportion of the employed who actually respond to wage signals in the labor
market directly. Looking at the (larger) UPSS labor force as a whole, it was seen
that the proportion of wage workers goes up (relative to the UPS count) by
3.5 percent in rural areas but it marginally declines in the urban areas. Evidently
in rural areas more of the total enter the labor market as wage workers in sub-
sidiary employment. In the urban areas relatively more workers in secondary
status are to be found in the non-wage employment segment.
Decline in labor-force growth and distribution of fall in
LFPR among different demographic groups
The fall in the rate of growth of employment in the post-reform period can be
shown to be basically due to the fall in the participation rate. It has already been
pointed out in the last chapter that the rate of unemployment in the Indian labor
market is low, either with or without the secondary workers. Even if the rates of
unemployment might have gone up in the post-reform era a bit its overall impact
on the employment growth is small.
Our discussion in this section, therefore, concentrates on the changes in the
participation rates, and the possible reasons for these changes.
Decline in labor supply in the 1990s 77
78 Poverty, inequality, employment, earnings
We first set out the change in the rates of growth of the total (UPSS) labor
force between the different NSS rounds.
Table 4.1 suggests that there was substantial decline in the labor-force growth
from the 1980s (38th to 50th round or 1983 to 1993–1994) to the 1990s (50th to
55th round or 1993–1994 to 1999–2000) from 1.71 percent to 1.23 percent. The
decline in the labor force could be due to decline in the working-age population
or due to the decline in the labor-force participation rate (LFPR). Keeping the
LFPR of 1999–2000 the same as 1993–1994 we find that hypothetical labor-
force growth would have been much higher at 2.16 percent – much higher that
even in the 1980s. It clearly shows that it is the decline in the LFPR that is
mainly responsible for slower growth of employment in the 1990s.
We examined separate graphs for the age-specific LFPRs for all the three
rounds for rural male, rural female, urban male and urban female.
The overall impression from the four profiles of age-specific PRs is that the
most important change in the post-reform period is the decline in female partici-
pation, particularly in the rural economy. As far as males are concerned, the pro-
files for both the rural and the urban areas showed marginal declines in LFPR in
age groups 5–19 years and 59+ age groups in 1990s. The decline in male LFPR
in 5–19 years was substantial in the 1980s but slowed down in the 1990s – in
both rural and urban areas. By contrast, the female LFPR showed a decline in all
age groups between 1993–1994 and 1999–2000. In the previous period between
1983 and 1993–1994 the decline in both rural and urban areas were sharper in
5–19 age groups, but there was no substantial changes in the older age groups.
The distinctive change in the latest period is the marked decline in female LFPR
in the working age group as well.
As a substantial proportion of females participate in the labor market in a
subsidiary capacity (i.e., enter the labor market only for a part of the year) it is
worthwhile to look at female LFPR separately for UPS (Principal) and SS (Sub-
sidiary) categories. This is portrayed in Figures 4.2a to 4.2d.
Table 4.1 Growth of UPSS labor force (annual compound in percentages)
Rounds Rural Urban Rural Urban Male Female Total
Male Female Male Female
38th–50th (1983 to 1.62 1.06 2.70 3.19 1.42 2.80 1.89 1.35 1.71
1993–1994)
50th–55th 1.15 0.41 2.63 1.35 0.89 2.37 1.55 0.55 1.23
(1993–1994 to 
1999–2000)
50–55th derived 1.81 1.93 3.06 3.69 1.85 3.19 2.14 2.20 2.16
Source: Calculated from unit-level data of employment and unemployment schedule of 38th, 50th
and 55th rounds.
Note
Derived figures are hypothetical labor force if there was no change of LFPR of 12 age groups (five-
year interval) during 50th to 55th rounds.
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As in the case of males, the UPS female LFPR in all areas showed marginal
decline only in the 5–19 age group in the 1990s most of the decline having taken
place in the earlier decade. In the urban areas a marginal decline was observed in
other age groups as well. But the real dramatic changes seem to have taken place
in the category of subsidiary female labor. The LFPR graphs in both rural and
urban areas showed shift inwards in the 1990s – signifying a decline in LFPR in
all age groups. This contrasts strongly with the movement in the previous period
in the 1980s, the adult age groups of 25–49 years showing a substantial increase
in LFPR in both rural and urban areas. The patterns and the nature of shift of the
LFPR graphs suggest that there was an upsurge in female subsidiary labor
demand in the period between 38th and 50th rounds and females belonging to
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the age group 25–49 were in the best position to respond to it. However,
between the 50th and the 55th rounds there seems to have been a substantial
decline in the demand for subsidiary workers and it is reflected in the inward
movement of the entire LFPR curve for female subsidiaries (It is to be remem-
bered that for the subsidiary labor force there is no unemployment, all are
employed.) This is an important point – which is valid both for the rural and the
urban sectors, but quantitatively more so for the rural.
Accounting for the decline in the labor force in the nineties
Three significant points emerged from the discussion in the last section: First,
the decline in the 5–19 age group of the primary labor force (UPS); Second, a






























































































































marginal decline in the 59+ UPS labor; last, a substantial decline in female sub-
sidiary labor supply.
The question is what is the relative contribution of each of these segments to
the total decline in labor supply in the 1990s? Table 4.2 throws light on this
question. It presents the actual (A) and hypothetical (D) labor force, the latter on
the assumption of no change in age-group specific LFPRs between the 50th and
55th rounds.1
The results show that decline in LFPR actually contributed to a fall of 23 million
in the labor force. The last column shows that female subsidiary labor force (of all
ages) contributed 47 percent of the total decline. The 5–19 UPS LFPR contributed
30 percent and aged LFPR (59+) contributed another 10 percent. These three
factors combined accounted for as much as 88 percent of the total hypothetical
labor force decline in the 1990s. Clearly the first component – the withdrawal of
subsidiary females from the labor force – leads the list in terms of the diagnosis of
the observed fall in employment growth. But before coming to this topic, we
discuss briefly the fall in LFPR in the 5–19 and 59+ age groups.
5–19 UPS labor-force participation rate
The distribution of all persons in this age group in different principal activities is
given in Table 4.3.
One can clearly see that the increase in proportion of students is the main factor
responsible for decline in the work participation rate in both the rural and the
urban sectors. There is a difference between the two periods: between 1983 and
1993–1994 and the subsequent period of the 1990s. The earlier period experienced
substantial jump in the category of students but the shift was relatively more from
the category of ‘nowhere children’ (doing nothing). In the latter period, it was
largely a shift from UPS worker and domestic work. However, the withdrawal
from work in absolute term was higher in the 1980s compared with the 1990s. We
conclude that it is either demand for education and/or better educational facilities
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Table 4.2 Actual and derived labor force
Sl. no Labor force Derived (D) Actual (A) (D–A) Ratio of (D–A) 
to UPSS (in %)
1 UPSS 55th 425,060,597 402,446,304 22,614,292 100
2 SS 55th female 25,908,883 36,622,565 10,713,682 47.38
3 UPS 5–19 44,194,706 50,877,018 6,682,312 29.55
4 UPS 59+ 29,481,191 31,892,790 2,411,599 10.66
2 + 3 + 4 Total 99,584,781 119,392,373 19,807,593 87.59
Source: Calculated from unit-level data of employment and unemployment schedule of 38th, 50th
and 55th rounds.
Note
Derived figures are hypothetical labor supply when there is no change of age groupwise LFPR from
50th to 55th rounds. See Appendix 2 for detailed procedure.
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that seem to be the prime reason for decline in labor-force participation in this age
group. However, increase in the students’ participation rate in this age group
seems to be tapering off in the urban areas in the 1990s (Table 4.3).
We examined the relationship of the participation of this demographic group
to the levels of the expenditure per capita of the households to which they
belonged. The tabulation was done separately for the rural and the urban house-
holds. Participation was found to be negatively related to household expenditure
levels in both sectors, but the negative relationship was stronger in the urban
areas. The slope of the negative relationship clearly decreased over time, but
was still strong in the 1999–2000 survey, particularly in the urban sector.
Aged 59+ labor-force participation rate (LFPR)
The post-liberalization years saw a reversal in participation trends in the rural
sector for both males and females, but not in the urban areas. Participation rates
fell in contrast to the positive trend in the previous decade. In the urban sector
the relatively slow decline in participation already noticed in the previous
decade continued at more or less the same pace. Overall the share of the post-
retirement workers in the total withdrawal from the labor force in the 1993–2000
years is small.
In the 59+ age group it is generally argued that income effect predominates
when withdrawal from labor force is observed over time. Only in the case of
urban females do we see a consistent decline in LFPR over the three rounds and
also for the top three quintiles. The trends are much more mixed for the other
categories, though for both rural and urban males the decline in participation in
the 1990s seems to have been strongest in the top two quintiles.
It should be emphasized that this result, although suggestive, cannot be con-
clusive about the income effect on the participation of seniors. This is because the
Table 4.3 Distribution of UPS persons in the age group 5–19 (UPS)
Year Sector Principal status
UPS Students Domestic Doing Others*
workers work nothing
1983 Rural 19.5 38.9 13.5 26.9 1.3
1993–1994 Rural 15.6 55.1 10.2 18.3 0.9
1999–2000 Rural 12.7 60.4 8.4 17.6 0.9
1983 Urban 10.6 62.5 10.8 13.9 2.3
1993–1994 Urban 9.1 73.8 7.3 8.3 1.5
1999–2000 Urban 8.0 74.8 6.6 9.1 1.5
Source: Calculated from unit-level data of employment and unemployment schedule of 38th, 50th
and 55th rounds.
Note
* Others include unemployed.
earnings of the seniors staying on in market activity itself affect the expenditure
level of their household.
Female subsidiary labor force
Change in the demand for subsidiary labor
As argued earlier, there was a sudden upsurge of female subsidiary labor
demand in the 1980s followed by a contraction of labor demand in the 1990s.
This fluctuation requires further probe. Tables 4.4a to 4.4b present the distribu-
tion of subsidiary female employment by major industries and occupations.
As we can see subsidiary female employment is concentrated in a few agri-
cultural and allied activities, i.e., growing of cereals and animal husbandry. They
contributed 80 percent of female subsidiary employment in rural areas and even
a sizeable part of such employment in the urban labor market.
We, therefore, looked specifically at the growing of cereals sector in rural
areas since it constituted the largest chunk of female subsidiary labor supply. This
sector contributed 4.9 million out of six million of additional subsidiary female
employment between the 38th and 50th rounds. At the same time it contributed
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Table 4.4a Share of selected occupation in female subsidiary labor supply
Occupation Rural Urban
1983 1993–1994 1999–2000 1983 1993–1994 1999–2000
Cultivators 34.2 42.0 37.9 14.0 13.2 8.8
Livestock, poultry 32.1 23.2 28.6 29.5 26.8 23.0
and dairy farmers
Agricultural labor 14.5 19.7 15.5 5.5 0.8 1.1
Total 80.8 84.9 82.0 49.0 40.8 32.9
Source: Calculated from unit-level data of employment and unemployment schedule of 38th, 50th
and 55th rounds.
Table 4.4b Share of selected industries in female subsidiary labor supply
Industry Rural Urban
1983 1993–1994 1999–2000 1983 1993–1994 1999–2000
Growing of cereals 48.1 60.2 53.6 19.0 20.2 13.0
Cattle breeding 33.2 21.5 27.0 23.7 15.7 14.2
and production of milk
Total 81.3 81.7 80.6 42.7 35.9 27.2
Source: Calculated from unit-level data of employment and unemployment schedule of 38th, 50th
and 55th rounds.
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5.8 million out of 6.3 million of decline in female subsidiary employment
between the 50th and 55th rounds.
However, analysis across states for this sector show that four states Kar-
nataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and West Bengal2 played the major role
in absorption of female subsidiary labor in this sector in the 1980s and sub-
sequent decline in the 1990s. These states include the districts which experi-
enced a spread of the green revolution in the 1980s. Thus this piece of evidence
gives credence to the argument that the spread of labor absorbing green revolu-
tion technologies in the 1980s bumped up the demand for labor in these areas,
which in the short run could only be met by increasing use of female secondary
labor. Subsequently in the 1990s as rising labor costs led to the introduction of
labor replacing technologies, the additional demand for female labor subsided.
This process might have been also helped by hurdles faced by oilseed develop-
ment program in the 1990s in parts of this region.
It should be noted that most of this adjustment took place, not in the wage-labor
market, but among the self-employed workers. It can be seen from Table 4.4a that
agricultural wage labor accounted for a small portion of total female subsidiary
employment in the rural areas, and even less so in the urban sector. Further exami-
nation of the NSS data by employment status showed that casual wage labor
accounted for only 16.9 percent of all female subsidiary workers (in the age group
15 and above) in the rural areas in the 55th round – down from 21.7 percent in the
50th. The corresponding percentages in the urban sector were 12.1 and 20.6. Much
the more substantial share of such employment in both sectors was accounted for
by the ‘self-employed’ and the ‘helpers’ categories.
Evidence on the ‘income effect’
If there is a significant income effect affecting participation then we would
expect the opportunity cost of leisure to increase at all household welfare (or
income) levels – but it would presumably increase more at higher levels of
welfare. Consider a supply function of labor-relating participation rate (of, say,
prime-age females) to the household welfare level. At any point of time, for a
given distribution of household incomes, we would expect this curve to turn
down quite sharply as the effect of higher household welfare begins to over-
shadow the substitution effect. When at a later date average income of all house-
hold increases, the supply curve relating participation of this group to the
household welfare level is pushed downwards. Thus there is less participation at
all welfare levels – but the point at which there is a significant fall in the slope of
the curve comes earlier in the lower part of the household welfare distribution.
We have seen that a very important portion of the change in participation in the
post-liberalization period is accounted for by the fall in the number of females of
subsidiary status. We can try to see which household welfare groups have typ-
ically contributed to the withdrawal of labor in the female subsidiary status. The
index for household welfare used is the mean per capita expenditure level. We
use the groupings as provided by the NSS reports.
Table 4.5 Distribution of subsidiary employment across APCE groups for ages 5+




Rural Urban Rural Urban
percentile)
Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total
0–5 1 2.2 3.2 3.1 5.6 7.1 6.9 4.5 5.6 5.5 2.4 2.6 2.6
5–10 2 2.2 3.6 3.4 2.3 6.3 5.8 2.3 4.9 4.7 1.3 2.0 1.9
10–20 3 6.0 7.8 7.6 8.9 12.5 11.9 6.8 8.7 8.5 2.1 4.2 3.8
20–30 4 8.0 9.9 9.7 6.2 9.8 9.3 8.2 9.7 9.6 2.8 7.1 6.4
30–40 5 6.9 8.5 8.3 11.3 13.1 12.9 9.3 10.2 10.1 6.1 5.6 5.7
40–50 6 10.4 9.7 9.8 10.4 10.5 10.5 9.2 8.7 8.8 2.6 10.4 9.2
50–60 7 10.5 10.7 10.7 14.4 9.5 10.2 11.6 10.9 10.9 6.5 10.8 10.1
60–70 8 10.3 10.1 10.1 11.7 11.1 11.2 9.1 10.1 10.0 10.9 8.4 8.8
70–80 9 13.1 11.6 11.8 8.8 7.8 8.0 11.4 11.3 11.3 8.0 10.5 10.1
80–90 10 13.0 11.4 11.6 11.9 7.4 8.0 12.1 10.4 10.6 16.9 17.4 17.4
90–95 11 6.6 6.1 6.2 3.6 2.8 2.9 6.5 4.8 5.0 10.4 9.1 9.3
95–100 12 10.0 6.8 7.2 4.7 1.6 2.1 8.9 4.8 5.1 29.9 12.0 14.7
Not 13 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.5
mentioned
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
0–20 (P1) 10.4 14.7 14.2 16.9 25.9 24.6 13.7 19.1 18.6 5.8 8.8 8.3
80–100 (P2) 29.7 24.3 24.9 20.2 11.8 13.0 27.4 20.0 20.7 57.3 38.5 41.4
P2/P1 2.9 1.7 1.8 1.2 0.5 0.5 2.0 1.0 1.1 10.0 4.4 5.0
Source: Unit-level data of 50th and 55th rounds of employment and unemployment schedule.
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It is seen that in the rural sector the female subsidiary workers in the 55th round
area coming much more from a lower expenditure group than those in the 50th
round. Notice in particular that the P2/P1 ratio, as defined in Table 4.5, has fallen
from a value of 1.66 to 1.04 in the post-liberalization years. The value of this ratio
for rural males has also fallen, but not by as much.3 The evidence strongly sug-
gests that the withdrawal of subsidiary workers – which was identified as a domin-
ant feature of the change in the rural labor markets over this period – came
increasingly from higher household expenditure groups. Interestingly enough, the
trend in the urban sector is the exact reverse. The P2/P1 ratio increased substan-
tially both for males and females, suggesting that the withdrawal observed for sub-
sidiary workers in the urban labor markets came increasingly from lower
expenditure groups. We conclude that the ‘income effect’ seems to have been a
factor in the fall in participation of subsidiary workers, particularly females, in the
rural areas, but that other factors (e.g., education or social connection) might have
been more important in the falling participation rate in the urban economy.
Principal-status labor-force participation
Let us now see how the supply of labor in the UPS category behaves in contrast
to the supply in the UPSS status discussed in the last section. The change in the
growth rates of UPS labor by gender and sector are shown in Table 4.6.
Unlike in the case of the UPSS labor force no decline in the growth rate is
observed in the 1990s compared with the 1980s. However, there is an important
gender difference. The male labor-force growth fell in in the 1990s, whereas
female labor-force growth increased by 50 percent. The last row in Table 4.6
shows the hypothetical growth rate which would have occurred if the PRs had
remained at the same levels as in the 50th round. The significant point to note is
that in the rural labor market although the actual growth rate for female principal
workers between the 50th and the 55th rounds was below the ‘derived’ growth
rate for this group, it had nevertheless increased compared with the previous
period between the 38th and the 50th rounds. Further scrutiny about changes in
age-specific participation rates for principal females shows that this increase is
really due to an increase in PRs for the prime age groups 25–59 (see Figure 4.2a).
Table 4.6 Growth of UPS labor force (annual compound in percentage)
Rounds Rural Urban Rural Urban Male Female Total
Male Female Male Female
38th–50th 1.67 0.80 2.76 3.01 1.42 2.80 1.95 1.13 1.73
50th–55th 1.29 1.77 2.67 2.49 1.42 2.64 1.66 1.89 1.72
50th–55th 1.79 1.92 3.05 3.70 1.83 3.17 2.13 2.22 2.16
derived
Source: Calculated from unit-level data of employment and unemployment schedule of 38th, 50th
and 55th rounds.
We did a D–A analysis for rural females in the 55th round by broad age groups,
showing the difference between the derived figure of the labor force (on the
assumption of PRs being unchanged from the 50th round) and the actual labor
force reported. A negative figure indicates that the PR for the relevant age group
has increased. It was seen that the D–A statistic for the 25–59 age group was
minus two million compared to the positive 0.5 million for the total rural female
workers of UPS status. Thus while for the rural principal females as a whole there
was a net marginal decline in PRs, the PRs for the prime age groups had
increased to a significant degree, relative to the trends in all other age–sex groups
in the rural labor market for UPS workers.
Considering that there had been a substantial fall in the PRs for the rural
females in secondary status in this period (see Figure 4.4a), we conclude that
there was some shift of employment from subsidiary to principal status during
this period. It is quite consistent with rationalization of the labor force where
principal workers are preferred compared with the subsidiary labor force when
growth is sustained over a period of time.
It is clear, therefore, that the observed decline in the labor force – and the
attendant fall in employment – has not affected the principal labor market. On
the contrary the evidence suggests a tightening of labor conditions in this
market. Since the reported wage rates refer to this labor market, we would
expect this tightening to be reflected in an increase in real wages. This is indeed
what we see across the board for different classes of principal workers.
Evidence on wage trends
We have already seen in Chapter 3 that the growth rate of the manual casual
wage per day shows a slight acceleration in the rural sector as a whole, for both
males and females. More detailed statistics are given in Table 4.7 for the manual
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Table 4.7 Growth rates of manual and non-manual wage per day (casual workers)
38th to 50th 50th to 55th
Male Female Total Male Female Total
Rural wage
Manual 2.85 2.77 2.91 3.18 3.11 3.14
Non-manual 2.70 2.53 2.54 3.09 3.83 3.25
Total 2.84 2.76 2.90 3.17 3.15 3.16
Urban wage
Manual 2.23 3.43 2.51 2.91 3.61 3.51
Non-manual 2.04 0.60 1.78 4.18 3.38 4.09
Total 2.22 3.32 2.45 3.01 3.72 3.59
Source: Calculated from unit-level data of employment and unemployment schedule of 38th, 50th
and 55th rounds.
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as well as the non-manual parts of the casual labor market. The wage rate accel-
erated substantially in the second period for both sexes in non-agriculture in
rural areas and in the urban areas.
While all groups seem to have experienced an upward trend, the acceleration
in the second period was stronger for non-manual workers and in the urban
areas. The evidence suggests that the increase in demand for labor in the non-
manual labor market supplemented the relative increase in demand for female
principal workers, which seems to have been caused by the rationalization of
labor deployment in the manual agricultural labor market.
Conclusion on withdrawal of labor
The observed fall in the supply of labor in the 55th round due to decrease in
PRs has three major components: the 5–19 age group in UPS status (30 percent
of the total decrease); the older 59+ age group in UPS (11 percent); and the
females of working age group in subsidiary status (47 percent). It is the last
which has been the subject of extended discussion and alternative explanations.
Our analysis based on a reading of the historical record suggests that the key to
an understanding of this phenomenon is the upsurge in the demand for labor in
the early eighties due to the second wave of the green revolution in paddy culti-
vation and also in oilseed cultivation. This increase in demand was met in the
short run by a lift in the participation of SS females as shown in the data for the
38th and 50th rounds. As the economy adjusted to the new level of labor
demand in agriculture labor deployment was gradually changed with more use
of female labor of a more regular kind. Thus we get a shift from SS females to
UPS females between the 50th and the 55th rounds. Since the supply of effort
by UPS workers is at a substantially higher level than for the SS workers, this
led an overall decrease in female number of workers over all. While this
restructuring of the female labor demand is the basic cause of the observed fall
in PRs of SS females, we can also discern an element of the income effect
leading to a withdrawal of female secondary workers from higher income
groups. As explained the wage rates in agriculture are determined in the market
for the more regular (UPS) workers. It seems that the increase in demand for
such workers continued to keep ahead of the increase in supply due to natural
growth of the working-age population, so that the rate of increase in wages
increased in the nineties.
Appendix 1 concept of different types of labor force
Usual Principal and Subsidiary Status (UPSS) include persons in the labor force
by both major and minor time criteria. In other words, it includes both principal
and subsidiary status categories of persons in the labor force.
UPS labor force refers to the persons those who are included in the labor
force by major time criterion.
5.0.15 Usual activity status: The usual activity status relates to the activity
status of a person during the reference period of 365 days preceding the date
of survey. The activity status on which a person spent relatively longer time
(major time criterion) during the 365 days preceding the date of survey is
considered the principal usual activity status of the person. To decide the
principal usual activity of a person, he/she is first categorized as belonging
to the labor force or not, during the reference period on the basis of major
time criterion . . . . For the persons belonging to the labor force, the broad
activity status of either ‘working’ or ‘not working but seeking and/or avail-
able for work’ is then ascertained again on the basis of the relatively longer
time spent in the labor force during the 365 days preceding the date of
survey.
(Instruction manual, 55th round, schedule 10, section 5.0.15.)
In this study, the Subsidiary Status (SS) labor force is defined as persons who
are pursuing non-economic activities (out of labor force) by major time criterion
(UPS) but belong to the labor force by minor time criterion. It excludes persons
who are included in labor force by UPS to avoid double counting. Since unem-
ployment status is determined by major time criterion, those belonging to labor
force only on the basis of subsidiary status by default are all workers.
5.0.16 Subsidiary economic activity status: A person whose principal usual
status is determined on the basis of the major time criterion may have
pursued some economic activity for a relatively shorter time (minor time)
during the reference period of 365 days preceding the date of survey . . . . It
may be noted that engagement in work in subsidiary capacity may arise out
of the two following situations:
i a person may be engaged for a relatively longer period during the
last 365 days in economic/non-economic activity and for a relat-
ively shorter period in another economic activity and
ii a person may be pursuing one economic activity/non-economic
activity almost through-out the year in the principal usual activity
status and also simultaneously pursuing another economic activity
for a relatively shorter period in a subsidiary capacity.
(Instruction manual, 55th round, schedule 10, section 5.0.16.)
In our concept of subsidiary status labor force we have only included the
persons who are engaged in non-economic activity for a ‘relatively longer
period during the last 365 days’ but engaged in economic activity for a ‘relat-
ively shorter period’ or ‘pursued non-economic activity almost throughout the
year in principal usual activity status’ but pursued another economic activity
for ‘relatively shorter period in a subsidiary capacity’. In this fashion we
managed to get UPSS labor force = UPS labor force + SS labor force which is
additive.
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Appendix 2: estimating the absolute number of the 
labor force
NSS rounds are sample surveys. They do calculate India’s population but these
are generally underestimated and the level of underestimation is going up over
the year. We can get corrected population estimates for these three mid-year
dates by interpolating population figures from three decadal population census
of India – 1981, 1991 and 2001.
NSS differs from decadal census in terms of age-group distribution popu-
lation. To adjust for the 38th, 50th and 55th rounds of NSS we have used the
five-year age-group distribution of the 1981 Census, 1991 Census and National
Health and Family Welfare Survey-II (NFHS) 1998 respectively. The 13 age
groups that we have considered are 0–5, 5–10, 10–15, 15–20, 20–25, 25–30,
30–35, 35–40, 40–45, 45–50,50–55, 55–60 and 60 and above. NSS also differs
from decadal census in terms of rate of urbanization rate and sex ratio. To get
around this problem we used the Census-adjusted NSS mid-year population and
age-group distribution separately for rural male (RM), rural female (RF), urban
male (UM) and urban female (UF). Thus, we calculated population for these
four sections of population for 13 age groups separately.
Labor-force participation rate (LFPR) for each of these four sections of popu-
lation for all three rounds have been generated for all 12 age groups (for 0–5 age
group LFPR is not calculated) from unit-level data. By multiplying LFPR for
each of them with the respective population cohort gives us the labor force for
each of this population cohort. By adding up the labor force of all age groups
and dividing it by its respective population we could derive the LFPR at more
aggregate levels. Our calculated LFPR at aggregate level marginally differs
from published LFPR figures of NSS.
A similar procedure has been adopted for calculating the number of workers
in Chapter 3 and elsewhere.
Table 4A.1 NSS rounds and their mid-year dates
NSS Rounds Period Mid-year
38th 1983 1 July 1983
50th July 1993–June 1994 1 January 1994
55th July 1999–June 2000 1 January 2000
Part II
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This page intentionally left blank 
5 Some implications of regional
differences in labor-market
outcomes in India
Ahmad Ahasan and Carmen Pages1
Introduction
This chapter attempts to examine and understand the determinants of key labor-
market indicators by looking at the experience across Indian states and regions
by analyzing the NSS thick round data from 1983–2000.2 It does so in two
parts. First, it shows how states and regions display considerable variation in
labor-market outcomes: some states and regions have been able to provide
significantly more employment opportunities, and thus show higher employ-
ment and participation rates.3 Others states, not all in the same group, have
lower unemployment rates.
Wage rates also vary significantly across regions leading to large differences
in earnings. This leads to the second part of the chapter, which attempts to
understand these patterns by trying to answer three key questions, two from the
demand and the other from the supply side of labor markets. First, what are the
factors that have enabled some states to create more jobs, and specifically what
role did differences in economic activity and economic growth play in creating
these jobs? Second, a related issue is, the role of differences in economic activ-
ity in affecting the quality of jobs as measured by earnings of workers. On the
supply side the key issue that we address is the determinants of the variation in
participation rates and especially in female participation rates across states and
regions.
It may be useful to highlight the four main findings of this chapter. First,
regional level differences in employment indicators are significant across
regions and display a geographical clustering: 34 out of 78 NSS regions have
statistically significantly different – better or worse – employment and unem-
ployment outcomes than all India averages. Further, not only are these differ-
ences significant, but they have persisted over time. A related finding is that
employment outcomes are clustered within certain states and regions: regions
in the North Eastern states, Bihar and parts of UP, Jammu and Kashmir and
Arunachal Pradesh, the coastal belts of Orissa and states such as Goa and
Pondicherry have significantly worse employment outcomes. On the other
hand Western and Southern States show better employment outcomes (see the
third section below).
Second, wage and earning trends across regions present a complex picture
with two countervailing aspects. On the one hand, significant differences in
wages across regions are being balanced to some extent by evidence of conver-
gence in wages across regions and between rural and urban areas. This finding is
consistent with observations that not only are migration rates in India surpris-
ingly low, but they have shown little signs of increasing in the 1990s. Further
urbanization rates have also been much lower than predicted (Mohan and Das-
gupta, 2004) and lower than in many other comparable countries. If wage rates
are converging across regions and between rural and urban areas, then, other
things remaining the same, the incentives to migrate to other states and to urban
areas will decrease. On the other hand, dualism in wages between the formal,
salaried sector and the informal, casual sector persists in that there remains a
substantial premium for salaried workers (around 16 percent of the labor force)
over casual labor (about 36 percent of the labor force) even after controlling for
human-capital characteristics across all regions.
Third, we take up the issue of job content of growth by relating employment
and earnings to GSDP levels across states as well as to changes in GSDP across
four rounds from 1983 to 2000. Although GSDP growth is significant in
explaining the growth of employment it cannot, per se, explain much of the vari-
ation in employment growth.4 However, we find that income differences across
states and growth of income within states exert substantial positive effect on
female employment levels while it also reduces unemployment rates for females
in rural areas; but they are not significant in explaining employment-level differ-
ences for men. However, GSDP level changes across states do have a significant
impact on raising rural earnings for males.
Fourth, regional variations in employment outcomes can be explained on
the supply side, by differences in female employment and participation rates.
Although female employment rates are uniformly lower than those of males,
the variance in regional participation rates is also much higher for female
workers. In addition, female participation rates have declined in the 1990s, a
trend difficult to reconcile with the declining fertility and increasing education
rates of female workers, factors that have contributed to rising female partici-
pation in other regions.5 In this chapter, we test two competing hypotheses to
explain differences across regions and time in female participation: The first is
that changes in participation are driven by income effects – increasing spouse
earnings are driving female workers out of the labor force (see Sundaram and
Tendulkar 2005b). The second hypothesis is that women are withdrawing from
the labor market due to lack of opportunities (substitution effect). We find that
while both forces are at work, the lack of opportunities, as indicated by unem-
ployment rates and low expected earnings, have a greater role in explaining
this trend.
The rest of this chapter is organized in the following manner: the second
section briefly discusses the methodology used here and how the Chapter
advances the literature. The third section documents the remarkable variance in
labor-market outcomes across Indian states and regions. The following section
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analyzes these differences focusing on the role played by GSDP in affecting
employment and earnings and the differences in participation rates. The final
section concludes.
Methodology and how this chapter advances the literature
The evident disparities in economic conditions, growth and human development
across Indian states have attracted considerable attention over the last few years. A
sizeable literature has developed attempting to explain differences in growth
and poverty-reduction performance across states. However, the cross-state
and, particularly, the regional dimensions of employment remain relatively
unexplored.
The literature on cross-state growth has highlighted the importance of differ-
ences in the investment climate in explaining differences in total factor produc-
tivity across states (Dollar et al. 2004); other studies have emphasized the
differences in infrastructure and regulations (Lall and Mengistae 2005), the
decline and variations in plan expenditures, the greater use of private capital
flows and the wide variations in credit utilization (Dev 2002); the degree of
urbanization (Sach et al. 2002); differences in land reforms, access to credit,
education and labor-market related regulatory policies (Besley and Burgess
2004) as factors that have led to divergences in growth across Indian states.
While most papers have confined their analysis to the state level, an important
paper by Palmer-Jones and Sen (2004) has extended the analysis to the regional
level, highlighting agro-ecological factors, irrigation and the interaction between
these factors to explain divergence in agricultural growth rates. Overall the liter-
ature appears to have converged on a consensus that there is growing divergence
in economic performance across states.
As noted, the literature on labor-market differences across states is relat-
ively less developed. Some of the papers have presented at some length the
differences in employment and unemployment rates across regions and have
emphasized the role of divergent labor-market outcomes being a driving factor
behind regional inequality (Bhattacharya and Sakkhivel 2004). A paper by
Kijima and Lanjwou (2004) has estimated differences in agricultural wages
across different regions. Another by Besley and Burgess (2004) has analyzed
the effects of labor regulations in explaining state-wise variations in manufac-
turing output and employment growth. Hasan et al. (2003) estimated the effect
of trade on labor-demand elasticity in industry and showed it to be positive.
Extending further, they have shown how regulatory policies in states affect
these demand elasticity adversely. At a broader level, the literature on labor-
market differences has stopped short at two important points. First, the liter-
ature has focused more on describing differences in employment indicators
across states and less on analyzing these differences, with Besley and Burgess
(2004) and Hasan et al. (2004) being important exceptions. Second, the dis-
cussion has stayed focused at the state level except for Palmer-Jones and
Sen (2004).
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This chapter contributes to the literature on regional labor-market analysis in
India in four ways. First, we construct synthetic panel data set on labor-market
indicators at the regional and state levels to identify the extent of state and
regional differences in Indian labor-market outcomes. The panel-based research
on employment in India has so far mainly focused on using the annual survey of
industries or smaller sample based data such as the NCAER surveys (e.g., Foster
and Rozenweig 2004). By definition such research has excluded more than 80
percent of the Indian labor force or has been based on small nationally unrepre-
sentative surveys. In this chapter we use the nationally representative panel to
present the regional differences in employment, wages and participation, and
analyze their determinants.
Second, this chapter takes the analysis beyond the state level to the (NSS-
sample-based) regional level. Hitherto, analysis of regional level has been con-
fined to a few studies on poverty and agricultural wage rate estimates. This is
important since significant differences in employment indicators lie at the
regional level. An examination of the data of the 55th round, as many as
ten out of 32 states display a higher within state variation (as measured by the
coefficient of variation) than the variation across states. Similarly, eight
regions show higher within state variation in rural casual wages than the all-
India variation.
Third, this chapter extends the discussion to the smaller states of the North-
east such as Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Nagaland and Himachal Pradesh,
where much of the variation in employment is found.
Fourth and last, this chapter uses a variety of panel data-estimation techniques
using region-level data to examine the drivers of regional variations. These
include estimating equations of varying degrees of complexity, fixed-effects
models, and using instruments to account for endogeneity of employment, partic-
ipation, wages and GSDP.
How different are labor-market conditions across states?
Some stylized facts
Labor-market outcomes are significantly different across India in a number of
respects. In what follows we focus on regional differences in employment, par-
ticipation and earnings.
Stylized fact 1: striking regional clustering of employment
The first stylized fact is the clustering of low employment rates in the north-
eastern states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Nagaland, Tripura and Manipur. In
addition, the lagging states of UP and Bihar have particularly lower employment
rates (Figure 5.1). This trend is largely mirrored in the low participation rates as
shown in Figure 5.2. In general one finds a high correlation between employ-
ment rates and participation rates (0.95). This correlation is stronger for females
(at 0.99 percent) than for men (0.95 percent). The relationship between these
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variables can be in both directions. Participation can lead to employment. Most
workers seeking work in a poor developing-country labor market such as India can
find work even if it is in a low-productivity job or a self-employed job. That is
supply of labor creates its own demand. On the other direction, low employment
rates in a region can lead to a discouragement of workers and lower participation.
We examine this issue at some length later in the section ‘Understanding differ-
ences across states and regions’, where we try to analyze some key regional differ-
ences and trends in labor-market outcomes.
Participation rates for males and females are shown for all states in Figure 5.2.
The relatively lower participation and employment rates in states such as
Delhi, Kerala and West Bengal are puzzling (employment rates are presented in
Figure 5.1). Given their higher income levels, the low employment rates in these
states need more explanation. On the other hand, and more predictably, the pros-
perous states of the South and West, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Gujarat and Andhra
Pradesh show significantly higher employment and participation rates. An inter-
esting exception is Rajasthan where employment and participation rates are high.
Arunachal Pradesh

































Mean of ERFMean of ERM
Figure 5.1 Employment rates for males and female, 55th round (source: Authors esti-
mates. Erm and Erf refer to employment rate of males and females respec-
tively (measured in 0 to 1 scale; i.e. 0.8 refers to 80 percent employment
rate). Employment rates for males and female are defined as workers in
15–59 age group as a share of the population in their age group. Derived from
NSS 55th Round data).
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This could be one factor explaining why poverty rates in Rajasthan are low
despite its relatively lower level of income.
Stylized fact 2: cross-regional differences in employment rates are
much larger for women than for men
The second interesting stylized fact emerging from state and regional analysis is
that the variation in female employment rates is significantly higher than for
men: the coefficient of variation of female employment and participation rates is
nearly four times as large as for men. However, the regional patterns in these
variations are not as clear as the ones for males. In addition to low employment
and participation rates in the North-eastern regions (including Tripura), and the
low rates in UP and Bihar, female employment rates are also very low in West
Bengal, and perhaps not so surprisingly in prosperous Punjab. But once again
female employment and participation rates are much higher in the prosperous
Southern and Western states of Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka, AP and Tamil
Nadu. One implication of this grouping is that it will be difficult to attribute low
Arunachal Pradesh

































Mean of PRFMean of PRM
Figure 5.2 Participation rates for males and female, 55th round (source: Authors esti-
mates). Participation rates for men (prm) and women (prf) are defined as
workers and unemployed in 15–59 age group as a share of the population in
their age group (units are scaled to 0 to 1). Derived from NSS 55th Round
data.
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participation rates in West Bengal to schooling rates, as these are also high in
the Western and Southern regions.
Stylized fact 3: regional differences in employment rates have
persisted
The third stylized fact is that the divergence in employment rates across
regions is persistent. We use the threshold of one standard deviation from the
Indian mean to classify regions as being significantly different from all-India aver-
ages. For most variables, the number of regions significantly different from the
mean have either stayed the same or increased in the 55th round (1999–2000)
compared with the 50th round (1993–1994). Particularly noteworthy is the
increasing divergence in rural employment rates in the 55th round compared with
the 50th round. This is also confirmed when we see that employment and partici-
pation rates are highly correlated across consecutive rounds: employment and par-
ticipation rates in the 55th round are closely correlated to those in the 50th round
and so on. That is employment and participation rates tend to show very high per-
sistence across regions, in sharp contrast to the case for real wages, which show a
small (and negative) correlation across rounds (Table 5.1).
Another and perhaps better way to look for convergence would be to run
unconditional convergence regressions (as done in the section ‘Understanding
differences across states and regions’).
Stylized fact 4: there are some signs of convergence in wages 
for casual workers
As Table 5.1 has hinted, in contrast to employment indicators, there are signs of
convergence in wages across regions at a time when wage growth has taken
place in most regions. First, wage inequality is falling across regions for all cat-
egories of casual wages (see Table 5.2). There is a drop in the coefficient of vari-
ation and Gini coefficients in all casual wage categories – rural and urban
non-agricultural between 1993 and 2000. However, there was an increase in
regional inequality in salaried wages, although it was low to begin with.
Second, convergence in wages is also suggested by econometric tests of con-
vergence that show wages in all categories to have unconditional convergence
Table 5.1 Correlation of employment and participation rates by regions across rounds
Correlation between one round and previous round
Employment Participation Unemployment Urban Urban Rural
rate rate rate salaried casual casual
Male Female Male Female Male Female
0.8266 0.8971 0.7955 0.8924 0.6485 0.5581 –.1143 –.0547 –.0819
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across regions between 1983 and 2000 (see Table 5.3). Growth rates of real
wages are robustly negatively related to initial real wages in all categories.
Significantly, the convergence is least for wages in agricultural operations. Given
that agricultural productivity will vary widely depending on agro-ecological
conditions, a slower degree of convergence is not unexpected.
Third, there is evidence that dualism between rural and urban areas has either
mildly declined or, at least, it has not increased. The ratio of real casual wages in
urban and rural (non-agricultural sector) shows a decline in all states except
Nagaland, Manipur and Orissa, all states in the Eastern and North-eastern part of
India. Similarly there are declines in the ratio of salaried to casual wage differ-
entials between 1993 and 2000 within each region in both rural and urban areas.
Most states show these trends, excluding West Bengal, UP, Meghalaya, Naga-
land, Orissa and Tripura, where the ratio of salaried to casual wages have
increased in the 55th round compared with the 50th.
However, the raw differential between rural and urban wages can be mislead-
ing as one needs to take into account human-capital characteristics in analyzing
wage differentials. Urban–rural premium for both casual and salaried workers
fell in the 1990s and largely disappears once human-capital characteristics are
taken into account. In terms of regions, the number with significantly higher
premium (say more than 20 percent) has fallen from 28 to five regions in the
Table 5.2 Trends in regional distribution of real wages
Rounds Mean Median CV Gini 90/10 50/10
Rural non-agriculture salaried
1983 43.06 42.52 0.25 0.14 1.91 1.40
1987–1988 57.92 57.72 0.26 0.14 1.85 1.48
1993–1994 62.33 63.13 0.22 0.12 1.64 1.35
1999–2000 86.37 84.66 0.26 0.15 1.96 1.42
Rural non-agriculture casual
1983 22.43 20.56 0.36 0.20 2.63 1.48
1987–1988 22.97 19.82 0.40 0.22 2.60 1.38
1993–1994 30.27 28.31 0.40 0.18 2.12 1.41
1999–2000 37.11 35.42 0.33 0.17 2.09 1.38
Urban non-agriculture salaried
1983 51.22 51.64 0.15 0.08 1.47 1.23
1987–1988 60.84 60.83 0.16 0.09 1.46 1.23
1993–1994 74.49 74.83 0.13 0.08 1.39 1.19
1999–2000 100.67 99.19 0.19 0.11 1.61 1.28
Urban non-agriculture casual
1983 25.84 24.46 0.29 0.16 2.13 1.40
1987–1988 29.26 27.48 0.28 0.16 2.08 1.38
1993–1994 32.11 30.70 0.28 0.15 2.03 1.41
1999–2000 38.55 39.01 0.25 0.14 1.90 1.49
Source: Wages have been derived from NSS data and deflated by CPIAL and CPIIW with
1993–1994 prices for rural and urban areas respectively.
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case of casual workers, and from 12 to six in the case of salaried workers.
However, as far as the more difficult issue of salaried to casual workers is con-
cerned, marked dualism still remains. Even after accounting for education, age
and gender, there is no evidence of a narrowing premium, which remain high at
about 30 percent.
To summarize, there is a large heterogeneity in employment and in earnings
both across and within states. The dispersion in employment outcomes is higher
for women than for men. And while there are few signs of employment conver-
gence across regions, regional divergences in wages, as well as in urban–rural
wage gaps, are declining. This leads to the next important theme in Indian labor
markets: low migration and urbanization rates.
Stylized fact 5: economic migration between regions and 
urbanization rates are very low
Given the significant differences in labor-market conditions across the different
regions, India’s unusually low economic migration rates present somewhat of a
puzzle. Overall while about 1.8 percent of India’s population migrated on
average each year between 1997 and 2000, only about 0.3 percent points of this
were due to economic factors. Also a similarly small share, 0.3 percent points,
migrated outside of their districts or states. In comparison some 5.5 percent of
the US population migrated across county or state lines in a similar period.6
A look at the pattern of migration from and to different regions in Map 5.1
confirms that migration rates are low across many regions. In three years from
1998 to 2000, most regions show less than 1 percent net in- or out-migration.
Chandigarh, Goa, Daman and Diu, Haryana, Punjab, Delhi, Mumbai and the
Kolkata areas show the maximum inflow, exceeding 1 percent of the labor force
in the three years from 1998 to 2000. Overall though Maharashtra and Gujarat
show in-migration to be around 0.5 percent and 0.2 percent respectively, North-
ern Tamil Nadu, AP and parts of MP, and, less expectedly, Mizoram and Naga-
land, also show in-migration. The main out-migration regions are Bihar, western
Rajasthan and J&K. Kerala, Karnataka and Southern Tamil Nadu are also
regions from where out-migration takes place.
Table 5.3 Regional convergence: beta coefficients of real-wage growth regressed on
initial real wages
Rounds Urban Urban Rural Rural casual Rural casual Rural 
casual salaried casual agriculture agricultural salaried
industry industry industry and allied operations industry 
38–50 –1.06 –0.64 –1.07 –1.21 –0.19 –0.68
50–55 –1.13 –1.24 –0.97 –0.95 –0.20 –0.92
38–55 –1.03 –1.03 –0.87 –0.99 –0.24 –0.97
Note
All coefficients are statistically significant.
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The convergent trend of wages across regions and growing unemployment
rates in the major urban areas can help to explain why migration rates have not
picked up. While wage differences are high, they are converging and do not
appear to significantly affect migration, though urban casual wages – the best
proxy of spot-market wages – are positively related with in-migration. On the
other hand, unemployment rates are significantly inversely related to net eco-
nomic migration rates.
Another issue related to labor markets is India’s low urbanization rates. Even
in the larger metropolitan areas of Mumbai, Delhi, Kolkata and Chennai that
attract the highest rates of migrants, the in-migration rates, about 1.5 percent of
the population per annum, are low. Further, the share of economic migration to
urban areas has been stagnant from 66 percent in the mid-1990s to 62 percent.
Compared with Asian countries such as China, Indonesia, Vietnam, Pakistan and
Bangladesh, India has the lowest rate of urban population growth. China provides
a dramatic contrast: urban population grew by some 190 million over 1990 to
2003. In India the corresponding number was 80 million or less than half.
Urbanization slowed down in India in the 1980s and 1990s as casual wages in
rural and urban areas converged. Demographic projections in 1981 estimated that
India’s urban population would be about 31 percent in 2001. In reality, it turned
out to be 27 percent of the population, i.e., lower by about 40 million persons.7
Part of the answer behind low urbanization rates would appear to lie in the con-
verging trend in rural–urban wages. As the gap between rural and urban wages







































Map 5.1 Economic migration across states and regions, 1997–2000 (source: Estimated
from NSS data, 55th Round).
migrating are falling. It follows that the incentives to migrate to the cities are
declining accordingly.8 An important implication could be that urban infrastruc-
ture and service development may not be proceeding fast enough to create jobs
that are better paying than rural areas. This may have further implications:
because economic growth shows up in the growth of cities and towns, this slow
urbanization has the potential to slow down growth.
Not only has urbanization slowed down, there is also evidence that job and
population growth has shifted away from the large metropolitan cities and rural
areas to mid-size towns. Decomposing urban growth by size of cities (Table 5.4)
we see that there is significant shift of jobs from the rural centre and large cities to
secondary towns and to a lesser degree in peri-metro areas. The implication of
these developments has to be interpreted carefully. The growth of the large cities
(100,000 or more) is not fast enough to accommodate the movement of labor and
population out of rural areas to secondary cities with population between 20,000 to
50,000 persons. Given that these town sizes are probably too small to take advant-
age of economies of scale, there is a particular need to develop peri-metro areas.
Understanding differences across states and regions
In this section, we attempt to answer three key questions regarding differences in
labor market performance across regions. We first study how economic growth
has affected job creation and address the question of whether growth has been
jobless and driven mainly by productivity growth. For this we estimate the impact
of GSDP growth and GSDP levels on employment and unemployment across
regions and across four time periods corresponding to the last four thick rounds
(1983, 1987, 1993–1994, 1999–2000). Second, we use the state and regional vari-
ation to estimate the effect of GSDP and economic activity on earnings. Third,
we analyze the determinants of regional differences in female participation rates
to understand the variation in participation rates and its declining trend.
Explaining differences in employment performance across regions
In the broadest terms the relationship between GSDP growth and employment
growth while significant in urban areas but is not by itself able to explain much
of the variation across regions. We used estimates of the correlation between
changes in GSDP and changes in employment across regions for rural and urban
areas and for the total population (Table 5.5).9 To filter away changes in employ-
ment that can result from secular changes in schooling and marriage decisions
by females, we take the labor force for persons age 25 and above. Finally, in
some specifications we account for unobservable differences across states and
rounds by including state and round fixed effects.
Our results presented in Table 5.5 indicate that growth of GSDP is signific-
antly correlated to employment growth, but the effect is confined to urban areas.
Overall 1 percent point increase in GSDP growth is associated with a 0.28 to
0.42 percentage point increase in employment growth rates. Two points are
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Table 5.4 Growth of population and manufacturing jobs by size of town
District type Number Population % share of % share of % share of % share of % share of 
(1991, mill.) population manufacturing manufacturing urban urban
employment employment population population 
1989 1996 in 1991 in 2001
Metropolitan centers 7 40.4 5.1 15.7 13.5 65.2 61.7
(100,000 +)
Peri-metro (50,000 to 7 21.7 2.7 3.9 8.3 10.9 12.3
less than 100,000)
Secondary cities 32 100.2 12.6 10.4 21.1 13.2 15.0
(20,000 to less than 
50,000)
Tertiary cities 36 86.5 10.9 7.5 10.2 7.8 8.1
(10,000 to less than 
20,000)
Towns and rural 306 549.2 68.8 62.4 46.9 2.9 2.9
centers (less than 
10,000)
Source: Staff estimates from Census and other sources.
Table 5.5 Growth of employment (UPSS) and GSDP across regions and time. Dependent variable: growth of employment
OLS OLS with round effects OLS with state effects
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Rural Urban All Rural Urban All Rural Urban All
Growth of GSDP 0.076 0.638 0.28 0.092 0.499 0.292 –0.099 0.931 0.425
(0.67) (2.96)** (2.22)* (0.54) (1.90)+ (2.02)* (0.64) (3.17)** (2.76)**
Urban dummy 0.008 0.008 0.011
(0.27) (0.26) (0.35)
Dummy for 1993–1994 0.028 0.23 0.13 0.079 0.129 0.102
(0.5) (3.61)** (2.68)** (1.57) (1.99)+ (2.45)*
Dummy for 1999–2000 –0.16 –0.106 –0.132 –0.116 –0.209 –0.166
(2.98)** (1.61) (3.11)** (2.27)* (3.17)** (4.09)**
Constant 0.045 –0.149 –0.056 0.044 –0.149 –0.056 0.06 –0.248 –0.1
(1.41) (2.24)* (1.58) (1.58) (2.32)* (2.03)* (1.07) (3.64)** (2.47)*
Observations 212 213 425 212 213 425 212 213 425
R2 0 0.09 0.02 0.13 0.29 0.18 0.38 0.43 0.27
Adjusted R2 0 0.08 0.02 0.12 0.28 0.17 0.27 0.33 0.21
Notes
Robust ‘t’ statistics in absolute values calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the state level reported in parentheses; + denotes significant at 10%; 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
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worth stressing. The employment effects of GSDP takes place mainly in urban
areas. Second, however, growth, by itself, can explain very little in the variation
in employment growth; only about 2 percent overall and about 9 percent in
urban areas (columns 3 and 2 in Table 5.5). Our results indicate that employ-
ment growth fell significantly in the 1990s as the round dummies for 1999–2000
in columns 6, 8 and 9 have a negative and statistically significant sign.
Although these estimates suggest a strong correlation of employment with eco-
nomic growth they can be misleading as these do not account for changes in wages
or other factors. They do not account either for the endogeneity of economic
growth and wages to changes in economic growth. We, therefore, make additional
estimates of the relationship between output and employment by means of estimat-
ing labor-demand functions, for male and female workers, and for rural and urban
areas.10 These relate employment levels in different states to output, wages and
other factors after trying to account for endogeneity – i.e., by attempting to account
for possibility that wages and output can be related to each other in both directions
or be related through the impact of a third factor, e.g., investment.11
Once again we find a strong relationship between output and employment
across the difference regions and periods. In the Appendix, Table 5A.1 presents
our estimates for males and females separately. We find that the elasticity of
employment to output, i.e., the effect of a percentage increase in GSDP on male
employment levels, across all states and periods and after accounting for wage
changes, is estimated to be about 0.4 percent on average, 0.2 percent in rural
areas and 0.8 percent in urban areas (columns 1–3 in Table 5A.1). Thus, across
India, richer states employ more workers because GSDP is positively and statis-
tically related to employment. As we saw previously in Table 5.5, employment
effects are here also stronger in urban areas than in rural areas.
We then make the same estimates for males including state dummies (columns
4 to 6 in Table 5A.1). These variables absorb all the unobserved heterogeneity
across states. This implies that the estimated relationship between output and
employment would now main measure the effect of employment within states
across and across time. Once we do this it turns out the relationship is much
weaker. After including state dummies the elasticity of output-employment is
positive and sizeable – though smaller than the one estimated without state
dummies – but not statistically significant. These results imply that while there is
a sizeable relationship between income and employment across regions, within
states such relationship is less clear. Increases in state income are not necessarily
related to an increase in employment in that state. While this may be evidence of
jobless growth in recent periods, it may also reflect the low cyclical variation of
male employment rates: i.e., most male workers have to find work of some kind.
Hence we next turn to see the effect of output change on females, who may
have more flexibility. Making the same estimates for female employment (Table
5A.1, columns 7 through 12), we find that the elasticity of female employment
with respect to GSDP levels is significant and higher (0.7 on average, 0.5 in rural
areas and 0.8 in urban areas) than that for male employment. Thus, across states,
there is an unambiguously higher impact of GSDP on female employment.
This suggest that female employment responds more significantly to changes in
the levels of GSDP across states partly accounting for the variations in participa-
tion we see across the regions. The estimates also suggest that within regions,
increases in output are associated with larger increases in female than in male
employment in the rural areas. Instead, we don’t find much of a relationship
between time changes in employment and output within urban areas. As in the
case of male workers, despite a sizeable and robust regional correlation between
income and employment across regions, there is no evidence that within states
increases in output lead to increasing employment for females in urban areas.
This latter result may be the result of a weakening relationship between income
and employment in urban areas. It could also be driven by the fact that an
expanding output may increase household income and allow women to buy more
leisure (and therefore not increasing their labor participation and employment
rates). We examine this point in more detail below.
It is also worth noting that as for males, female employment is substantially
lower in urban areas than in rural ones and that the difference between urban and
rural employment rates is much larger for women. Our results also suggest that
the decline in employment registered in the latest round (1999–2000), and also
shown in Table 5.5 is mostly due to a decline in the employment rates of women
in rural areas (columns 7 and 10 of Table 5A.1).
Finally, our results also provide some estimates for wage-elasticities – i.e., how
sensitive is employment to wages. Our results (in columns (1)–(3) of Table 5A.1)
suggest that states with higher urban wages for males tend to register a lower
demand for male urban salaried employment. There is, however, no evidence of
such negative relationship between the price of labor and employment across
states for male casual rural workers or for women in general.
Explaining differences in earnings
We next assess the impact of economic activity on real weekly earnings of males.
Earnings are defined as the product of actual employment in a week and wages
received.12 The results, presented in Table 5A.2, show an interesting contrast to
the previous result on employment. There is little evidence, when we do not take
into account state-specific effects, that weekly earnings in rural or urban areas are
higher in richer states (Table 5A.2 columns (1–4)). Once we control for overall
state differences, we find that within states, earnings increase with output in rural
but not in urban areas. This may reflect the much more significant presence of the
formal and public sector (which provides for two-thirds of formal-sector jobs) in
urban areas, which are less sensitive to cyclical changes in GSDP. It may also
indicate that labor supply in rural areas is more elastic than in urban areas: an
increase in economic activity in rural areas may require a higher increase in
wages to pull people into the labor market. Combining these findings with those
related to employment, we find that while an increase in economic activity
increases employment and earnings for males in rural areas, not much change is
registered in the urban areas.
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We also find interesting results about the effects of caste and education on
earnings. We find that regions with higher shares of scheduled tribe and caste
people in population experience lower casual agriculture earnings and higher
wages for salaried workers. Finally, we find the share of labor force with primary
education to be positively correlated with higher earnings in rural areas, while the
share of workers with post-primary education is positively correlated with earn-
ings in urban areas.
Understanding regional variation and trends in participation rates
One key issue in determining employment outcomes is the variation in female
participation rates across the different regions and time. As we have seen earlier
in Figures 5.2 to 5.3, the main variation across regions takes place in female
rates of participation. This is also evident in Map 5.2.
Map 5.2 shows that participation rates are particularly low in Bihar and UP,
the Northern parts of Madhya Pradesh, parts of Punjab, and coastal Orissa and
Goa. Interestingly, except for one region in Assam, participation rates are not
particularly low in the North-east. On the other hand, parts of Tamil Nadu and
Kerala show relatively lower participation rates. In general, as Table 5.7 shows,
while participation rates for women are markedly lower than for men in both
rural and urban areas in all regions, the variation in participation for females
across regions is 15 to 20 times higher than for male.
In addition, not only are female participation rates significantly lower than for









Uttar  Prade sh
Orissa


























Map 5.2 Participation rates for females, 1999–2000, NSS 55th round (source: Based on
author’s estimates from the NSS rounds).
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Several authors (Vaidiyanathan 2001; Mazumdar 2005, Sundaram and
Tendulkar 2005a) have suggested that much of the decline in participation is
explained by the rise in school attendance by females. Further, marriage at the
age of 15 to 24 may also account for women dropping out of the labor force.
These points are generally confirmed in Table 5.6 which shows that while
participation rates markedly declined in the 1990s for females in the prime age
group (15 to 59 years), this decline was not significant for females in the 25 to
59 age group.
However, it is clear from the coefficients of variation presented in Table 5.7
that the regional variation among the 25–59 age group is also high and not very
different from the variation for females. Understanding the regional variation
among females in the 25–59 age group would help us better understand the
determinants of female labor-force participation. We now turn to estimates of
the determinants of participation of this group.
Table 5.6 Participation rates for men and women for prime age and 25 to 59 group
Participation rates 1 2 3 4
Male 15–59 Female 15–59 Male 25–59 Female 25–59
Dummy for 1987–1988 –0.011 –0.024 0.003 –0.022
(1.61) (0.42) (1.48) (0.41)
Dummy for 1993–1994 –0.021 –0.011 0.005 0.009
(3.05)** (0.19) (2.58)* (0.16)
Dummy for 1999–2000 –0.033 –0.118 –0.002 –0.084
(4.91)** (1.97)* –0.83 (1.46)
Constant –0.091 –1.102 –0.01 –1.019
(10.49)** (7.95)** (3.96)** (7.34)**
Observations 610 611 610 611
R2 0.38 0.26 0.33 0.27
Adj R2 0.34 0.22 0.29 0.23
Notes
Robust t statistics in absolute value in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; 
** significant at 1%.
Table 5.7 Participation rates for male and female groups
Variable Rural Urban
Mean CV Mean CV
Prime-Age male 15–59 0.892591 0.053957 0.823559 0.060779
Male (without schooling 0.976455 0.019959 0.963766 0.019026
effects) 25–59
Prime-Age female 15–59 0.548692 0.368957 0.253506 0.358385
Female (without schooling 0.588716 0.351426 0.288471 0.356256
effects) 25–59
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The key issue that we take up is what role do income and substitution effects
play in explaining differences in participation rates for females? Income effect
refers to the effect of rise in income of the household from increasing earnings of
the spouse or due to other sources of household income due to which female
workers can opt out of the labor force to do housework or enjoy leisure. Substitu-
tion effect refers to the greater incentives for females to work due to higher wages
or better employment opportunities for women. Conversely, substitution effects
will lead to lower female participation if opportunities for gainful work decline. If
substitution effects are present, then the scope for bringing more women to the
labor force increases by providing them with greater opportunities.
We approach this issue from two different sides. In the first approach, presented
in Table 5A.3, we estimate the determinants of participation rates for females
25 years or older by using both female wages and spouses’ wages to capture sub-
stitution and income effects. The unemployment rate is taken to measure the
absence of opportunities in the labor market. Our results suggest that urban unem-
ployment and overall high unemployment rates for females tend to discourage par-
ticipation. Higher wages encourage participation in rural casual work for females,
denoting the presence of substitution effects. Men’s wages appear to have little
impact indicating the weak role of income effects in this approach.
In our second approach to estimating income and substitution effects, we
construct variables to represent expected earnings by female and male workers
by multiplying wages by the probability of employment (or 1 minus the unem-
ployment rate). Female expected earnings represent substitution effects and also
capture opportunities available. Men’s expected earnings capture income effects.
The results shown in Table 5A.4 consistently indicate that higher expected
female earnings in rural areas robustly increase female participation. The same
effects are found in urban areas, but the coefficients are not statistically reliable.
Still, the overall indication is that raising opportunities for female employment
increases female participation across regions, particularly in rural areas. This
association is also observed within regions across time (see first row of Table
5A.4 columns 4 and 6, and 7 and 9). Thus, in periods when women enjoy higher
work opportunities (measured by higher expected earnings), female participation
increases. Conversely, increase in male casual wages in rural areas and salaried
wages in urban areas reduce female participation, a sign of income effects
working. We estimate that substitution effects would have led to a 25 percent
increase in female participation, while income effects would have reduced par-
ticipation by 16 percent between the early and the late nineties. The net result,
assuming no other effects were at play and that expected earnings by male and
female would increase by the same proportion, would have been an increase in
female participation of 9 percent.13
Summing up
In this chapter we have characterized labor-market outcomes across Indian states
and regions over a period spanning the last four thick rounds, from 1983 to
2000. We have shown how regional differences in labor-market outcomes are
striking in India, and have persisted over the last two decades. The exception is
wages which show signs of converging across regions and across rural and
urban areas. The latter fact combined with unemployment in states may help to
explain why economic migration rates and urbanization rates are unusually low
in India. Some interesting implications can be drawn.
Foremost among these is economic growth and activity levels have been
important in causing good labor-market outcomes, though in a somewhat
nuanced way. When regional differences are taken into account, growth has not
been jobless. In the short run though, growth has a muted effect on employ-
ment. Increasing labor productivity, which has led to growth, is associated with
lower employment growth as an immediate effect. But in the medium term,
increasing productivity does not adversely affect employment growth. Over the
longer term, however, the relationship with growth and employment is clearer.
States with higher levels of GSDP are also states which have created more
urban employment and rural earnings in the case of males. Given that male-
unemployment rates are negligible in rural areas this result is understandable.
Significantly, the effect of differences in GSDP levels is more striking for
female employment, which tend to vary much more than male employment.
Higher GSDP levels lead to higher female employment in rural and urban
areas.
Our analysis also suggests that increasing employment opportunities for
females will also help to arrest the decline in female-participation rates.
Although there is some evidence of income effects that lead females to drop out
of the labor force, economic opportunities are the strongest factor affecting
female participation.
The analysis in this chapter also highlights the importance of urbanization
and domestic migration. The narrowing of the wage gap between rural and
urban areas in each region and higher unemployment rates has lowered urban-
ization rates. Seen from the opposite direction, impediments to urbanization
lower the growth of employment and higher wages. At present slow urban
development also slows down manufacturing growth – with about half of new
manufacturing jobs being created in rural areas. A complementary approach
would also be to facilitate economic migration both to regions that are more
dynamic and also to urban areas. Policies that can mitigate obstacles to domestic
migration, through better safety nets and insurance for migrants, will also
improve labor-market outcomes by allowing workers to work in areas where
there are more opportunities and higher return.
Given that poor employment outcomes are persistently clustered in North-
ern, North-eastern and some coastal regions a regional focus on growth and
employment is called for. Investment in infrastructure - power, road, and irriga-
tion and credit facilities, which are found to affect GSDP positively, can lead to
higher employment prospects. Related to this is the need to improve investment
climate in these regions - a key aspect of which are labor-market-related regula-
tory reforms.
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Table 5A.1 Instrumental variable estimates of the effect of GSDP on employment levels for male and female workers
Without state dummies With state dummies Without state dummies With state dummies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Male Male Male Male Male Male Female Female Female Female Female Female 
rural urban all rural urban all rural urban all rural urban all
GSDP 0.21 0.817 0.423 −0.155 0.452 −0.453 0.515 0.77 0.677 1.089 0.188 2.115
[1.73]+ [4.73]** [4.99]** [0.22] [1.05] [0.26] [4.41]** [3.63]** [4.02]** [1.20] [0.14] [1.28]
Rural 0.146 0.242 −0.223 0.968
casual-wage [0.31] [0.52] [0.26] [0.67]
male
Urban −8.368 −3.835 −0.493 0.145
salaried-wage  [2.90]** [2.15]** [0.54] [0.08]
male
Rural 0.287 1.249 0.014 −0.723
casual-wage [0.83] [2.11]* [0.03] [0.89]
female
Urban 5 −2.201 0.48 1.544
salaried-wage [1.22] [0.90] [0.39] [0.91]
female
1987–1988 0.054 1.095 0.422 0.142 −0.105 −0.179 −0.052 −0.775 0.176 −0.123 −0.19 −0.554
dummy [0.30] [2.17]* [1.25] [1.51] [0.60] [0.55] [0.39] [1.15] [0.43] [0.86] [0.62] [1.23]
1993–1994 −0.03 2.913 1.213 0.295 0.112 0.1 −0.225 −1.933 0.456 −0.386 −0.013 −1.287
dummy [0.14] [2.74]** [1.67]+ [1.76]+ [0.24] [0.09] [1.20] [1.25] [0.45] [0.95] [0.01] [1.02]
1999–2000 −0.229 4.954 2.023 0.326 0.038 −0.052 −0.648 −4.137 0.368 −0.929 −0.407 −2.502
dummy [0.75] [2.65]** [1.59] [1.13] [0.05] [0.03] [2.31]* [1.40] [0.22] [1.35] [0.24] [1.17]
Urban −1.262 −1.262 −2.063 −2.063
dummy [24.02]** [24.02]** [39.42]** [26.90]**
Constant 11.311 38.175 24.39 16.653 10.058 15.326 7.554 −15.334 11.713 1.822 7.397 −12.847
[5.53]** [3.21]** [2.91]** [3.26]** [1.44] [0.77] [5.20]** [1.05] [1.48] [0.20] [0.46] [0.62]
Observations 247 277 492 270 253 492 235 253 462 233 251 462
Test for validity of instruments
Overidentification test of 0.29779 0.20501 0.22334 0.73552 0.1719 0.40246 0.50153 0.49159 0.18463 0.47135 0.40425 0.8337
all instruments (P-val=)
1st stage IGSDP 0.341 0.2407 0.3395 0.9971 0.9968 0.9965 0.2838 0.4053 0.3121 0.9959 0.9968 0.9959
centered R2 Urban salaried 0.761 0.7736 0.8426 0.8553
for wage, male
instrumented Rural casual wage, 0.3231 0.3201 0.5754 0.5792
variables male
Urban salaried wage, 0.4177 0.4916 0.5315 0.6218
female
Rural casual wage, 0.1864 0.1931 0.3726 0.3723
female
Excluded Share of industry x x x x x x x x x x
instruments in GSDP
Road density x x x x x x x x x x x x
Percentage of villages x x x x x x x x x x x
electrified
Industrial credit x x x x x x x x x x
Rs. per capita
Agricultural credit x x x x x x x x x x x x
Rs. per capita
Notes
1 Absolute value of z statistics in brackets. Robust z is reported where heteroskedasticity exists.
2 + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
3 x excluded instruments used in the specification.
Table 5A.2 Estimates of the effect of GSDP on earnings for male workers
Without state dummies With state dummies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Rural Urban Rural Urban
Casual non- Casual Casual Salaried Casual non- Casual Casual Salaried
agriculture agriculture agriculture agriculture
GSDP 0.018 −0.202 −0.021 −0.045 1.934 1.381 −0.368 −1.181
[0.27] [2.64]** [0.38] [0.93] [2.23]* [2.44]* [0.55] [2.17]*
Schedule tribe −0.043 −0.075 0.009 0.059 −0.048 −0.068 0.026 0.063
(share in 25 plus) [1.43] [2.36]* [0.27] [2.17]* [1.13] [1.70]+ [0.57] [1.63]
Schedule caste −0.121 −0.029 0.005 0.092 −0.153 −0.141 0.023 0.057
[2.14]* [0.51] [0.10] [2.35]* [2.40]* [2.22]* [0.51] [1.50]
Primary educated 0.062 0.193 0.108 0.002 0.172 0.221 0.068 0.07
[0.55] [2.29]* [1.03] [0.03] [0.93] [1.30] [1.10] [1.37]
Post primary 0.085 −0.067 0.659 0.465 −0.148 −0.177 0.08 0.027
educated [0.79] [0.58] [2.69]** [2.73]** [0.80] [1.08] [0.53] [0.21]
1987–1988 round 0.487 0.532 0.359 0.438 0.301 0.343 0.436 0.619
[5.91]** [6.14]** [4.61]** [7.40]** [2.15]* [3.73]** [4.19]** [7.46]**
1993–1994 round 1.081 1.26 1.017 1.274 0.256 0.533 1.273 1.903
[11.44]** [11.25]** [9.84]** [15.48]** [0.62] [1.89]+ [4.03]** [7.24]**
1999–2000 round 1.73 1.973 1.554 1.903 0.297 0.73 1.95 2.951
[14.04]** [14.51]** [11.53]** [17.31]** [0.41] [1.51] [3.60]** [6.46]**
Constant 3.954 5.83 5.323 6.361 −16.377 −10.394 8.58 18.07
[4.85]** [7.11]** [8.36]** [11.48]** [1.80]+ [1.84]+ [1.22] [3.16]**
Observations 245 245 244 246 245 243 246 248
Adj R2 0.6 0.61 0.56 0.68 0.57 0.6 0.57 0.69
Test for validity of instruments
Overidentification test of all instruments (P-val=) 0.6053 0.63297 0.899 0.22666 0.13694 0.26443 0.19339 0.15474
1st state centered GSDP 0.5734 0.5265 0.5328 0.5655 0.9963 0.9964 0.996 0.9963
R2 for instrumented 
variables
Excluded instruments Road density x x x x x x x x
Share of industry in x x x x x x x x
the state economy
Percentage of x x x x x x x x
villages electrified
credit to industry x x x x x
per capita 
credit to agriculture x x x x x x x x
per capita
Notes
1 State fixed effects is not reported in this table.
2 Robust z statistics in brackets.
3 + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
4 x excluded instruments used in the specification.
Table 5A.3 Estimates of determinants of female participation rates: female and male wages, household earnings and unemployment rates
Dependent variable: OLS Female wages and unemployment Household per capita expenditures, 
female participation rates rate instrumented unemployment instrumented
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Rural Urban All Rural Urban All Rural Urban All
Rate of unemployment −0.098 0.001 −0.05 −0.778 0.092 −0.338 −0.475 −0.235 −0.325
[3.68]** [0.05] [2.74]** [2.70]** [0.22] [3.91]** [2.72]** [0.40] [1.45]
Real household −1.812 3.381 1.685
per capita expenditure [0.93] [0.47] [0.52]
Rural (non-agr) 0.133 0.119 0.734 1.491 1.547 1.359
casual wages, female [2.20]* [3.35]** [1.06] [2.59]** [1.69]+ [1.50]
Urban casual −0.019 −2.069 0.155 2.855 −1.596
wages, female [0.29] [0.94] [0.19] [0.53] [0.68]
Urban salaried −0.114 −0.126 5.651
wages, female [1.10] [1.44] [0.97]
Urban casual 0.211
wages, male [1.92]+
Rural casual −0.187 −0.051 0.046 −0.617
wages, male [2.01]* [0.79] [0.10] [1.57]
Urban salaried −0.169 −0.071 −4.35 −1.412
wages, male [0.77] [0.40] [0.98] [1.91]+
Urban dummy −0.573 −0.182 −0.71
[10.85]** [1.18] [0.57]
1987–1988 round 0.217 0.016 0.097 0.624 0.199 0.405 0.889 −2.226 −0.229
[2.16]* [0.20] [1.40] [2.16]* [0.49] [2.42]* [1.29] [0.49] [0.24]
1993–1994 round −0.012 0.162 0.105 −0.486 −0.026 0.144 1.072 −4.339 −1.636
[0.11] [1.70]+ [1.28] [1.44] [0.05] [0.77] [0.67] [0.48] [0.63]
1999–2000 round −0.032 0.122 0.066 −0.724 −0.112 0.152 1.217 −6.719 −2.494
[0.26] [0.89] [0.56] [1.48] [0.13] [0.56] [0.57] [0.50] [0.70]
Constant −0.946 −0.87 −0.316 −6.757 0.668 1.034 2.006 −27.422 −9.869
[2.48]* [1.14] [0.48] [2.55]* [0.12] [0.53] [0.26] [0.53] [1.03]
heteroskedasticity 0.0981 0.8393 0.0459 0.9498 1 0.9828 0.999 1 0.9995
test (P-val=)
R2 0.14 0.04 0.45
Adj. R2 0.11 0.01 0.43
Observations 177 210 371 159 170 322 161 177 324
Test for validity of instruments
Overidentification test of all instruments (P-val)= 0.81588 0.88074 0.15068 0.543 0.84699 0.39977
1st state centered Rate of unemployment 0.1884 0.1247 0.4474 0.3931 0.236 0.4387
partial R2 Rural (non-agr) casual 0.2989 0.3332 0.292 0.2699
for instrumented wages, female
variables Urban salaried 0.6647
wages, female
Urban casual 0.4212 0.3408 0.2027 0.267
wages, female
Real household 0.4962 0.5121 0.5342
per capita expenditure
Excluded Share of industry x x x x x x
instruments in GSDP




Test for validity of instruments
Overidentification test of all instruments (P-val)= 0.81588 0.88074 0.15068 0.543 0.84699 0.39977
Share of sch caste x x x x x
25–59; female
Share of primary x x x x
educated female 25–59




Agricultural Credit x x x x x
Rs. Per Capita
Gini–real daily wage x x
count no salaried 15–59 x
Notes
1 t statistics in brackets. Robust is reported where heteroskedasticity exists.
2 + signigficant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
3 x scheduled instruments used in the specification.
Table 5A.4 Determinants of female participation rates: expected earnings of male and females
Female participation rate OLS without state dummies OLS with state dummies Expected earnins instrumented
with state dummies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Rural Urban All Rural Urban All Rural Urban All
Expected earnings for 0.083 0.045 0.1 0.074 0.926 0.352
females in rural casual [1.68]+ [1.31] [3.96]** [3.47]** [3.26]** [2.19]**
work
Expected earnings for −0.06 −0.045 −0.069 −0.055 −0.021 −0.649
females in urban casual [1.03] [0.94] [1.50] [1.62] [0.10] [3.43]**
work
Expected earnings for males −0.318 −0.228 −0.183 0.149 −0.685
in rural casual [3.40]** [3.19]** [2.13]* [2.28]* [3.24]**
work
Expected earnings for males 0.222 0.233 0 −0.075 −0.086 −0.128
in urban casual [2.43]* [2.55]* [0.00] [0.75] [0.78] [0.71]
work
Expected earnings for males 0.19
in urban salaried [0.85]
work
Urban dummy −0.708 −0.716 −0.749
[20.59]** [29.08]** [23.21]**
1987–1988 round 0.05 0.003 −0.003 0.051 0.026 0.046 0.106 0.033 0.11
[0.66] [0.04] [0.07] [1.14] [0.55] [1.26] [1.24] [0.51] [1.67]+
1993–1994 round 0.042 0.053 0.009 0.041 0.094 0.083 −0.093 0.083 0.076
[0.54] [0.80] [0.17] [0.88] [1.57] [1.87]+ [0.96] [1.14] [0.80]
1999–2000 round 0.042 −0.06 −0.047 −0.01 0.006 0.028 −0.248 −0.01 0.022
[0.51] [0.85] [0.82] [0.17] [0.10] [0.54] [1.98]* [0.10] [0.15]
Constant 0.214 −1.911 −0.624 −0.809 −1.314 −0.298 −1.235 −1.167 −0.546
[0.78] [6.69]** [2.56]** [3.10]** [3.32]** [0.99] [2.86]** [3.11]**[0.63]
continued
Table 5A.4 continued
Female participation rate OLS without state dummies OLS with state dummies Expected earnins instrumented
with state dummies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Rural Urban All Rural Urban All Rural Urban All
Heteroskedasticity 0.7878 0.4838 0.1421 0 0 1 0 0.006
test (P-val=)
Observations 263 277 498 263 277 498 258 232 432
R2 0.05 0.03 0.48 0.71 0.55 0.74
Adj R2 0.03 0.01 0.47 0.67 0.48 0.71
Test for validity of instruments
Overidentification test of all instruments (P-val=) 0.21917 0.3455 0.60499
1st stage centered R2 for Expected earnings for females in rural casual work 0.4564 0.4703 0.60499
instrumented variables Expected earnings for females in urban casual work 0.5021
Excluded instruments Share of sch tribe 25–59; female x x x
Share of sch caste 25–59; female x x x
Share of primary educated female 25–59 x
Share of secondary educated female 25–59 x
Gini–real daily wage x
Industrial Credit Rs. Per Capita x x
Agricultural Credit Rs. Per Capita x
share of industry in GSDP x x
count no salaried 15–59 x
Notes
1 State fixed effect is not reported in this table.
2 Absolute value of t statistics in brackets. Robust is reported where heteroskedasticity exists.
3 + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
4 x excluded instruments used in the specification.
6 Trends in the regional disparities
in poverty incidence
An analysis based on NSS regions
In this chapter we work on the basis of the 59 NSS regions in the 38th, 50th and
55th rounds rather than the 16-odd major states of India. Our focus is the rural
sector and the inter-regional variations in rural poverty. Work using time series
from successive NSS surveys has firmly established the connection between
poverty reduction and agricultural productivity growth (Ahluwalia 2002).
Ravallion and Datt (2002) use state-level cross-section and time-series data
pooled together to re-establish the connection. The contrary view of Beasley
and Burgess (2004) is probably due to a dubious fixed-effect model which has
been rightly criticized by Peter Timmer (2005). Few studies have used the cross
section data available for the NSS regions. One exception is Palmer-Jones and
Sen (2003). This chapter attempts to push the work based on NSS regions
further.
Poverty map for NSS regions
Jain and Tendulkar (1988) had studied the regional variation in poverty inci-
dence based on the unit-level data for 1973–1974 NSS regions available to
them. The number of regions used was 56. They had divided the regions into
four quartiles using the headcount ratios calculated for each region. This enabled
them to draw the “poverty map” for India which is reproduced in Map 6.1 The
basic data on the different regions – the upper terminal value of the headcount
ratio for each quartile, along with the shares of the population involved – are
given in Table 6.1.
The overwhelming impression from the map of 1972–1973 (Map 6.1) is that
the regions with varying incidence of poverty form reasonably clear blocks of
contiguous areas. The high poverty NSS regions (in the fourth quartile), num-
bering fourteen, form a continuous East–West belt stretching all the way from
West Bengal to Rajasthan in the west. Similarly the regions with the lowest
headcount ratio (in the first quartile) are concentrated in the North-West of the
country. The other regions, constituting the second and third quartile ranges of
the headcount ratio, are not so compactly placed but they are not distributed geo-
graphically in a random way either. Both groups are represented in fairly large
blocks both in North and South India.
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We wanted to see how a similar poverty map looked from the NSS data of
the 55th round in 1999–2000. The regions now numbering 58 as against 56 in
1972–1973 and were again broken down into four groups by the quartile values
of the headcount ratio. The poverty map for 1999–2000 is presented in Map 6.2.
The statistics comparable to these two years are presented in Table 6.1.1
When we compare the two maps the first strong points which impress us are
the very slight changes which have taken place in the spatial distribution of
poverty incidence over the 30-year period. In particular the high-poverty region
stretches from the East to the West across the heart of India, as it did in the early
seventies, but it stops at the border of West Bengal. The low-poverty region is
confined as before to the North-West. Assam (north-eastern India), which used
to be a low-poverty region, now falls in a mid-poverty region. However, unlike
Map 6.1 NSS regions ranked by rural poverty 1972–1973 (source: Jain and Tendulkar
(1988)).
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in the early 1970s, in the late nineties one can discern low-poverty regions in
patches spreading over northern and eastern India. The Table 6.1 does show the
substantial decline in the headcount ratios that has taken place in the country
over this period but the impact on the relative variations by regions is minor.
The comparative stability of the inter-regional differences in poverty is
surprising, because the period has seen some important changes in the rural









Map 6.2 NSS Regions ranked by rural poverty 1999–2000 (source: Generated from unit
level data of consumption schedule of 55th round).
Note
NSS regions are ranked in descending order in terms of rural poverty. The ‘0’ shows regions not
covered. Codes 1 to 4 reflect high to low level of poverty (HCR) in four quartiles.
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Relationship between the growth of rural household incomes and
poverty incidence
An econometric analysis of the cross-section data from the 1972–3 survey had
revealed two points: (i) the incidence of rural poverty was explained mostly by
the level of household income (as measured in the NSS by RAPCE-the rural per
capita expenditure of households; (ii) the contribution of the inequality measure
in household expenditure was significant but added only a small amount to the
explanation of the variance (Mazumdar 1990). We wanted to see if this relation-
ship held in the data set for 1999–2000, thirty years later.
The relationship between poverty incidence (as measured by the headcount
ratio) and APCE in the rural areas is indeed close and non-linear. The non-
linearity is to be expected. It shows that as rural income levels increase across
regions its marginal impact on the headcount ratio diminishes as fewer people
are below the poverty line.
We fitted a non-linear model to the two variables, and also added a measure
of the inequality of the distribution of APCE in a second model. The model
specification was as follows:
HCR = a*[exp(bRAPCE + cRAPCE2 + dGINI)]
The estimated results are given in Box 6.1. It is seen that adding inequality
variable GINI to the equation improves the fit, but the R2 increases only slightly
by 8 percentage points. Evidently the degree of inequality matters but is of
minor importance compared to RAPCE in explaining the inter-regional variation
in poverty incidence. This result may come as a surprise since the NSS regions
in our sample of observations vary a good deal in the structure of land distribu-
tion and off-farm activities, as well as other sociological factors (like caste com-
position, the proportion of agricultural laborers, etc.) which have an impact on
the degree of inequality in the distribution of RAPCE. We conclude that the
Table 6.1 Poverty characteristics of four groups of NSS regions for 1972–1973 and
1999–2000
Quartiles of regions
I II III IV
Year 1972–1973
Upper terminal value of POVT 0.3777 0.4693 0.5939 0.8500
Percentage of total rural population in quartile 13.81 37.34 28.83 20.02
Percentage of total rural poor population in quartile 7.42 32.84 31.31 28.43
Year 1999–2000
Upper terminal value of POVT 0.1080 0.1926 0.3043 0.4329
Percentage of total rural population in quartile 22.72 25.82 30.14 21.32
Percentage of total rural poor population in quartile 7.42 19.67 36.78 36.13
Source: Jain and Tendulkar (1988) and NSS unit level data of 55th round.
evidence shows that the variation in mean expenditure across regions is much
more than that of the degree of inequality – and it is the former which is the
more significant determinant of rural poverty. It should also be emphasized that
as indicated the situation in rural India in this respect has not changed over the
thirty years.
The close relationship between RAPCE and poverty incidence means that in
studying inter-regional variations in poverty we can concentrate on the
determinants of the former. This is what we do in succeeding sections of this
chapter.
The Palmer-Jones–Sen model
A paper by Richard Palmer-Jones and Kunal Sen (2003) attempts to explain the
spatial stability of poverty incidence in rural India in terms of initial ecological
conditions in the 80-odd NSS regions. They used the 43rd and the 50th rounds
of the NSS to calculate the average headcount ratio (HCR) for each of the NSS
regions for 1987–1988 and 1993–1994. The authors then used a simple linear
relationship to explain the inter-regional variation in HCR by the agricultural
growth rates (measured by gross output per hectare – aggregated from available
district level data into NSS regions). An initial level of HCR for the only year
available 1973 is used as a control variable, and some socio-economic factors
are added to ‘allow for social factors and agrarian structure’ (Equation 1). The
strong negative effect of agricultural growth on poverty incidence remains even
after allowing for the other variables (Table 3), and vindicates the importance of
the relationship between poverty reduction and agricultural growth at a fairly
disaggregated cross-section level.
The authors then work out in some detail the proximate determinates of agri-
cultural growth. Their empirical results are based on two propositions: (i) a posit-
ive relationship between irrigation and agricultural growth – worked out in a time
series production function form (equation 2 and table 4); and (ii) a positive rela-
tionship between initial agro-ecological conditions and irrigation – worked out in
an empirical relationship between the level of irrigation in the district and the
proportion of the district included in each one of 15 ‘agro-ecological’ zones, the
latter capturing the best conditions for irrigation (equation 3 and table 5).
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LN (RPOV99) = 7.39 − 0.017 RAPCE99 + 0.00001 (RAPCE99)2, R2 = 0.896
(8.77) (−3.38) (1.01)
LN (RPOV99) = 5.99 − 0.01305 RAPCE99 + 9.51253 GE(0), R2 = 0.963
(50.68) (−38.00) (10.23)
LN (RPOV99) = 6.15 − 0.021 RAPCE99 + 0.00001 (RAPCE992) + 8.39 GINI, R2 = 0.982
(13.62) (−7.71) (2.77) (12.15)
Box 6.1 Regression estimates of rural poverty ratio in 1999–2000 across NSS regions.
The message seems to be that initial agro-climatic conditions have driven the
process of agricultural growth and poverty reduction in India. These are the
conditions which have defined the potential for irrigation, the ‘fundamental vari-
able’ for growth in land productivity in South Asian conditions. They have been
“conducive to agricultural growth given the emerging technologies and public
investment, and which once set off, induces through political administrative
pathways, further investments, growth and poverty reduction” (ibid., p. 5). The
model is then in the genre of ‘ecological fundamentalism’. ‘The initial con-
ditions are unchangeable and unmodifiable and hence truly exogenous to policy,
while variables such as irrigation, literacy, and rural infrastructure would be
regarded as outcomes of “policies”, past and present, and, of course, private
actions through markets’ (ibid.).
In the empirical work the authors use the relatively homogeneous agro-
ecological zones (AEZs) defined by National Bureau of Soil Sciences and Land
Use Planning sponsored by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR
1992) (see Palmer-Jones and Sen Map 1, p. 14). Each AEZ would comprise NSS
regions (or States or districts) in different proportions – the proportions could be
ascertained by overlying the map of the unit of analysis (state, NSS region or
district) over the AEZ map.
The amount of detailed work in piecing together different sources of data is
impressive. But at the end of it one is left with some points of enquiry:
1 The role of factors other than agricultural productivity growth, e.g., the role
of the non-farm sector, is not addressed in the exercise.
2 Any change in the process, e.g., in the post-reform period, is not
discussed.
3 The analysis speaks to the determinants of poverty for the country as a
whole. It does not throw much light on possible differences in the traject-
ories of development in different regions. Dividing the whole of India just
into two groups of the ecologically ‘favored’ and ‘non-favored’ regions is’
illuminating for a limited purpose only. Even then the authors were unable
to evaluate the marginal returns to public investment in the two regions in
terms of the limited objective of poverty reduction. The only strong result
was about region 13 which ‘seems to have favorable agro-ecological con-
ditions and moderate irrigation levels but has the highest poverty ratio in
India’. Evidently this region was an outlier in the model and cried out for
better attention to its potential for poverty reduction through agricultural
productivity growth. But as we shall see even for this region more recent
developments point to better conditions than what was diagnosed in the P–S
analysis.
Broad regions
We decided to divide the country up into a limited number of ‘broad regions’,
grouped from the available 60-odd NSS regions, on the basis of three
126 Regional dimensions
principles: (i) the average incidence of poverty (as measured by the headcount
ratio over the three rounds of the NSS – 83, 93 and 99; (ii) the agro-climatic
zones into which the NSS regions fell; and (iii) geographical contiguity. After
some experimentation 7 (seven) regions were distinguished. They are reported
in Table 6.2.
(See Palmer-Jones and Sen, Map 2 and Table 2, for the definition of the agro-
clmatic zones.)
Map 6.3 should be read with the representation of poverty incidence in Map
6.2 above to get a fix on the demarcation of the broad regions in our analysis. It
should be noted that in Map 6.3 we have divided the medium-poverty zones into
two sub-groups – medium low and medium high. We have also distinguished
geographically between sub-regions in the Northern and Southern parts of the
country with similar incidence of poverty. Thus we end up with seven ‘broad
regions’ in our subsequent analysis.
Defining the broad regions
Region 1 is the most clearly demarcated – not only did it have the lowest inci-
dence of poverty in 1999 (less than 6 percent) but also the steepest decline over
the period considered. It stretches from the Western Plain, Kutch and part of
Kathiwaar peninsular into the Northern Plain and central highlands, and further
into the fertile irrigated areas of Punjab and Haryana.
Region 2 is the ‘heart’ of the poverty belt, which had been identified as
early as the early 1970s (Jain and Tendulkar) accounting for substantial part of
the rural poor in 1999. It covers the area of the Eastern (Chattisgarh) plateau
and Eastern Ghats and extending into the central highlands and part of the
Deccan plateau. This is a hot semi-arid region with limited scope for
irrigation.
Region 3 is the medium-poverty region extending over Eastern UP, Bihar and
into the Central Highlands. It had more potential for irrigation than Region 2
though the soil is less favorable for staple agriculture.
Regional disparities in poverty 127
Table 6.2 Broad regions of India
Regions Region description Agro-climatic regions
1 North-western prosperous regions 2, 4, 14 and part of 9
2 West-central high-poverty regions 11, 12 and part of 6 & 10
3 Central-eastern medium-poverty regions 5, 13 and part of 9 & 10
4 East-coast and north-eastern regions 15 to 19
5 West-coast low poverty regions 20
6 West–southern medium-poverty regions 3, and part of 6 and 8
7 Southern high-poverty regions 7 and part of 8
Source: Classification of agro-ecological zones from Palmer-Jones and Sen and our classification of
broad region.
Region 4 is a more heterogeneous one stretching along the east coast of India.
It includes the hot sub-humid to humid plains of Bengal and Assam and
stretches north-east to include the area of the Eastern Himalayas, and further
south into the semi-arid perhumid area of the Eastern coastal plain.
Region 5 is the Western Gnats and Coastal Plain with red laterite and allu-
vium derived soils and humid to perhumid ecological conditions.
Region 6 is the arid region of the Deccan, including parts of Telengana and
the Eastern Ghats with red and black soil.
Region 7 is the Eastern Ghats and Tamil Nadu uplands the Karnataka Deccan
plateau with red loamy soil.
Table 6.3 presents the cropping pattern in seven broad regions. In terms of










Map 6.3 Broad regions of India (source: Generated through GIS software).
Characteristics of broad regions
Incidence of poverty
Table 6.4 gives the headcount ratio (% poor) by broad regions for different NSS
rounds. The method of calculating the HCR is as follows:
1 The HCR is calculated by using a state-specific poverty line built up by
Deaton for all the three years. Therefore, the portion of each broad region
falling in different state would have different poverty line.
2 rpov87 and rpov93u are based on APCE (average per capita consumption
expenditure) of uniform reference period (URP), given in the NSS unit-
level data of the year 1987–1988 and 1993–1994. The rpov99 was based on
APCE of mixed reference period (MRP). To make 1993 poverty estimate
comparable with that of 1999, we have converted APCE (URP) of
1993–1994 to APCE (MRP) by following the procedure of Sundaram and
Tendulkar (2003a). Note that given the comparability problems posed by
the change in reference periods, it is pertinent to compare poverty incidence
between 1987 and 1993 on the basis of the URP, and the change between
1993 and 1999 on the basis of the MRP estimates.
Figure 6.1 graphs the HCR by broad regions for the different NSS rounds. It is
seen that the reduction in poverty is more uniform across regions in the first
period 1983–1993 than in the subsequent post-reform years. The second line
from the top in the graph (showing poverty incidence in 1993) has shifted down
in a roughly parallel way, except for region 2 (slightly less poverty reduction)
and region 7 (slightly larger poverty reduction). The change in the incidence of
poverty in the post-reform years 1993–1999 varies more as between the broad
regions. The three regions 3, 4 and 6 have rather similar incidence of poverty in
the 1999–2000 round but regions 3 and 6 had substantially higher poverty inci-
dence than region 4 in earlier years. That is to say 3 and 6 had a steeper decline
in poverty than region 4. Region 2 – the high poverty region of the North,
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Table 6.3 Main crops grown during 1997–1999
Broad region Main crops grown
1 Wheat, Bajra, Paddy and Cotton
2 Paddy, Jowar, Wheat and Cotton
3 Wheat, Paddy, Soya bean and Maize
4 Paddy and Jute
5 Rubber, Spices and Paddy
6 Small Millets, Jowar, Paddy and Bajra
7 Groundnut, Small Millets and Paddy
Source: Computed from district-wise crop-wise data of all India for the years 1997–1998 and 1998–1999.
Note
Crops in descending order of importance.
managed little poverty reduction in the second period, while region 7, the high
poverty region of the South, actually saw an increase in the headcount ratio. The
two low-poverty regions, 1 in the North and 5 in the South, continued to reduce
the incidence of poverty at much the same rate.
We now turn to the relative importance behind the inter-regional difference in
the headcount ratio. The major elements are: i) the levels of land productivity
relative to the pressure of population of land (the land-man ratio); (ii) the rela-
tive importance of off-farm rural employment; and (iii) the relative importance
of urban development. We discuss each of these elements in the equation indi-
vidually before bringing them together in the last two sub-sections.
Land productivity
Land productivity is obtained by dividing Value of output (at constant 1993–1994
all-India prices) by net sown area.2 Its variations across the broad regions and over
the three years 1980, 1990 and 1999 are portrayed in Figure 6.2.
The two low poverty regions, 1 and 5, have consistently maintained and
improved upon their land productivity. But high land productivity had been
achieved by region 4 as well, particularly in the last period after the second
green revolution, and by regions 3 and 6 to a smaller extent. Evidently, in the
case of these other regions greater pressure of population on land has depressed
household welfare.
Land–man ratio and land productivity
Figure 6.3 maps the position of the seven broad regions at two dates – 1983 and
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Figure 6.1 Trends of HCR across broad regions.
Ishikawa (1978) suggested that in Asian peasant agriculture, as the land–man
ratio deteriorates due to the pressure of population on land, the agricultural
economy adjusts by increasing land productivity – that is the movement in the
space of Figure 6.3 would be in the direction of the south-east or the fourth
quadrant. A second part of the Ishikawa hypothesis was that the points in the
graph will lie along a rectangular hyperbola. The area under this hyperbola
remains constant, signifying that the productivity per man remains roughly con-
stant. In other words more intensive cultivation increases land productivity but
only just compensates for the deterioration of the land–man ratio. Technical
progress or the availability of co-operant inputs like capital can of course shift
the curve upwards and to the right, thus increasing land productivity by more
than the hypothetical level.
The following points can be made by looking at the scatter in Figure 6.3:
1 The movement of all regions over time has been in the Ishikawa direction –
to the South East.
2 Region 1 – the low poverty region of the north-west have a position all of
its own lying above and to the right of the other regions. It shows the
importance of the higher level of technology – based presumably on
irrigation – which enable it to attain a higher level of land productivity for
all levels of land–man ratio relative to the other regions. Note that both in
1983 and 1999 it had a lower land–man ratio than region 2 and only slightly
higher than region 6, but substantially higher land productivity.
3 Regions 2 and 6 are distinguished by having a steep slope of the curve con-
necting the two variables. It signifies a sharper decline in land–man ratio,
relative to the increase in land productivity, than the other regions, The
increase in the pressure of population on land for these regions has been of
critical importance in depressing household welfare.
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Figure 6.2 Land productivity across region.
4 All the other regions lie close together along a downward sloping non-linear
curve. But it should be apparent that at most points of this hypothetical
curve the elasticity would seem to be more than unity That is to say these
regions over time have been able to increase its land-productivity at a higher
rate than what would just compensate for the deterioration of the land–man
ratio. This is the basis for the increase of productivity per man in these
regions – though obviously at different rates (This point is pursued further
below.)
5 Turning now to inter-regional comparisons it is interesting to note that
outside of region 1, as we move down the scale of the land–man, each
region, at both dates, lies to the south-east of the one before it. The only
exception would seem to be region 7 – whose position at both dates is left
or south-west of the region. Evidently this southern high-poverty region is
burdened by particularly low potential for raising land productivity to com-
pensate for its relatively low land–man ratio.
Rural non-farm sector
EMPLOYMENT
The welfare levels of rural households depend on the development of the non-
farm sector along with the level of land productivity. Regions with low land pro-
ductivity or unfavorable land–man ratio might be able to pull up their income




























Figure 6.3 Land–man ratio and land productivity in agriculture: 1983 data points
connected to 1999 points by arrows, across broad NSS region.
Notes
Land Productivity is Value of Output per hectare of Land (in Rs.) at 1993–1994 constant prices.
Land–Man Ratio – Hectare of land per person.
1 to 7 show changes in broad regions 1 to 7 and A is the figure for all-India (combined 1 to 7). 
Y-axis is land–man ratio.
in the urban areas. The role of the urban sector is portrayed in the next sub-
section. Figure 6.4 presents the percentage employment in rural non-farm activ-
ities in the seven regions of our study.
Employment in the rural non-farm sector (NFS) can respond to two different
types of developments. High growth in the farm sector creates demand for non-
farm products (including services) and ‘pulls’ labor into it. On the other hand,
limited opportunity for increase in land productivity together with pressure of
population on land could ‘push’ labor into the off-farm sector.
The ‘pull’ effect seems to have been important in the prosperous low poverty
region 1 – particularly in the development over time. The percentage of employ-
ment in NFS was relatively low in 1983 (NSS 38th round) but grew 30 percent
over the period until 1999 as the farm economy prospered. Although NFS has
increased somewhat over time in other regions, the rate of growth has been quite
limited in all the regions – with the possible exception of region 7.
Looking across the seven regions it is clear that it is the pressure of popu-
lation on land (as represented by the land–man ratio) that seems to be critical in
determining the relative size of NFS. It is striking that the lowest levels of NFS
outside region 1 are to be found in the regions with a relatively high land–man
ratio: regions 2, 3 and 6 (see Figure 6.4). Since the regions differ a lot in terms
of their incidence of poverty and hence levels of income, the conclusion sug-
gested by this evidence is that it is the pressure of population on land, rather than
the level of income, that is the dominant influence on the size of the NFS.
Both regions 5 and 7 are low land–man regions. The NFS sector in region 5
has been at the highest level in India for the entire period of our study, while the
sector in region 7 has had a growth rate almost as high as that of the low-poverty
region 1. But the two regions differ in terms of poverty incidence. Region 5 can
clearly point to the successful development of its NFS sector as an instrument in
its achievement of a low incidence of poverty in spite of the unfavorable






























Figure 6.4 Share of non-farm employment across region.
land–man ratio. But region 7 continues to be a high-poverty region despite its
relatively high growth rate of NFS.
LABOR PRODUCTIVITY
The proportion of rural income generated in the non-farm sector does not
depend only on the proportion of employment in this sector. The other variable
is the relative level of labor productivity. It is not possible to determine a priori
how the latter will vary with the prosperity of the region. On the one hand, we
would expect that in a relatively poor region there will be good deal of labor
‘pushed’ into off-farm activity for lack of opportunities in cultivation and related
activities – and this will tend to depress the relative productivity in non-farm
sectors. On the other hand, we would expect the agricultural sector to be less
integrated with the non-farm economy in poorer regions. The enhanced
‘dualism’ in such regions would tend to make the productivity in non-farm to be
relatively higher. We do not know which of these two influences would prevail
in an inter-regional comparison. The empirical data presented in Table 6.4 sug-
gests that in fact the latter is the more dominant influence. High-income regions
(like 1, 3 and 5) have a lower productivity gap, while the highest productivity
gap is found in the poorest regions 2 and 7.
Rate of urban-employment growth
How far does creation of employment outside the rural sector provide an addi-
tional element to the pattern of inter-regional differences? The data for the dif-
ferent rounds on this point are portrayed in Figure 6.5. There is a clear
correlation between the incidence of poverty and the rate of urbanization across
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Table 6.4 Income per rural UPS worker in agricultural and non-agricultural sector
Broad lp_ag55 lp_nag55 lp_ag50 lp_nag50 y_gap55 y_gap50 gr_yag gr_ynag
region
1 1,224 1,276 1,030 1,073 104 104 2.92 2.93
2 542 812 510 774 150 152 1.03 0.79
3 923 925 777 872 100 112 2.91 0.98
4 807 909 764 878 113 115 0.91 0.59
5 946 1,090 895 965 115 108 0.93 2.05
6 598 882 520 764 147 147 2.37 2.41
7 474 708 466 797 149 171 0.28 –1.94
Notes
lp_ag – consumption expenditure of agricultural households divided by total agricultural UPS
worker.
lp_nag – consumption expenditure of non-agricultural households divided by total non-agricultural
UPS worker.
y_gap – ratio of lp_nag to lp_ag.
Gr_yag and Gr_yanag are annual growth rates of lp_ag and lp_nag.
regions. As with NFS, region 1 again stands apart from the others in not only
having a higher than average proportion of employment in the urban areas all
along, but also in experiencing a faster growth of this sector than the other
regions. The low poverty region 5 shows the highest urban rate, which increases
by a third between the 38th and the 55th rounds. Clearly urban employment
played as much of a role in poverty reduction as the NFS in this region. The
lowest urban rates are found in the two high-poverty regions of the Central-West
and the South (regions 2 and 7). The medium poverty regions 3, 4 and 6 have
intermediate levels of urbanization and show only small gains over the period.
Components of RAPCE across broad regions
There is a close relationship between the rural household welfare levels as meas-
ured by the average rural household expenditure per capita (RAPCE) and the
incidence of poverty as measured by the headcount ratio (see section 1). We
therefore tried to look at the different components of RAPCE which contribute
to its differences across regions.
We make use of the identity:
Yr/Pr = Ya/N. N/P.Yr/Ya. P/Pr (1)
Where Yr = total rural household income (expenditure)
P = total (rural + urban) population in region
Pr = rural population
Ya = total income (expenditure) of agriculture households
N = net sown area
Then Yr/Pr is RAPCE


































Figure 6.5 Share of urban UPS workers in All UPS workers.
Ya/N is land productivity
N/P is the land–man ratio
Yr/Ya is the ratio of total rural income to agricultural income (an index of
the relative importance of the rural non-farm sector)
P/Pr is the inverse of the proportion of the population in the rural sector
Note that the Yr/Pr as given in the identity will not correspond exactly to the
actual RAPCE obtained from the unit level data of the NSS. There is the issue of
missing crops, and there is also the problem of the difference between household
income and expenditure due to household savings among other things. Further-
more, a critical element missing from equation (1) is that of net value added per
unit of gross output since detailed data on this point for the NSS regions is not
available. Nevertheless, we can treat the Yr/Pr in equation (1) as a reasonably
close index of the actual RAPCE.
Taking logs of all the terms equation (1) the percentage difference of all the
variables in any region with respect to the base region – say region 1 – can be
calculated. Thus the percentage difference in Yr/Pr between region 1 and every
other region can be expressed as a sum of the percentage differences of the vari-
ables included in the RHS of equation (1). We can then form some notion about
the relative quantitative importance of the latter in accounting for the difference
in the hypothetical Yr/Pr.
Table 6.5 sets out the calculations for the 55th round of the NSS. We also
include in the second column the actual value of RAPCE for this round (at
1993–1994 prices). It is seen that the signs of the differences of the actual values
agree fully with those of the hypothetical values entered in the last column as the
sum of the components in columns 3 through 6. It is, however, seen that the dif-
ferences in the hypothetical values are exaggerated in all the regions except 4
and 7.
The following interesting conclusions emerge from the values of the com-
ponents in relation to the sum:
1 Difference in land productivity is of overwhelming importance in the lower
value of Yr/Pr in regions 2 and 6. It is also a significant factor in the lower
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Table 6.5 Change (in %) from broad region 1 in the year 1999–2000
Regions Yr/Pr lnpro N/P Yr/Ya P/Pr Sum
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 –36 –52 8 –10 –8 –62
3 –30 –11 –32 –13 –16 –72
4 –27 24 –47 4 –8 –28
5 9 34 –63 31 26 29
6 –17 –37 –3 –1 8 –33
7 –32 –15 –48 13 15 –35
level of rural income in regions 3 and 7. Only in two regions 4 and 5 land
productivity seems to be higher than that of region 1, but in both these
regions the adverse land–man ratio overwhelms the land-productivity
advantage.
2 The more unfavorable land–man ratio plays a bigger role in the regions 3–5
and 7.
3 The important role played by the rural off-farm sector and urbanization
(columns 5 and 6) in the southern regions 5 and 7 are striking. Region 5 is
able to lift itself to a low-poverty region, in spite of a very unfavorable
land–man ratio, through major developments in these activities, while
region 7 mitigates its unfavorable land productivity and land–man ratio to
some extent.
4 Off-farm activity and urban development are much less important in the
more northern regions where the pressure of population on land is not as
great (regions 1, 2 and 6). Regions 2 and 3 are in fact poorer because of the
lower level of performance of these sectors compared with region 1, but the
dominant factor behind the difference is lower land productivity – as indeed
it is so in region 6 as well.
Dynamics of the broad regions
Using equation (1) the growth rate of RAPCE can be decomposed into the alge-
braic sum of the growth rates of the variables on the RHS. Note it is expected
that N/P will all be negative. Yr/Ya is an index of the growth of the non-farm
sector in the rural areas, and as we have seen will be positive. P/Pr shows the
effect of urbanization and also will be positive. The decomposition exercise
helps us to quantify the relative importance of the different variables in the
identity in the growth rate of RAPCE in the seven regions. The results are
given in Table 6.6.
The data presented in Table 6.6 help us to throw some light on the question:
does the difference in land productivity – which was seen to be of such import-
ance in the lower level of rural welfare in most of the regions relative to region
1 – a result of differential growth over the 1983–1999 period? Considering the
period as a whole the growth rate of land productivity (Lnpro) was indeed
higher in region 1 – with the exception of regions 3 and 4. But looking at the
two shorter periods 1983–1993 and 1993–1999 separately, the striking fact
emerges that the differential growth rate is largely due to developments in the
1993–1999 period. Over the 1983–1993 period, the growth rate of land produc-
tivity was significantly lower than that of three of the other region and exceeded
the growth rate only in regions 4 to 6. This changed in the post-reform period
1993–1999. The growth rate of land productivity in region 1 shot up, while it
became low or negative in three of the other regions. Even the four regions
which had positive growth rate – the growth rates fell far short of the one
attained by land productivity in region 1 with sole exception of region 4. The
point underlines the problem of uneven regional development in agriculture in
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the immediate post-reform years which have been emphasized by many
commentators.
The second point pertains to the role of the rural non-farm and the urban
sectors. We had noticed the difference in 1999–2000 between region 1 and the
other northern regions on the one hand, and the southern regions as a group, on
the other. It is now seen that theses differences had indeed gathered momentum
over the 1983–1999 period. It was the result of the differential patterns of
growth over the entire period. The low-poverty region of the North (region 1)
has maintained its difference in RAPCE (and poverty incidence) or pulled away
from the others partly because of its high growth rate of land productivity, but
also partly (with respect to the northern regions 2 and 3 in particular) because
of higher growth rate of the rural non-farm and the urban sectors.
The importance of the rural non-farm and urban sectors were seen to be more
important in the Southern regions in the 55th round. It is now seen that this is
due to the relatively high growth rates of these sectors over the preceding twenty
years. They grew at a relatively high rate not because of, but to compensate for,
the low growth of land productivity.
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Table 6.6 Decompostion of growth of RAPCE in period 1983–1999 and in sub-periods
1983–1999 and 1993–1999
Regions Lnpro N/P Yr/Ya P/Pr Sum
For 1983–1999
1 3.43 –2.37 0.63 0.45 2.15
2 2.66 –2.36 0.31 0.17 0.78
3 4.54 –2.60 0.10 0.13 2.17
4 3.55 –2.16 0.92 0.19 2.49
5 1.81 –1.67 0.85 1.05 2.03
6 1.56 –1.97 0.55 0.77 0.91
7 1.79 –1.38 1.09 0.53 2.02
For 1983–1993
1 3.18 –2.27 0.65 0.41 1.96
2 4.42 –2.24 0.40 0.07 2.65
3 5.81 –2.17 0.00 0.14 3.78
4 2.50 –1.70 1.21 0.22 2.23
5 1.09 –0.97 0.40 1.13 1.65
6 1.53 –0.98 0.94 0.48 1.97
7 4.03 –0.93 1.64 0.29 5.03
For 1993–1999
1 3.85 –2.55 0.61 0.54 2.45
2 –0.20 –2.56 0.14 0.35 –2.27
3 2.45 –3.35 0.28 0.11 –0.51
4 5.32 –2.96 0.41 0.13 2.90
5 3.01 –2.88 1.63 0.90 2.66
6 1.61 –3.69 –0.12 1.28 –0.92
7 –1.85 –2.17 0.12 0.96 –2.94
Conclusions
The spatial stability in the inter-regional variation in rural poverty is impressive,
The Palmer-Jones–Sen model is a very useful contribution in suggesting that the
stability can be traced to the initial agro-ecological conditions of different
regions of India which determined the effectiveness of infrastructure invest-
ments, particularly irrigation, and the subsequent growth of land-augmenting
technical progress in agriculture. In this chapter we have tried to see if this broad
interpretation is too restrictive, and if the aggregate picture might not hide
important variations in poverty incidence and of factors other than land produc-
tivity in explaining the inter-regional variations.
A first attempt has been made to divide India into ‘broad regions’, grouping
the NSS regions into seven clusters determined partly by agro-ecological con-
ditions. Since it was shown that the relationship between RAPCE and the head-
count ratio is very close in rural areas, we tried to concentrate on the
determinants of the variations in RAPCE across our broad regions. It was seen
that while the variations in land productivity is indeed of major importance, we
need to take account of other factors to have a fuller explanation. Most import-
ant are: (i) the variations in land–man ratio; (ii) the relative importance of rural
off-farm employment; and (iii) the degree of urban development. The decompo-
sition model given in this chapter seeks to highlight the comparative importance
of these factors in accounting for the variations in RAPCE across the broad
regions. To mention one result in particular: the more important role played by
the latter two factors in the southern regions of 5 and 7 is striking. The dynamic
extension of the decomposition model helped us to unravel some of the interest-
ing differences in trends across the regions. It was seen that the low poverty
region of the North-West (region 1) was in fact losing in advantage over the
other regions in terms of the growth of land productivity in the period
1983–1993, but that this equalizing trend has been reversed in the post-reform
years of 1993–1999. Over the entire 1983–1999 period the maintenance of the
leading role of region 1 in poverty reduction has not been entirely due to differ-
ential growth in land productivity (relative to the offsetting trend in land-man
ratio). The growth of off-farm employment, both in the rural and the urban areas
of this region, has contributed at least half of the differential growth in RAPCE
relative to regions 2 and 3. The rural non-farm and urban sectors played a larger
role in determining the level of RAPCE in the southern regions in the 55th
round. These sectors grew at a relatively high rate over our period not because
of, but to compensate for, the low growth of land productivity.
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7 Agricultural productivity, 
off-farm employment and 
rural poverty
The problem of labor absorption in
agriculture
Background
The growth of agricultural output decelerated in the post-reform period. According
to the National Account Statistics the trend rate of growth of GDP at factor cost in
agriculture, which was 3.3 percent in the period 1981/1982 to 1990/1991 and 3.1
percent over the years 1991/1992 to 1995/1996, decelerated to 2.4 percent during
1996/1997 to 2000/2001. Much higher growth rates were registered by manufactur-
ing and particularly the services sector. Since agriculture is still the largest labor-
intensive sector in the Indian economy, the slow-down in output growth in this
sector has raised concerns if the possibility of economically viable labor absorption
is reaching its limits in agriculture. It should be noted that a slow-down in output
growth can also be expected to reduce the employment elasticity in this sector. As
the returns to labor fall it will move out into alternative occupations, including
schooling and off-farm employment, even if it does not significantly increase open
unemployment. We shall now briefly review the various difficulties – both at the
external and internal margins – which might have led to a marked slow-down in
output and employment. We will see that problems in policy making might have
had their share in the causes of the slowdown.
The external margin
The net sown area in agriculture marginally declined in India in the 1990s –
from 143 million hectares in 1990–1991 to 141.23 million hectares in
1999–2000 (Statistical Abstract: India 2002). It can be seen from the data on
‘patterns of land utilisation’ that in the same period ‘land not available for culti-
vation’ increased from 40.48 million hectares to 42.41 million hectares. It indic-
ates an increase of two million hectares of land for non-agricultural uses – not an
insignificant shrinkage of the external margin for cultivation, at the annual rate
of about 1.5 percent per decade. However, gross cropped area has increased
from 185.78 million hectares to 189.74 million hectares in the same period. It
appears that there exists little scope for labor absorption through extensive culti-
vation. We will now discuss why the possibility through intensive cultivation
(raising cropping intensity) also appears to be limited.
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Increasing labor absorption through irrigation
It is well known that in Indian agriculture, as in many other Asian economies,
controlled water supply is the critical input which not only enhances land pro-
ductivity but also increases opportunity for increasing the input of labor. In
fact we have discussed in Chapter 6 that the Palmer-Jones–Sen model has
made irrigation the centre of their interpretation of the pattern of rural growth
in India. In recent years, however, there has been much discussion in the liter-
ature of the increasing difficulties and costs of providing controlled water
supply to agriculture.
At the end of the nineties the total gross irrigated area (GIA) reached 39 percent
of gross cropped area. In the last two decades of the century ground-water irriga-
tion (through wells) increased much more rapidly. By the triennium ending
1998/1999 ground water accounted for 56.7 percent, canals for 31.2 percent and
tanks for 5.5 percent of net irrigated area (World Bank 2005, p. 30).
It has been maintained that ground-water extraction through private pumps
has reached its limit in most parts of India except eastern India. The subsidized
power for agricultural use is an important factor that led to the decline of ground
water resources. The remaining potential of ground-water resources largely lies
in eastern India where it is hampered by the inadequate spread of electric power
(Hanumantha Rao, 2004). However, as the World Bank reports: ‘Capital Expen-
diture on major and medium surface irrigation schemes and flood control con-
tinue to account for the largest share of public expenditures in the agricultural
sector . . . But future expansion of surface irrigation infrastructure will come at
increasing cost’. (2005, p. 31).
Under-pricing of canal water is extensively practiced by state governments,
who are responsible for the administration in this sector. The consequent financial
crunch leads to a vicious circle of deterioration of the irrigation infrastructure,
diminished water supply to farmers and their reduced capacity to meet even the
subsidized costs. Further, the system is regressive. ‘Small and marginal farmers
who comprise about 82 percent of the farmers who use canal irrigation, cultivate
about half of the area that is irrigated by canals’ (ibid., p. 33, italics ours).
The impact of fertilizer price policy
Fertilizer subsidy has been one of the crucial elements in the package of policies
introduced in the seventies to support the green revolution in agriculture.
Domestic producers of urea are given a designated retention price, calculated on
a cost-plus basis. The difference between this price and the administered farm-
gate price, minus the distribution margin, is paid as subsidy to the producers.
The amount of the subsidy increased continuously through the eighties and the
nineties reaching a peak of 0.7 percent of GDP at the end of the century (ibid.,
Figure 4.1, p. 28).
At the state level the main beneficiaries of this large volume of subsidies have
been the richer states, in which irrigation is also more extensive. Gulati and
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Naryanan (2002) estimated that between 1981/1982 and 1999/2000 the subsidy
shares of farmers was 66.5 percent of the total, the remaining 33.4 percent
accruing to the fertilizer industry.
Another important by product has been that, together with the other subsidies
in the overall agricultural package of policies, this expenditure has been a major
factor reducing the availability of finance for agriculture extension and research
and development. The longer-run impact of this policy on the growth of the
sector has been substantial though difficult to quantify.
Diversification of output
Diversification of the product mix is an important way of increasing markets,
including exports and also of increasing the labor use in the sector. Figure 7.1
reproduces the chart for labor use in selected agricultural products from the
World Bank Report.
The substantially higher use of labor per unit of land in non-cereal products is
striking. Sectors outside vegetables, like livestock and fisheries, have also been
important in providing both extra employment and high value added to agricul-
ture in many developing countries.
Recent growth in Indian agriculture has indeed seen evidence of significant
development of the non-cereal sector. The share of food grains in total value of
output in the crop sector declined from 48 percent at the beginning of the 1980s
to 40 percent at the end of the 1990s (ibid., Table 2.5, p. 7). There has also been
significant growth in meat and fish output, including exports. But some aspects
of agricultural sector policies have been a drag on the process of diversification.














































































Figure 7.1 Average labor use for selected crops (days/ha/season) (source: World Bank
(2005)).
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both in the wake of the reform process of the nineties and in response to the
responsibilities under the WTO agreements. But the late nineties saw an increase
in the nominal protection coefficients (NPCs – the ratios of domestic to world
prices). Of most significance in the present context is the increase in NPCS for
rice and wheat. This increase was driven by the maintenance of minimum
support prices in the domestic market in the face of a rapidly declining world
prices.
The government’s food-grain policy was meant to achieve two objectives:
provide adequate income to farmers, and to ensure an adequate supply of food
grain at reasonable prices. The major elements of the policies are: procurement
of grains at the minimum support price from the farmers; distribution through
the public system at subsidized prices; and a variety of restrictions on private
trade in these commodities. With the downward trend in the world prices of
rice and wheat since the mid-nineties, and the limited opportunity for exports,
the volume and cost of buffer stocks in the government distribution system
have increased. The effective subsidies associated with this system have bene-
fited disproportionately the states growing the bulk of these commodities –
which happen to be the richer states – and the richer farmers within them.
Along with the regressive nature of the subsidies, this price policy has been a
major element in slowing down diversification to non-cereals in the agricul-
tural sector.
Investment in agriculture
A persistent criticism of the agricultural policies in India has been that the finan-
cial burden of the elaborate system of subsidies, quite apart from the impact on
efficiency and equity, has produced a financial crunch which has inevitably
reduced the funds potentially available to support public investment and
research on R&D. Even India’s elaborate extension services, which had played
such a crucial role in the green revolution, is said to be starved of funds. The
lack of productive research has meant that there is no major breakthrough in
agricultural technology on the scale of the green revolution insight. The prospect
Table 7.1 Comparison of average yields of major crops in India (1998–2000) with other
major producing countries
Crops India Brazil China Indonesia Pakistan Thailand Vietnam
Rice 1,938 2,875 6,317 4,283 3,000 2,501 4,101
Wheat 2,619 1,713 3,790 2,299 639
Maize 1,768 2,767 4,938 2,693 1,730 3,523
Soybean 1,106 2,375 1,743 1,209 1,240 1,445 1,159
Sugarcane 71,514 68,340 68,902 64,783 47,981 54,831 50,094
Potatoes 17,053 16,375 14,212 14,480 15,690 12,505 10,970
Cotton 640 1,995 3,130 1,281 1,776 1,396 994
Source: World Bank (2005).
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for a high rate of growth of output and consequent growth in labor absorption on
this sector does not look all that good at the beginning of the new century.
Land productivity continues to be at a low level in India relative to compara-
tor countries (Table 7.1).The low level of land productivity is a major reason for
the low incomes of households’ dependent on the sector – both in absolute and
relative terms. Increase in land productivity creates the virtuous circle of higher
agricultural income, higher off-farm employment, and further income growth
per worker in agriculture as ‘surplus’ labor pulled away from the sector (see
‘Diversity of activities in agriculture’ section below).
Employment elasticity in agriculture
We now turn to a discussion of employment elasticity in agriculture. Tables 7.2
and 7.3 combine the NSS data on employment in this sector with our own
estimates of the index of agricultural; output used in Chapter 6 to provide
Table 7.2 Employment and output growth in agriculture, 1983/1984–1993/1994
Region Gr_UPS_80s Gr_op_80s elas_ups80 Gr_UPSS_80s elas_upss80
1 0.15 3.15 0.05 0.40 0.13
2 1.29 4.49 0.29 1.41 0.31
3 1.74 5.86 0.30 1.83 0.31
4 1.79 2.75 0.65 2.15 0.78
5 –0.09 1.70 –0.05 0.02 0.01
6 1.40 2.78 0.50 1.55 0.56
7 1.89 4.88 0.39 1.98 0.41
All 1.26 3.66 0.34 1.44 0.39
Source: Unit-Level NSS data on all three rounds of NSS and district-level value of output data on
agriculture.
Table 7.3 Employment and output growth in agriculture, 1993/1994–1999/2000
Region Gr_UPS_90s Gr_op_90s elas_ups90 Gr_UPSS_90s elas_upss90
1 –0.19 5.06 –0.04 –0.44 –0.09
2 1.58 0.17 9.29 1.10 6.50
3 0.89 3.00 0.30 0.72 0.24
4 0.97 4.86 0.20 0.48 0.10
5 1.25 2.55 0.49 1.39 0.54
6 1.67 0.44 3.78 1.25 2.83
7 –1.70 –1.30 1.28 –1.78 1.34
All 0.92 3.06 0.30 0.60 0.19
Source: Unit-Level NSS data on all three rounds of NSS and district-level value of output data on
agriculture.
Notes
Gr_op is the annual percentage rate of growth of agricultural output; Gr_UPS and Gr_UPSS refers to
employment growth rates for these categories of workers; elas is employment elasticity (for the rele-
vant count of workers) for the 83–93 and the 93–99 periods.
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estimates of employment elasticity over the two NSS periods – the 1980s cover-
ing the period between the 38th and the 50th rounds (1983/1984 to 1993/1994)
and the 50th and the 55th rounds (1993/1994 to 1999/2000).
It should be noted that the estimates of employment elasticity presented in the
tables above are different from the ones given in Chapter 3. The earlier estimates
are based on NSS employment data combined with National Account estimates
of agricultural growth. The latter of course are not available for the broad
regions given in Tables 7.2 and 7.3.
The overall figures for employment elasticity for all-India confirm its decline
in this sector which has been mentioned in Chapter 3. We have discussed earlier
the problems on the supply side of labor. The withdrawal of labor for education
in the younger age-groups for example pulls down the numbers reported to be
employed in the NSS counts. To minimize this problem we have defined
employment as comprising only those reported in the prime 15–59 age group.
Agriculture of course has a high incidence of self-employment. Thus the prob-
lems mentioned in Chapter 3 about the count of employment would be particu-
larly strong in this sector – and would affect the UPSS estimates more than the
UPS ones. It is seen that the decline in employment elasticity in the 1990s is
only marginal based on the UPS estimates and is substantial for the UPSS count.
This is as it should be. The upsurge in the demand for secondary female labor
during the second green revolution in Eastern India, and its decline in the sub-
sequent period, has already been discussed in Chapter 4.
The results for the broad regions show some large variations. But before we
can discuss the possible reasons for these differences we need to have a digres-
sion on a conceptual issue about the value of employment elasticity in agrarian
economies.
The determinants of employment elasticity in peasant agriculture
What determines the volume of employment in an agricultural economy of the
Indian type – in which self-employed farmers provide the majority of labor
input, and hired wage labor is only a part of the labor force? There are two dif-
ferent approaches to the question. These might be called the ‘production func-
tion approach’ and the ‘disguised unemployment approach’. In the production
function model the amount of labor used is determined by a profit-maximizing
farmer much like in an industrial firm. The level of employment is then deter-
mined by the volume of output, the use of co-operant factors like capital, and the
relative price of labor (wage rate). The labor used in this model is of standard
efficiency. If the supply of workers in the region is larger than the demand the
excess moves away to other occupations or regions or is openly unemployed.
In peasant agriculture dominated by family farms employment is determined
more by work sharing than profit maximization. If supply of labor exceeds
demand, and the opportunities of off-farm employment are limited, workers are
not wholly unemployed but are absorbed in farm activities at a lower level of
work intensity.
The disguised unemployment model has two important predictions for the
level of employment per unit of land (or output), and hence on the value of the
elasticity of employment with respect to output over time. First, poorer regions
with low land productivity can be expected to be beyond the point of labor
absorption at which a reservoir of ‘disguised unemployment’ has begun to accu-
mulate. If then the labor-force growth exceeds the growth of agricultural output
we can expect to see a further accumulation of surplus labor. The resultant high
elasticity of employment would then just be reflecting the growing volume of
‘disguised unemployment’. Second, the elasticity of employment in agriculture
will be higher in regions in which the opportunities for non-farm employment
are less. If we find (as will be discussed in the next section) there is a positive
relationship between off-farm employment and land productivity, the two con-
clusions will reinforce each other.
Differences between ‘broad regions’ in employment elasticity
It will be recalled from the material presented in Chapter 6 that of the seven
broad regions distinguished in our classification, regions 1 and 5 are the ones
with high land productivity and low incidence of poverty. Regions 2 and 7 are
the high-poverty regions, while the other three occupy intermediate positions on
terms of income levels and poverty incidence.
The contrast in employment elasticity between the low-poverty region 1 and
the high-poverty region 2 is striking (see Table 7.3). The former had a high rate
of growth of agricultural output in both periods, actually increasing to the
highest among all regions in the 1990s. But labor absorption in agriculture was
quite low, turning negative in the 1990s. Most of the growing labor force was
absorbed outside agriculture, partly due to rising wages and mechanization, and
partly due to the high growth of off-farm employment. In region 2, on the other
hand, the labor force had to be absorbed in the agricultural sector itself. When
output growth declined in the 1990s to a very low rate, the increase in ‘disguised
unemployment’ in the sector was reflected in a massive increase in employment
elasticity.
Region 5 is the other low-poverty region which has succeeded in finding pro-
ductive employment for its growing labor force with the highest rate of growth
of urban employment in the 1983–1993 period. In the post-reform period the
growth rate of urban employment slowed down significantly (see Chapter 5).
Agriculture was called upon to absorb a larger proportion of the growth in the
labor force – well in excess of the moderate growth in farm output. It is likely
that this is the major reason for the jump in the value of employment elasticity in
agriculture in this region in the 1993–1999 period.
Two conclusions follow from these examples. First, relatively high employ-
ment elasticity in agriculture could result, not so much from a higher rate of
demand for labor with agricultural growth (as the production function approach
would suggest), but rather from the fact that this sector serves as the reservoir for
labor unable to find more productivity employment in other sectors (as the
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disguised unemployment hypothesis stresses). Second, there is some suggestion
from the inter-regional variations given in Tables 7.2 and 7.3 that relatively higher
employment elasticities are found in low-income regions in which opportunities
for non-agricultural development have been small or has grown weaker over time.
It is not, however, possible to prove this suggestion conclusively with regres-
sion models using unit level data because our observations are for three single
years separated by time, and as such subject to large variations caused by
random factors.
Our tentative conclusion is that, with the existing pattern of development of
the agricultural sector, the prospects for gainful absorption of labor in agricul-
ture is not all that great. In fact increase in land productivity, and the resulting
increase in income per worker in agriculture, is more likely to increase labor
absorption through non-farm development which might be induced. It is to this
topic that we turn in the next section.
Diversity of activities in agriculture
We have so far discussed employment in agriculture on the basis of the UPS and
UPSS classifications of the employed workers in agriculture. These concepts are
used by the survey to classify the employed respondents to allocate the latter to
different occupations/industry on the basis of their major activity. The data col-
lected this way pays no attention to the time spent by the workers in different
activities. The CDS concept attempts a partial accounting of the time budget. It
gives the distribution of person-days in different types of work undertaken by
members of rural households.
All activities relating to production of crops are included in “cultivation”. They
comprise six manual and one non-manual activity (Table 7.4a). However, in all
rounds of the NSS a little more than 40 percent of all person-days are classified in
‘other cultivation activities’ and this proportion does not show any definite change
over time. The next in importance is harvesting which accounts 21–22 percent of
cultivation activities, followed by ploughing and weeding (10–12 percent each).
Note that ‘other cultivation’ is different from ‘other agriculture’. The latter as seen
in Table 7.4b account for a sizable proportion of the total rural households’ activ-
ities: the most important of this type is ‘animal husbandry’. Nevertheless a substan-
tial part of this type of activity is also not definitely specified in the NSS codes.1
It will be seen from Table 7.4c that rather more than a quarter of the rural
person-days of work are spent in ‘non-agricultural activities’. This fraction does
not change much over time (not presented here), but there are interesting varia-
tions over the broad regions – which also do not vary much over time. The more
prosperous regions 1, 4 and 5 have a larger share of time devoted to these activ-
ities. So has broad region 7 – a high-poverty region which has a high man–land
ratio and limited opportunities in agriculture (see Chapter 6). The regions of relat-
ively high poverty incidence – regions 2, 3 and 6 have a relatively smaller pro-
portion of time devoted to non-agriculture. We conclude that for rural
households, diversification to non-agriculture is significant, and, across the ‘broad
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Table 7.4a Distribution of CDS person days in cultivation across various operations (55th round, 15–59 years)
Broad Ploughing Sowing Transplanting Weeding Harvesting Other cultivation Non-manual Total
region activities work in 
cultivation
1 6.3 4.8 2.9 10.6 20.7 53.2 1.4 100
2 9.1 3.6 6.2 13.1 21.3 45.9 0.8 100
3 8.7 5.8 4.4 9.5 27.5 41.3 2.9 100
4 11.2 4.3 8.6 9.3 20.5 43.7 2.4 100
5 11.0 4.2 7.7 10.3 19.9 41.9 4.9 100
6 10.1 4.7 3.6 18.3 19.3 42.4 1.5 100
7 10.1 2.5 4.4 14.7 20.4 46.0 1.9 100
Total 9.1 4.7 5.0 12.3 22.3 44.9 1.9 100
Source: Calculated from NSS unit-level data of 38th, 50th and 55th rounds of employment schedule.
Table 7.4b Distribution of other agricultural activities across various operations (55th round, 15–59 years)
Broad Other agricultural activities operation code
region
Forestry Plantation Animal Fisheries Other Non-manual work in Total
husbandry agricultural activities other than 
activities cultivation
1 0.8 0.2 65.8 0.1 28.2 4.9 100
2 9.2 0.2 10.9 1.0 69.2 9.5 100
3 0.9 0.7 35.3 0.6 54.5 7.9 100
4 2.0 18.1 11.6 4.2 57.1 7.0 100
5 3.7 36.2 8.6 2.3 44.1 5.2 100
6 2.2 1.9 18.0 1.0 71.3 5.6 100
7 3.6 1.4 22.6 1.4 66.6 4.4 100
Total 2.5 6.3 31.2 1.3 52.3 6.4 100
Source: Calculated from NSS unit-level data of 38th, 50th and 55th rounds of employment schedule.
Note
Bold figures show maximum values in different activities in specific broad region.
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regions’, its relative importance in terms of labor time spent on such activities is
inversely related to the incidence of poverty.
One would like to know what levels of income are generated by the labor
time spent on such activities, and how they compare with income originating in
agriculture. Unfortunately the ‘thick’ rounds of the NSS (on which much of the
work on this book is based) do not collect data on the components of household
income. But there was special survey of the NSS, the so-called 59th round
which collected data on this topic as part of a general survey of farmers’ eco-
nomic conditions. The share of household income of farmers derived from off-
farm activities is given in Table 7.5.
Table 7.4c Distribution of CDS employment across various activities (55th round, 15–59
years)
Broad Cultivation Other agricultural Non-agricultural Total
region activities activities
1 48.1 25.9 25.9 100
2 68.1 14.0 17.9 100
3 63.7 17.2 19.1 100
4 49.3 19.0 31.7 100
5 26.2 32.4 41.3 100
6 56.6 19.6 23.8 100
7 51.3 16.7 31.9 100
Total 55.3 19.9 24.7 100
Source: Calculated from NSS unit-level data of 38th, 50th and 55th rounds of employment schedule.
Table 7.5 Share of off-farm income in household income of farmers’ households (2003)
Broad region Micro Marginal Small Medium Large Total
(<0.1 (0.1–1 (1–2 (2–4 (>4 
hectare) hectare) hectare) hectare) hectare)
1 44.8 22.8 8.6 4.5 3.1 10.7
2 26.6 20.9 9.0 4.9 4.9 10.6
3 33.9 14.3 5.5 4.8 1.2 8.2
4 50.0 20.6 7.5 4.5 3.8 14.1
5 18.9 31.6 10.1 5.8 5.3 21.2
6 40.1 21.1 10.3 6.8 3.1 10.1
7 57.0 25.0 12.2 4.3 2.6 11.2
Total 40.6 20.6 8.1 5.0 3.0 11.0
Distribution of farmers’ 1.4 64.5 18.0 10.5 5.6 100.0
households across 
land- size groups
Source: Unit-Level data of NSS 59th round (2003), schedule 3.3.
Note
Farmer’s household is defined as any rural household possessing some land and any member of
household should be engaged in some agricultural activities on that land. On-farm activities include
crop cultivation, plantation activities and farming of animal.
It is seen that the relative income in off-farm activities of farmers’ house-
holds is quite low. This is as one expects since the off-farm activities recorded in
this survey are marginal for the households concerned. Nevertheless, the sub-
stantive point remains that, in contrast to some other Asian agricultural
economies, most notable Taiwan from its early stage of development, both the
total income and income per unit of labor time generated in off-farm activities of
farming households have been quite low in India. Even the more prosperous
regions in India like regions 1 and 5 do not seem to have higher relative labor
productivity in off-farm activities.
In the next section we consider the role of non-farm activities who ‘specialize’
in the non-farm sector in the rural economy. The ‘thick’ rounds of the NSS distin-
guish such households on the basis of occupation/industry of the principal earner
in the household. We do not have income data but the welfare level of households
can be approximated by the statistic of household expenditure per capita.
We need to be aware of the limitations of the main source of our data, the
NSS, before proceeding further. First, a large share of employment in India is in
the ‘self-employed’ category. There is an inherent difficulty of allocating
income accruing from self-employment when more than one earner from the
same household is in income-earning activity. Households from different self-
employed activities by different members of the household would be typically
pooled together. There is no way of distinguishing the individual contributions
of individual earners. Hence the income we can deal with is household income,
and we can normalize for the size of the household. Further, it is generally
accepted that figures on expenditure given by the respondent in the household is
more reliable than that of income. Thus we use the measure of household
welfare as given by mean expenditure per capita.
When we are comparing levels of household welfare across sectors we need to
identify the principal occupation of the household. This poses problems both con-
ceptually and in terms of execution. The conceptual problem arises from the fact
that a significant number of households will have more than one earner, and not all
earners will be in the same category of occupation. The secondary earners might
not be all wage earners. If they are working in the self-employed sector, they will
be pooling their earnings with other earners of the household to create the house-
hold’s pot of earnings. By assigning all the household income effectively to the
principal occupation of the household we might be exaggerating the income – and
the expenditure which it sustains – originating from this occupation.
Rural off-farm employment
It might appear at first sight that the pressure of excess labor supply on land and
the incidence of ‘disguised unemployment’ in poor regions would be partly
relieved if off-farm employment were to develop in a significant way in theses
areas. We saw in the last chapter that while in the northern ‘broad regions’ off-
farm growth seemed to add to the process of regional difference in growth over
time, there was some suggestion that the southern regions, particularly in the
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1983–1993 period, were able to compensate for the slow growth in land produc-
tivity through a more vigorous growth of the off-farm (and urban) sectors. What
is the evidence on this point from the pattern of development of off-farm
employment in rural India, taking all 75-odd NSS regions together?
Off-farm rural employment is a heterogeneous sector. Kijima and Lanjouw
(2004), drawing on the evidence from a host of village studies, distinguish three
major categories of NFS: (i) regular employment (generally salaried); (ii) casual
employment (daily wages); and self-employed enterprise activities. The first cat-
egory, often related to public-sector jobs created by rural development pro-
grams, are generally the most sought after as it not only offers higher earnings
but more importantly stability of employment. ‘Casual non-farm employment is
generally thought to be less demeaning to a worker than agricultural wage labor,
but returns may be only marginally higher’. Finally, the self-employed consist
both a group of low income earners who are pushed into the sector, and higher-
income workers with business activity. Kijima and Lanjouw report that analysis
of the NSS for the last three ‘thick’ rounds shows that the overall employment
share of the non-farm sector as a whole has hovered around 25–30 percent for
all-India, with no evidence of any growth over time. Casual labor has been in the
neighborhood of 6 percent, regular wage workers constituted 7–8 percent and
12–14 percent was the self-employed. The three components obviously have dif-
ferent distributional impact – regular workers and a portion of the self-employed
in particular would tend to be recruited from the better-off economic classes.
The significant question about off-farm employment relieving the pressure of
population on land is its relationship to the level of productivity (or income) in
agriculture. There are two different hypotheses in the literature about this rela-
tionship.
The Johnston–Mellor hypothesis
In the traditional view, associated with the work of Johnston and Mellor, off-farm
activity develops in response to the prior development of agriculture. High land
productivity, such as was achieved in selected regions due to the green revolu-
tion, increases demand for off-farm goods and services, both in the rural areas
and smaller towns. The growth of farm productivity and off-farm activity consti-
tute a virtuous cycle of mutually supported development.
This model has also an important implication for relative productivities in the
farm and non-farm sectors at different levels of rural welfare across regions. As
already mentioned, the existence of an excess supply of labor in traditional agri-
culture is not compensated adequately by off-farm employment, and does not
take the form of open unemployment. Agriculture is the ‘residual’ sector for the
population which cannot move to other occupations or regions. Since there is no
floor to self-employed income in this sector one sees a fall in the income of
households’ dependent on agriculture. In off-farm employment on the other
hand, the level of wage earnings or business income will have a floor determined
either by the reservation price of labor or the opportunity cost of capital. Thus
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we would expect to see regions with a low absolute level of income in agricul-
tural households would also show a relatively lower ratio of agricultural to non-
agricultural incomes. That is to say, the hypothesis is that in a cross-section
sample of NSS regions the relative income in agriculture would be positively
related to the absolute level of agricultural income.
The Foster–Rosensweig hypothesis
The contrary view has been most elaborately developed by Foster and
Rosensweig (2004). They distinguish between ‘traded’ and ‘non-traded’ types of
off-farm activities. While the latter could be a function of the development of the
local rural economy and hence would be sensitive to the growth of agricultural
income in the region, the ‘traded’ part is not necessarily tied to local develop-
ment. Further, Foster and Rosensweig suggest that writers have over-emphasized
the self-employed part of off-farm employment to the exclusion of wage earners.
The development of business activity in the rural economy is expected to be a
function of the growth of capital from outside the local economy seeking out
labor at affordable cost. Thus low-wage regions with low land productivity would
have a preferential pull on such investments. The proportion of employment in
off-farm activities in such regions would accordingly be higher. Clearly this
interpretation of the development processes in the rural economy outside agricul-
ture emphasizes the importance of outside capital rather than capital generated by
internal savings of rich farmers.
It is useful to note that the Foster–Rosenweig hypothesis has no particular
prediction about the relative incomes in the farm and off-farm sectors. While we
do have the scenario of capital migrating to less prosperous regions, presumably
with lower agricultural incomes, we cannot expect to see any particular changes
in the wage or income differences between the two sectors in the regions con-
cerned without more specific indication about labor market dynamics.
Testing with NSS data
The analysis in Chapter 6 for broad regions revealed that the evidence on the
basis of the seven regions distinguished leaned towards supporting the predic-
tions of the Johnston–Mellor rather than the Foster–Rosensweig model. It was
the pressure of population of land which seemed to be critical in the determina-
tion of the share of employment in the non-farm rural sector. Since a higher
man–land ratio was generally associated with a lower level of per capita income
and higher incidence of poverty, there was some positive relationship between
income levels and the share of non-farm employment. Also the poorer regions
tended to have a larger gap between the income per worker in the non-farm
sector relative to the farm sector. It is the purpose of this section to go beyond
the level of aggregation involved in the discussion of Chapter 6. We shall try to
test the hypotheses in a more detailed and rigorous way with the help of all the
observations available from the 70-odd NSS regions.
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The partial correlation of RAPCE with selected variables
We first examine the relative importance of different variables affecting rural
incomes (approximated by RAPCE), taking one variable at a time. The correla-
tion matrices for the variables enable us to do so. The definitions of the key vari-
ables are as follows:
rapce_ci – Rural average monthly per capita consumption expenditure at
constant prices adjusted for inter-state difference in prices.
uapce_ci – Urban average monthly per capita consumption expenditure at
constant prices adjusted for inter-state difference in prices.
Rapce – Rural average monthly per capita consumption expenditure at
current prices.
lnpro – Land productivity obtained by dividing value of output of crops at
constant 1993–1994 prices divided by net sown area.
hn_ag – Ratio of income in the non-farm relative to the farm sectors. It is
proxied by ratio of average monthly household mean consumption expendi-
ture per capita of non-farm to farm households.
tur – urbanization ratio obtained as the share of urban UPS workers to total
UPS workers.
tnfups – share of UPS non-farm labor to rural labor.
cul_nsa – net sown area per UPS worker involved in cultivation.
We define the variables in logs so that it is easy to examine the relative elasticity
of RAPCE with respect to each of the variables from the regression models to
follow. The correlation matrix is given in Table 7.6.
The more important conclusions are as follows:
1 The correlation of RAPCE with land productivity is quite high, showing an
elasticity of 0.48. In fact it increased quite dramatically between 1983 and
1993, before falling off somewhat in 1999 (not shown in the table). Some of
the reason for the low correlation in the 1983 round is the problem with
Table 7.6 Correlation matrix, Year: 1999–2000
rapce_ci lnpro99 hn_ag55 t55ur t55nfups uapce99_ci cul_nsa99
rapce_ci 1.0000
lnpro99 0.4797 1.0000
hn_ag55 –0.3203 –0.2372 1.0000
t55ur 0.5578 0.2190 –0.0150 1.0000
t55nfups 0.4963 0.5667 –0.2269 0.3166 1.0000
uapce99_ci 0.4743 0.3028 –0.0373 0.5357 0.4532 1.0000
cul_nsa99 0.4206 –0.0640 –0.4177 0.3570 0.0073 –0.0158 1.0000
Source: Unit-Level NSS data on all three rounds of NSS and district-level value of output data on
agriculture.
inter-region price conversions in that round in particular. But even when we
look at the results without these price corrections, the correlation coefficient
of these two variables for 1983 at 0.39 is much lower than for the later
dates. Evidently the importance of land productivity in the determination of
the inter-regional variation in rural household welfare becomes substantially
stronger after the second green revolution of the 1980s.
2 Non-farm employment is positively correlated with land productivity – sup-
porting the Johnston–Mellor rather than the Foster–Rosensweig hypothesis.
In fact the correlation co-efficient between tnfus and lnpro is at 0.5667 the
highest in the matrix of Table 7.6.
3 As is to be expected from the last two results, the non-farm employment
variable tnfups is positively correlated with RAPCE and the correlation
value increased as much as that of yield between 1983 and 1993 and con-
tinued to increase somewhat in 1999. But the ratio of income per capita (as
proxied by household expenditure) of non-farm to farm households is nega-
tively correlated with RAPCE. The obvious inference is that in higher
RAPCE areas the productivity per worker in non-agriculture falls relative to
that in agriculture. A plausible interpretation is that in a cross-section view
of the rural NSS regions, as non-farm employment becomes a source of
increasing importance, the ‘dualism’ between farm and non-farm activities
decreases.
This is a second important finding of relevance to the Foster–Rosensweig
thesis. Part of the reason why non-farm employment seems to be of more
importance in poorer, low land-productivity regions is now seen to be
because its relative productivity is higher in such regions due to a stronger
incidence of ‘dualism’ – and not because a greater proportion of non-farm
employment is found in them.
4 Both the urbanization variables tur and uapce increased their correlation
coefficients with RAPCE dramatically between 1983 and 1993, specially
the former. The former in fact increased marginally also between 1993 and
1999, while the latter fell slightly. All this can be interpreted in terms of a
greater integration of the urban and rural economies, particularly the devel-
opment of small towns which has been noticed as an important aspect of
development since 1983.
5 The correlation of cul_nsa (the net sown area per cultivator) with RAPCE
also increased steeply from 1983 to 1993 and further to 1999. Thus the
impact of the farm sector on the rural expenditure also increased along with
the bigger role of urbanization. All this contributed to a very large increase
in the explanatory power of these variables in the regression to determine
RAPCE.
The elasticity of RAPCE with respect to the key variables
What are the relative strengths of the variables studied above – particularly land
productivity and non-farm employment on rural income levels? Regression
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models with the relevant variables put together were tried in order to decipher
their joint impact on RAPCE. We tried the regressions both with the dependent
variables rapce and rapce_ci (that is to say, both without and with price deflation
at the regional level). While the values of the coefficients are not that different,
slightly better fits were obtained for the former set. We therefore report and
discuss the results from only this set.
The more important conclusions are summarized below.
1 The elasticities of RAPCE with respect to tnfs for the different rounds are
given in Table 7.7. The elasticities with respect to land productivity and the
cultivated area per worker are also included in the table. It is apparent that
the elasticity of RAPCE with respect to farm income is much more than that
of non-farm employment. (Note that the elasticity of farm income would be
the sum of elasticities of land productivity and cultivated area per worker.)
2 The elasticity of RAPCE with respect to income generated in the non-farm
sector is probably a more relevant variable to compare with the elasticity
with respect to farm income. As already indicated the labor productivity gap
between the non-farm and farm sectors narrows with increase in RAPCE.
The elasticity of RAPCE with this variable hn_ag is highest in the 50th round
at –.213 in the multiple regression framework. Since this value is well below
unity, it can be easily be demonstrated algebraically that the elasticity of the
income ratio of non-farm to farm with respect to RAPCE will be positive but
below the value of the employment ratio (tnfs). In other words the positive
association of the proportion of employment in non-farm and the rural APCE is
moderated to some extent by the narrowing of the productivity gap between the
two sub-sectors because of the diminishing ‘dualism’ between them as regional
rural income increases.
A surprising finding of our regressions is that the elasticity of RAPCE is very
high with respect to the urbanization variables, particularly UAPCE. Table 7.8
reports the elasticity value for the two such variables used in our regressions. The
relationship seems to be especially strong in the 50th and the 55th rounds and the
value of the elasticities well exceed those of farm income and rural non-farm
Table 7.7 Elasticities of RAPCE with respect to selected variables
Variable 38th round 50th round 55th round
Tnfs 0.156 (1.53) 0.081 (2.08) 0.120 (2.24)
Lnpro 0.159 (1.91) 0.142 (3.73) 0.112 (2.62)
Cul_nsa 0.132 (1.97) 0.111 (3.47) 0.144 (3.91)
Source: Unit-Level NSS data on all three rounds of NSS and district-level value of output data on
agriculture.
Note
Figures in parentheses are corresponding t-values of estimated regression coefficients.
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employment. The importance of urban development – particularly the develop-
ment of small towns – for rural incomes in recent decades is evidently an import-
ant part of the changing rural economic scenario.
The results give unequivocal support to the model of a ‘cumulative’ process
of development in the rural sector. Rural incomes are propelled by increased
land productivity, and off-farm employment adds to the virtuous circle by
responding to it positively. The gap in labor productivity between farm and off-
farm sectors is reduced in this process.
The impact of liberalization on marginal farmers
We have seen that liberalization in the agricultural sector has been more on the
external front in the post-reform years with limited effort to dismantle the
regime of controls and subsidies in the internal economy. The impact on agricul-
tural output growth has not been very impressive. At the same time several
authors have raised the issue of adverse effect of post-reform developments on
equity in this sector (see, for example, Chandrasekhar and Jayati Ghosh 1999;
Sheila Bhalla 2005). Some evidence emerged in the analysis presented in
Chapter 6 above that the post-reform growth process in the rural sector favored
the more prosperous regions. There has also been an undercurrent of concern
that important changes are taking place – which affect particular sections of the
population adversely – and which are not captured by aggregate statistics. One
of the issues is the impact of changes introduced by liberalization on small and
marginal farmers.
‘Distress inducing’ growth
Liberalization has allowed competition from foreign countries even as world
prices of some key agricultural commodities had a substantial downward trend in
the nineties. The impact of these developments on distribution in the agricultural
sector has been significant in some areas. A notable example is the case of Telen-
gana in Andhra Pradesh. This case study has been analyzed by Vakulbrahmanam
(2005) who has sought to generalize the case of Telengana as an instance of ‘dis-
tress’ of small farmers in the growth process fueled by liberalization.
Table 7.8 Elasticities of RAPCE with respect to selected variables
Variable 38th round 50th round 55th round
Tu_r –0.132 (–1.76) 0.052 (1.44) 0.041 (0.84)
Uapce 0.163 (0.89) 0.427 (3.97) 0.435 (3.15)
Source: Unit-Level NSS data on all three rounds of NSS and district-level value of output data on
agriculture.
Note
Figures in parentheses are corresponding t-values of estimated regression coefficients.
Two crops, rice and cotton, account for almost 50 percent of the gross
cropped area in Telengana. World prices of both have taken a dive while the
domestic prices in Telengana have remained stagnant (ibid., Figures 2 and 3,
p. 977). Indian manufacturers have begun to import cotton lint in response to its
downward trend. In spite of this increased competition the area under cotton has
continued to increase at a high rate. Between 1985 and 2001 the area under
cotton in Andhra Pradesh increased at an annual rate of 17.2 percent, while the
area under rice increased at only 3.3 percent, and the area under a number of
coarse grains actually decreased (ibid., Table 16). This is because cotton is a
high-value crop and also provides a higher level of employment per acre.
It is possible to provide a dynamic model in which with a large enough differ-
ential in output per acre between the commercial and food-crop sectors, the rate
of shift of acreage to the former would be continuing even if the gap is reduced
over time. But a reading of the article by Vakulbrahmanam reveals that there
might be several supplementary factors at work. First, marginal farmers are more
specialized in non-food crops because they do not have access to irrigated fields
which is necessary for cultivation of rice. They are net buyers of food. So with
the increase in the relative price of food their welfare declines and the response is
to increase work on crop cultivation at the expense of leisure – a process emphas-
ized by Chaynov (1966). Second, the reform process saw an increase in input
prices – of power, credit and fertilizer, in particular, which squeezes the “net
surplus” further. This effect is likely to be more important for marginal farmers,
both absolutely and relatively, and might elicit the Chaynov type of response
even further.
Vakulbrahmanam’s data from the NSS showed that the average per capita
expenditure for large and medium farmers increased significantly in the pre-lib-
eralization decade of 1983–1993 but was nearly stagnant in the post-liberaliza-
tion period of 1993/1994–1999/2000. The contrast was much sharper for
marginal farmers and agricultural laborers – who actually suffered a significant
decline in welfare in the second period. Consistent with this poverty decline was
arrested in the post-liberalization period, and the agricultural growth rate in real
terms was stagnant contrasted with its robust growth in excess of 4 percent per
annum in the eighties. (ibid., Tables 2, 4 and 6).
The scenario presented above is for one region or district and is consistent
with qualitative evidence about distress among farmers including suicide due to
economic pressures. Part of the pressures arises from the fluctuations in market
prices for non-food crops and is clearly related to liberalization not accompanied
by adequate measures for crop insurance. How does the experience generalize to
the all-India picture?
The trends for all-India
A significant point emphasized by Vakulbrahmanam is that while agricultural
output in Telengana had grown over the 15 years of the last century at the healthy
rate of 4.7 percent per annum, the growth in the real wage rate for agricultural
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labor had slowed down over this period, becoming virtually stagnant over the
period of 1994–2000 (ibid., Table 6). We analyzed the data on output growth in
agriculture and the wage rate (daily average earnings) of agricultural worker for
57 NSS regions between the 50th and the 55th rounds. The statistics are set out in
Table 7.9. The much higher inter-quartile range for output growth implies that
the means of the two variables are fairly close, but the median growth rate of the
wage rate is much lower.
We also studied the growth rates of household welfare as measured by the
household expenditure per capita for the different classes of agricultural house-
holds as distinguished by Vakulabrahmann. Table 7.10 gives the statistics of
growth rates calculated.
It is seen that, unlike in the Telengana case, there is no monotonically
decreasing growth rate of household welfare as we go down the landholding
classes. There is, however, a difference between large farmers on the one hand,
and the marginal farmers and the agricultural laborers on the other. In spite of
the bottom quarter of the large farmers having negative growth, the overall
growth rate of this class – either in terms of the median or the mean – was sub-
stantially above that of marginal farmers or agricultural laborers. There is some
evidence supporting the Telengana phenomenon for all-India.
Region-specific evidence
Doubts remain nevertheless about the validity of the above analysis of central
tendencies based on all-India figures averaged over many regions when the
Table 7.9 Growth rates of agricultural output and daily wage 1993/1994–1999/2000
(1993/1994 prices)
Variable 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile Mean St deviation
Real output 0.34 3.24 6.05 2.905 –2.255
Real wage 1.56 2.44 4.20 2.829 2.122
Source: Unit-Level NSS data on all three rounds of NSS and district-level value of output data on
agriculture.
Table 7.10 Household expenditure per capita (APCE) for different classes
1993/1994–1999/2000 (at 1993/1994 prices)
Household type 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile Mean St. deviation
Large Farmers –1.26 3.13 5.43 2.558 4.433
Medium –0.37 1.57 4.69 2.040 3.636
Small 0.05 1.82 3.49 1.640 3.052
Marginal 0.41 2.08 4.16 2.189 3.326
Agriculture laborers 0.87 2.12 3.64 2.217 2.225
Source: Unit-level data of consumption expenditure schedule of 50th and 55th rounds.
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inter-regional variance is so high. In an alternative exercise we looked at the
question if any significant trends could be found in the period studied by looking
at region-specific growth rates for the household welfare of different classes of
farmers. This was done by taking each of the lower farming classes in turn and
then regressing the region-specific growth rate of per capita expenditure (mea-
suring household welfare) of each class on the same variable for large farmers.
As an example, the graph showing the scatter is given for one pair of the classes
distinguished in Figure 7.2 – namely the growth rate of APCE for the ‘marginal’
farmers. plotted against the growth rate for ‘large farmers’. The variance is large
but a regression line could nevertheless be fitted to the scatter with a significant
slope. Similar scatters for the growth rate of each of the other three classes
plotted against the growth rate of large farmers also show a significant positive
relationship (not shown here).
Table 7.11 presents the linear equations of the growth rates of each of four
classes in the agricultural sector regressed on the growth rates of large farmers.
Agricultural labor households are defined as those whose main source of earn-
ings is wage labor in agriculture, whether or not they are landless or cultivate a
small piece of land. The other landholding classes are distinguished on the basis
of the size of their operational holdings.2
In spite of the relatively low value of R2 (suggesting there are many other
factors behind the large inter-regional variance in growth rates of APCE), all the
coefficients of ‘b’ are significant at an acceptable level. We find that even for
medium farmers the growth rate is only a third of the rate achieved by the large
farmers. Further, there is indeed a gradual reduction in the slope co-efficient as
we move from medium to marginal farmers and to agricultural laborers. There
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Figure 7.2 Growth rate of consumption of marginal farmers vis-à-vis large farmers.
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The results give credence to an aspect of the hypothesis that post-reform
developments in the agricultural sector have helped larger farmers more than the
marginal ones. But it should be remembered that the period between 1993/1994
and 1999/2000 which we have considered has not been a particularly prosperous
one for agriculture. We would like to see developments in subsequent periods
when relevant data are available from further rounds of the NSS.
Conclusions
In conclusion we can recount the more important results from the detailed
discussions in this chapter:
1 Policies affecting the agricultural sector continue to favor the more prosper-
ous regions.
2 The objective of policy should not be viewed as maximizing employment
elasticity in agriculture. There is some evidence to suggest that employment
elasticity is higher in low-productivity regions simply because agriculture,
as the residual sector dominated by family farms, is best able to absorb
‘surplus’ labor.
3 Off-farm employment, both in the rural and the urban sectors, seem to be
more important in regions with higher agricultural income – supporting the
hypothesis of ‘cumulative causation’.
4 There is disturbing evidence of post-reform developments favoring larger
farmers more than the marginal ones and the landless.
Table 7.11 Results of growth regressions for different classes 1993/1994–1999/2000
Class Intercept Value of b t-value (P) R2 (F)
Medium 1.131 0.353 2.221 (0.001) 0.170 (0.001)
Small 1.066 0.222 2.524 (0.015) 0.088 (0.015)
Marginal 1.611 0.223 2.311 (0.025) 0.088 (0.025)
Agriculture laborers 1.884 0.129 1.942 (0.057) 0.047 (0.057)
Source: Unit-level data of consumption expenditure schedule of 50th and 55th rounds.
Notes
All equations are of the form: Y= a+bXi, where Y is the growth rate of HH per capita expenditure of
large farmers; Xi is the growth rate of HH per capita expenditure of the ith class: (P) in parenthesis is
the significance level of ‘b’ and F in parenthesis is the significance of F-value for the equation.
8 Employment elasticity in
organized manufacturing 
in India
This and the following chapter are devoted to the manufacturing sector of India.
The center of attention in the current chapter is the organized (or formal) manu-
facturing sector in India. It is identified with the sector covered by the Annual
Survey of Industries (ASI) conducted by the Central Statistical Organization of
the Government of India – which in its turn covers all manufacturing establish-
ments which come under the purview of the Factories Act. They comprise units
employing ten or more workers using power or units with 20 or more workers
not using power. Our analysis of the employment trends in the formal manufac-
turing sector is focused on the issue of its low employment elasticity. In spite of
a healthy rate of growth of output or value added, the absorption of labor has
been very low.
The problem of low employment elasticity in manufacturing – that is, the
feeling that employment growth has been lagging seriously behind output
growth – has been a serious issue in development economics since the sixties,
when concerns about the employment problem in Third World countries began
to be discussed (see, for example, Morawetz, 1974). It has been a particularly
important matter of concern in India which has had a dismal record on employ-
ment generation in ‘organized (formal) manufacturings’ in recent years. The
concern is a serious one for two basic reasons: first, formal manufacturing has
been traditionally expected to take the lead in the generation of new productive
employment and have large multiplier effects on the other sectors; and second,
because of the huge labor productivity differential between the organized and
the unorganized sectors, wage levels are at a much lower level in informal man-
ufacturing, and so the dependence on the latter for manufacturing growth does
not do much for raising living standards at the lower part of the distribution.
In this chapter we undertake a systematic analysis of the determinants of
employment elasticity in Indian formal manufacturing based on the unit-level
data available from the Annual Survey of Industry. The plan of the chapter is as
follows. In the first section we give an overview of the behavior over time in
employment elasticity in this sector over the last four decades. We are able to
classify the entire period into four sub-periods which reveal a cyclical pattern of
the value of employment elasticity. The political economy of the four periods
are explained. The second section sets out the outline of the decomposition
model, used elsewhere by Mazumdar (2003), which seeks to break down the dif-
ferent factors affecting the growth rate of employment given the growth rate of
output (value added in constant prices). This section also goes beyond the earlier
paper in setting out a model of the equilibrium of the firm which illuminates the
economic process behind the decomposition model. The three factors shaping
the value of employment elasticity are (i) the trend in the share of wages; (ii) the
wage–employment trade-off; and (iii) the movement in the ‘domestic real
exchange rate’ (DRER) or the ratio of the producer price index to the consumer
price index. While the third is more a product of macro-economic factors, the
first two are primarily labor-market variables. The mechanics underlying the
movements in the three variables are explained. The determinant of the wage-
share variable is explained in terms of a model which gives primacy to the firm’s
investment rate and its financing. In order to preserve the flow of the argument
in the body of the paper, a full exposition of the model, and its testing with data
from the ASI, is relegated to the Appendix. The results spelled out in the third
section for the four periods distinguished show the relative importance of the
three factors over the cycles. In the fourth section we turn to some analysis with
disaggregated sectors of formal manufacturing. In particular we discuss the
experience of different sub-groups of industry distinguished by the dual criteria
to exposure to world markets, and level of technology. Other topics include the
private–public classification and disaggregation by size groups of firms. The
final section summarizes some of the more important results.
Classifying the periods of manufacturing growth in terms 
of employment elasticity
The organized manufacturing sector in India has grown at different rates in dif-
ferent periods of its development in the last thirty years. At the same time
employment elasticity – the rate of growth of employment relative to output
growth has also varied enormously over these phases of growth. Figure 8.1
plots volume of employment against the real value added in manufacturing (at
constant 1981–2 prices) in logarithmic scale, so that the slope of the curve
gives an idea of the changing value of employment elasticity in different
periods.
We are able to distinguish between four periods in terms of distinct breaks in
the value of employment elasticity (i) 1974–1980 when employment elasticity
had a high positive value of 0.99 (ii) the 1980–1986 period of “jobless growth”
when employment elasticity actually turned negative (with an average value of
–0.16); (iii) the reform period of 1986–1996 which saw a recovery of the
employment elasticity to positive values (increasing to 0.33), although signific-
antly lower than the value attained in the first period (iv) the post reform period
1996–2001. These periods also witnessed widely differing growth rates of value
added. The data are given in Table 8.1.
The periods distinguished above are, as it happens, reasonably separate in
terms of the politics of Indian economic policy. The beginning of the eighties
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has been identified by some researchers as an “attitudinal shift” towards private
business on the part of the government (Rodrik and Subramanaian 2004). 
The change was inaugurated with the return of a much-chastened Indira
Gandhi to political power in the 1980s after a three-year rule by the Janata
Party . . . But the attitudinal change was grounded primarily in political cal-
culation, and not in a desire to enhance the efficiency of the economic
regime.
(Ibid., p.15)
The motivation has been ascribed to Indira Gandhi’s desire to undercut one
prong of the support of the Janata Party coming from organized business
groups. “This shift had more to do with currying favor with existing business
interests (essentially large, politically influential firms in the formal manu-
facturing sector) than with liberalizing the system” (ibid.). Rodrik and
Subramanain had identified in a more detailed way the significant increase
in growth rate – of organized manufacturing in particular – evident in the
data of Figure 8.1 They also pointed out that when the industrial firms were
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Figure 8.1 Employment and real GVA (1974–1975 to 2001–2002).
Table 8.1 Growth rate of value-added and employment elasticity
Period Value-added growth Employment elasticity
I 1974–1980 3.99 0.99
II 1980–1986 6.21 −0.17
III 1986–1996 10.65 0.33
IV 1996–2002 1.75 −1.39
Source: Various years’ data of Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), CSO, Government of India.
government policy – even of the ‘attitudinal shift’ kind could bring about a
substantial response.
Indira Gandhi herself was not able to go through much substantial reform
program even if she had planned to do so. After her assassination, it was left to
Rajiv Gandhi to start on some pieces of substantive reform. It is customary to
date the coming of reforms from 1991. This is because liberalization on the
external and trade accounts was only seriously addressed as part of the package
agreed with the IMF after the serious balance of payments crisis of 1991. But as
indicated above, the reform process had started earlier in a substantive way. The
decade spanning the period stretching from the mid-eighties to the mid-nineties
could be legitimately regarded as the reform period. This was the period that
saw an upsurge of business optimism in the organized manufacturing sector,
leading not only to a still higher growth rate of output, but also, as we shall see,
a large lift in the investment ratio as manufacturing firms sought to build up their
capacity. The overhang of the excess capacity of the controlled era of low effi-
ciency had presumably been run down by the surge in output growth, starting at
the beginning of the eighties.
The most recent decade has seen a post-reform recession. The windfall gains
form the initial liberalization of the economy had been realized, and the manu-
facturing sector had to adjust to the more difficult problems of market growth in
competitive environment. The reform process itself might have slowed down as
policy makers and the various interest groups started to grapple with the thorny
issues of continuing on the reform path.
The determinants of employment elasticity: a conceptual
framework
This section discusses the conceptual framework for analyzing the significant
factors determining employment elasticity which has been used for the analysis
of the Indian data. It will hopefully identify the quantitative importance of some
of the critical variables which have affected the growth of employment in Indian
manufacturing, and the way they have varied over the four periods distinguished
in the last section. The empirical results are presented in the next section follow-
ing the discussion of the analytical framework.
Employment growth in manufacturing is obviously limited by the rate of
growth of output or value added. But given the growth rate of output there are
three important elements determining the value of the employment elasticity:
1 the trend in the share of wages, i.e., the rate of growth of the wage bill rela-
tive to value added in current prices facing the producer (α);
2 the relative rates of increase in the producer and consumer price indices
(sometimes called the domestic real exchange rate DRER) – which deter-
mines the value of the wage bill for the workers in terms of the prices facing
them; and
3 the trade-off between employment increase and real wage increase.
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The process is shown in Figure 8.2.
We can use an algebraic decomposition, explained elsewhere (Mazumdar












where w is the real wage (average earnings per worker); ν is value added (in
constant producer prices); L is employment; Pp is the index of producer prices
and Pc index of consumer prices; and α is a technological and behavioral para-
meter which is assumed to remain constant over the period under consideration.
A variable written with a dot on top (.) represents the proportionate rate of
change of the variable concerned. α defines the rate of growth of the wage bill
related to the growth rate of output and hence determines the trend of the share
of wages over the time-period being considered. The relative movements of the
producer price and the consumer price indices, sometimes called the ‘domestic
real exchange rate’ (DRER), translates the wage bill growth into real terms (in





shows the wage-employment trade-off, i.e., the way the growing wage-bill cake
is divided between wage increase and employment increase.
If the firm has no external source of finance, and cannot either accumulate or
draw down financial reserves, then it must balance its books in every period, and
equation (1) is an identity. But no firm can be expected to behave in this way.
Generally it would have means of external borrowing, but in order not to face
bankruptcy, it will aim at achieving a target gearing ratio. This target has to be
reached, not on a day-to-day basis, but over a period of time – usually deter-
mined by its accounting period of consequence. Equation (1) then becomes a
condition of equilibrium of the firm which enables it to maintain a stable gearing
ratio over time. The model then has to be completed by a theory of the equilib-
rium of the firm in which the interconnected variables would force the firm
towards this equilibrium.
The formal model and its testing with Indian data are to be found in
Appendix 2. Here we present an overview of the relationships.
The model of the firm and its equilibrium
We have assumed that one of the key determinants of employment elasticity –
the DRER – is an exogenously determined variable. Prices of both producer
goods and consumer goods are given to the firm. This of course means that our
firm is a competitive one and a price-taker in the goods market. It does not have
Wage-bill growthOutput growth Wage-bill growth DRER Emp.–Wage trade-off
(consumer prices)(producer prices) (producer prices) Pp/Pc
Figure 8.2 Determination of employment elasticity.
the ability to influence either the price of its product or the price of the wage
goods. In a more general framework these assumptions, particularly the first one
might be dropped, but this issue is not addressed here.
The other two, the share of wages and the wage–employment trade-off, are
both labor-market variables. They are tied together in neo-classical economics
by the supply functions of labor and of capital working through the production
function. Together they determine the share of wages, the level of employment
and the wage per worker.
Economists have in more recent discussions recognized the importance of
expectations both in the determination of the wage per worker and the share of
wages. Thus the difference between the neo-classical tradition, stressing the domi-
nance of factor-supply functions, and the post-Keynesian tradition, emphasizing
the importance of decisions originating on the employers’ side, have been reduced.
In post-Keynesian models the independence of the investment function from
the general savings function is stressed. There is a long tradition in economics
which has worked with the idea that firms finance investment principally from
the internal surpluses generated by the firm. Even though we have external
financing the need to achieve the target-gearing ratio effectively makes internal
sources the principal source of investment. Thus the share of profits in value
added is the crucial variable here. In fact it can be postulated that it is the invest-
ment rate which determines the share of profits (and hence wages).1
This does not mean that firms are able to fix their investment arbitrarily so
that any share of wages will do. For any investment rate there is a determined
level of the wage bill corresponding to the wage share. The firm must make sure
that this level of the wage bill is sufficient to elicit the supply of labor needed to
work with the investment which is achieved.
There is another decision-making involved in the firm. The supply of work
(in efficiency units) is a function of two variables: the number of workers and
the supply of efficiency units per worker. The latter is a function of the wage
rate. Thus for the profit-maximizing firm, for a given wage bill, the optimum
labor supply will be achieved where the marginal cost of hiring an extra body of
worker is exactly equal to the marginal cost of increasing the same number of
labor units by increasing the wage rate of the existing workforce. This formal
condition, of course, hides a number of factors which will affect the employer’s
choice. This includes institutional factors like job-security legislation, union
pressures, etc., as well as economic variables affecting the relationship between
the decision makers in the firm and their employees.2
The employer’s decision about the wage per man (determined within the con-
straints just mentioned) yields both the supply of work units per man and the
wage cost per work unit. For the overall general equilibrium of the firm the total
supply of work units (the product of the number of workers hired and the supply
of work units per man at the wage offered) must be sufficient to produce the
level of output (value added) which in fact supports the investment ratio. If the
wage bill corresponding to the equilibrium wage share falls short of the amount
required, the investment rate and profit share must fall, and hence the wage bill
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increases. In the contrary case the investment rate might increase with an atten-
dant fall in the wage bill.
Needless to say the production function determining the productivity of
capital (and of labor) is an essential part of the system of general equilibrium.
The cyclical predictions of the model
It is generally accepted in the economic literature that the rate of investment of
the firm is very sensitive to expectations of market trends. This sensitivity to the
perception of the future by entrepreneurs makes the investment ratio follow a
typically cyclical pattern. Since the share of wages in our theory is ultimately
determined by the investment ratio, it will have a cyclical pattern – though it
would be anti-cyclical. The investment ratio increases in periods of optimism
and thus the share of wages (and in our model α) falls. This has the effect ceteris
paribus of reducing the value of employment elasticity.
Consider now the second labor-market variable: the wage–employment trade-
off. It has been recognized increasingly in modern labor economics that labor is
also a quasi-fixed factor. We have discussed above that entrepreneurs have the
option of increasing the flow of labor units either by hiring more workers, or by
eliciting more work-units from the existing workforce by increasing the wage
per worker. In many economies including India, a distinction has to be made
between the permanent core of workers and contract labor of various types. The
firm operates with at least a core body of tenured workers whose size is slow to
respond to changes in the current demand for labor. This is because the cost of
hiring-and-firing of ‘permanent’ workers is significant. Like the stock of fixed
investment the firm’s stock of the ‘permanent’ workers is built up more on their
perception of expected demand. If current demand deviates from the expected
demand, firms adjust the labor input for the period in question by varying the
flow of labor units per worker rather than the stock of labor. They are able to do
so principally because of the wage-efficiency mechanism making the flow of
labor per worker an (increasing) function of the wage per worker. If expectations
are buoyant firms would build up the stock of labor, and there would be less
concern with an increase in wage per worker to elicit a larger inflow of labor
units per worker. This will ceteris paribus tilt the wage–employment trade-off
towards employment increase. Conversely, when there is a downward trend in
expected growth, firms would tend to be more inclined to reduce the size of their
labor force (through normal attrition of the quasi-fixed part and retrenchment of
the non-tenured component) and meet their demand for labor input by increasing
the wage per worker. Thus the trade-off would show a bias to wage growth.
It should be noted that wage increase in this kind of model is fuelled by three
separate factors: (i) the inelasticity of supply of quasi-fixed labor of the requisite
type to the individual firm; (ii) the upward institutional pressure on wages
exerted by the firm-specific labor; and (iii) the increase in wage needed to elicit
a larger flow of labor per worker. In a recessionary period, with pessimistic
expectations, presumably the factors (i) and (ii) will be weak or totally absent.
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But we can expect an increase in wage per worker due to the third factor. Taking
all factors into account the net effect is more likely to be a slowdown in the rate
of growth wages, but the wage–employment trade-off might still see a signific-
ant swing to wage growth if the relative fall in employment growth is high.
It is then seen that the cyclical behavior of the wage–employment trade-off is
pro-cyclical – the tilt to employment tends to increase in periods of optimistic
expectations and decrease in times of gloomy prospects. Thus as far as the
impact on employment elasticity is concerned the two elements of our decompo-
sition model works in opposite directions with respect to economic cycles. In the
upswing the wage share tends to fall leaving a smaller pie of value added to be
taken in the form of either employment or wage increase, but the trade-off leans
towards a larger share for employment growth. The net result on employment
elasticity depends on the relative strength of these two effects.
Decomposition of the factors determining employment
elasticity: empirical results
The methodology of decomposition expounded in the last section is now applied
to the time series for the organized manufacturing sector as given in the Annual
Survey of Industry data set. The equation (1) is applied to growth rates sepa-
rately for the four periods, which has been distinguished in the previous section.
The results are presented below in Table 8.2. Note that for each period the com-
pound growth rates of the variables in the first five columns are calculated, and
the value of the last variable alpha is calculated as a residual using equation (1).
This is because, as explained, the equation (1) must hold over a discrete period
of time (in our case over the years covered by each of the four cycles). The value
of α tends to adjust itself in each period to secure the equilibrium of the firm.
We can see at once the enormous differences in employment elasticities –
just about unity in the first period, turning strongly negative in the second
period, and recovering to a value of just over 0.3 in the last period. In the last
period post-reform years the employment elasticity has turned negative in a
more substantial way than before, even as the output growth has faltered.
Period I can be considered to be the period of ‘benign’ growth in terms of the
variables treated in our analysis. The economy experienced a moderately high
rate of output growth at around 4 percent per annum. This was, however, supple-
mented by a favorable trend in the producer prices relative to consumer prices.
Since the value of α was just over unity, the share of wages in gross value added
grew at the same rate as output, so that in terms of real wage bill the growth rate
was over 6 percent per annum, including the real output growth plus the relative
increase in producer prices. It is seen from Table 8.2 that this growing cake was
shared between wage growth and employment growth, with the latter taking the
lead with the more substantial share of the wage bill growth.
The subsequent periods register major deviations from this standard. Of the
non-labor market variables the trend in the DRER over all the three succeeding
periods is a significant difference. The trend turned negative after the ‘benign’ first
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Table 8.2 Proportionate growth rates of selected variables for three periods
Period
.




α Output effect Price effect Employment 
elasticity
I (1974–1980) 2.63 3.99 3.95 7.10 4.72 1.02 4.07 2.52 0.99
II (1980–1986) 3.51 6.31 –1.01 6.32 8.91 0.90 5.68 –3.20 –0.16
III (1986–1996) 1.83 10.65 3.54 9.10 9.56 0.76 8.10 –2.68 0.33
IV (1996–2002) 0.88 1.75 –2.74 3.07 6.92 1.11 1.93 –3.53 –1.42
Source: Various years’ data of Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), CSO, Government of India.
Notes
The values of growth rates are compound rates. Alpha is calculated as a residual using the decomposition equation. The output and price effects are also calculated
from the equation as defined.
period, and quantitatively it was in all periods a significant ‘leakage’ from the
growth in the real output. This can be seen by comparing the magnitudes in the
column of the ‘price effect’ with those in the column headed ‘ν’. This adverse
trend in the domestic terms of trade against manufactured products must be con-
sidered to be a major factor tending to dampen the value of employment elasticity
after the first period of our study. The macro-economic factors causing this shift in
the trend of this variable will be considered further in our subsequent discussion.
While this factor was a persistent negative influence on all the three periods,
the cyclical swings in employment elasticity were the net result of the way the
actual magnitudes of the two labor-market variables worked out in these periods.
Period II has been called the period of ‘jobless growth’ in India. In spite of a
healthy rate of growth of output the employment elasticity turned negative
(employment actually fell). It can be seen from Table 8.2 that this was largely
because of the large shift to wage growth in the wage–employment trade-off. The
period of benign growth preceding it had seen an accumulation of excess labor in
manufacturing, driven in part by the policies of government in alliance with a
trade-union movement biased to the policy of expanding and protecting employ-
ment in the formal sector. When the dominance of this institutional support in
favor of those already in employment eased, employers responded by policies
which met the demand for labor by eking out more efficiency units of labor from
a reduced stock.
The succeeding two periods of boom and slump saw working out of the
labor-market variables much as had been predicted in our theoretical discussion
in the last section. In the upswing of the post-reform years of Period III the
uplift in the investment ratio resulted in a sharp reduction of the share of wages
(a drastic reduction of α). This would have pushed employment elasticity to
further lower levels. But it was overshadowed by a tilt in the wage–employment
trade-off to employment growth, as employers buoyed up by optimistic expecta-
tions and an erosion of the excess stock of labor from the last period, sought to
build up their labor complement. The net result was a positive if low value of
employment elasticity. The downswing of Period IV saw a large recovery of the
value α and the wage share as the investment ratio slumped, but again it was
swamped by the drastic shift in the wage–employment trade-off, this time
against employment growth in line with our a priori expectations, and we see
significant negative employment elasticity for the period.
We shall now add short notes on each of the three periods II–IV, elaborating
on the economic and institutional factors influencing the value of employment
elasticity as outlined in the last paragraph. The trend decrease in the domestic
terms of trade will be discussed at the end of this section, together with its policy
implications.
The period of jobless growth 1980–1986
The spectacular fall in employment elasticity in the second period, extending
from the end of the 1970s to 1985–1986, is to a major extent due to the tilt in
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the trade-off to wage growth. It has been ascribed to institutional factors eman-
ating from trade unions pushing up wage rates (Hanson and Lieberman, World
Bank Country Report 1989). But it can be seen from Table 8.2 that although
there was some increase in the rate of real wage growth (in constant consumer
prices) in period II, a much larger part of the increase of product wage (in con-
stant producer prices) was because of the sharp increase of the rate of growth of
consumer prices relative to producer prices (or the domestic real exchange rate,
DRER). Ajit Ghose (1994), in fact, pointed to the increase in the DRER as the
crucial factor in the rise in capital intensity in industry, which slowed down
employment increase. The increase of DRER was in turn a consequence of the
abandoning of government policies to fix the price of food at low levels.
The impact of relative price changes meant was that, although the real output
growth increased somewhat in period II, the growth rate of the real wage bill
which could support wage and employment growth was drastically reduced
below the level of period I (from 6.59 to 2.46). The fact that the real wage growth
(in constant consumer prices) did not fall but actually increased somewhat in
response is prima facie evidence of the wage–employment trade-off being tilted
in favor of the wage of those already in employment. Detailed examination of
labor-market institutions in this period, however, casts serious doubt on the
hypothesis if this tilt was mostly or even primarily due to enhanced trade union
power.
Reshaping of labor institutions
As already mentioned, this period saw the ‘attitudinal’ change to private busi-
ness in Indian policy making. One aspect of this was the withdrawal of virtually
automatic state support from the large all-India trade unions which had been
dominating industrial relations in the organized sector with the help of the major
political parties. This attitudinal change was nowhere more prominently seen
than in the textile strikes of Bombay and Ahmedabad at the beginning of the
eighties.
The power exerted by large-scale industry wide unions, often backed by
political parties, and sometimes supported by the government in power, was
seriously challenged in the early 1980s by the owners of large factories in the
older industries – which were rapidly becoming uncompetitive. The confronta-
tion led to a large-scale closure of the mills, and after a long period of lock-out,
job loss without compensation on a fairly extensive scale. This major event saw
a turning point in industrial relations in the large-scale manufacturing sector.
Uchikkawa (2002, p. 38) writes:
The phenomenon reduced the incentive of workers to join labor unions.
Membership of workers’ unions including the service sector decreased from
8.18 million in 1986–1987 to 5.61 million in 1996–1997. Closure of many
mills did big damage to the labor union movement because labor unions
failed to protect job security.
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Uchikawa has produced a graph of the time series of job losses due to strikes
and those due to lock-outs over the eighties and the nineties. His graph demon-
strates that man-days lost by labor disputes dropped sharply during our second
period, and for the first time fell below the level of jobs lost due to lock-outs.
This altered relationship continued into the third period in the nineties (ibid.,
Figure 2, p. 39).
Moreover, as pointed out by Tirthankar Roy (2002), there was shift in the
nature of bargaining institutions. It began to be much more plant based than
industry based. Industry-wide unions were in decline throughout the eighties,
making way for firm-specific bargaining. There is evidence for continued dis-
putes at the plant level, sometimes spilling over into closures of factories. But
such closures ceased to be industry-wide. It has been pointed out by several
commentators that one of the major causes of the decline of the large industry-
wide unions has been their de-linking with public-sector undertakings, and the
budgetary support they received from non-profit making firms financed by state
budget deficits. 
Indian labor regime is decisively changing. It seems to be changing from a
pluralist regime, where unions can play a role in national politics via their
dependent relationship with political groups, to a truly decentralized regime
where unions have little or no relationship with political groups.
(Roy 2002, p. 117)
It might seem odd that along with the decline in centralized union power
which the last paragraphs suggest, there should have been an attempt by the
government to strengthen job-security legislation by the 1982 amendment to the
Industrial Disputes Act which extended the protection to workers already in
employment. The lower limit for the employment size of establishments beyond
which permission had to be sought from the quasi-judicial authorities for any
retrenchment was in fact reduced from 300 workers enunciated in the 1976
Industrial Disputes Act to 100 workers in the amendment of 1982. Fallon and
Lucas (1993) used this amendment to ‘explain’ the reduction in employment
elasticity in the eighties in their estimated labor-demand function. The conflict-
ing trends can be reconciled in terms of the hypothesis that the government in
the initial period of ‘attitudinal’ change was in effect pursuing a carrot-and-stick
policy. The withdrawal of automatic support for the all-India unions during large
industry-wide strikes was accompanied by the promise of extended support for
job security if militancy were avoided.
Consistent with this stick-and-carrot policy employers seemed to have
pursued a two-prong strategy of cutting down the size of a large union-supported
labor force but instead developing a core of smaller committed body of workers
who could enjoy guaranteed employment. Moreover, the employment structure
started to shift to the industry groups with lower labor intensity – electrical
machinery, chemicals, transport equipment, rubber, plastic and petroleum prod-
ucts, non-electrical machinery, etc.
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As far as the wage growth reported in Table 8.2 is concerned several
researchers, including Nagaraj (1994). Papola (1992), Bhalotra (1998) and
Uchikawa (2002), have all pointed out the weakness in the analysis which refers
only to number of workers rather than person-days worked. According to
Uchikawa’s latest research average annual working days in all manufacturing
rose from 273 during the first period, to 300 days in the second period to 309
days during the third period. (Uchikawa’s periods are fairly close to our first
three periods distinguished in Table 8.2.) Thus the wage cost per man-hour of
work did not increase at nearly the same rate as average earnings or average
product wage person.
Why did the number of person-hours per worker start to increase at the begin-
ning of the second period? Uchikawa’s explanation is that “the manufacturing
sector had redundant workers in the late 1970s. Although growth rates of GVA
(gross value added) declined, man-days increased during the recession period
between 1978–1979 and 1982–1983” (ibid., p. 38). Strong labor unions, still
powerful at the end of the second period, prevented retrenchment of redundant
workers. Thus when industry recovered at the beginning of the eighties, there
was enough ‘surplus’ labor available to increase the flow of labor in terms of
hours of work required. The employer response to the changed climate of labor
deployment in Indian manufacturing was to increase the flow of labor per
worker from a reduced rationalized labor force.
The reform period (1986–1996)
It has already been mentioned in our summary of the developments of period III
that the reform decade saw a jump in output growth to around 10 percent.
Another feature of the period was a sharp fall in the share of the wage as wages
grew at only three-quarters of the rate of growth of output. But the rate of output
growth was very high, and, furthermore, was augmented by the DRER swinging
in favor of producer goods, so that the growth rate of the real wage bill – which
could support either wage or employment growth – was high at 5.37, up from
2.50 of the jobless growth period. The change in the wage–employment trade-
off was also drastic, swinging substantially to employment rather wage growth.
It might be tempting to suggest that both the tilt in the wage–employment trade-
off towards employment growth and the decline in the share of wages in value
added are due to the weakening of union power in the last period, which was
discussed above.
As far as the bias towards employment growth is concerned one of the ele-
ments in the story is quite clearly that the excess capacity of the labor force,
which might have been a legacy of the previous years, had been largely elimi-
nated during the period of ‘jobless growth’. With the strong output growth regis-
tered in this period it was necessary to increase the size of employment over
time. Nevertheless, the relatively low employment elasticity suggests that
employers might have been wary of the critical role of job security legislation.
Not only was labor used more efficiently, employers in this period are widely
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reported to have used a variety of other methods of organizing production which
helped to moderate the increase in ‘permanent’ employment. A major develop-
ment discussed in the literature was the increasing use of subcontracting.
Ramaswami (2006) constructed an index of subcontracting by taking ‘the value
of goods sold in the same condition as purchased plus the value of work done by
concerns on material supplied” – both sets of information given for the regis-
tered factories surveyed in the ASI. Although not covering all types of subcon-
tracting, the data showed that ‘subcontracting intensity’ rose from 10.0 in
1989–1990 to 12.3 percent in 1994–1995, and the real value of subcontracting
grew at a compound growth rate of 10.9 percent – at a faster rate than total
output in manufacturing (ibid., Table 4, p. 135).
The investment rate–wage share nexus
A major factor which influenced employment elasticity – albeit in a downward
direction – was the increased investment rate. Careful work by Uchikawa (2001)
has shown that there was a sharp acceleration in gross investment in the first half
of the nineties. The gross fixed capital stock in ASI industries increased at the
rate of 10.1 percent per annum at 1980–1981 prices. A regression equation esti-
mated for the time-series of capital stock showed that a multiplicative dummy
for the post-1990 period was significant at the 5 percent level, confirming the
acceleration of investment after the economic reforms. The rate of growth of the
capital stock was about three times the rate of growth of employment. There are
several reasons for this spurt in investment, some of them having to do with the
easing of control over the stock market which encouraged the corporate sector to
shift their sources of finance from term lending to paid-up capital. The share of
the latter suddenly rose from 7.1 percent in 1992–1993 to 29.6 in 1993–1994
(Uchikawa 2001).
The spurt in capital growth was clearly expectations of continued market
expansion. This was the reason for the build-up of both capital stock and perman-
ent labor by the manufacturing firms. The fact that the capital build-up was so
much faster than the increase in the stock of labor shows that employers were still
wary of labor as a potentially costly quasi-fixed factor, although improving the
quality of production through more mechanized techniques might have been an
additional motivation. This meant that although the trade-off shifted to employ-
ment growth, employment elasticity was lower than it might have been.
There is another way that the spurt in investment rate depressed employment
growth. As indicated, the financing of investment shifted to retained profits to a
considerable degree in this period. It has been suggested that a significant factor
in the fall in the share of wages was the need to finance the increased investment
rate form internal ‘surplus’ (see Appendix 2) for an elaboration and testing of
this ‘Kalecki-type’ model. In terms of our decomposition equation the fall in the
share of wages (or α in the equation) meant that a smaller chunk of the growing
cake was available to support the wage bill growth. Thus employment growth
was lower than otherwise.
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Decline in the growth rates of output and employment 
(1995–1996 to 2001–2002)
The upswing in manufacture output tapered off in the second half of the 1990s.
From a highpoint of 14 percent growth rate in 1995–1996 the real value added (as
well as the production index) has showed a steady decline. Over the period until
2001–2002 the compound rate of growth has been a modest 1.75 per annum.
For manufacturing as a whole the rate of growth of real value added slumped
to 1.75 percent compared with 10.65 in the previous period. But the response of
employment to the slump was even more drastic. Employment growth turned
substantially negative: falling at the rate of 2.74 percent per annum compared
with the mere 1 percent per annum during the earlier period of jobless growth in
the eighties. This, in spite of the rather sharp recovery of α to above unity,
signify an increase in wage share (and hence in wage-bill growth) as the rate of
investment slumped.
The drastic fall in employment elasticity was due to both factors isolated in
our decomposition exercise: (i) the DRER turning against manufacture further as
the producer-price index increased at a much slower rate than the consumer-
price index; and (ii) the tilt in the wage–employment trade-off towards, once
again, wage growth at the expense of employment growth. Both these factors
were important as indeed they were in the period of jobless growth. But looking
at the magnitudes involved the quantitative importance of the DRER (price)
factor was more important than the wage–employment trade-off.
The relative importance of the wage–employment trade-off can be quantified




w. A negative sign of the value signifies
that there is a tilt towards wage growth, while a positive value indicates that
employment growth is preferred. Thus, other things being equal, a positive value
of the first term would favor an increase in employment elasticity, while a negat-
ive value would signify that the bias towards wage growth reduces employment
elasticity. The DRER effect is the difference between Pp and Pc. Given real output
growth,
.
v a negative value of the DRER indicates a leakage from the growing
cake, which has to be shared between wage growth and employment growth:
ceteris paribus it depresses employment elasticity. The quantitative importance
of the two effects can be studied by comparing the difference [L – w] with the
difference [Pp − Pc ]. The way these relative magnitudes varied as between the four
periods of our study is given in Table 8.3.
It should be emphasized, however, that although the negative trend in the
DRER was strong, the tilt in the wage–employment trade-off towards wage
growth was also substantial – in fact a more important relative change compared
with the previous period.
The shift in the wage–employment trade-off: labor-market behavior
An interpretation in terms of a strictly dynamic neo-classical model is very prob-
lematic. It will be recalled that in period III for all-India, while employment
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grew at 3.54 percent per annum, the real wage increased at the rate of 1.83. In
the post-reform period IV when employment growth was significantly negative
at –2.74 percent per annum, real wage still increased at 0.88 percent. The fall in
the rate of growth of real wage with the decrease in employment growth might
at first sight seem to be consistent with a neo-classical model in which the
dynamic supply curve of labor is gently upward sloping. But the fact that wage
growth still grows at nearly 1 percent per annum even when employment is
falling at the annual rate of 2.74 percent is inherently implausible in strictly
supply-and-demand terms. It is necessary to invoke one of several labor-market
forces which pushes the wage level upwards at a significant rate even when
employment growth is zero or negative. Such factors include the following,
which might operate singly or in combination: (i) an upgrading of labor might
be going on with skill formation due to technological change; (ii) the
efficiency–wage function, so that the flow of labor units supplied per worker
increases; and (iii) ‘insider’ power which keeps the wage increasing through
time even when employment growth is negative.
All these types of wage behavior imply the existence of a firm-specific labor
force which is a ‘quasi-fixed’ factor in the firm’s production function. As already
mentioned, the firm operates with at least a core body of tenured workers whose
size is slow to respond to changes in the current demand for labor. Like the stock
of fixed investment the firm’s stock of the ‘permanent’ workers is built up more on
their perception of expected demand. If current demand deviates from the
expected demand, firms adjust the labor input for the period in question by varying
the flow of labor units per worker rather than the stock of labor. They are able to
do so principally because of the wage–efficiency mechanism making the flow of
labor per worker an (increasing) function of the wage per worker.
This hypothesis would seem to fit the different scenarios witnessed in the
Indian manufacturing sector for the periods of reforms and the post-reform
years – the periods III and IV respectively of the analysis presented above. In
the reform decade there was a general euphoria about the expansion of business
in which the entrepreneurs participated with enthusiasm. It seems to have led to
a rebuilding of the stock of labor which had been drawn down during the pre-
ceding decade of ‘jobless growth’. The recession of the second half of the
nineties, along with the adverse movement of the producer prices facing manu-
Table 8.3 The relative importance of the wage-employment trade-off and the DRER effect






I (1974–1980) 1.32 2.38 0.99
II (1980–1986) –4.84 –2.59 –0.16
III (1986–1996) 1.71 –0.46 0.33
IV (1996–2002) –3.62 –3.85 –1.42
Source: Various years’ data of Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), CSO, Government of India.
facturers, led to a revision of these expectations. It might have prompted a
hurried attempt to reduce the permanent workforce, and possibly a greater use
made of out-sourcing, which led to the substantial negative employment elastic-
ity. The increase in wages slowed down relative to period III but it was positive.
Thus the wage–employment trade-off swung to wage growth.
The downward trend in the domestic terms of trade3
We have seen that the adverse movements of producer prices to consumer prices
had a significant role in depressing the value of employment elasticity in manufac-
turing, and in fact producing negative values for this variable in periods II and IV.
The relative movement of prices, however, depends not only on labor-market
conditions but also on overall macroeconomic factors. For instance if real effective
exchange rates appreciate or do not depreciate to maintain manufacturing competi-
tiveness, the domestic terms of trade can be adversely affected. As Figure 8.3 (top
panel) shows, this indeed happened since the mid-1990s: real effective exchange
rates stabilized and even appreciated slightly since then. This was associated with
an adverse movement of produce prices relative to consumer prices. Econometric
estimates show that, after controlling for time trends, there is a robust relationship
between real exchange-rate appreciation and adverse movements in the domestic
real exchange-rates (Figure 8.3, bottom panel), which in turn lowers employment
elasticity. Thus, one policy implication will be to keep exchange rates competitive
through guarding against inflation, especially of consumer goods. This in turn has
implications for fiscal policy. Higher deficits, government borrowing and inflation
tend to appreciate real exchange rates. If government expenditure growth is
directed disproportionately towards consumption – as has been the trend in India
in the 1990s – that will also turn the domestic real exchange rate against producers
and discourage the growth of jobs. If government policy raises food prices in an
artificial manner, that would also lower manufacturing elasticity.
Desegregation: some selected issues
We have so far dealt with the whole of organized (formal) manufacturing as a
single entity. It is now important to extend the story to cover some critical issues
involving a more disaggregated view of this sector. These are: (i) the difference
between the publicly and privately owned units in manufacturing; (ii) individual
sub-sectors distinguished by key characteristics like technology and trade-
orientation: and (iii) manufacturing establishments of different size-groups.
Public and private sub-sectors4
The public sector was a significant part of organized manufacturing in period I.
The high employment elasticity observed in this period was at least partly due to
the influence exerted by the all-India unions, with strong affiliation to political
parties, in favor of expanding “good jobs” in the formal sector. Since the 
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Figure 8.3 Changes in real effect exchange rates and domestic real exchange rates
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wage-gap was already very high in favor of the formal sector, the interest of
unions was more in the direction of increasing its membership of the privileged
workers – rather than the OECD type of bias towards the wage increase of
‘insiders’.
The reform period saw a decline in the public sector as the state-controlled
pattern of manufacturing growth was gradually whittled down. Table 8.4 gives
the results of the decomposition analysis separately for the public-and private-
sector establishments in the ASI time series.
The data in Table 8.4 show the slower growth rate of output in the public
sector undertakings, as well as the attempt to reduce over-manning. The relatively
high growth rate of wages in this sub-sector probably is partly an attempt to
reduce the excess capacity built up among the workers. As pointed out earlier, the
increase in wage per person-hour would probably be not as much. However, the
broad conclusions arrived at above for all manufacturing, without making
the public–private distinction, are not altered.
The composition of industry
New technology and greater openness are the two characteristics of the reform
period. Accordingly it is useful to classify the industries at the two-digit level of
the NIC classification in term of the dual characteristics of the level of technology,
and exposure to the world markets. The latter in turn involves the degree of import
penetration and/or the proportion of output exported. We used the input–output
table for the Indian economy constructed by the Planning Commission for 1991 to
undertake such a classification. The results are given in Table 8.5.
It is seen that in 1991 the high technology sub-sectors had not yet started to
play a significant role in exports. Rather, trade liberalization measures allowed
some of these groups to establish themselves with a sizable ‘import penetration’
ratio (sector 1 in Table 8.5). The industries classified as using medium-low techno-
logy were of two types: NIC groups 31–34 (code 2a) was domestically oriented,
although making use of a not insignificant proportion of imports. But a group had
emerged (group 38), consisting a variety of new ‘other manufacturing’ which
exported a substantial proportion of its output, and also had a high import penetra-
tion. This was then the sub-sector with the highest degree of globalization (our
‘exposure ratio’). However, its overall importance in terms of the total share in
value added in all manufacturing was only around 5 percent in 1991. Low-
technology manufacturing, as is to be expected, had very low import penetration.
But one sub-group (3b) had a significant export ratio, and indeed accounted for
nearly a quarter of the total output of manufacturing. These included textiles and
textile products, paper and leather products. Industry groups 20, 22 and 27 – food
and beverages and wood products – were the truly domestic industries at this date,
with a share of 15 percent of total manufacturing.
It might be of some interest to look at the trends in the key variables studied
above for all variables, separately for the industry groups just distinguished. The
data are reproduced in Table 8.6.
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Table 8.4 Proportionate growth rates for the public and the private sectors, 1986–1987 to 1994–1995




α Output effect Price effect Employment 
elasticity
Public 2.38 5.58 –0.11 9.28 9,43 0.79 4.40 –2.12 –0.02
Private 1.60 10.97 3.55 9.28 9.43 0.72 7.90 –2.75 0.32
All manufacturing 1.50 9.68 2.77 9.28 9.43 0.72 7.00 –2.73 0.29
Source: Various years’ data of Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), CSO, Government of India.
Notes
1 The figures for all manufacturing differ from those given in Table 8.1 because we could not include the high growth year of 1995–1996 because our data period
ends on 1994–1995.
2 ‘Public’ includes establishments wholly owned by state and/or local governments as well as those owned or owned jointly with the private sector. Employment in
joint sector establishments was around 10 percent of the total in all public manufacturing in 1987–1988. The private-sector variables are calculated as residuals and
therefore include ‘unspecified’ units.
Table 8.5 Classification of industries by technology level and exposure to trade 1991
Technology level plus NIC code Import Export ratio Exposed ratio Size of sector (%) Sector code
exposed ratio penetration
High exposed 30+35 to 37 29.5 6.1 33.8 31.8 1
Medium domestic 31 to 34 11.1 3.8 14.5 23.9 2a
Medium exposed 38 25.3 28.4 46.5 5.5 2b
Low domestic 20, 22, 27 1.4 3.0 4.3 15.6 3a
Low exposed 23 to 26; 28+29 2.7 15.8 18.1 23.4 3b
All 14.3 8.5 21.6 100.0
Source: Planning Commission 6060 input–output table, 1991.
Notes
Import penetration = (Value of Import)/(Value of Output – Value of Export)*100
Export ratio = (Value of Export)/(Value of Output)*100
Exposed ratio = (Value of Import + Value of Export)/(Value of Output)*100
NIC codes: 30: Basic Chemicals and chemical products.
35–36: Machinery and Equipment other than transport equipment
37: Transport equipments and parts.
31: Rubber, plastic, petroleum and coal products.
32: Non-metallic mineral products.
33: Basic metals and alloys industries.
34: Metal products and parts except machinery.
38: Other manufacturing Industries.
23: Cotton textiles.
24: Wool, silk and man-made fiber textiles.
25: Manufacture of jute and other vegetable fiber.
26: Textile products including wearing apparel.
28: Paper and paper products.
20–21: Food products.
22: Beverages, tobacco and related products.
27: Wood and wood products.
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The first point to note is that there is a clear difference in the rates of growth
in industry groups of different levels of technology. The higher technology
sub-groups 1, 2a and 2b had a significantly higher rate of output growth. The
group of “new” industries identified above (2b) as leading the charge in export
markets suffered from a relatively lower trend in producer prices (compared
with the trend in consumer prices), so that some of its growth was ‘lost’ in the
declining terms of trade. Both the low-technology industry groups – the more
‘exposed’ as well as the less so – had a decidedly lower rate of growth.
Turning to labor-market outcomes, domestically oriented low-technology
sub-group (3a) seems to have suffered the least from the adverse price (DRER)
effect, and labor’s share declined the least in this industry group. Thus the wage-
bill growth was nearly on a par with output growth. But the tilt to employment
growth as against wage growth was the least pronounced in this group. A rea-
sonable hypothesis is that these older domestically oriented industries continued
to experience some of the old power of ‘insiders’. Thus in spite of the rate of
output growth being the second lowest, the growth rate of real wages was
highest in this group.
It is, however, remarkable that all three sub-groups with the highest ‘expo-
sure ratios’ – groups 1, 2b and 3b – had the lowest rate of growth of real wages.
In the two exports-oriented groups, 2b and 3b, in fact, the growth rate of real
wages was barely positive. The wage–employment trade-off had in fact swung
heavily in favor of employment growth even as the share of wages declined
significantly. We can conclude with some confidence that, if the aim of liberal-
ization had been to promote labor-intensive growth and reduce the power of
those already in employment, our first cut at the evidence shows that the policy
certainly succeeded in its objectives to some extent.
The experience during the post-reform slowdown
The upswing in manufacture output tapered off in the second half of the nineties.
From a highpoint of 14 percent growth rate in 1995–1996, the real value added
(as well as the production index) has showed a steady decline. Over the period
until 2001–2002 the compound rate of growth has been a modest 1.75 per annum.
Table 8.6 Trends in selected variables by industry groups, 1986–1987 to 1996–1997






1 1.58 12.83 4.73 8.49 9.56 0.74
2a 2.38 11.22 3.01 8.71 9.56 0.75
2b 0.44 16.57 7.54 5.27 9.56 0.80
3a 2.51 7.58 3.27 9.79 9.56 0.88
3b 0.66 6.86 2.75 10.40 9.56 0.75
Source: Various years’ data of Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), CSO, Government of India.
What has been the experience of different industry groups during this
slowdown?
Looking at the industry groups (Table 8.7), as classified by us, this slump is
significantly due to a negative rate of growth in group 1 – the sector with the
most import penetration (chemicals and machinery). The two other large groups
(in terms of employment share in 1991) are the medium domestic (2a) and the
low exposed (3b). Both had their growth rates cut but continued to have above-
average positive growth rates. The newly emerging group 2b with high export
ratio – miscellaneous manufacturing – continued to have a high, though reduced,
rate of growth, but presumably it was still too small a sector to have a substantial
effect on the overall ratio of growth. Generally the more export-oriented sub-
sectors reduced their rates of growth by a smaller amount than the domestically
oriented or import competing groups. This suggests that the slowdown was more
due to domestic market conditions than to recession in the export markets.
We have already seen that for industry as a whole, although the negative
trend in the DRER was strong, the tilt in the wage–employment trade-off
towards wage growth was also substantial – in fact, quantitatively more import-
ant. The data are now presented by industry groups (Table 8.8).
It is seen that, comparing the two periods, the shift in the DRER against man-
ufactured producer prices was pretty widespread across product groups. But it
seemed to have been particularly strong the domestically oriented groups – 2a
and 3a. In fact for the newly emerging group of export-oriented industries (3b)
the fall in DRER is relatively small. The importance of the slackness of the
domestic market is again brought out: we had seen earlier that the slow-down in
output growth was more prominent for these groups.
The tilt in the wage–employment trade-off towards wage growth was also as
widespread as the shift in DRER, and reduced the rate of employment growth
significantly in all sectors. The largest shift seems to have been in group 1 – the
high-technology import-competing sector – where the tilt to wage growth was
nearly 9 percentage points. Otherwise the domestically oriented groups were as
much affected by this phenomenon as the export-oriented ones. The evidence
suggests that there is some general labor-market phenomenon causing this tilt to
wage growth in the post reform period when the output growth slowed down.
Changes in the size structure of industry5
A major development in the reform period has been that, along with the change
in labor institutions mentioned in the last paragraph, there has been a distinct
shift of production and employment to small-medium enterprises (SMEs), redu-
cing the role of large factories in the manufacturing sector. It will be recalled
from our analysis in the second section that this development has important
implications for economic welfare generally, and on employment elasticity in
particular. Table 8.9 gives the relevant data documenting the change.
These figures show that size groups with 500–999 employees increased their
share in employment and gross value added while the size group of 1,000 and
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Table 8.7 Output and employment growth rates by industry groups: periods III and IV compared
Industry group 1986–1987 to 1995–1996 1995–1996 to 2001–2002
v̇ L̇ Employment v̇ L̇ Employment
elasticity elasticity
1 High exposed 12.83 4.73 0.37 –0.57 –4.56 8.05*
2a Medium domestic 11.22 3.01 0.27 2.28 –2.25 –0.98
2b Medium exposed 16.57 7.54 0.46 10.77 1.42 0.13
3a Low domestic 7.58 3.27 0.43 5.15 –0.19 –0.04
3b Low exposed 6.86 2.75 0.40 3.01 –3.03 –1.01
All 10.65 3.54 0.33 1.75 –2.47 –1.42
Source: Various years’ data of Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), CSO, Government of India.
Note
* Both output growth and employment growth are negative.
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above employees reduced their share. In the late eighties the SMEs in the size
groups 50–199 and 200–499 were the most dynamic groups, and in the nineties
the group 500–999 joined them in having a relatively high rate of growth.
Employment in the largest size was particularly affected, falling at the rate of
4.68 percent per annum in 1984–1989, and of 1.16 percent in the first half of the
nineties, while the other groups had significant positive rates of growth.
How much was this change in the size-structure related to the change in the
composition of industry noted in the paragraphs above? We crossed the five-
group classification of industries given in Table 8.8 above with the five size
groups of Table 8.9 and noted the cells showing substantial increase or decrease
(more than 5 percent) in its share. The results are given in Table 8.10.
It is seen that the reduction in the relative importance of the very large firms
was generally across the board, although the low-tech, somewhat export-
oriented group (3a) seems to have had the most spectacular loss in this size
group. Only the group of miscellaneous industries rapidly expanding in the
export markets (2b) might have increased its average employment size as the
share of 50–199 enterprises increased at the expense of the very small ones.
Were there significant differences in labor-market outcomes in different size
classes of enterprises? The decomposition analysis, used above for all manufac-
turing, was applied separately for the five size groups distinguished. The results
are set out in Table 8.11.
The rate of growth of real output was somewhat low in the smallest size
group though not so low as the largest size-group (1,000+), but all the other
three SME groups with employment size ranging from 50 to 500 workers regis-
tered a remarkably high rate of output growth. It is seen that, with the sole





v) decreases as the size-class increases. It is then clear that the redistribution
of output to small and medium enterprises from the largest size-group (though
Table 8.8 Relative importance of wage–employment trade-off and DRER in employment
elasticity
Sub-group 1986–1987 to 1995–1996 1995–1996 to 2001–2002










1 3.83 –1.07 0.37 –5.72 –2.36 8.05*
2a 1.38 –0.85 0.27 –3.88 –4.69 –0.98
2b 6.16 –4.29 0.46 0.42 –4.55 0.13
3a 0.51 0.84 0.40 –3.29 –6.34 –1.01
3b 1.30 0.21 0.43 –2.25 –1.28 –0.04
All 1.94 –0.46 0.33 –3.35 –3.85 –1.42
Source: Various years’ data of Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), CSO, Government of India.
Note
* Both output growth and employment growth are negative.
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not to the smallest) was one of the factors which help bump up the overall
employment elasticity in the reform period.
The DRER effect in terms of the differences in the rates of growth of pro-
ducer and consumer prices is of minor importance in the overall differences in
the wage–employment outcome by size-groups. It should be apparent that the
Table 8.9 Employment and gross value added by size classes of factories
Size group Distribution of  employment (%) Annual growth rate (%)
1984–1985 1989–1990 1994–1995 1984–1989 1989–1994
10–49 15.1 18.1 17.4 4.4 1.3
50–199 19.8 24.3 26.2 4.7 3.7
200–499 14.0 15.7 16.4 2.9 3.1
500–999 13.0 12.9 15.3 0.5 5.8
1,000 and above 38.2 29.1 24.7 –4.7 –1.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.6 2.1
Size group Distribution of GVA (%) Annual growth rate (%)
1984–1985 1989–1990 1994–1995 1984–1989 1989–1994
10–49 8.3 9.1 9.1 9.4 8.6
50–199 13.2 16.0 17.7 12.0 10.6
200–499 14.9 16.8 18.7 10.4 11.1
500–999 17.2 17.4 21.3 8.5 13.5
1,000 and above 46.4 40.6 33.2 4.8 5.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 7.8 9.0
Source: Various years’ data of Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), CSO, Government of India.
Note
The total mentioned here is total of five size groups mentioned above. But it excludes factories in the
0–9 employment size group. So growth rates of the total will not match with manufacturing sector’s
growth rates.
Table 8.10 Size classes with substantial change in the share of total employment by
industry groups, 1984–1985 to 1994–1995
Industry group code Substantial gain Substantial fall
1 50–199; 200–499 1,000+ (13%)
2a 10–49 1,000+ (8%)
2b 50–199 10–49 (7%)
3a 50–199; 200–499 1,000+ (24%)
3b 50–199 1,000+ (6%)
Source: Various years’ data of Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), CSO, Government of India.
Note
Industry codes as defined in Table 8.5.
Table 8.11 Decomposition results by size-classes of factories, 1984–1985 to 1994–1995




α Price effect Output effect Employment
elasticity
10–49 3.18 8.89 2.53 8.78 9.35 0.85 –1.89 7.60 0.29
50–199 2.91 11.47 6.64 8.78 9.29 0.84 –1.92 9.63 0.58
200–499 2.34 11.55 3.49 8.78 9.30 0.75 –2.72 8.67 0.30
500–999 1.34 10.94 2.97 8.24 9.30 0.71 –3.44 7.77 0.27
1,000 and above 1.88 5.03 –1.55 8.32 9.30 0.71 –3.39 3.57 –0.31
Source: Own calculations from data tapes of ASI.
differences in employment elasticity by size-groups are the joint outcome of dif-
ferent values of α and the wage-employment trade-off.
a The most striking result in Table 8.11 is the inverse relationship of α with
the size classes – with the exception of the largest size-class, for which α
stayed at the same value as the next lower size-group. The major conclusion
reached earlier about the third period for manufacturing as a whole was that
the reduction in wage elasticity with respect to value added – which implies
a fall in the share of wages – was due to the increase in investment rate. In
the extended econometric exercise reported in Appendix.2 we get the result
that the inverse relationship of α with the investment rate is confirmed (after
allowing for variations in capital productivity) – but α still falls monotoni-
cally with the firm-size groups. This is most likely due to capital intensity
increasing with firm size.
b The wage–employment trade-off did not have such a clear pattern. But we
can read from the table it favored wage growth for the smallest (10–49) and
the largest (1000+) groups, employment growth actually being negative in
the latter case. In all other size-groups the employment growth rate was sub-
stantially higher than wage growth. The bias to wage growth relative to
employment growth in the smallest and the largest size-groups have prob-
ably different explanations. The wage growth in the 10–49 size-group is
likely to have been a supply-side phenomenon as the period saw a faster
increase in the alternative earnings of labor in the unorganized (informal)
sector. For the very large firms (1,000+) the tilt to wage growth reflects the
continued effort on the part of employers to trim the number of permanent
workers and increase the efficiency of the smaller body of the workforce
through higher wages per worker.
Conclusions
The review of the Indian experience in formal manufacturing over the last
quarter of the century revealed the enormous fluctuation in employment elastic-
ity from period to period. Starting with the period of ‘benign’ growth in the last
half of the 1970s, when employment elasticity was nearly unity, employment
growth turned somewhat negative in the period of ‘jobless growth’ in the 1980s.
It picked up to a reasonable, but not unduly high, value of 0.33 during the
reform period, when output growth was also high. But it slumped badly to a sub-
stantial negative figure in the latest post-reform years of 1996–2001 when output
growth also stumbled.
We have learnt from the decomposition model that there are three sets of
factors affecting employment elasticity, given the rate of growth of real value
added: (i) the trend in the share of wages as measured by our α; (ii) the
wage–employment trade-off; and (iii) the trend in the domestic real exchange
rate or the relative movement over time of the producer-price index relative to
the consumer-price index. The last variable is, for the present analysis, more in
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the nature of an exogenous factor which defines the rate of growth of the wage
bill in consumer prices (which is of relevance to the workers’ welfare). The first
two are labor-market variables. At first sight they might both seem be related to
the strength or weakness of workers’ organization like trade unions, but this
would be overlooking the different decision-making processes at the firm level
which affect the two variables.
The model has a strong suggestion that the employment elasticity resulting
from the interaction of these factors will have a cyclical pattern. This is because
expectations about future market conditions play a critical role in the model with
two factors – capital and labor, which are both, quasi-fixed. The model enables
us to decompose the determinants of employment elasticity into these three key
factors. It is applied to the case of formal manufacturing in India over the period
1974–1975 to 2001–2002.
As predicted the employment elasticity does show the cyclical pattern – and
four phases are distinguished. They correspond reasonably way to different
periods of the recent political economy of Indian development culminating in
the reform period (1986–1996) and the immediate post-reform period of
1996–2002. The relative importance of the three key factors in the fluctuating
trend of the employment elasticity over the four periods is discussed –
particularly in terms of the changes in labor-market institutions.
While the illustrative case of India is interesting in itself, some of the findings
are of general importance for many economies in the globalizing world.
First, a strong finding was that the downward trend in the DRER has been
persistent for the last two decades of the past century. The DRER is of course
closely related to the terms of trade of manufactured products to that of primary
commodities (particularly cereals). This turning of the terms of trade against the
latter has been noted in the literature (cf. Kaplinsky 2006 for a recent contribu-
tion). In the Indian case desegregation of the manufacturing sector shows that
the competitive pressure facing manufacturing producers in the domestic market
after liberalization might have as much to do with downward trend of the DRER
(which seemed to have gathered momentum in the post-reform period) as the
trend in prices of the growing manufactured exports. 
Second, the close relationship between the investment rate and the share of
wages (or with α) is established in the Indian case and we have provided
independent evidence of the importance of growing importance of internal
finance to the boom in investment in the reform period. Although economies
would differ in the importance of this connection, it is probably of general
importance, and would indeed be found to be of importance in the determination
of employment elasticity in most economies.
Third, wage–employment trade-off is a key determinant. It is influenced
partly by employer perception of the expected demand for labor relative to the
perceived cost of altering the complement of permanent workers. On the other
hand, institutions on the labor side will play an important role the decisions
about this trade-off. Some of the theoretical issues as well as possible empirical
differences between regions of the world were discussed in Mazumdar (2003).
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In this chapter, the Indian case illustrates how difficult it might be to reduce the
perception of labor as a quasi-fixed factor of perception once it has been estab-
lished in the industrial culture. Our discussion of the reform period in India
showed that important changes have been made in the direction of slackening
the rigidity in the labor market of the formal sector, both in the way labor unions
operated and the way job-security legislation was being implemented. But the
results do suggest that employers continue to be wary of the fixed costs of
increasing their complement of permanent labor, and the downward revision of
expectations in the post-reform years of 1996–2002 is seen to have had a strong
effect in tilting the trade-off to wage growth relative to employment growth.
In the previous section of the chapter we looked at some selected issues for
disaggregated sub-sectors of formal manufacturing. The analysis was applied, for
example, separately to groups of industry classified by trade exposure and
technology. An important result is that while the elasticity of employment fell in
all categories in the post-liberalization period (period IV) compared with the pre-
vious one, revealingly it fell most in the low-technology exposed industries and
the least in high-technology domestic industry. Sectors more exposed to trade
have tended to have higher employment elasticity in both periods but it also suf-
fered a decline in elasticity in the post-reform years. However, while employment
elasticity declined across the board, the reasons for the decline differ according to
the degree of exposure to trade. In the more exposed industries, the choice of
techniques that tilted towards higher wages instead of employment – which is
consistent with firms adjusting to raise skills and productivity of workers – has
been the more important factor behind reducing elasticity. In the less exposed
domestic industries, the domestic real exchange rate effect – the increase in con-
sumer prices relative to producer prices – has been more important one.
Appendix 1
The decomposition model used in the paper
The following are the variables used:
w = real wage (average earnings per worker)
Sw = wage bill (in current prices)
V = value added (in current prices)
v = value added (in constant prices)
L = employment
Pp = index of producer prices
Pc = index of consumer prices
The relationship defining the movement of the wage bill with respect to value
added over time is specified by the following equation:
Sw = A V
α (1)
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A is a positive constant less than unity, determined by the base-year share of
wages; α is a technological and behavioral parameter which is assumed to
remain constant over the period under consideration. However, it can take any
positive value and would generally vary from one economy to another depend-
ing on the factors determining the share of wages over time. If it has a value of
unity, the share of wages remains constant. A variable written with a dot on top
(.) represents the proportionate rate of change of the variable concerned.
Note that from (1)
S
.
w = α v
.
where A is a positive constant less than unity, determined by the base-year share
of wages.
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Pc (2a)
(Output Effect − Employment Effect + Price Effect)
The trend rate of growth of real wages is thus seen in equation (2a) to be the
sum of three effects: the output effect is the first term of the right-hand side; the
employment effect is the second term; and the sum of the third and fourth is
the price effect. The equation focuses our attention on employment elasticity as
being an outcome of the trade-off between employment growth and wage
growth. But it is seen that the borders of this trade off are governed by three
variables: output growth; the value of the α parameter determining the trend in
the share of wages; and the price effect. The equation shows that real wage
growth is higher the lower is employment growth. But two other factors have an
impact upon it: the output effect, which is the part of the real wage increase
ascribed to real growth in value added, given the value of α; and the last two
terms, showing the impact of changes in the price levels facing producers and
consumers over time.
The price effect is really composed of two distinct elements. The last two








The first term in (3) could be called the wage-share effect of price changes over
time. If α < 1, the share of wages in net output falls over time in current prices
in accordance with equation (1). In this case the first term in (3) is negative,
showing that a certain part of the real output growth, as measured by this term,
is not available for the growth of the real wage bill. It is clear that the higher the
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inflation rate the greater will be the leakage from the available wage bill in real
terms to support wage and/or employment growth. As mentioned in the second
section of this chapter, this effect can be traced to the lag in the adjustment of
wage to the inflationary increase in prices. The second term is the rate of change
in the ratio of producer to consumer prices or the so-called domestic real
exchange rate (DRER). One can intuitively grasp its importance by considering
the case of an inflationary economy in which the exchange-rate depreciation lags
behind the rate of inflation – a common enough scenario in developing coun-
tries. In this case the consumer-price level that affects the real value of workers’
wages increases faster than producer prices that are tied to international prices of
traded goods. Thus the second term in (3) is also negative implying that a
portion of the real output growth is used to keep the wage bill growing at the
same real rate. Both these price effects, if negative, can be thought of as leak-
ages from the real output growth, which decrease the rate of growth of the
portion available for supporting either employment or real wage growth.
Appendix 2
A model of investment rate and the share of wages
The following definitions apply:
P = profits of the firm in the period in question
I = investment Planned for the period
V = Value Added produced by the investment
σ = productivity of the capital investment
Sp = propensity to save of entrepreneurs out of profits
In the equilibrium portrayed in Figure 8A2.1 it is assumed that the wage per
man has been determined within the constraints of institutional factors men-
tioned in the text. Thus the both the supply of work units per worker and
the wage cost per work unit is determined, and it is assumed it is constant
for the range of work units needed. For any share of profits in value added
P/V (and hence the wage bill) we then have a supply of work units forthcom-
ing as the product of number of workers and the supply of work units per
worker. The curve in the fourth quadrant is the result of the production
function – combining the capital used (as determined by the investment ratio
corresponding to the profit share) with the quantity of work units available. It
shows diminishing return to the use of capital per work unit (for a given
technology and economic environment of the period in question). As K/L
increase with I/V along the y-axis of this quadrant, the productivity of capital
σ falls.
The curve in quadrant I on the other hand shows the feasibility of sustaining
different values of profit share. The profit share is the residual from the value
added after the pre-determined wage bill is deducted. Obviously it increases with
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the productivity of capital σ (some non-linearity in the function is allowed in the
diagram to allow for increase in marketing costs but this detail is unimportant).
In equilibrium the share of profits which is attained in any period must satisfy
both σ and the share of investment (I/V) which is desired. But given the produc-
tion function, σ varies with the amount of investment and hence with I/V. If the
system is to stay in equilibrium the σ yielded by the production function has to
be consistent with that yielded by the function of Proposition 1. The full equilib-
rium can be described in the diagram shown as Figure 8A2.1.
Quadrant 2 depicts the relationship between the Investment ratio (I/V) on the
x-axis and the profit share on the vertical. Following Kaldor (but not invoking
the aggregate demand or macro-economic aspects of his analysis), the relation-
ship is a straight line at an angle less than 45 degree to the vertical axis, i.e., a








Figure 8A2.1 The equilibrium with capital productivity (σ) profit share (P/V) and invest-
ment share (I/V).
the profit earners. The straight line in quadrant 3 copies the investment ratio
from quadrant 3 to the vertical axis of quadrant 4. The relationship between I/V
and σ (negative assuming diminishing returns and a given production function)
is portrayed in Quadrant 4.
The dotted lines show the full equilibrium of the system in any period.
The planned I/V ratio at the beginning of the period must be sustained by a
level of σ and a share of profits as shown in quadrants 4 and 2 respectively, and
both must be consistent with each other as per the relationship shown in quad-
rant 1. Any attempt, given the production function and market conditions, to
increase I/V leads to a lower σ and a hence lower P/V than what is required to
finance the investment. The wage–price nexus required to support the increased
I/V fails as it comes up against the inflation barrier posed by workers’ wage
demands and/or the loss of competitiveness in the product market.
The reform process, by relaxing the constraints on the markets for inputs and
outputs, can be expected to shift the production function upwards, as discussed
above, and thus the schedule in quadrant 4 relating I/V to capital productivity
shifts outwards. Firms can then sustain a higher I/V ratio relative to the pre-
reform situation with a higher σ and a higher profit ratio.
Firms differ in their levels of capital productivity. Thus comparing equilib-
rium positions across firms or groups of firms (or industries), we get a testable
hypothesis:
Disequilibrium situations
In any period, it would be unusual for the system to be in complete equilibrium.
But any deviation from it would tend to be corrected in the next period. Thus
suppose entrepreneurs plan a certain I/V ratio on the basis of information about the
profit share and capital productivity in period t-1. They would expect the system to
be in equilibrium with these values of the three variables in period t. But suppose
capital productivity falls short of the expected value in period t. Then P/V is not
large enough to sustain the planned I/V, and in planning for the next period entre-
preneurs would aim at a lower I/V unless they have reason to believe that the
shortfall was due to exceptional events. Considering that the observed points of
different combinations of the three variables are likely to be a series of disequilib-
rium points, we have a hypothesis much like Hypothesis 1 above. In other words:
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Hypothesis 1: The share of profits (wages) will be higher (lower) the
higher (lower) the I/V ratio and the level of capital productivity.
Hypothesis 2: Even if we do not have firms differing in their levels of
capital productivity in equilibrium, we would expect to see that the
observed share of profits (wages) is directly (indirectly) related to the
investment ratio and capital productivity.
Employment elasticity in manufacturing 199
Testing the hypotheses
We tested the hypotheses emerging in the discussion of the last section by
regressing the value of α, the elasticity of the wage bill with respect to value
added (and hence determining the trend in the share of wages) on the investment
ratio and capital productivity. The data for the years from 1986–1987 to
1994–1995 by the five size-classes of firms were pooled together. Since we get
only nine observations for each size class, it was decided to test a fixed-effect
model (i.e., a pooled regression model with size-group dummies). The results
are presented in Table 8A2.1.
The result shows that both investment ratio and capital productivity are nega-
tively related to dependent variable α. The coefficients of size dummies are also
negative relative to the smallest size class of 10–49 workers, showing that the
effect of size on alpha is negative. All the independent variables are significant.
In the regression model of Table 8A2.1 the absolute value of capital produc-
tivity has been used. We have also tried an alternative specification of capital
productivity, viz. taking capital productivity of each size class for the year
1986–1987 as 100 and then calculating the capital productivity separately for
each class for successive years. Such a specification neutralizes the initial dis-
parity in capital productivity as between different size-classes. The estimated
coefficient of capital productivity in this specification also turned out to be
significantly negative.
The results lend support to the conclusions from the Kalecki (1971) model
outlined above. The increased rate of investment induces the dynamic firm to
plough back the surplus above material and wage costs into the financing for
investment. The decrease in the share of wages, which this process involves, is
Table 8A2.1 Regression results for alpha (α)
Dependent variable α
Model: Fixed-effect model with size dummies
R2 = 0.715 F-values = 13.724
Variables Estd. coeff. t-values Significance
Constant 1.55415 9.03 0.000
Investment ratio –0.00190 –3.76 0.001
Capital productivity –0.00001 –3.65 0.001
Size dummies
1 50–199 –0.246 –5.43 0.000
2 200–499 –0.295 –5.40 0.000
3 500–999 –0.434 –6.71 0.000
4 1,000 and above –0.449 –5.84 0.000
Note
The constant term absorbs the effect of excluded dummy variable size-group 10–49. The estimated
values of other size dummies are with respect to the excluded size-group.
possible because of the increase in total-factor productivity. The higher rate of
surplus can be generated without a decrease in the rate of growth of real wages
and of employment below a threshold, which might have triggered worker resis-
tance, or a potential shortage of labor of requisite skills. As we have seen, the
fall in the share of wages in value added in the third period was accompanied by
a much reduced rate of real wage growth, but it continued to be positive, and the
rate of employment growth actually increased substantially.
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9 Dualism in Indian manufacturing
Causes and consequences
The evidence presented in Chapter 8 of the generally low employment
elasticity in organized manufacturing suggests that much of the growing labor
force outside agriculture has been absorbed either in the tertiary sector or in
unorganized manufacturing. Since the gap in labor productivity and earnings
between the unorganized and the organized sectors is large, this leads to the
phenomenon of ‘dualism’ in the manufacturing sector – which is alleged to be
the source of welfare loss both from the efficiency and equity angles. There
are in fact two aspects to ‘dualism’. The first has its origin in the productivity
gap and distribution of employment between the ‘formal and the ‘informal’
sectors, where the demarcation line between the two is fixed by the interna-
tionally comparable definition of the use of more than five workers in the
establishment. Second dualism would be accentuated if, within the formal
sector, distribution of employment is skewed heavily to large firms, with
relatively small representation of small and medium enterprises. In other
cases the distribution of employment, even within the ‘formal’ sector, might
be strongly bi-polar, with two peaks of employment at the low and the
high end of the size spectrum, and a wide range of size groups with a relat-
ively small number of workers. This is the phenomenon of the ‘missing
middle’.
Categories in the ‘unorganized’ manufacturing sector
Before embarking on a detailed analysis of the problem it is important to be
clear about the sub-groups within informal manufacturing (or the unorganized
sector, as it is called in India), and which sub-sector we are considering in our
comparison with the formal (organized) sector.
The data on the sub-sectors in manufacturing outside the ASI sector (ana-
lyzed in the last chapter) as well as trade and services come from the sample
surveys organized by the National Sample Survey. The surveys used the sample
frame of Economic Censuses conducted by the Central Statistical Organization
(CSO) of the Government of India in selected years. The Unorganized Sector
Surveys define three categories of enterprises, classified by the size of enterprise
and the type of labor used:
1 Own-account manufacturing enterprises (OAME). These units make use of
only of family labor, and most of them are on the household premises.
2 Non-directory establishments (NDME) which have at least one hired
worker, but the total size of all workers (including family labor) do not
exceed five.
3 Directory manufacturing establishments1 (DME) which have at least one
worker hired more or less on a regular basis and their total complement of
workers is six but less than ten. If it is more than ten then the enterprise is
under the purview of the Factory Act and is part of the formal sector
covered by the Annual Survey of Industries.
Within the unorganized manufacturing sector nearly 67 percent of the
workers were in own account enterprises in 2001 (Table 2). The proportion
of workers in own account units was even larger in rural areas 79 percent,
compared to urban, 43 percent. Less than 20 percent of workers were in the
larger unorganized enterprises with 6–10 workers (DME) and about 14
percent were in the NDME, less than 6 workers. Overall workers were
engaged in larger enterprises in urban areas, 30 percent in DMEs and about
26 percent in NDMEs. Over the period 1983 to 2001, the share of employ-
ment in the larger units increased marginally.
(Unni 2006, p. 219)
The OAME units represent the ‘pure’ informal sector, based on households
and in most cases in the same premises. They generally pursue the traditional
or craft activities. A great deal of the NDMEs also fall into this type of activ-
ity, although they make use of ‘at least one’ hired worker (who indeed might
be partly a house servant). For our purposes we will use the DME sector as
representing a part of the formal sector – the other component of the latter
being the sector covered by the ASI including units with ten or more workers.
Admittedly this demarcation is to some extent arbitrary, determined by the
practices of the National Sample Survey. But it stands to reason that the estab-
lishment has entered a more ‘modern’ economic relationship when it has grad-
uated to a six-worker employment size. This size group is also a highly
convenient one because it permits comparison with other countries in the
region (see below).
The DME sector is then be distinguished, at the lower end, from the informal
sector on the one hand – comprising the very large household sector – and the
smaller non-household units. At the upper end it is demarcated from the larger-
scale component of the ‘organized’ manufacturing sector covered by the ASI
(which was discussed in the last chapter). Table 9A.1 gives the size distribution
of the entire spectrum of enterprises, including the sub-sectors of the unorga-
nized as well as the formal sector in manufacturing.
Distribution by size-groups in manufacturing could be considered with
respect to either value added or employment. In fact, the former is the more
basic of the two and is the product of two separate variables: first, the
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distribution of employment by size groups; and second, the differences in
productivity or value added per worker as between size groups. In what
follows we will work with these two variables to shed more light on the eco-
nomic processes involved. Wages generally increase proportionately with
labor productivity. Thus the extent of productivity differentials between small
and large units would reflect differences in wage levels between them. In so
far as informal sector undertakings would have wage and productivity near to
the levels found in the smallest size-group in the formal sector, the large-small
productivity differential in the formal sector would also be a measure of the
economic distance between the informal and the formal sector firms in the
economy concerned.
The size distribution and labor productivity differentials by
size-group: India relative to selected Asian countries
This section seeks to present a snapshot of the Indian pattern of size distribution
and productivity differential by size in manufacturing relative to selected Asian
countries. It should be noted that we are confining ourselves to the size-
distribution within the ‘modern’ sector. That is to say, our international compari-
son refers to the second aspect of ‘dualism’ mentioned above: the establishments
employing five or more workers. Data could be assembled for only a few Asian
countries, for various years in the late 1980s.
Table 9.1 presents data on the distribution of employment by size groups,
while Table 9.2 sets out the data on relative labor productivity for the various
size groups. The data reported in Tables 9.1 and 9.2 for other Asian countries
also have a similar cut-off points at the lower end based on employment size
they are comparable to the Indian statistics.
Basically three ‘types’ can be distinguished within this small sample:
1 a fairly even-size distribution in which small, medium and large firms plays
more or less equally important roles and the productivity difference between
the size classes is small;
2 the pattern in which the distribution of employment by size groups is dis-
tinctly skewed to the large firms. Typically in this pattern the productivity
difference between large and small firms tends to be substantial; and
3 the ‘dualistic’ pattern in which there is a strong mode at both ends of the
distribution – a relatively large proportion of employment is found both in
the small and the large size groups. Within this ‘type’ two sub-types can be
distinguished depending on the extent of the productivity differential
between small and large firms.
(i) The first group is classically represented by the case of Hong Kong. As
can be seen in Table 9.1 employment was fairly evenly distributed among the
various size-groups, with the small enterprises playing as much a role in the
island’s manufacturing structure as medium and large enterprises. At the same
Dualism in Indian manufacturing 203
time, the difference in labor productivity between the largest and the smallest
size-group is the smallest in the sample (Table 9.2).
The pattern of distribution in Hong Kong could be usefully compared with
that in the Japanese economy which has been characterized by the strong role of
small establishments. It will be seen from Table 9.1 that although the modal size
group for both Hong Kong and Japan is the small enterprises of 10–49 workers,
the proportion of employment in large enterprises of 500+ workers is signific-
antly larger in Japan. Further, the data in Table 9.2 show that productivity differ-
ences between small and large firms were much less in Hong Kong. The wage
differential between small and large units was accordingly much smaller.
Average earnings in Hong Kong in 1982 were only 55 percent higher in estab-
lishments with more than 1,000 workers than in those with 1–9 workers. In
Japan the wage differential was twice as much.2
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Table 9.1 Percentage distribution of employment by size-groups in manufacturing,
selected Asian countries (various years in the 1980s)
Size- India Korea Japan Hong-Kong Malaysia Philippines Taiwan 
groups 1989–1990 1986 1987 1982 1981 1988 1986
5–91 41.8 3.8 13.2 12.22 4.3 21.5 10.4
10–49 10.1 20.6 29.2 27.4 20.5 13.6 24.0
50–99 5.9 12.9 12.9 15.6 13.5 6.5 13.5
100–199 6.2 12.7 11.6 14.5 15.4 8.9 28.1
200–499 7.7 14.8 12.4 13.8 16.6
500 and over 28.0 35.0 20.8 16.5 29.7 49.5 24.1
Size- Indonesia Size- Thailand 
groups 1985 groups 1989
5–19 29.5 1–4 3.7 (0.7)
20–49 9.3 5–9 4.9 (1.2)
50–199 13.3 10–49 17.3 (8.4)
200–995 25.2 50–99 9.3 (9.1)
1,000 and over 22.8 100–299 17.9 (20.7)
300–499 10.2 (16.1)
500 and over 36.6 (43.7)




Hong Kong: Annual Digest of Statistics
Malaysia: Onn Fong Chan (1990, p. 161)
Indonesia: Hal Hill (1983, Table 19, p. 91)
Taiwan: Abe and Kawakami (1997, Table 1, p. 386)
Philippines: National Statistical Office
Thailand: Yearbook of Labor Statistics. The figures in parentheses are for the provinces surrounding
Bangkok which saw the fastest growth of manufacturing in the last two decades.
Notes
1 6–9 for India. The sources for India are fully documented in Mazumdar 1997b.
2 1–9 for Hong Kong.
Hong Kong comes closest to a free-market model of development in Asia.
Beng (1988) observes that ‘within the proclaimed laissez faire environment in
Hong Kong the government does not seem to have a policy towards manufac-
turing not to mention any policy towards the SSIs’ (p. 88). An obvious hypoth-
esis emerging from the Hong Kong case is that left to itself modern industry
makes efficient use of small enterprises in a striking way. Also, in the absence
of the usual set of policy biases which protect both capital and labor in large
firms, labor productivity and wage differentials are kept within fairly narrow
bounds.
Of the other countries represented in the sample, Taiwan comes close to the
Hong Kong pattern. The size distribution is very similar. While the productivity
difference in Taiwan would seem to be larger if we compare the lowest and the
highest size-groups, closer examination shows that this appearance is largely
due to the high relative productivity of the largest (500+) size-group in Taiwan.
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Table 9.2 Relative productivity (value added per worker) by size-groups of enterprises in
manufacturing, selected Asian countries [around 1985]
Size- India Korea Japan Hong Kong Malaysia Philippines Taiwan 
groups 1989–1990 1986 1987 1982 1981 1988 1986
5–9 123 31 32 544 54 94 34
10–49 39 42 39 61 58 30 35
50–99 45 59 50 66 73 56 38
100–199 60 56 59 71 94 74 49
200–499 74 81 76 82 93
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Hong Kong: Annual Digest of Statistics
Malaysia: Onn Fong Chan (1990, p. 161)
Indonesia: Hal Hill (1983, Table 19, p. 91)
Taiwan: Abe and Kawakami (1997, Table 1, p. 386)
Philippines: National Statistical Office
Thailand: Yearbook of Labor Statistics. The figures in parentheses are for the provinces surrounding
Bangkok which saw the fastest growth of manufacturing in the last two decades.
Notes
3 6–9 for India.
4 1–9 for Hong Kong.
4 1–9 for the Philippines.
Value added per worker rises very gently up to the level of the large firms of 500
plus workers, and then seems to take a big jump.
Differences in wage levels, as measured by average earnings of the workers
between the smallest and the largest size-groups, are almost the same for Taiwan
and Hong Kong.3
(ii) The second pattern in our sample is a size distribution of employment
which is skewed to the right, with the modal size-group employing 500+
workers.
The countries in our sample which show this distribution are Korea and
Thailand, although, as of 1986, Korea had a larger presence of smaller firms
than Thailand, particularly in the 20–50 size-group. But Korea had been con-
sciously trying to develop its small and medium sectors since about a decade
earlier. In 1976, when the proportion of employment in the largest size-group
peaked at 45 percent, the Korean distribution was much more skewed – almost
at par with Thailand’s.
Malaysia is another country which, in 1981, showed a pattern of distribution
skewed to the large size-group. But it can be seen from Table 9.2 that the pro-
ductivity differential between small and large firms is much smaller than in the
case of Korea. Thus we would expect different economic forces operating on the
size distribution in the case of these two countries.
(iii) The ‘dualistic pattern’ is characterized by, first, the strong presence of
both small establishments and large firms, and second, the substantial economic
distance between small and large firms. The classic case of this type is Japan.
The ‘dualistic’ pattern of Japanese industrialization has a long history. It has its
roots in the initial surplus-labor conditions prevailing in Japan during its initial
industrialization (which contributed to labor-market segmentation) and the
simultaneous development of a complex tying large industry, the state and finan-
cial conglomerates which accentuated capital market dualism.
The other less developed countries in Asia – the Philippines, Indonesia and
India – all share with Japan the dualistic pattern in their modern (formal) manu-
facturing sector.4 There is, however, a big difference with Japan, which is
brought out in Table 9.2. The productivity difference between the small and the
large size-groups of firms is much larger in these Asian countries than in Japan.
Thus while the ‘surplus labor’ situation in Asian countries makes the ‘dualistic
pattern’ emerge in a wide variety of Asian economies, Japan had, by the middle
1980s, succeeded in narrowing the gap in productivity between small and large
firms which typically characterizes the dualistic development. We will return to
this point later.
In South Asia, the extreme peculiarity of the Indian structure is immediately
apparent. India has an exceptionally large proportion of employment in the
lowest size-group of 6–9 workers and an exceptionally low relative value added
per worker in this group. Furthermore, the size distribution is characterized by a
large presence of the 500+ group of firms with a conspicuous ‘missing middle’.
This pattern resembles that of Japan in terms of a ‘dualistic’ development, but is
wildly exaggerated in the Indian case. There can be little doubt that this outcome
206 Employment and earnings in major sectors
is basically due to the protectionist policy adopted by the government since 1950
which favored the small scale.
The problem of the missing middle
Figure 9.1 shows the extreme case of the formal manufacturing sector in India –
how employment was concentrated in the two extreme size-groups compared
with the other Asian countries.
It would seem in the Indian case there are formidable obstacles to the small
units growing beyond a threshold size into middle-sized ones. This is a serious
barrier in so far the middle-sized entrepreneur is often the most dynamic, and the
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Figure 9.1 The missing middle manufacturing firms – India compared to other countries
(source: Figures are taken from Table 9.1).
competitiveness (and hence efficiency) of the manufacturing sector depends a
good deal on the buoyancy of such units.
The productivity gap between the informal and 
the formal sectors in manufacturing
The second problem distinguishing the Indian case from the other Asian coun-
tries is the much larger productivity gap noticed in India. In Japan, Korea and
Taiwan the labor productivity in the largest units (employing more than 500
workers) was around three times that in the smallest units. In India it was eight
times as large. Even in less developed Asian country like Indonesia the larger
units had labor productivity no more than five times that in the smaller units.
The policy of SME development in India
Both the two exceptional characteristics of the Indian case can be traced to
have its origins in the peculiar policy of industrial controls practiced in the first
40 years or so after independence. In India a dual system of protection has
been in effect since the beginning of independence. On the one hand, the
policy has been to protect the small-scale from the competition of the large –
the policy of ‘reservation’, under which a long list of items has been desig-
nated as the exclusive preserve of the small-scale (defined in terms of the value
of capital assets). The capacity of production of these items by large-scale units
has been frozen at the level at the time of the legislation. At the same time, the
import substituting industrialization has protected all domestic units – small
and large – from the competition of foreign firms. The result has been that
small and large firms have developed their own niches of markets in different
lines of production without too much competition between them or from
foreign firms.
This method of fostering the growth of SMEs was first introduced in 1967
and the list of items “reserved” for the small-scale have been progressively
increased and in the mid-nineties it comprised a total of around 830.5 The value
of the limit in plant and machinery has been increased over time in nominal
terms, but the increase in value of this limit after allowing for inflation has been
small.
Initially, this approach encouraged the establishment of large numbers of new
SE units which were protected from competition from the large-scale sector. But
the problem with the continuation of such policies is two-fold: (i) in attempting
to select labor-intensive products or industries, it misses the point that labor-
intensive enterprises are found in many, nearly all industries, not just a limited
set which can be easily identified; and (ii) it is not sufficiently biased towards
small enterprises which show potential for growth.6
(i) Industry-based policies of reservation overlook the fact that small enter-
prises are not confined to specific product lines, and that their importance in dif-
ferent product groups is constantly changing. What is needed is for policies to
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have a pervasive effect so that all small enterprises, no matter in what product
groups, could potentially take advantage of the assistance measures available.
Small enterprises are generally more labor-intensive than large ones, espe-
cially if size is defined in terms of fixed investment rather than employment. But
it does not mean that they are concentrated in industries where the mean
capital–labor ratio is particularly low. SMEs are found in many industries. There
is no reason that in any economy the number employed (or the proportion of total
output or investment) in SEs would be larger in those industries which have a less
than average K/L ratio than in those in which the ratio is above the average. This
is because there is a spectrum of techniques within each industry, and enterprises
of different sizes and capital intensities will be found in most of them.
(ii) Turning to the second point of criticism, it is important that SE support
policies do not discourage the growth of small into medium enterprises.Here the
approach of the Indian package of polices has been the opposite of what is
desired. Along with the reservation policy, there have been a number of fiscal
subsidy programs and other forms of support which provide benefits to enter-
prises below a certain size. Thus there is a built-in disincentive for enterprises to
go beyond this size limit. Labor laws on wages, benefits and job security are
applied to units above the critical size. Enterprises graduating out of the pro-
tected small sector are thus faced with extra costs even as they are denied the
benefits of fiscal subsidies and other programs.
The effect has been a polarization of the industrial structure. The small-scale
and large enterprises have increasingly occupied different niches of the market
in the same industry. Even when industries are defined narrowly in terms of spe-
cific product lines, there is generally a great deal of difference in the quality of
the product. Small enterprises with low wages and less mechanized techniques
occupy the lower end of the spectrum, catering to the demand of low-income
consumers, while larger mechanized firms serve the high price segment of the
market. The classic example is the textile industry. Small units with non-
automatic, often reconditioned, looms (‘powerlooms’, as they are called in
India) produce cheap cloth, while the large factories with automatic looms
produce more durable cloth for the upper-class domestic and export markets.
This type of polarization accentuates dualism and increases the productivity and
wage gap between the small and large sectors.
Post-reform developments
The package of reforms in the last decade could be expected to have made a
serious dent to the traditional policy of protection for the small scale. On the one
hand, liberalization of import controls, particularly on a range of consumer
goods, should have reduced the strength of the protective umbrella. At the same
time the relaxation of the licensing system for large-scale industrial units could
be expected to have reduced the effectiveness of the policy of ‘reservation’ for
small enterprises. What is the evidence on the effect of these developments on
the size structure of manufacturing?
Dualism in Indian manufacturing 209
The relevant data culled from the NSS Establishment Surveys and ASI for the
various dates are given in Tables 9.3 and 9.4. They are graphed in Figure 9.2.
As far as the distribution of employment is concerned the only change over
the period covered seems to have been a significant reduction in the number
employed in very large firms (1,000 and above). The distribution is, however,
still bi-polar with strong modes at the employment size groups at the two
extremes (6–9 and 500+).
The productivity differentials by size-groups seem to have changed even less.
If anything the extreme ‘dualism’ noticed in India compared with other Asian
countries seems to have worsened since 1984–1985, though much of the deterio-
ration occurred in the first half of the nineties.
Size structure of enterprises in the ASI sector
The problem of the ‘missing middle’ carries over into the large-scale or ASI
sector of manufacturing. The inability or unwillingness of smaller non-ASI units
to grow is reflected in the paucity of small-scale establishments in the latter.
Little et al. (1987) pointed out the peculiarly biased structure of employment
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Table 9.3 Percentage distribution of employment in different size classes
Type and size 1984–1985 1994–1995 2000–2001
6–9 40.27 44.91 41.52
10–49 9.47 10.34 10.42
50–199 11.83 13.31 15.34
200–499 8.27 8.56 9.49
500–999 7.65 7.02 8.87
1,000 and above 22.52 15.85 14.35
All 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Unorganized manufacturing survey 40th, 51st and 56th rounds of NSS and ASI, various years.
Table 9.4 Indices of labor productivity by size groups (500+ = 1.00)
Type & Size 1984–1985 1994–1995 2000–2001
6–9 0.19 0.12 0.10
10–49 0.42 0.35 0.37
50–199 0.53 0.47 0.49
200–499 0.86 0.77 0.84
500–999 1.06 0.98 1.02
1,000 and above 0.98 1.01 0.99
Source: Unorganized manufacturing survey 40th, 51st and 56th rounds of NSS and
ASI, various years.
Note
Growth of labor productivity is given in Table 9A.2.
in the ASI sector for the early year of 1977. The proportion of total employ-
ment in size-groups increased progressively as one went from the smaller to
the larger groups. In other words, the dualism one noticed in formal manufac-
turing as a whole, taking the ASI and the DME sectors together, was not
apparent when one looked at the ASI sector by itself. Rather, the distribution
was heavily skewed to the largest size-group. This picture contrasted starkly,
not only with the experience of Japan, which had a ‘cascading’ employment
structure with the proportion of employment falling as the size category
increased, but also with the United States, Korea and Taiwan. All three of
these had an employment distribution more or less resembling the ‘normal’
curve and had the highest proportion of employment in the 100–500 size-
group (or what might typically be called the ‘medium-scale’ units). The domi-
nance of the very large firms in India had been whittled down somewhat
between 1956 and 1977, but even so in 1977 the establishments with more
than 1,000 workers accounted for no less than 45 percent of the total employ-
ment in the ASI sector.















































Figure 9.2 India – distribution of employment and productivity by size groups. Panel A:
Distribution of employment (in %) in manufacturing firms by employment
size groups. Panel B: Index of labor productivity by different size of firms
(source: ASI data).
Note
The slabs have been adjusted to take care of the varying length of the size groups (see Little et al.
p. 88).
How does the size structure look in more recent years? The package of reforms
in the last decade could be expected to have made a serious dent to the traditional
policy of protection for the small scale. On the one hand, liberalization of import
controls, particularly on a range of consumer goods, should have reduced the
strength of the protective umbrella. At the same time the relaxation of the licens-
ing system for large-scale industrial units could be expected to have reduced the
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Figure 9.3b Size structure of ASI employment.
Note
The slabs have been adjusted to take care of the varying length of the size groups (see Little et al.
1987: p. 88).
effectiveness of the policy of ‘reservation’ for small enterprises. What is the evid-
ence on the effect of these developments on the size structure of manufacturing?
The evolving picture in the last 25 years of the last century is presented in
Figures 9.3 which give the distributions of value added and employment respec-
tively for different years. It is clear that the whittling down of the largest size-
groups, which had been noticed earlier between 1956 and 1977, continued in the
recent decades. But it is also clear that much of this change took place before the
post-reform period. In fact the biggest reduction in the importance of the size-
groups of 1,000 and above had taken place in the early eighties and was associ-
ated with the closure of many cotton and jute mills.
Uchikawa (2002, p. 46) found that the 
average gross profit ratio between 1979–1980 and 1997–1998 was highest
in units employing 50–99, second in units employing 100 to 199 and lowest
in units employing 1,000 and above. Medium scale units were (therefore)
dynamic sector to gain employment and investment. That is a reason why
medium scale units increased employment.
He emphasized that this did not mean that medium-scale units were more prof-
itable than large–scale ones in the same industry. In fact, many of the large units
were in the depressed textile industries which were suffering from gross ineffi-
ciency and had to be closed down or retooled. These industries pulled down the
gross profit ratio for large units in the manufacturing sector as a whole.
Nevertheless, there were some new industries which had a growth rate of
value added in excess of 10 percent per annum (between 1979–1980 and
1997–1998) and were also home to many of the medium-scale units. These indus-
tries were chiefly NIC 26 (textile products or wearing apparel), NIC 29 (leather
and leather products) and NIC 30 (chemicals and chemical products). Firms in
these industries contributed to the improvement of average gross profits in the
medium-scale units. There was a good deal of churning of establishments in these
industries. Many medium-scale units failed, but others merged to take their place.
We can use the ASI to present a disaggregated picture of the industrial struc-
ture, and its changes in the post-reform years. It is worth emphasizing that the
persistence of dualism in India appears to cut across most manufacturing sub-
sectors. Data disaggregated by sectors show that in 14 of the 18 two-digit indus-
tries the largest shares of workers are found in the smallest of the ASI groups
(10–99 group). Comparing 2000–2001 figures with those of 1994–1995, it is
seen that the loss in the share of employment was found in the 100–199 class for
as many as 13 out of 18 industries (Table 9.5). It is likely that both these devel-
opments are due to the barrier imposed by the job-security legislation which
comes into play for units with 100 or more workers. There is a distinct disincen-
tive for establishments to cross this threshold. One way industrial units could
deal with the difficulty of crossing the employment barrier of 100 workers is to
resort to subcontracting of some of their product lines or components. This topic
is discussed in the next sub-section.
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To sum up, the size structure of industry in the organized sector, as in the
manufacturing sector as a whole, showed only limited change in the post-reform
years. There was one clear change: the relative decline of very large units of
1,000 and above. But this was mainly due to the sickness and decline of old
industries – chiefly cotton and jute. There is some indication of medium-scale
units emerging. But the trend is not a particularly striking one. The ASI sector is
still skewed to large-scale establishments. At the same time dualism in manufac-
turing continues to be striking because of the large employment in very small
units outside the ASI sector (even if we leave out of consideration the non-direc-
tory establishments and household units).
The role of subcontracting in Indian manufacturing
The fall in the share of 100–199 size-group in a large number of industries, which
we infer from the data in Table 9.5 has its counterpart in the rising practice of
contract labor. Contract intensity (the percentage of contract labor used to the
total labor force in the establishment) in export-oriented or import-competing
industries peaks in the 100–199 group when we look at disaggregated groups of
industries (Ramaswamy 2006, Table 9.5). This happens probably in response to
firms searching for more flexible ways to respond to changing market conditions
facing the firms more exposed to global competition.
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Table 9.5 Change in employment shares by factory size 1994–2000: gainers and losers
Industry Employment-size class of factories
10–99 100–199 200–499 500–999 1,000–1,999 Above 2,000
Food 3.5 –4.7 –2.0 –5.6 2.3 5.4
Beverage and tobacco –48.9 –3.4 –4.7 –11.5 2.4 63.0
Cotton textiles 5.0 –6.5 –4.3 –3.1 –5.4 –1.0
Other textiles 0.1 –1.6 7.2 –3.0 –6.7 –1.4
Jute 0.6 –0.1 –0.5 0.9 –4.4 3.3
Textile products –11.3 –9.4 18.8 5.8 4.3 4.7
Wood –12.8 1.9 4.9 1.7 2.3 0.0
Paper 13.0 –3.4 1.5 –5.5 –4.9 –0.2
Leather –4.1 –11.7 16.7 0.9 5.3 –4.3
Chemicals –11.8 4.9 5.7 0.1 –2.5 1.5
Rubber 19.0 –8.7 0.2 –4.0 1.6 –5.8
Non-metallic minerals 3.0 –3.5 0.9 –0.5 3.0 –1.7
Basic metals 5.3 –4.0 –4.3 –7.2 –0.5 3.0
Metal products 1.9 0.2 7.4 –1.9 1.3 –6.4
Machinery 4.4 –4.5 6.7 –0.4 1.4 –9.0
Transport equipment 7.4 1.4 1.3 2.5 0.1 –15.7
Miscellaneous –5.7 –7.3 7.8 –3.8 –6.2 15.5
Repairs 50.9 –0.2 –1.5 –5.9 –4.7 –27.4
Source: Calculations by Ramaswami (2006) based on ASI data.
Use of contract labor is of course not the only form of devolution of activity
by larger firms to smaller units. Much the more important method is that of
outsourcing – getting smaller firms to produce some components of the final
product or producing inputs used in the manufacture of the final product. Subcon-
tracting in this sense has been historically a very important part of the dual struc-
ture of the Japanese manufacturing economy, and it has been praised as an ideal
system of ensuring the co-existence of small and large firms without sacrificing
the efficiency and competitiveness of the sector. But this favorable outcome
depended crucially on the subcontracting system graduating from a dependant to
a technologically advanced system. It has been noted in the literature that,
with advanced technology spreading rapidly, the quality of subcontractors’ output
became increasingly important, along with their costs. Accordingly, large
primary enterprises came increasingly to monitor and upgrade the quality of
subcontractors as well as select them carefully (Kaneda 1980, p. 43). This type
of keiretsu or ‘vertical inter-firm hierarchy’ spread rapidly in the fast growing
industries like machinery, automobile, metal working and electrical appliance
industries. A 1981 survey conducted by the Central Bank for the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry revealed that 51.5 percent of the more than 1500 subcon-
tracting firms surveyed claimed that their technology was equal to or even
superior to their parent companies (Koshiro 1990, p. 202). The traditional subor-
dination of the subcontractors faded away over a large area of the SME sector
with this increasing technological independence. In matters of pricing, negotiated
rates for the products supplied by the subcontractors increasingly replaced the old
system of dictated rates.
What is the evidence of subcontracting in India developing in the direction of
the Japanese model? Ramasawmy (2006) has used data on this point from the
ASI and classified them by size-groups of enterprises and the type of industry.
His results are reproduced in Table 9.6.
It is clear that in India the largest incidence of product outsourcing takes place,
not in larger firms, but in the smallest size groups. This would suggest that the
motivation for outsourcing is rather different in India than in the Japanese model.
It would seem that small firms are anxious not to grow beyond the employment
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Table 9.6 Product outsourcing intensity by employment size of factories: 2000–2001
Employment Export Import Auto Food Others
size oriented competing
0–9 22.1 26.2 – 36.2 11.2
10–99 8.8 11.4 27.6 12.5 11.8
100–199 6.1 9.1 7.7 7.4 4.7
200–299 7.7 6.2 – 10.5 5.6
Above 300 6.3 3.4 4.0 8.6 4.2
Total 6.3 4.0 6.0 10.0 5.1
Source: Calculations by Ramaswami (2006) based on ASI data.
size of nine workers as it would make them come under the purview of labor laws.
This is an altogether different scenario from the Japanese model where out-
sourcing was perceived more as a policy of vertical disintegration by large firms.
Further evidence on this point is provided in the evidence collected by the
‘Unorganized Sector Survey of the NSS. Using this source, Unni (2006) reports
that 30 percent of firms in this sector undertook subcontracting work for other
firms. The industries in which this percentage was particularly high were: tobacco
products (89 percent), textiles (56 percent), chemical products (67 percent) and
office accounting and computing. Consistent with the small size of the typical
firm which outsourced work, the firms catering to the demand for such work were
even smaller. The distribution of subcontracting firms by place of work showed
that the overwhelming portion of them (81.2 percent) operate at home, and only
15 percent in business premises. It seems that much of this activity was non-
mechanized. While 88 percent of the firms reported receiving raw materials from
the contractor, and 93 percent reported working to design specified by the latter,
only 7 percent were supplied with any equipment for the work.
One is left with a strong impression that the subcontractors in Indian manufac-
turing are yet to graduate from the dependent status vis-à-vis the parent firm with
a low level of technology. It is a far cry from the Japanese model in which many
of the subcontractors were dynamic small firms actively seeking out large pro-
ducers anxious to collaborate in the production of finished products, and were
often at the technological frontier, with a high grade of specialized workforce.
The problem of ‘dualism’ in Indian manufacturing
We have, in the material provided so far in this chapter, discussed the size distrib-
ution in Indian manufacturing and brought the peculiarity of the Indian size struc-
ture compared with other Asian countries. “Dualism” and the problem of the
‘missing middle’ were identified as a dominating characteristic of the Indian
structure. Why is this a problem, and in what sense can we consider this phenom-
enon to be a major factor retarding manufacturing growth in India? We turn to a
discussion of this group of questions in this part. Following a discussion of the
impact of ‘dualism’ we discuss the proximate causes of its origin. This discussion
leads us to an analysis of the persistence of this phenomenon even when some of
the policy distortions seem to have been removed in the post-reform years.
Why is dualism a problem for manufacturing growth?
Why should we regard the phenomenon of ‘dualism’ in manufacturing as drag
on the growth and performance of the manufacturing sector? Of the many points
relevant here the more important are the following:
1 the impact on allocative efficiency and wage inequality;
2 the dynamic impact on the growth of skilled labor and entrepreneurship;
3 the stagnation in the growth of markets for manufactured goods.
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Allocative efficiency and inequality
The large gap in productivity between the firms in the two extreme size-groups,
as described in the data on manufacturing presented above, suggests the exist-
ence of a large gap in the marginal products of labor and capital between the two
classes of firms. We know from independent evidence that large firms have
access to capital supplied by the formal financial institutions, while small firms
mostly have to depend on local informal sources of finance and the interest-rate
differential between these sources can be huge (Little et al. 1987, Chapter 15). It
is also well known that wage levels follow differences in labor productivity and
large firms have a wage per worker which, even after we have controlled for
measurable human capital attributes, are much higher in the large firms. Again
the detailed study in a specific labor market (Bombay City) reported in Little et
al. (1987, Chapter 14) revealed that, after allowing for the effect of education,
training, occupation and knowledge of English, wage per person of manual
workers in the largest-size-class of factories employing 1,000+ workers was
almost twice the level in ‘small’ enterprises with less than ten workers. Two
conclusions are suggested by this evidence of size-related factor price differen-
tials: first, the larger the differential the larger is the loss in welfare in terms of
static allocative efficiency theory; second, since employment in the ‘dualistic’ is
concentrated in the smallest and the largest size-groups, inequality in the distrib-
ution of wage per person is very unequal.
Impact on dynamic efficiency
In a more dynamic sense the missing middle implies a weak process of gradua-
tion of small firms and the development of entrepreneurship. It is arguable that
the dispersion of entrepreneurship as well as industrial technology over a wide
spectrum of spatially and economically distributed regions is dependent on the
mushrooming of medium-scale enterprises, into which the small units are able to
graduate.
Similarly dualism slows down the growth of the labor force with industrial
skills. This is particularly true in developing economies in which many of the
skill requirements of modern industry (including discipline in the workplace) are
acquired by on-the-job-training rather than education in schools. The slow
growth of the skilled workforce in its turn has an impact on the choice of
technology. It has been established that capital-intensive techniques have been
adopted in economies or sectors more in response to a shortage of skilled rather
than unskilled labor. Thus a potential shortage of skilled labor of the type
needed by modern manufacturing could dampen the value of employment elas-
ticity and slow the rate of growth of employment in the industrial sector. An
important result in our research work on Indian manufacturing in the preceding
chapter was the evidence that although employment elasticity varied with the
economic cycles it did not exceed 0.33 in the best period of the post-reform
upswing. As analyzed in the research there are several important reasons for the
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low employment elasticity, but a perceived shortage of labor of the requisite
skill and efficiency is one of them.
Dampening the growth of markets
While the last two points emphasize problems created on the supply side,
‘dualism’ might also affect the growth of manufacturing through its impact on
the demand side – on the expansion of markets for industrial goods. The
medium-sized establishments have been lauded in the literature for having the
desired amount of flexibility and enterprise to seek out new export markets in
new industries. But their importance in the expansion of domestic markets also
needs to be emphasized. Dualism strengthens and perpetuates product market
segmentation. The market for industrial products is split into low-quality prod-
ucts catering to the need of low-income consumers, and supplied by small-scale
local producers on the one hand, and the higher-quality segments which the
large establishments supply to a limited number of high-income consumers. The
lack of integration of markets could be a bottleneck in the development of mass
markets for manufactured consumer goods.
Causes of the emergence and persistence of dualism
What are the major factors causing the emergence of dualism in its two aspects,
the phenomenon of the ‘missing middle’ and the unusual productivity gap
between the small and the large units? What are the reasons for its persistence
over time, even when the reform process reducing some of the strength of the
proximate causes of dualism has been eroded?
The more important reasons behind the origin and persistence of ‘dualism’
will be now be discussed under the following heads:
1 segmentation in the factor markets – of (i) labor and (ii) capital;
2 education policies affecting the relative price of skilled labor;
3 the policy of protection of the small scale;
4 hysteresis causing persistence of critical causal factors.
Segmentation of factor markets
LABOR MARKETS
An important factor which cements labor-market segmentation and discourages
the upward mobility of small establishments is labor legislation. The aspect of
this type of legislation which is most relevant to the problem of the missing
middle in India pertains to job security laws rather than those impacting on
wage levels. Wage differential between small and large firms are known
to have preceded the era of wage legislation and could be traced to some extent
to differences in the quality of labor. Wage cost per efficiency unit of labor was
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probably never as large as the difference in wage per worker in small and large
firms (Little et al. 1987, Chapter 13 and the literature cited). Job-security legis-
lation, such as those embodied in the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947, however,
is critical since it places enormous costs on factories in so far as they have to
obtain permission from the state designated authorities before permanent
workers can be laid off. It is not so much the actual compensation that has to be
paid to workers who are laid off which is important as the fact that the process
of obtaining permission takes a long time and has considerable uncertainty.
Even if the number of workers sought to be laid of in a particular period of time
is small, the law creates a fixed overhead cost (of, for example, maintaining
legal officers who can pursue the long process through the labor courts), which
is only mildly variant to the size of the workforce in the factory. Thus over a
considerable range of size, the overhead costs would be significantly higher for
smaller firms than the larger ones. Labor legislation of this type bites for facto-
ries employing more than 100 workers. Other types of labor laws involving
inspection and supervision over conditions of work are applicable to units
covered by the Annual Survey of Industries (employing ten or more workers).
Both sets of legislation add to the fixed cost of labor for units employing more
than the respective threshold.
Employers have various means of working round these legislative require-
ments. For instance, a common practice is to employ part of the workforce as
‘casual’ labor: although they work regularly in the unit they are kept in the books
as non-permanent labor as long as inspectors can be kept off the practice by
bribes or other means. Similarly, in some states of India employers wanting to
close down factories have deliberately refrained from paying electricity bills
which have led to the effective closure of the units. But all these ways of finding
ways of adjusting the labor force to avoid confrontation with the law imply the
incurring of transaction costs. The possibility of bearing such costs is a clear dis-
couragement to small employers to expand vertically in size. There is an incen-
tive to expand horizontally with a multiplication of small units rather expanding
into larger size groups.
CAPITAL MARKETS
It is well known that modern financial institutions find it much easier to lend
to larger establishments than to smaller ones The high transaction costs of
dealing with small units, as well as the relative scarcity of collaterals, operate
against the latter, The result is the interest cost of finance – even when it is
available – typically tends to be significantly higher for small units. Financial
liberalization and globalization have, if anything, increased the effective bias
on the part of largely urban-based financial institution to lend to large-scale
establishments.
State policies in India have sought to counter this bias by creating institutions
like the Small Industries Development Organization (SIDO) which have reached
out specifically to the units under their purview (whether defined in terms of
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employment or capital size). Units which expand beyond this size tend to lose
both ways – deprived of the special opportunities provided under SIDO and not
large enough to avail of the low-cost finance potentially available in the modern
large-scale sector. This type of segmentation in the capital market strongly dis-
courages the growth of small firms into middle-sized ones.
Education polices
Policies that have been implemented in India over the years have been biased
towards the promotion of tertiary education and have neglected basic primary
and low secondary education.7 It has been maintained in the literature (e.g., by
Adrian Wood among others) that modern manufacturing requires a minimum of
basic education for a workforce to be able to perform up to minimum standards
in modern manufacturing. Small- and medium-sized units – adopting compara-
tively labor-intensive technology – benefits from an ample supply of such labor.
They are contrasted with tiny units which could use nearly unskilled labor with
less than primary education for low-grade production, but would find it difficult
to grow beyond a certain scale with such labor. The relatively plentiful supply of
skilled labor with higher education biases production to less labor-intensive
industry and modes of production. Large units have a comparative advantage in
using such labor which smaller units cannot afford.
Recently researchers in the IMF (2006) have explored the question if the
organized manufacturing sector in India has specialized more in industries using
less unskilled labor compared with other countries. The authors use the cross-
country data sets for the formal manufacturing sector prepared by the United
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) to identify industries (at
the 3-digit level) which are ‘labor-intensive’. For labor intensity the proxy is 
the share of wages in value added for the industry in a country averaged
across a broad group of developing countries – examples of industries that
score highest on labor intensity are clothing, printing and publishing and
non – electrical machinery while those which are lowest are beverages,
tobacco and petroleum refineries.
Labor-intensive industries are identified as those below the median on the range
of scores thus calculated. The authors then examine the pattern of manufacturing
in each of the countries in their sample to determine the share of output/
employment in labor-intensive industries. They regressed the shares of each
country on per capita GDP, its square and a dummy for India. It was found that
even for as early a date as 1981 the Indian dummy was negative and significant
in the value-added regression, signifing that it was specializing exceptionally in
less labor-intensive industries. For employment the Indian scenario was in the
same direction but less significant.
In the next exercise the authors analyzed skill-intensity, using the input –
output matrix for South Africa – which enables them to classify industries by the
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share of remuneration of highly skilled and skilled workers. As with labor
intensity the industries in each country were divided into above and below
median skill-intensive ones and then the ratios of value added of the two sub-
groups (in the cross-country sample) in 1981 were regressed against GDP per
capita, its square, country size and the dummy for India. The dummy was
strongly significant and positive, showing that in 1981 India was abnormally
specializing in skill-intensive industries.
In order to see what has been happening since the early eighties, the authors
plot the evolution in the share of output generated in labor-intensive industries
for India and a select group of comparer countries – which include China,
Indonesia, Korea and Malaysia. India contrasts dramatically with Indonesia
which shows a rising share of labor-intensive industries. Korea and Malaysia –
at much higher income levels – also show mildly increasing shares. China, on
the other hand, has a declining share of such industries but from a much higher
level of this share (see ibid., Figure 2, p. 48). Turning to the topic of skill intens-
ity, the graphs for the evolution in comparator countries also show that
India’s share which was already high in 1980 despite its lower level of per
capita income, has been increasing and is at levels reached by Malaysia or
Korea at much higher levels of per capita income. There is also a striking
contrast with China. China’s share of output in skill-intensive industries is
lower than India’s and has been virtually flat.
(Ibid., p. 22 and Figure 4, p. 52)
The tilt towards skill-intensive industries in India is also reflected in exports: the
share of India’s exports in skill-intensive goods has increased from 25 percent in
1970 to 65 percent in 2004.
The protection of small-scale units
The policy of protecting small-scale enterprises (SSEs) has been an important
aspect of Indian industrial policy since independence. It has taken the form of
reservation of large number of items for production in exclusively small units
and the provision of incentives – fiscal, financial and legislative – as long as the
units stayed below a certain size. The threshold size was first defined in terms of
the traditional employment size of five workers. It was in later years changed to
a definition based on capital size and it was also increased somewhat over the
years. Nevertheless, the policies have always provided an incentive for entre-
preneurs to expand horizontally with more small units, rather vertically with
larger middle-sized units.8
Hysteresis
The policy of reservation for the small scale was largely ended in the post-
1991 reform process. But we have seen that the impact on the size structure
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of establishments in manufacturing has been minimal. This limited impact
might be due to widely recognized processes in which a socio-economic
system established over a long period of time tends to persist even after the
original causes have disappeared. This persistence is not just due to inertia.
Economic agents and institutions acquire characteristics which sustain the
system. For example, entrepreneurs develop with ambitions to think in terms
of horizontal rather than vertical growth. Marketing channels, financial insti-
tutions and infrastructure are geared more to supporting small units with
limited market rather than dynamic units growing into larger sizes and differ-
ent markets.
It is not easy to determine how much of the inertia of the industrial structure
can be ascribed to ‘hysteresis’. It should be remembered that there are institu-
tional factors, particularly labor legislation and the segmentation in the capital
market, which continue to reinforce the dualism in this sector, with the attendant
problems discussed in this chapter.
Conclusions
This chapter has dwelt on the peculiarities of the size structure in Indian manu-
facturing, relative to the experience of other comparator Asian countries. The
employment size distribution is pronouncedly bi-modal. This is not just
the usual phenomenon, often witnessed in developing countries when we put
the household enterprises in the informal sector together with the modern enter-
prises in the formal sector. Rather the Indian scenario is peculiar when we take
the ‘organized’ – or what is internationally accepted as the ‘formal’ – sector
employing five or more workers. The size distribution in this subset of organ-
ized sector firms shows two strong modes in India, in the 5–9 and 500+ size-
groups. There is a very large productivity differential between these groups,
and a conspicuous feature of the size distribution is the low proportion of
workers in its middle part. We have discussed the analytical and empirical
reasons as to why this phenomenon of the ‘missing middle’ could be con-
sidered to be a significant drag on the healthy development of a dynamic manu-
facturing sector. While the problem of the ‘missing middle’ might have had its
origins in past policies it has shown a remarkable persistence in the post-reform
era. We refer to some possible reasons for this persistence in the previous
section of the chapter.
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Appendix
Table 9A.1 Number of workers (in millions)
1984–1985 1989–1990 1994–1995 2000–2001
OAME 25.4 22.8 20.5 25.1
Establishments 15.6 17.0 17.3 19.8
NDME 4.3 4.4 4.1 5.6
DME 4.5 5.7 5.5 6.5
ASI (Organized) 6.7 6.9 7.7 7.8
Gross value added (in Rs. billion)
OAME 118 119 104 174
Establishments 563 773 1,086 1,511
NDME 63 61 60 103
DME 71 83 95 134
ASI (Organized) 429 628 932 1,274
Productivity (Rs. Per worker)
OAME 4,662 5,222 5,057 6,929
Establishments 36,116 45,456 62,736 76,328
NDME 14,610 13,901 14,573 18,479
DME 15,583 14,709 17,318 20,800
ASI (Organized) 63,790 90,547 120,723 163,775
Sources: Unorganized Manufacturing Enterprise Survey (NSS) various years and ASI, various years.
Table 9A.2 Growth of labor productivity (in % per annum)
Type and size 1984–1985 to 1989–1990  1994–1995 to 
1989–1990 to 1994–1995 2000–2001
OAME 2.30 –0.64 5.39
Establishments 4.71 6.66 3.32
NDME –0.99 0.95 4.04
DME –1.15 3.32 3.10
ASI (Organized) 7.26 5.92 5.21
Sources: Unorganized Manufacturing Enterprise Survey (NSS) various years and ASI, various years.
10 Growth of employment and
earnings in the tertiary sector
The growth of the tertiary sector in India seems to be somewhat out of line with
international experience of recent decades. Table 10.1 brings together the data
for sectoral changes in the shares of employment for several Asian countries
over the last three decades of the twentieth century. The newly industrializing
countries of Asia – Korea and Taiwan – had their share of employment in manu-
facturing increasing much faster than that of the tertiary sector during their
initial period of growth in the 1970s. In the next decade tertiary-sector employ-
ment grew faster, but the magnitude of the increase relative to manufacturing
was not nearly as high as was observed in India during this decade. Only in the
1990s, after Taiwan and Korea had developed into mature industrialized
economies, did their tertiary sector become the dominant provider of employ-
ment outside agriculture. By contrast India’s share of employment growth in the
tertiary sector in the seventies was already 60 percent higher than in manufac-
turing. Since then, the decades of 1980s and the 1990s have seen a virtual stag-
nation in the share of employment in manufacturing, with the tertiary sector
absorbing virtually the entire loss of employment share by the agriculture. The
figures also show that other developing countries of Asia – Thailand, Malaysia
and Indonesia – do have their larger shares of employment created in the tertiary
sector, but the contrast with India is that none of them have a stagnant share in
manufacturing in any decade. On the contrary, something between a third and
one half of the often large decline in the share of employment in agriculture was
taken up by manufacturing. The only country in the sample with an experience
close to that of India is the Philippines.
The tertiary sector has been the leading sector of growth in the Indian
economy in recent decades, both in terms of output and employment (Table
10.4). The employment elasticity in the sector as a whole in the post-reform
period (1993–2000) has been 50 percent higher than in manufacturing sector. Is
this growth due to labor being pushed into the sector because of limited growth
of jobs in the productive sector or due to labor being pulled into it because of
increasing earnings? Are there different trends in different components of the
tertiary sector, and between the formal and informal segments of it? What light
do the trends in the tertiary sector throw on the process of equitable growth in
India?
Table 10.1 Change in the sectoral shares of employment
Country 1971–1980 1980–1991 1990–2000
Agriculture Manufacturing Tertiary Agriculture Manufacturing Tertiary Agriculture Manufacturing Tertiary
Rep. of Korea –14.4 8.3 6.0 –17.3 5.0 12.9 –7.6 –6.7 14.5
Taiwan, China1 –15.6 11.1 3.7 –6.6 1.7 8.9 –5.0 –4.1 9.2
Thailand –1.4 0.3 1.7 –10.5 3.2 7.3 –15.3 4.3 10.2
Malaysia –14.8 6.1 9.9 –10.4 4.6 6.6 –7.9 2.9 3.0
Philippines2 –1.4 –0.7 2.1 –6.2 –0.6 6.7 –7.8 0.3 7.6
Indonesia –2.7 1.3 1.1 –10.9 2.8 7.1
India3 –5.5 1.8 3.0 –4.6 0.0 3.4 –3.6 0.3 2.4
Sources: For the last period calculated from ILO Year Book data.
1 Figures for first two periods are obtained from Mazumdar and Basu (1997, Table 3.2, p. 38). 
2 For all periods calculated from ADB Key Indicators, 2001.
3 For all periods calculated from NSS adjusted by population from decadal census. The periods refer to 1973–1983, 1983–1993 and 1993–2000.
We should mention at the outset that the Indian statistical series do not allow
for the construction of time series of employment and output by formal and infor-
mal sectors, however defined. Hence the substance of our analysis in this part will
be based on the study of trends in the tertiary sector as whole. We will address
the question of absorption of labor in this sector at low- and high-income levels,
as well as the earnings gap between ‘good jobs’ and ‘bad jobs’ in the sector by
looking at the entire distribution of earnings in the sector. But before we come to
this analysis it would be useful to give an overview of the structure of employ-
ment in the tertiary sector at one time period, i.e., 1999–2000. The 55th round of
the NSS, however, included some questions which provide criteria for distin-
guishing the formal and the informal sub-sectors within the tertiary activities. The
broad structure of tertiary employment will be clear from these data.
Formal and informal sub-sectors within the tertiary sector
The 55th round questionnaire obtained information on the type of establishment
in which a worker was employed. We grouped workers in all public and semi-
public establishments as being in the formal sector. This round of the NSS also
reported for the first time the employment size of the establishment in which a
worker was employed. We take ten workers as the cut-off point, with those in
establishments with ten or more workers being in the formal sector. For the large
group of self-employed workers we adopt the usual classification in terms of the
workers’ education. Those with lower secondary education or less are in the
informal sector, and the more highly educated (which would include the profes-
sionals) are in the formal sector. These criteria help us to give a rough picture of
the composition of tertiary-sector employment for the year 1999–2000 across
formal and informal sectors (Table 10.2).
The following points emerge from Table 10.2:
1 The formal sector accounts for a quarter of tertiary employment in the rural
areas and rather more than a third in the urban economy. Overall it accounts
for 30 percent of all tertiary-sector employment.
2 Even after the decline of public-sector employment in the post-reform
period, this sector still accounts for more than half of formal tertiary
employment in the urban areas, and more than two-thirds in the rural.
3 Females account for a small part of tertiary employment in the formal
sector, and surprisingly no more than 10 percent of informal tertiary
employment, both in the rural and the urban areas. It should, however, be
remembered that we included only UPS workers (principal workers).
4 The share of the self-employed in the non-public part of the tertiary employ-
ment is high, but contrary to expectations it is higher in the formal sector of
both the rural and urban economies.
It will be interesting to know how the levels of employment in the formal and
informal segments of the tertiary sector compare with those in manufacturing.
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Table 10.3 throws light on this question. It is seen that three-quarters of all
employment outside agriculture and construction are in the tertiary sector and
this percentage is only slightly more in the urban areas. As is to be expected, a
larger proportion of tertiary employment is in the formal sector in urban areas.
But the rural areas still have a good deal of formal-sector presence.
Employment elasticites by broad sectors
We presented the basic tables in Chapter 3 on employment trends by broad
sectors of the economy (Table 3.1) Table 3.1 combined output trends calculated
from the National Accounts Statistics with employment trends obtained from the
NSS which provides an overview of employment elasticities over a time period
for sectors at 1-digit National Industrial Classification (NIC 1987). The employ-
ment estimates are based on Usual Principal Status Workers (UPS).
The major points to emphasize from these tables are:
1 Tertiary-sector employment grew faster than manufacturing in all three
periods. The differential in the growth rates was much higher with respect
to agriculture, particularly between the 50th and the 55th rounds. However,
we should remember that the employment growth in the last period was dis-
proportionately affected by the fall in employment-growth rate in the agri-
cultural sector.
Growth of tertiary employment and earnings 227
Table 10.2 Distribution of employment in the tertiary sector: formal and informal (in
percentages)
Category Formal Informal
Males Females Total Males Females Total
Rural
Public 64.1 82.8 66.8 – – –
Private regular wage 10.8 11.2 10.9 16.1 15.4 16.0
Casual wage – – – 32.3 27.6 31.7
Self-employed 25.0 6.0 22.4 51.5 57.0 52.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
% of rural tertiary 19.1 3.1 22.2 67.6 10.1 77.8
% of all tertiary 7.7 1.3 9.0 27.4 4.1 31.5
Urban
Public 52.7 64.3 54.5 – – –
Private regular wage 15.8 22.3 16.8 26.6 33.2 27.6
Casual wage – – – 23.5 26.7 24.0
Self-employed 31.5 13.4 28.7 49.9 40.1 48.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
% of urban tertiary 30.6 5.6 36.1 54.2 9.7 63.9
% of all tertiary 18.2 3.3 21.5 32.3 5.8 38.0
Source: Estimated from NSS unit-level Data of 55th round.
2 Employment growth in the tertiary sector fell in the second half of the
nineties relative both to the 1987–1993 period and even the longer
1983–1993 decade. But this was entirely because of the decline in employ-
ment in the community and social services. The table shows that compared
with the 1983–1993 decade, the decline in employment growth was mar-
ginal in financial services. The rate of growth of employment increased in
all other groups, particularly strongly in trade.
3 Employment elasticity mirrored the story of employment growth. The
employment elasticity fell slightly in all the other tertiary sectors but was in
the last period well above that in manufacturing.
Productivity differentials between sectors
Is the employment growth in the tertiary sector being driven by high demand for
labor or is labor entering this sector because of lack of jobs in other production
sectors. In other words, is labor being pulled or pushed into this sector? A first
cut at this question is to see if there are major productivity differentials or if the
productivity differential increasing vis-à-vis the production sectors as revealed
by sectoral GDP figures. The data given in Table 10.4 gives an initial answer to
this question.
1 The average productivity in the tertiary sector as a whole is pulled up by the
high value in the financial sub-sector, but seems to be above the level of
manufacturing (in 2000) in most sectors except trade (where it is 20 percent
lower). There is a suggestion that the trade–manufacturing differential
might have slipped over time. Between 1983 and 2000 productivity in trade
relative to its base (agriculture) remained practically constant (in real terms)
but went up by more than 40 percent in manufacturing. This allowed manu-
facturing productivity to go significantly above trade, but it is interesting to
see that this differential was established only recently – between the 50th
and the 55th rounds.
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Table 10.3 Tertiary employment as a percentage of the total in manufacturing plus
tertiary 1999–2000
Area Formal Informal
Male Female Total Male Female Total
Rural 13.6 2.3 16.0 46.8 6.9 53.7
All urban 22.4 4.1 26.4 41.1 7.3 48.4
Metro 23.5 4.6 28.1 37.5 7.6 45.1
Non-metro 21.9 3.9 25.8 42.6 7.3 49.8
Source: Estimated from NSS unit-level Data of 55th round.
Note
Total employment in manufacturing plus tertiary in each area = 100.0.
Table 10.4 Labor productivity by broad sectors 1983–2000
NIC 1987 classification Labor productivity (UPS) Labor productivity index (UPS)
55th 50th 43rd 38th 55th 50th 43rd 38th
Agriculture (0) 13,349 11,752 10,116 10,223 100 100 100 100
Mining (1) 129,579 73,754 64,802 62,920 971 628 641 615
Manufacturing (2–3) 46,999 34,444 27,547 24,801 352 293 272 243
Electricity, gas, etc. (4) 239,870 139,433 111,410 93,247 1,797 1,186 1,101 912
Construction (5) 34,406 34,492 25,551 37,543 258 294 253 367
Trade, hotel, etc. (6) 42,838 36,593 32,298 31,866 321 311 319 312
Transport, etc. (7) 60,537 48,310 42,871 38,468 453 411 424 376
Finance, insurance, etc. (8) 303,895 259,820 184,626 171,029 2,276 2,211 1,825 1,673
Community, social and 47,729 27,137 26,387 22,588 358 231 261 221
other services (9)
Tertiary sector (6–9) 61,216 44,144 37,985 33,950 459 376 375 332
Source: Calculated from several years data of National Accounts Statistics (NAS) and data from four rounds of NSS.
2 Not all sub-sectors of tertiary, however, suffered the fate of NIC sub-group
6, i.e., trade. Both finance (group 8) and community and social services
(group 9) improved their relative productivity vis-à-vis manufacturing. In
the transport services (group 7) the relative improvement of productivity
seems to have been under way since the 43rd round. But in the community
and social services (group 9) the relative improvement was prominent only
between the 50th and the 55th rounds. The surge in salaries in the public
sector is reflected in the large increase in productivity between these two
rounds in this group.
3 The above pattern suggests that there is indeed some evidence to support the
general perception that some sub-groups, like the trade (group 6), have had
a relatively large influx of labor pushing down its relative productivity to
some extent, while others, like business services in group 7, have improved
their position due to demand factors.
However, a study of trends in average relative productivity can carry us only
so far in our understanding about the trends in relative earnings at which labor is
being absorbed in the tertiary sector. For a more complete understanding we
need to look at the way the entire distribution of earnings (or incomes) have
been changing in the tertiary sector in response to the high rate of growth of
employment in this sector.
Before getting into further analysis of the tertiary sector on the basis of unit-
level data it will be worthwhile to discuss the limitations of the database that we
have used.
Limitations of the NSS data
We need to be aware of the limitations of the main source of our data, the NSS,
before proceeding further. First, a large share of employment in India is in the
‘self-employed’ category. There is an inherent difficulty of allocating income
accruing from self-employment when more than one earner from the same
household is in income-earning activity. Households from different self-
employed activities by different members of the household would be typically
pooled together. There is no way of distinguishing the individual contributions
of individual earners. Hence the income we can deal with is household income,
and we can normalize for the size of the household. Further, it is generally
accepted that figures on expenditure given by the respondent in the household is
more reliable than that of income. Thus we use the measure of household
welfare as given by mean expenditure per capita.
When we are comparing levels of household welfare across sectors we need
to identify the principal occupation of the household. This poses problem both
conceptually and in terms of execution. The conceptual problem arises from the
fact that a significant number of households will have more than one earner,
and not all earners will be in the same category of occupation. The secondary
earners might not be all wage earners. If they are working in the self-employed
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sector, they will be pooling their earnings with other earners of the household
to create the household’s pot of earnings. By assigning all the household
income effectively to the principal occupation of the household we might be
exaggerating the income – and the expenditure which it sustains – originating
from this occupation.
In terms of execution, one of the major problems faced in the 55th round of
the NSS is that, unlike in the earlier rounds, households were not classified in
terms of their detailed occupational or industrial code of their main source of
earnings. We first have to match household type (given in household file) to the
individual workers’ file which provides the code for occupation, industry, work
status, etc. We generated household type for each individual worker. Thus
through an arduous process we could identify main earners in most of the
household and then assign main earners’ industry–occupation code to the house-
hold’s main earning source. The occupation–industry distribution of households
will differ somewhat from that of individual earners to the extent that our
matching has been unsuccessful particularly in households where more than one
principal earner belongs to a different industry–occupation. The difference in
the proportions of employment in the tertiary sector obtained on the basis of
households and two definitions of the individual worker (usually principal and
usually principal-cum-secondary status) are given in Table 10.5.
Evidence on the marginal absorption of labor
We can get some idea about the question posed – how far labor is being pulled
rather pushed into the tertiary sector – by looking at the share of labor in the ter-
tiary sector at different parts of the distribution of income. Specifically, we can
look at the proportion of the main earners working in the tertiary sector in differ-
ent quintiles of the distribution of household expenditure per capita for succes-
sive rounds.
Table 10.6 gives the share of household employment across different rounds.
It shows that the share of tertiary sector in household employment increased
over the successive rounds. Table 10.7 seeks to throw light on the question as to
where the jobs were created – at the low end or uniformly across household
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Table 10.5 Proportion in tertiary sector for different categories of workforce
Category Rural Urban
38th 50th 55th 38th 50th 55th 
round round round round round round
Household 12.90 15.15 16.72 57.31 59.54 61.55
UPSS workers 10.75 11.48 12.51 54.57 55.40 59.17
UPS workers 11.48 12.46 13.23 54.58 56.01 59.79
Source: Estimated from unit-level data of several NSS rounds.
quintile ranges.1 The data are presented in Figure 10.1 which shows the changes
in the distribution more clearly, separately for the rural and the urban areas.
A major change seems to have taken place in the post-liberalization period
(between 50th and 55th rounds) both in the rural and the urban areas, compared
with the movement in the pre-liberalization period (between the 38th and the
50th rounds). In the earlier pre-liberalization years more jobs in the tertiary
sector seem to have been created in the higher quintiles. The slopes of the
graphs increased with the quintile groups between 1983 and 1993 (the 38th and
the 50th rounds) – more prominently in the rural areas, and except for the
highest quintile in the urban economy. But between 1993 and 2000 (the 50th and
the 55th rounds), the graph for the rural sector shows a more or less parallel
movement outwards, with some suggestion that the movement was larger in the
1–2, as well as the 5th quintiles. In the urban sector the differential movement
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Table 10.6 Structure of household employment (in different NSS rounds)
Sector 38th 50th 55th
Primary 61.43 57.99 54.33
Secondary 14.95 15.58 16.95
Tertiary 23.62 26.42 28.72
All 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Estimated from unit-level data of several NSS rounds.
Table 10.7 Share of tertiary sector in different quintiles of household APCE (different
NSS rounds)
Rural
Quintiles 38th 50th 55th
1 8.17 7.91 10.17
2 10.41 10.77 12.50
3 11.87 14.00 14.93
4 13.84 17.21 18.31
5 20.23 25.83 27.69
All 12.90 15.15 16.72
Urban
Quintiles 38th 50th 55th
1 49.80 50.46 52.34
2 53.84 56.15 60.00
3 58.71 61.05 63.24
4 60.48 64.53 64.12
5 63.72 65.52 69.04
All 57.31 59.54 61.55
Source: Estimated from unit-level data of several NSS rounds.
by quintile groups was quite striking at the two ends of the distribution. There is
a sharp increase in the share of tertiary earners both at the lower (2nd) and the
highest (5th) quintiles at the expense of the middle (3rd and 4th) quintiles.
The fact that more tertiary-sector employment has been created at the lower
quintiles does not mean that there has been immiserizing growth of the tertiary
sector in the sense that labor pushed into this sector has depressed earnings in
the sector absolutely. The mean of the distribution might have increased over the


















































Figure 10.1 Employment share of the tertiary sector by quintile groups, different rounds.
Note
Panel A is rural and panel B is urban.
period. There is a suggestion that the distribution of incomes in the sector might
have deteriorated, particularly in the urban areas, with the incomes of the low
earners falling relative to the high earners. But to shed more light on this spe-
cific question we need to look directly into the changes in the distribution of
income (or household welfare in our case). This we do in the next section.
Evidence on the distribution of average per capita
consumption expenditure (APCE) in the tertiary sector
The Kernel density functions for the three rounds have been graphed, separately
for the rural and the urban areas in Figure 10.2. Both the distributions have shifted
to the right in the post-liberalization years – much more perceptibly so in the post-
liberalization years than between the previous two rounds. Further the outward
movement is more striking in the urban economy. This is our first important con-
clusion: in spite of tertiary-sector jobs being created disproportionately in the
lower quintiles, particularly in the urban areas, the evidence suggests that levels of
earnings have gone up significantly including at the lower part of the distribution.
The graph also confirms what has been suggested by the evidence discussed
in the last sub-section: that there has been some increase in the inequality in the
distribution in the urban sector – perhaps not at all in the rural economy. Further
information on the changes in distribution can be found from the decile and
quartile ratios reported in Table 10.8.
The conclusions emerging from two tables are as follows:
1 As far as the rural areas are concerned there has been a decided improve-
ment in the distribution. Inequality decreased in magnitude in the lower half
234 Employment and earnings in major sectors





















50th round43rd round 55th round
Figure 10.2 Kernel density functions of APCE in the tertiary sector, different rounds.
of the distribution – judged both by the decile and the quartile ratios. There
has been a smaller improvement in the top half; both the P90/P50 and the
P75/P50 ratio moved down a bit.
2 In the urban economy, there is an evidence of the deterioration in the
distribution at the lower part of the distribution. The P10/P50 ratio
deteriorated particularly between the 50th and the 55th rounds – when we
saw there was such a pronounced increase in the absorption of labor
in low-income tertiary jobs. But the deterioration is not by any means
large.
Trends in poverty and inequality in the post-liberalization
years
It has been noted in the earlier chapters in Part I that, while the incidence in
poverty has fallen both in the rural and the urban areas in the post-liberalization
years, the reduction in poverty in the urban economy has been accompanied by a
perceptible increase in inequality (see Chapter 2). The graphs of APCE given in
Chapter 3 (Figures 3.4a and 3.4b) clearly bring out the change between the suc-
cessive NSS rounds in the urban and rural sector.
The material presented in the two previous sections above suggests that the
increase in inequality in the urban sector (and not so much in the rural) has been
driven by the trends in the distribution of incomes in the tertiary sector. The
point has relevance to the wider literature on the impact of liberalization in
inequality.
It has been expected on the basis of standard trade theory of the Heckscher–
Ohlin type that greater openness of an economy would tend to increase the rela-
tive returns to those factors of production which are in abundance in the
economy concerned. Thus a less developed economy, where labor rather than
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Table 10.8 Decile and quartile ratios for the distributions of APCE in the tertiary sector
A Rural areas
Round P90/P10 P90/P50 P10/P50 P75/P25 P75/P50 P25/P50
43rd 3.660 2.068 0.565 1.938 1.432 0.739
50th 3.442 1.989 0.578 1.883 1.401 0.744
55th 3.265 1.919 0.588 1.869 1.408 0.754
B Urban areas
R P90/P10 P90/P50 P10/P50 P75/P25 P75/P50 P25/P50
43rd 4.054 2.174 0.536 2.090 1.482 0.709
50th 4.107 2.191 0.533 2.118 1.496 0.706
55th 4.067 2.116 0.520 2.118 1.476 0.797
Source: Estimated from unit-level data of several NSS rounds.
capital is the more abundant factor, will see an increase in the relative return to
labor – leading to a more equitable trend in the distribution of income. The
experience of many developing countries after the recent spate of liberalization
has, however, belied this expectation. Economists have tried to explain the
observed increase in inequality in less developed economies by modifying the
Heckscher–Ohlin model to allow for the inclusion of two types of labor – skilled
and unskilled. Liberalization in this extended model leads to an increase in
demand, not of unskilled labor but of more skilled labor which is demanded by
the manufactured products in the sector open to international markets. In other
words the industries which have a spurt in growth following liberalization
demands labor of a type which might be less skilled than labor in manufactured
goods produced by advanced countries, but they are more skilled than the
general mass of unskilled labor which is in abundant supply in less developed
countries. Thus the increase in skill differential in the latter drives the observed
increase in inequality (Acmogolu, 2002).
The discussion in this chapter suggests that the mechanism described in the
literature would be more pertinent if we incorporate the tertiary sector in the dis-
cussion. In other words the relative increase in demand for more skilled labor
after liberalization comes as much, if not more, from the growth of some parts of
the tertiary sector, as from the traded manufacturing sector. Clearly this effect
can come only from the sub-sectors of the tertiary activities which deal with ser-
vices to the globalized part of the economy. These contrast with those branches
of the tertiary sector which are ‘non-traded’ catering to the needs of the domestic
economy. As far as the latter are concerned, we would like to know if they show
any evidence of ‘immiserizing growth’ which the aggregate view of the tertiary
sector does not reveal – i.e., is labor being ‘pushed’ into the sector with falling
incomes because of lack of opportunities in the production sectors.
The next section, therefore, goes into a discussion of trends in income distrib-
ution in different branches of the tertiary sector.
Shifts in the KDF distribution in different sub-sectors of
tertiary activity
How do the shifts in the APCE distribution compare in different sub-sectors of
the tertiary activities? We can go a fair distance by looking at the picture for the
four major one-digit sectors distinguished in the National Industrial Classifica-
tion (NIC). This is done in Figure 10.3.
The NIC Group 8 (business services) would contain the bulk of the services
catering to the traded part of the economy, while group 6 (trade, hotels and
restaurants) would comprise the bulk of the private non-traded services. Group 9
includes community, social and personal services, but is also heavily represented
by government activities, including administration.
Two points stand out in the picture presented in Figure 10.3. First, the shift in
the distribution between the two rounds is more pronounced for the urban areas
than the rural ones even when we look at the disaggregated tertiary sub-groups.
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Second, the shift is least for the NIC group 6 (trade, hotels and restaurants) in both
the rural and the urban areas, and the most striking for groups 8 (business services)
and 9 (community, social and personal services). Further, in the groups showing
the larger outward shifts, the shift in the urban areas is more prominent. Nowhere
is there any evidence of any increase in the incidence of low-income groups.
KDF distributions for regular wage earners in the tertiary
and other sectors
It might be useful to look at the KDF functions for the three rounds exclusively
for regular wage earners (see Figure 10.4). The incomes of these respondents are
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Figure 10.3 Kernel density functions by major sub-groups of the tertiary sector.
Note
6: Trade, hotels and restaurants; 7: transport, storage and communication; 8: finance, real estate and





























more easily obtained in the NSS survey. A study of the change in the distribu-
tion of their earnings over the three rounds of the survey is a useful supplement
to the changes in the household welfare by the classification of ‘main earners’
presented above.
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Figure 10.4 KDF distributions for regular wage regions by major sector, and rural and
urban areas: three rounds.
Note
Panel A is rural and panel B is urban.
Two points need to be emphasized:
1 There is a rightward shift in the KDF in the successive rounds for both the
rural and the urban areas, but it is clear that the shift is largest for the
tertiary-sector regular wage earners. The ordering of the primary and sec-
ondary sectors are, however, rather different for the rural and urban areas.
In the urban areas the shift seems to be larger for the primary rather than
the secondary sector, presumably because of the development of different
types of high-value primary activities. In the rural areas, however, the
outward shift in the secondary sector is more pronounced relative to the
primary sector.
2 The shape of the KDF in the tertiary sector is altered in rather the same way
in the rural and the urban areas in the later rounds, even though the move-
ment is stronger for the urban economy. There is marked flattening of the
curve suggesting a wider dispersion of earnings and larger proportions of
workers with higher earnings. There is a clear reduction of the proportion of
people with low earnings, but interestingly both in the rural and urban
sectors, the mode seems to have moved to the left (even though much
reduced in its density). This might suggest that there is a sizable influx of
low wage workers – earning rather less than in the 38th round in real terms.
However, this phenomenon might really mean that there is a larger influx of
younger or less educated workers along with others who earn much more.
The last point carries with it an implication that “dualism’ has increased in the
tertiary sector, and might indeed be stronger in the tertiary than in the secondary
or manufacturing sectors. We cannot be sure about this hypothesis unless we
control for the quality – in particular the human-capital attributes – of the
workers entering these sectors.
Is ‘dualism’ higher in the tertiary sector? Earnings
differentials (net) as between sectors in different points 
of the distribution
Our purpose is to know how the earnings in the tertiary sector relative to the
earnings in the other two sectors, in particular manufacturing, vary in different
parts of the distribution. ‘Dualism’ in terms of the gap between low and high
earners in manufacturing is high in the Indian economy and has also been dis-
cussed in Chapter 9. If the dualism is stronger in the tertiary sector, then we
would expect to find the ‘net’ tertiary-manufacturing differential, after control-
ling for the other major determinants of earnings (like human-capital attributes)
to increase as we move up the scale in the earnings distribution. We ran quantile
regressions for the 55th round of the NSS to estimate the net differential at the
five quintiles of the distribution. Dummies for the sectors (with primary sector
as base) were used in the regressions along with a set of other explanatory vari-
ables. The latter included education, age, sex, urban–rural location and regions.
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The exercise was done separately for the APCE of households (for in which the
characteristics of the ‘main earner’ were used for the explanatory variables) and
for the daily earnings of regular wage earners. There were some differences in
the sets of explanatory variables used in each case. (Model description is given
in the Appendix.)
The coefficients of the tertiary and manufacturing sector dummies at the dif-
ferent quintiles are given in Table 10.9, and they are graphed in Figures 10.5 and
10.6. There are apparent differences in the shapes of the distribution. This is pri-
marily because for the wage sector secondary wages are below tertiary wages
(remembering that the base in each case is primary sector earners), while for the
APCE of households the values for the tertiary and the secondary sectors are all
above the primary. This rather intriguing difference is probably because sec-
ondary wage earners in the middle range of the distribution (q25 to q75) earn
less than those in regular primary employment. The relatively high wages
observed in the latter are due to public-sector and similar government employ-
ment in the primary sector.
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Table 10.9 Values of dummies of quantile regressions: 55th round
Quantiles q5 q25 q50 q75 q95
APCE
Tertiary 0.048 0.08 0.108 0.128 0.172
Secondary 0.024 0.05 0.064 0.079 0.145
Wage of Regular Workers
Tertiary 0.171 0.211 0.222 0.192 0.142
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Figure 10.5 Estimated coefficients of (dummy) variables from quantile regressions:
APCE.
But as far as the tertiary–secondary differential is concerned the results are
the same for APCE and daily wages. The differential is all along higher for the
tertiary-sector workers. The gap between the two sectors increases in the middle
range and diminishes somewhat only at the highest quarter of the distribution.
We conclude that dualism is quantitatively more important in the tertiary
sector when we compare the earnings of the lowest quintile with those in the
higher quintile – except that the difference is reduced for the highest quintile.
There is then some support for the popular perception that the tertiary sector is
home to a body of low earners more so than the secondary sector.
Conclusion
The structure of employment observed in the NSS survey year of 1999–2000
(the 55th round) shows that the formal sector accounted for a quarter of tertiary
employment in the rural areas and one third in the urban areas. Even after the
decline in public-sector employment in the post-reform period this sub-sector
still accounts for more than half of formal tertiary employment in the urban
areas and more than two-thirds in the rural. Around one-half of employment in
the informal segment of the tertiary sector is accounted for by the self-employed
in both the areas. Regular wage earners are more important in the urban sector,
the rest (25 percent in the urban, and 33 percent in the rural) being casual wage-
workers.
In the absence of time-series data for the formal and the informal sectors we are
obliged to analyze the trends in the low- and high-paid employment in the tertiary
sector by looking at the changes in the entire distribution of earnings in this sector
over time. We have looked at the issue from several angles and for different vari-
ables representing income levels. As mentioned the self-employed constitute a




























Figure 10.6 Estimated coefficients of (dummy) variables from quantile regressions:
regular wage earners.
very large part of the tertiary sector. By definition the individual earnings of the
self-employed are not recorded for each worker. All the earnings of the household
members are pooled together. The variable most relevant to look at, then, is a
measure of household welfare – which in the simplest formulation is mean house-
hold per capita expenditure (APCE). The industry affiliation of the household is
given by the occupation of the main earner. This may create some errors for
multiple-earner households whose earners follow different occupations.
The movement of the distribution of APCE for the successive rounds brings
out two important points: (i) there is an outward shift in the distribution in the
tertiary sector, so that earnings at all levels have increased; and (ii) there has
been proportionately larger increase in the number in the first and the fifth quin-
tiles of the distribution – with relatively less absorption of labor in the middle
range. This implies an increase in inequality in the bottom half of the
distribution – a trend more prominent in the urban economy. Disaggregating the
tertiary sector by its 1-digit components, it is seen that these effects are mild in
trade (group 6) but much more striking in business services and in the commun-
ity and social services,
We looked specifically at regular wage earners whose individual earnings are
recorded. The outward movement of the earnings distribution over successive
rounds (and particularly during the 1987–1993 and 1993–1999 periods), as well
as the ‘flattening’ of the curve, is more striking for the tertiary sector than either
the primary or the secondary. It is also more prominent for the wage-earners
than the welfare index for all tertiary households (APCE) which we had used.
Thus we conclude that while there is no evidence for the incidence of low
incomes in the tertiary sector to increase in any absolute sense, more jobs are
being created in the bottom and the topmost part of the distribution.
This last point suggests an increase in ‘dualism’ in the tertiary sector. We have
seen in the last chapter that dualism was particularly striking in Indian manufactur-
ing compared with other Asian economies, and it had most likely increased in
recent years. Our quintile regression analysis was meant to see how the earnings
differentia between tertiary and the manufacturing sectors compare at different
parts of the earnings distribution. The results for the 1999–2000 round of the NSS
show that the differential, after controlling for human-capital attributes and loca-
tion of the labor, increases from the lowest quintile to the fourth – and only in the
highest is there some reduction in the ‘net’ differential. This is true for both the
APCE measure and for regular wages. We conclude that dualism has become
higher in the tertiary sector than in manufacturing.
Appendix
In the last section, both sets of regressions were simultaneous quantile regres-
sion with bootstrapping standard errors. The quantile regressions were simultan-
eously run at five quantile points namely 5, 25, 50, 75 and 95.
Both regressions were based on NSS unit level data of 55th round. The
regression with APCE as dependent variable was estimated at household level
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and it had 92,282 observations. The regression with wage of the regular
workers as dependent variable was estimated at individual level and it had
52,439 observations.
In the following tables, we present variable descriptions of both regression
models.
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Table 10A.1 Description of independent variables: set A
Variable Description of independent variables
Sec dummy for households with secondary sector as principal industry
tert dummy for households with tertiary sector as principal industry
edu average years of education of main workers
age average age of main workers in the household
east dummy for eastern region
south dummy for southern region
cent dummy for central region
nw dummy for north-western region
empl dummy for self-employed
urban dummy for urban
Table 10A.2 Description of independent variables: set B
Variable Description of independent variables
ind2 dummy for workers in secondary sector
ind3 dummy for workers in tertiary sector
Edu years of education of regular workers
East dummy for eastern region
South dummy for southern region
Cent dummy for central region
Nw dummy for north-western region
Male dummy for male
Urban dummy for urban
occ2 dummy for workers with occupation codes – 2
occ3 dummy for workers with occupation codes – 3
occ4 dummy for workers with occupation codes – 4
occ5 dummy for workers with occupation codes – 5
occ6 dummy for workers with occupation codes – 6
occ7 dummy for workers with occupation codes – 7, 8 and 9
In addition, all independent variables were interacted with urban to control
urban influence on them.
Dependent Variable: ln (APCE).
In addition, all independent variables were interacted with urban to control
urban influence on them.
Dependent Variable: ln (Wages of Regular Workers).
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Table 10A.3 Description of occupational codes
NCO divisions Description of the occupation code
0–1 Professional, technical and related workers
2 Administrative, executive and managerial workers
3 Clerical and related workers
4 Sales workers
5 Service workers
6 Farmers, fishermen, hunters, loggers and related workers
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11 Legislation, enforcement and
adjudication in Indian labor
markets
Origins, consequences and the way
forward
Ahmad Ahsan, Carmen Pages and Tirthankar Roy1
Introduction
Throughout the world, governments have enacted laws to protect the interests of
the workers. India is no exception. In fact, in India, laws are often perceived to
be too restrictive on employers. International comparisons show that the
problem is not one of laws relating to conditions of work, but one of laws on
hiring and, especially, dismissals. Laws in India on these matters are restrictive
compared with other emerging economies, other nations in Asia and even
developed countries.
While some regulations are necessary, excessive controls are not necessarily
better for workers and society. Indeed, whereas the particularly restrictive provi-
sions were created to protect jobs, many studies show that the effects of job
security on growth of employment in large enterprises have been adverse
(Fallon and Lucas, 1993; Anant et al. 2003; Besley and Burgess 2004; Dutta
Roy 2004; Saha 2005; Ahsan and Pagés 2006). Nor have these provisions been
helpful to the cause of industrial peace. In 2004, 482 major cases of work-stop-
page cost industry 15 million person-days. It is obvious that little de jure liberal-
ization in the regulatory framework has been allowed to happen since the
reforms began despite demand from industry, economists and media. That being
said, others have noted several areas of de facto and indirect liberalization (Roy
2003). For example, incidence of voluntary retirement, fixed-term and contrac-
tual employment has increased. Some degree of de jure rationalization, there-
fore, is needed.
Why did legislation take the particular form that it did in India? What are the
problem areas? What are the economic impacts of such legislation? What
changes have occurred? What is the way forward? These are some of the ques-
tions addressed in this chapter.
The conclusion of this chapter is that the current dispute and retrenchment-
related laws do not preserve existing jobs and prevent the creation of new ones.
In terms of reforms, it is found that while no significant change has occurred in
legislation and formal union presence, weakening law enforcement, increasing
recourse to contract employment, judicial decisions upholding the legality of
temporary and contract employment, and increasing decentralization in the leg-
islation initiative are some of the ways that flexibility has increased. Nonethe-
less, this chapter argues that substantial transformations are still needed. To
create a new institutional infrastructure that can truly advance the cause of
workers and promote job growth it is necessary to expand the reform debate
beyond chapter Vb of the Industrial Disputes Act to areas such as dispute resolu-
tion, adjudication, labor inspections and labor policy.
The chapter has five main sections. The first three deal with labor regulations,
law enforcement and the adjudication process, respectively. The following
section examines the economic impact of this legal and institutional system.
A final section concludes and provides some suggestions to move forward.
Regulatory framework
Labor laws
Seeds of over-regulation were present in the history of labor laws before
independence (1947). A broad coalition between nationalists and mill workers in
the interwar period encouraged legislation that created a role for elected provin-
cial governments in collective bargaining and firm-level negotiation. After
independence, labor laws continued to be influenced more by the desire to
protect labor, which had originated in nationalism, than by considerations of
efficiency in labor markets and dispute settlement. The principle of protection
was subsumed under the pursuit of ‘social justice’, and employment security
was enhanced in the formal sector by a range of new laws and case laws.
Removing or changing laws became politically difficult, with the result that new
demand for laws led to proliferation. Big business implicitly traded off labor-
market flexibility for a trade regime that offered them a high degree of import
protection. After the economic reforms started in the 1990s and protection was
reduced, the lack of flexibility became a serious issue.
The present legal framework consists of major acts, and a number of minor,
usually state-level acts. Industrial relations are governed by the Trade Unions
Act, 1926, which specifies the conditions that a trade union needs to satisfy in
order to be recognized under the act, and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
(IDA), which sets out the institutions for adjudication of disputes.
The IDA specifies a multi-tier conciliation-cum-adjudication system. The tiers
are created and maintained by the state governments. The lowest and the imme-
diate tier consist of Conciliation Officers and Boards appointed by the govern-
ment. The Conciliation Officer either settles the dispute, or sends a ‘failure report’.
The dispute then goes to Labor Courts, and further to Industrial Tribunals. The
Labor Courts deal with disputes that affect workers. The Industrial Tribunals,
apart from working as appellate bodies, deal with cases that affect all workers in
an industry. In rarer cases, disputes go to National Tribunals, which are centrally
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administered bodies, empowered to deal with cases that have potentially national
significance. The IDA imposes significant restrictions on employers regarding
retrenchment and exit. It gives power to labor courts and Tribunals to set aside any
discharge or dismissal that has been referred to them as not justified and direct
reinstatement of the worker in any terms it sees fit. In units employing more than
100 workers, retrenchment requires seeking authorization from the government.
Such authorization is rarely granted. In the event of retrenchment, longer tenure
workers are given priority to stay. In addition, retrenched workers receive priority
in case of new recruitment. Closure also requires prior authorization.
Working conditions are governed principally by the Factories Act, 1948; the
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, which specifies the form of
the employment contract; and the Contract Labor (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970. The Factories Act governs the health, safety and welfare of workers
in factories. The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, requires
employers of industrial units with 100 or more workers (excluding management
and supervision) to specify working conditions more or less in line with a
‘model standing orders’. The Contract Labor (Regulation and Abolition) Act,
1971 (CLA), was created with the objective of gradual abolition of casual labor
hiring, and where permitted, to regulate the working conditions of casual labor.
Although it is now being used extensively as the principal means available to
employers and state governments to increase flexibility within the existing legal
regime, the original purpose of the Act was quite the opposite. Section 10 of the
act prevents firms from outsourcing most core functions or hiring workers on
temporary contracts for more than 120 days. Anyone so employed can demand
permanent employment from the company.
The principal laws relating to wages are the Payment of Wages Act, 1937
and the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. The Payment of Wages Act, 1937, is a
central act, the enforcement of which is a state responsibility, except in mines,
railways, oilfields, ports and air transport. The Act specifies the standard wage
period (a month or less), payment day, permissible deductions, mode of payment
and inspection. It applies to workers below a certain salary range. The Minimum
Wages Act, 1948 specifies minimum wages (and is empowered to specify also
the length of the working day) in ‘scheduled’ employment.
Social Security and Insurance are governed by, first, the Workmen’s Com-
pensation Act, 1923, which specifies compensation that the employers need to
pay on account of injury by accident at work-site or occupational diseases. An
important provision of the Act is the liability of the principal employer in case of
contract labor employment. Other important acts in this class include the
Employees State Insurance Act, 1948, which extends to all factories under the
Factories Act, and other commercial establishments employing 20 or more
persons, and to workers earning less than a certain salary limit within these, and
requires contributions from both employers and employees to be paid for insur-
ance against sickness, maternity, funeral and disablement. The Employees Prov-
ident Funds Act, 1952, which applies primarily to factories and specifies
deposit-linked provident fund or pension scheme, is also relevant.
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Since the early 1990s, demands have been raised to reform the IDA and the
CLA, the two most disputative acts. However, little success has been achieved
on this front. Important changes have been introduced in the Trade Unions and
Factories acts. Somewhat more bold initiatives have occurred at the state level.
In June 2000, the Government of Maharashtra announced a fairly broad-based
labor law-reform package. The National Labor Commission cited the Govern-
ment of Punjab’s fast-track courts, called Labor Lok Adalats, which cleared
more than 11,000, or two-thirds of, the pending cases in the Labor Courts and
Tribunals in three rounds of hearing since 2000. The Andhra Pradesh govern-
ment announced its intention to introduce liberalized labor laws for designated
Special Economic Zones.
International comparison
Is the Indian legal framework especially restrictive by comparison with other
developing countries? Doing Business, 2004, a publicly available database based
on a detailed study of employment laws across the world (see http://rru.
worldbank.org/DoingBusiness), provides information on legal provisions related
to hiring, hours of work and retrenchment of workers across a large number of
countries in the world. Such provisions are then ranked with scores that are
higher the more protective of workers the labor laws.
A first index (restrictions on hiring) measures how difficult it is for employers
to hire workers other than with indefinite, permanent contracts. A higher score
indicates higher difficulty to hire through alternative contracts. A second index
(restrictions on hours of work) measures legal provisions pertaining to hours of
work. It compares overtime, restrictions to night work and length of the work-day
and work-week. Countries where employers face more restrictions on hours of
work are given a higher score. A third index (restrictions on retrenchment) meas-
ures legal and administrative constraints on dismissals. A fourth index measures
the cost of dismissal measures in weeks of pay. Such costs are related to the com-
pensation that workers obtain in that event although not one to one, as often times
legislation imposes costs on firms that are not transferred to workers (for example,
the cost of legal fees). Finally, the rigidity of employment index provides a
summary indicator of different aspects of labor legislation across countries.
According to the latter, Indian laws are more protective of workers than the
international average or the average of a group of comparator countries, com-
posed by large developing economies and countries in East and South Asia (see
Table 11.1, column 5). On paper, Indian laws are also much more protective of
workers than in developed countries. Disaggregating among different indicators,
it emerges that this more protective stand of the law in India comes from the
higher restrictions on dismissal. In comparison, other aspects of the labor law
are closer or below the international norm.
Thus, for example, Indian laws concerning the ability to hire workers
with alternative contracts are in line with international standards, although
they impose somewhat higher constraints on employers than in the sample of
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comparator countries. Similarly, Indian labor laws exert little restrictions on
hours of work, compared either with the international standard or the median of
the group of comparator countries. Indian labor laws also impose lower monetary
costs to employers in the event they dismiss a worker relative to comparator
countries (although higher than the international average and way above the
average for developed countries). Instead, Indian labor laws impose more admin-
istrative hurdles to initiate a dismissal than almost anywhere else in the world.
Only in a few countries firms need to obtain authorization to retrench from the
government. Moreover, in India, authorization to retrench is hardly granted,
which leads to a few requests for authorization in the first place. In a scale of 1 to
100, India scores 90 in the restrictions of dismissals index, well above the inter-
national norm, the average of the group of comparators, or the average in
developed economies.
Law enforcement
While labor laws have remained largely unchanged, their effects may be chang-
ing depending on the application and enforcement of such laws, the capability of
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Table 11.1 International comparison of labor legislation in India and comparator countries
Country Difficulty Rigid Restrictions to Compensation Rigidity of 
of hiring hours retrenchment for dismissal employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
India 33 20 90 79 48
Bangladesh 11 40 20 47 24
Brazil 67 80 70 165 72
Cambodia 33 80 30 39 48
China 11 40 40 90 30
Indonesia 61 40 70 157 57
Korea Rep. 11 60 30 90 34
Malaysia 0 0 10 74 3
Nepal 22 20 90 90 44
Pakistan 78 40 30 90 49
Philippines 22 60 40 90 41
Russian Federation 0 60 20 17 27
Sri Lanka 0 40 80 108 40
Thailand 67 40 20 47 42
Vietnam 44 40 70 98 51




Average 22 49 24 41 32
World average 35 516 38 56 41
World median 31 60 40 46 41
Source: Doing Business 2004: http://rru.worldbank.org/DoingBusiness/.
unions to monitor application, as well as the strategies firms are following to
avoid them. We find that little has changed in the formal presence of unions,
either in terms of affiliation or the number of disputes. Yet, there are signs of
weakening law enforcement, ineffective and corrupted inspections, and rising
recourse to contract labor. A shift in the stand of the judiciary might be also con-
tributing to a more flexible application of the law.
Union membership and labor disputes
Data on union membership is sketchy and incomplete. Data for few states that
have more complete information suggest that union membership has not
declined. A regression of such measures against state and a time trend for data
covering the period 1985–1997 yields a positive although not statistically
significant coefficient on the trend variable. Data by state (Figure 11.1) indic-
ates that in a number of states union membership increased (Assam, Orissa,
Punjab, Gujarat), although in the latter state, union membership suffered a
decline in the second half of the nineties. In other states, most notably
Karnataka and Kerala, union membership declined. The lack of significant
overall trends is also evident when union membership is measured in relation
to population (Figure 11.2). There has been a decline in disputes during the
nineties, although disputes were high in some years at the end of the decade.
The time trend is statistically significant, and it indicates a decline in 
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Figure 11.1 Evolution of union membership by state (in ‘0000s) (source: Labor 
Bureau).




































































































Figure 11.3 Number of disputes per 10,000 manufacturing workers (source: Author’s
computations based on Labor Bureau and ASI data).
disputes at a rate of 2.2 disputes per ten thousand workers a year within states
(Figure 11.3). It should be noticed, however, that while on average the number
of disputes have declined the number of person-days lost in such disputes has
increased since 1997 after a sustained decline throughout the first part of the
nineties (Figure 11.4).
Labor inspections
All governments inspect business for compliance with their regulations. Yet, law
enforcement becomes particularly difficult when the legal framework is overly
complex and outdated, and when reforms in other markets are increasing the
demand for flexibility and adaptability.
Inspectors in India have certain duties and powers. Among their duties, they
are supposed to inquire into the correctness of any of the particulars appearing in
any statement, or return. They have also to find out whether the provisions of the
laws have been complied with. To do that they are awarded the power of requir-
ing any employer or contractor to furnish the appropriate information and of
entering at any reasonable time in a establishment, factory or office, examining
the employer or contractor, and making copies of any documents maintained by
the premises.
There has been a large decline in the number of factories inspected relative to
the number of registered factories in the post-reform period (Figure 11.5).2 In
principle, it is possible that the trend reflects a changed inspection strategy that
subjects a smaller set of firms to stricter inspection. Some evidence documented
below, however, suggest an increasingly inefficient system of inspections. There
are also significant differences in the share of factories inspected across states in
1991–2001 (Figure 11.6). State differences explain 73 percent in the total vari-
ance of the share of factories inspected, suggesting important differences in
enforcement policies across states.
India’s 2002 Investment climate survey (ICS) provides a more detailed
picture of labor inspections obtained from the responses of a large sample of
firms. On average, firms report 0.4 labor inspections from the Central labor






















































Figure 11.4 Person-days lost to disputes per manufacturing worker (source: Author’s
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Figure 11.5 Share of factories inspected (as % of factories registered) (source: Labor
Bureau).
administration and 1.76 State labor inspections per year (Table 11.2). It is
noticeable that at the state level, labor inspections are more frequent than any
other type of inspections. The breakdown by states indicates that states such as
Tamil Nadu, Gujarat or Kerala, which according to the labor bureau data are
states with a large share of firms inspected, are also the states with the highest
number of inspections per firm (Table 11.3). The ICS data also suggests import-
ant differences in law enforcement policies across states.
There are numerous accounts that suggest the presence of irregularities. For
example, there are accounts that many inspectors collect bribes in exchange for
reduced enforcement. Firms rarely know about the rules and inspectors are seen as
unwilling to provide this information since that could endanger their future bribes
(Rastogi 2002). The ICS data provides some information about the incidence of
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Table 11.3 Average state labor inspections and incidence of irregularities
State inspections per % of respondents 
establishment acknowledging that unofficial 











Tamil Nadu 3.06 0.33
UP 1.74 0.19
W. Bengal 0.80 0.10
Source: Authors’ elaboration from ICS data.
Table 11.2 Average inspector visits to establishments per year (different agencies)
Central government State government
Sale tax 0.59 1.61
Income tax 0.51 0.42
Customs duty 0.89 0.21
Excise duty 2.13 1.24
Labor and Social Security inspectors 0.40 1.76
Fire and building safety 0.21 0.66
Environment 0.19 1.26
All others 0.12 1.46
Source: ICS, World Bank.
these accounts. This Survey asks firms’ managers if inspectors respond to unofficial
payments by reducing the number of visits to their establishments. On average, a
positive answer is confirmed for 20 percent of the respondents, although in states
such as Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu this percentage increases to around 30
percent (Table 11.3). While this question refers to inspectors from all government
agencies, additional evidence suggests that labor and social-security inspectors are
among the ones that are more responsive to unofficial payments. Not only there
were more instances of irregularities involving labor inspectors, but also the
response in terms of the reduction in the number of visits was higher than for offi-
cials of other state administrations (see Table 11.4).
The ICS data also allows examining whether inspectors target their inspec-
tions to particular firms. Table 11.5 reports the results of a regression of the
number of inspections against firm characteristics such as size, age of the firm,
whether the firm is public, whether the firm is owned by foreigners or has
foreign participation, whether it dominates a substantial share of the market for
its main product, and finally whether (at least some) workers employed in that
firm belong to a union. The regression also includes state and industry dummies.
Both the reported number of inspections (column 1) and the adjusted number of
inspections (column 2) are used. The adjusted number is computed by adding to
the reported inspections the ones that did not happen because unofficial pay-
ments were made.3
Notably, results are very different depending on whether the adjusted or the
reported number of visits is used as dependent variable, indicating that irregular-
ities tend to be concentrated in certain types of firms. Thus, reported inspections
do not exhibit any systematic pattern other than the fact that exporting firms tend
to experience more state labor inspections per year than firms that sell in
domestic markets. Instead, the adjusted number of inspections indicates that
large firms, firms that sell abroad and firms that dominate a large share of the
market (more than 20 percent of the market share of their main product) would
experience more labor inspections than the ones that actually take place after
making unofficial payments to inspectors. Once such payments are made, they
experience the same intensity of inspections than other firms. This difference
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Table 11.4 Average reduction in inspector visits and time spent if unofficial payments
are made, by government agency
Number of firms Reduction in % reduction 
reporting number of visits in time 
incidents (percent) spent
Tax 57 33.49 NA
Labor and social security 157 53.25 49.66
Environment 92 42.52 37.06
Fire and safety 100 42.43 41.62
All others 73 38.97 36.31
Source: Authors’ elaboration from ICS data.
Table 11.5 Patterns of inspections and effect of inspections on compliance
Number of Number of Labor laws as Labor laws as Labor laws as Labor laws as
inspections – inspections – an obstacle? an obstacle? an obstacle? an obstacle?
observed adjusted?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medium 0.161 0.222 0.229 0.25 0.252 0.257
(0.28) (0.3) (2.93)** (2.57)* (2.56)* (2.62)**
Large 1.115 3.059 0.306 0.243 0.226 0.206
(1.24) (2.72)** (2.56)* (1.65) (1.49) (1.36)
Age 0.027 0.012 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(1.76) (0.62) (1.06) (0.75) (0.82) (0.58)
Public –1.138 –2.357 –0.303 –0.654 –0.533 –0.524
(0.49) (0.68) (0.97) (1.53) (1.15) (1.14)
Foreign participation –0.758 –2.864 –0.591 –0.707 –0.701 –0.675
(20–49%)
(0.33) (0.93) (1.89) (1.74) (1.71) (1.65)
Foreign (>49%) 0.575 1.852 –0.156 0.259 0.187 0.183
(0.24) (0.57) (0.47) (0.61) (0.43) (0.42)
Export 1.461 2.092 0.115 0.091 0.091 0.077
(2.58)** (3.06)** (1.48) (0.98) (0.98) (0.83)
Market share>20% 0.159 1.381 –0.017 0.057 0.065 0.075
(0.31) (2.10)* (0.24) (0.65) (0.73) (0.85)
Presence of unions –0.55 –1.639 0.068
(0.69) (1.68) (0.51)
% of LF in union 0.002
(1.04)
# inspections – observed 0.003
(0.93)
# inspections – adjusted 0.015 0.015 0.016
(3.64)** (3.62)** (3.64)**
Constant 1.644 –0.197 0.502 0.501 0.471 0.483
(1.41) (0.13) (3.13)** (2.49)* (2.32)* (2.37)*
Observations 1497 1016 1498 1016 1006 998
R2 0.04 0.06 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.16
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes
‘Labor laws as an obstacle’. The answer to this question ranges from 0 to 4, where 4 corresponds to labor laws are a major obstacle for growth, while 0 is no obstacle.
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
between adjusted and actual number of visits suggests that inspectors target and
respond to the unofficial payments of firms with higher profits and rents (which
presumably can offer higher payments).
Quite surprisingly the presence of unions in a firm does not increase the
number of inspections it experiences, as it would be expected if inspectors
responded to unions’ calls of unfair labor practices or breaches with labor laws.
Instead, the negative sign in the adjusted visits suggests two alternative hypothe-
ses. The first one is that employers of unionized firms are more compliant with
labor laws; the second is that unions could expose irregular inspection practices
and therefore inspectors stay away from such firms.
ICS data provide information on whether employers perceive labor laws to be
an obstacle to their growth. The answer to this question ranges from zero to four
where four indicates that a firm perceives labor laws as a major obstacle and
zero as no obstacle. If inspections induce compliance with labor laws, then
firms’ perceptions on the stringency of labor laws are expected to increase with
the number of inspections.4 Table 11.5, columns (3)-(6) report the results of
regressing individual firms perceptions against the number of inspections, con-
trolling for industry and state dummies, firm characteristics such as size, age and
export status, and whether the firm is publicly owned, foreign controlled or
foreign participated or whether it dominates more than 20 percent of the market
of its main product.
Interestingly, once again results are different depending on whether inspec-
tions are measured according to the reported or the adjusted number. While the
reported number of inspections is not related to firms’ perceptions on the strin-
gency of regulations, the adjusted number – that is, the number of inspections
that would have taken place if inspectors had not responded to unofficial
payments – is positively related. This suggest that firms that are engaged in pay-
ments in exchange of a reduction in inspections perceive labor laws to be more
binding, which in turn leads to two alternative hypotheses: Either paying to
inspectors is perceived to be the problem with labor laws or, perhaps more
likely, inspectors target firms for which labor laws are more binding and there-
fore are more interested in evading the law.
Unions can also contribute to law enforcement if they are vigilant for infrac-
tions and alert inspectors of breaches in the law. The results presented in
Table 11.5 however, suggest that the presence of unions in a firm does not affect
managers’ views regarding the stringency of labor-market laws. This result is
consistent with the estimated lack of effect of unions in bringing about inspec-
tions. It also suggests that the fact that inspectors target firms without unions for
irregular payments is not related to a higher compliance of unionized firms.
Instead, the results suggest that it is the fear of being exposed by unions, or a
lower profitability of unionized firms, that deters inspectors from soliciting pay-
ments from such firms.
Overall the results indicate that labor inspectors do little to enforce labor
laws. If anything, the evidence points to the opposite, that is, to a coalition
between employers and inspectors to evade the law. Unions may prevent some
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of these exchanges from taking place but seemingly cannot bring about more
inspections. This in turn, reduces their effectiveness to enforce the law. The con-
clusion is an ineffective system plagued with irregularities that seemingly does
little to promote compliance or advance the cause of workers while increasing
the costs of doing business for firms.
Firms’ strategies to cope with strict labor legislation
While labor-law enforcement is in general weak, laws that force firms to seek
and obtain permission from the government prior to retrenchment are well
enforced. Thus, still today, few firms seek permission to retrench, and for
those who do, permission is rarely granted.5 Hiring labor to contractors and
subcontracting non-core activities to other companies provides flexibility to
firms that seek to manage their labor force in an uncertain and volatile context.
Perhaps not surprisingly the use of contract labor has increased substantially
during the nineties climbing from 15 to 25 percent of manufacturing labor
force (Table 11.6).6 This rise, however, has not occurred in all states. In a
number of large states, the use of contract labor has remained low and stable.
This is the case in Delhi, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. In
contrast there has been a large increase in contract labor in states like Orissa or
Andhra Pradesh. State differences explain as much as 74 percent of the total
variance in the use of contract labor suggesting the importance of state policies
in determining firms’ hiring decisions.
Legislation and adjudication in labor 261
Table 11.6 Percentage of contract labor by state and period
State 1985 1990 1995 2002
Kerala 1.6 1.8 1.5 2.33
Assam 8.2 6.4 7.9 3.95
Tamil Nadu 6.9 5.2 4.4 7.21
West Bengal 4.6 5.1 5.3 7.63
Delhi 7.5 7.4 4.8 7.64
Karnataka 11.5 10.4 8.1 9.33
Punjab 19.1 8.8 10.8 14.32
Maharashtra 5.7 6.4 12.8 16.34
Bihar 9.8 8 7.8 22.08
Rajasthan 8.8 13.2 14.1 22.25
Madhya Pradesh 13.6 23.1 21.5 23.94
Uttar Pradesh 14.2 12.6 13.5 25.92
Haryana 19 9.9 14.8 28.07
Gujarat 14.5 19.9 23.5 31.27
Jammu & Kashmir 25.4 8 16.1 31.55
Orissa 30 26 28.7 40.14
Andhra Pradesh 33.8 39.9 49.2 62.08
Total 12.1 13.5 16.8 23.22
Source: Annual Survey of Industries.
A recent study on contractual employment in Karnataka (Rajeev and
RoyChowdhuri 2005) documents that the main reason mentioned by principal
employers to hire contract labor is flexibility, along with lower cost, higher effi-
ciency and lower dispute-propensity. A field survey in that state indicated that
contract workers’ wages were substantially lower than those of regular workers,
very few contract workers received bonuses or wage raises, many worked longer
hours, and few received any training from employers. The survey also reveals a
burgeoning growth of contract employment agencies and a decline in the com-
missions charged to workers. And while higher competition among contractors
should be welcomed by workers, in this context higher competition has seem-
ingly resulted in corruption, in particular, collusion between primary employers
and contractors to pay wages below the minimum wage.
Another loophole actively exploited by employers is that voluntary retire-
ments (VR) require no permission from the State. Fallon and Lucas (1991)
reported that offers of one month pay per year of work in exchange of retirement
were not unusual. While there are no reported data on the number of VR, or the
median payments, casual evidence suggest that such payments are still wide-
spread and that offers of one month or six weeks per year of work are still the
norm. The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act allows employment for
a fixed term, which, under certain conditions, does not involve a commitment on
the part of the employers to offer job security. This clause has been reportedly
used by a number of large employers in manufacturing.
Adjudication
The IDA makes provisions for dispute settlement in three stages: negotiation,
mediation and adjudication. The first stage involves voluntary communication
between the disputants. The Act makes provisions for the constitution of
Works Committees for the purpose. If such negotiations fail, the Act allows
for outside conciliation, for example, settlement of industrial disputes by
Labor Courts, Industrial Tribunals or National Tribunals. Collective bargain-
ing is the accepted means to negotiate terms of employment, especially in
larger organizations. However, there is a widely held opinion that both collect-
ive bargaining and conciliation systems are rather ineffective mechanisms in
settling disputes on retrenchment, and are not much more than a necessary for-
mality, before an industrial dispute case goes to adjudication (see, for
example, Malhotra 2001).
Legal experts suggest that there is a built-in bias for judicial reference. The
majority of cases of dispute concern discharge, dismissal and retrenchment.
The legal provisions under the IDA are so protective that the worker expects
to gain more from the court-room than from conciliation efforts. ‘The easy
accessibility of adjudication on these cases encourages the parties to take rigid
stands’ (Mukhopadhyay 2005). Khan (2005) states that ‘Trade Unions prefer
the adjudication process because the ministries and the labor judiciary, as well
as the appellate courts are expected to be sympathetic to the cause of workers’.
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Table 11.9 confirms the impression that conciliation is not very effective.
Labor Bureau statistics suggest that conciliation is more effective at the state
level, but the percentage of disputes sent for adjudication is increasing in
the 1990s.
In sources of data on disputes, the word ‘dispute’ is employed in two senses.
The Indian Labor Statistics refers to strikes and lockouts alone, the legal liter-
ature refers to cases that fall under specific labor laws, and are heard in courts of
law as ‘disputes’. The total number of strikes and lockouts has fallen somewhat
in the early 2000s compared with the 1990s, even though the average duration
and person-days lost has increased. ‘In other words, though we are having fewer
disputes the cost of a given dispute has substantially risen’ (Saha 2005, p.89).
There is some statistics that suggest a rather poor rate of disposal of cases, about
10 percent in 1997, by the Labor Courts, which implies an average duration of
proceedings in Labor Courts of ten years.
With the judiciary, however, the situation is complex. While the legal frame-
work has changed rather little in the 15 years since the economic reforms began,
observers and experts have noted a significant shift in the axis of judicial inter-
pretation of the most restrictive of the labor laws. In order to examine what has
happened in the sphere of judgments, we decided to use case data compiled from
the legal literature, instead of the less readable labor statistics. Table 11.7, pre-
pared from case data, shows that:
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Table 11.7 Industrial Disputes Act and Contract Labor Act cases heard in the Supreme
Court and/or High Courts
Number of cases under Of these 2 ÷ 1 (%) Cases with a clear 
the Contract Labor Act cases, those verdict as a ratio of 
and under Sections 11-A decided in total IDA and 
and 25 of IDA, which favor of CLA cases
resulted in a definite employers
verdict
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1990 23 4 17 45
1991 22 7 32 44
1992 3 1 33 3
1993 20 5 25 14
1994 18 11 61 9
1995 16 8 50 14
1996 16 3 19 12
1997 26 10 38 27
1998 16 9 56 10
1999 12 5 42 9
2000 23 9 39 14
2001 37 16 43 19
2002 34 19 56 29
Sources: Labor Law Reporter; Labor Law Journal; Awards Digest, various issues.
a The number of labor cases that find their way to the High Courts and the
Supreme Court has increased since the economic reforms began in India.
A large increase has happened with the Contract Labor Act cases, that is,
cases concerning dismissal of a contract worker. The disputant worker
makes the case that the worker deserved to be regularized and, therefore, the
case should fall under ‘retrenchment’ rules of IDA.
b Unambiguous decisions in favor of or against the worker occur only in a
minority of cases. Of the 165 cases in 2001, 37 had an unambiguous
verdict.
c Of those cases unambiguously decided, a larger share of decisions goes in
favor of the worker.
d However, the employer is faring better in the later period, the percentage of
cases settled for the employer is higher in more recent times than before.
A regression of the logarithm of these percentages on time yields a signific-
antly positive trend, and suggests that time accounts of about 30 percent of
the increase in pro-employer decisions.
The most disputative individual laws in IDA are the Sections 11-A, 25-O, 25F
and 25G. Many cases of retrenchment under Section 11A end up before the judi-
ciary. The section permits the Labor Courts to modify the retrenchment order dealt
to an employee. This is also true in the case a worker is retrenched on disciplinary
grounds. In nearly every case that reached the judiciary the aggrieved employee
had filed an industrial dispute case with the Labor Court, received a judgment in
his or her favor, and the employer challenged the judgment. What about the cases
that were not challenged by the employer? In principle it is possible that in those
cases the Labor Court gave an award in favor of the employer. But that is highly
unlikely, for the cases that did go to the judiciary consisted of many in which the
Labor Court condoned grave misconduct. In many cases, the order to take an
errant worker back was passed in ‘humanitarian interest’.
Section 25-O of the IDA makes it mandatory for employers to refer cases of
closure to the state government. This clause has been in the eye of a legal storm
for nearly 50 years, during which legislative intent and judicial interpretation of
individual freedom came into conflict on several occasions. Legislative intent has
been driven by the idea that unemployment through retrenchment or closure in
any context was against the public interest. On the other hand, the idea that a
bankrupt employer could be forced to keep a firm open at serious cost to personal
well-being and finances seemed to contradict constitutional rights. The section
25-O has been a perennial source of anxiety for the judiciary. The historic
amendment in 1982 that seriously restrained the rights of the employer was the
response of the legislature to a generally adverse judicial opinion about the con-
stitutionality of 25-O. In the more politically charged contexts, 25-O has been
misused by the powers that rule the state governments. In Jay Engineering Works
Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, Calcutta High Court, 1991, for example, it was
observed by the judge that 25-O was invoked by the state government refusing
permission to close a sick unit based on consultations with the workers alone.
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The Section 25-G imposes on the employer the ‘last-come-first-go’ principle
when carrying out retrenchment. As in many other pieces of legislation, this one
too loads the job-security provisions for the insider by making the jobs of the
older employees more secure than the younger ones. In effect, it violates the
employer’s right to select among the best workers, and neutralizes the right to
retain the younger and better-trained workers in favor of the older and less well-
trained ones. The clause arises out of a mindset that sees experience to be more
valuable than formal training, measures experience by years rather than quality
of service, and that sees technology as static during the lifetime of a worker, a
world of the public-sector engineering firm at 1980. It is clearly incompatible
and dangerous in activities that must keep up with rapid growth of knowledge.
Section 25F states that any employee working in a firm for 240 days or more
in the previous 12 months can in principle claim retrenchment compensation.
Other sections in the law state various kinds of termination (such as disciplinary
action, end of probation period, etc.) that are not legally retrenchments.
However, what is a retrenchment and what is not is a question that was left open
by both the acts and the case laws until recently. In many cases, employees, irre-
spective of the nature of the contract, demanded that their dismissal from service
was retrenchment under the length-of-service rule. Several court cases show that
the Labor Courts are usually ready to grant such requests. In 2003, a Supreme
Court judgment (S.M. Nilajkar v. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka) clari-
fied that the natural coming-to-an-end of project-based, contractual employment
was not retrenchment, provided the employee was pre-informed of the nature of
the contract. In the meantime, the term ‘retrenchment’ had been broadened.
The Section 25 practically disallows retrenchments or lay-offs without com-
pensation except when the owner dies. And a series of court cases made lay-offs
and retrenchments with compensation on any ground impossible too. According
to the IDA, lay-off is an inability of the firm to employ a worker on the muster,
and retrenchment is termination of employment except on disciplinary ground.
In one interpretation, the Section 25 makes it risky for the employer to promote
anyone. In Suraj Prakash Bhandari v. Union of India (Supreme Court, 1986), an
employee was promoted to a new position, and shortly thereafter retrenched on
the ground that the new position was no longer needed. Section 25 also encour-
aged employees under a variety of fixed-term contracts, whether formal or infor-
mal, to claim the status of regular employees (entitled to retrenchment
compensation), with a fair degree of success until recently. In two significant
judgments (Divisional Manager, Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corpo-
ration v. P. Lakshmoji Rao, Supreme Court, 2004; and Executive Engineer, Zilla
Parishad Engineering Division v. Digambara Rao, Supreme Court, 2004), the
court ruled that serving one employer for 240 days continuously is not sufficient
to claim the status of a regular employee.
The CLA has also seen a conflict between two tendencies in the sphere of
case laws. On the one hand, the Act allows freedom to the employer denied
him/her by the IDA. Some judges understood and respected that freedom. On
the other hand, like in the case of 25-O, some judges saw this freedom as a
Legislation and adjudication in labor 265
failing and weakness of the Act, and judgments passed in that spirit led to a
gradual crystallization of a job-security right within the Contract Labour Act. It
is in this sphere that judicial rethinking has perhaps been the most striking.
A series of cases in 2004 and 2005 reflected the interpretation that the fixed-term
worker has no automatic right to demand regular employment on completion of
240 days of more or less continuous work. To demand a regular job, such a
worker needs to make a case that the temporary status was a ploy to deprive
him/her of a permanent status to which the person was in some sense entitled
(for example, Regional Manager, State Bank of India v. Raja Ram, Supreme
Court, 2005). An important judgment of 2004, delivered by the Bombay High
Court observed that
The other injurious effect of indiscriminate regularization has been that
many of the agencies have stopped undertaking casual and temporary
workers though they are urgent and essential for fear that those required to
be continued for 240 or more days have to be absorbed. Public interests are
thus jeopardized.
(Maharashtra Krishna Valley Development Corporation v. Tukaram
Sahebrao Veer, 2004)
The economic effects of selected key legislation
What was the effect of this complex and overly restrictive legislation on eco-
nomic outcomes? Did the inefficiencies in enforcement and the de facto deregu-
lation that took place reduce the impact of legislation? To answer this question
requires performing statistical and econometric analysis to assess if and how
legislation and, in particular, changes in legislation relates to variables such as
output, employment creation, investment or workers’ earnings.
While labor legislation is introduced with the objective of improving
workers’ welfare, there may be a number of adverse consequences on eco-
nomic outcomes, and in turn, on workers’ wellbeing, because it can generate:
(i) price effects; (ii) hold-up effects; and/or (iii) rigidity effects. Price effects
occur when legislation increases the cost of labor, thus reducing employers’
incentives to hire workers. Hold-up effects occur when legislation makes it
easier for one party to appropriate the return of the investment of the other
party, thereby reducing the incentives of the latter to invest. This is the case,
for instance, when legislation increases workers’ ability to initiate and sustain
industrial disputes, which may lead to lower returns on the investments of
employers. Finally, rigidity effects occur when legislation makes the adjust-
ment of labor (or other factors) more costly and difficult. Legislation that
increases the price of labor or generates expropriation effects is expected to
have a negative effect on the demand for labor. Instead, legislation that
increases the cost of adjusting employment has ambiguous effects since it
may cause a reduction of both job creation and job destruction (Bertola
1990).
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Employers’ opinions
Are employers constrained by labor legislation? An interesting source of cross-
country information is provided by the Investment Climate Surveys (ICS). They
collect firm level information on production, input use and the investment
climate across a large number of countries.7 Among other questions, ICS ask
firms about how much labor-market regulations constitute an obstacle for their
growth. Higher values of this answer imply higher obstacles for firms. The
average of such responses by country yields a telling measure of differences in
perceptions across countries (see Figure 11.7). According to this data, in India
labor regulations are perceived to be a larger obstacle for firms’ growth than in
most other countries of the world.8
Moreover, larger firms tend to consider labor legislation as more of an obs-
tacle than smaller firms (Figure 11.8). This is consistent with the fact that the
most contentious labor law, chapter Vb of the Industrial Disputes Act, applies
only to manufacturing firms that employ 100 or more regular employees. Inter-
estingly, large firms consider labor legislation to be as constraining for their
growth as electricity shortages, although not as constraining as taxes (rate and
administration) or corruption.
The effects of dispute and retrenchment legislation
A number of studies have attempted to estimate the effects of job-security leg-
islation, such as chapter Vb, on economic outcomes in India. In comparison,
there is much less analytical work assessing the effects of the rest of laws con-
tained in the IDA. Fallon and Lucas (1991) and (1993) studied the effects of
the 1976 introduction of chapter Vb. They concluded that after the reform
formal employment for a given level of output declined by 17.5 percent. In
another study, Besley and Burgess (2004) found labor legislation to have
important adverse effects on output and employment, particularly in the regis-
tered manufacturing sector. Hasan et al.(2003) examined whether differences
in labor laws explain differences in the way labor markets adjusted to trade
reforms. They found that states with more stringent labor legislation (meas-
ured as in Besley and Burgess 2004) had lower demand elasticities and these
elasticities were less affected by trade reforms. Finally Lall and Mengistae
(2005) examined the influence of labor-market legislation – as perceived by
employers – on plant-productivity differences across Indian cities. They found
that differences in legislation, jointly with differences in the severity of power
shortages, explained a large share of the productivity differences between
cities in India. Not all authors found results in the same direction. Dutta Roy
(2004) examined the effects of a 1982 central amendment to the IDA, which
extended the prohibition to retrench workers to firms that employ hundred or
more workers and found evidence of substantial adjustment costs in employ-



















































Figure 11.7 Average country perception on whether labor market regulations are an obs-
tacle for growth (source: Investment Climate Surveys, the World Bank).
Notes
0 = No obstacle, 3 = Large obstacle.
While the former results suggest that labor legislation can generate important
adverse effects on economic outcomes, some of the former studies do not
address important methodological issues. For example, while Fallon and Lucas
find a decline in employment after the introduction of chapter Vb, this decline
could be driven by factors contemporaneous to the introduction of the law,
rather than by the law itself. Besley and Burgess control for this fact and still
found an important effect of labor legislation, but since they use an aggregate
measure of legislation, their results provide little evidence on whether all laws
have similar effects, and if not, which labor laws are behind their identified
adverse effects.
Using Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) data on manufacturing employ-
ment, output, investment, wages and number of factories by state and industry,
Ahmad and Pagés (2006) estimate the effect of different laws on a number of
economic variables distinguishing between job-security and dispute-related leg-
islation. Within job security, they also distinguish between amendments to
chapter Vb, and amendments in other laws that relate to the procedures for ter-
mination of the work relationship or the closure of firms. They also distinguish
between labor reforms that involve amendments in the law (de jure) and de facto
deregulation that occur, for example, by the increasing recourse of firms to con-
tract labor.
Their methodology is based on constructing measures that track de jure and de
facto labors reforms at the state level during the period 1959–1997. The construc-
tion of measures of de jure labor reforms follows Besley and Burgess (2004) pro-
cedure with some modifications. For the measure of job security, they construct a
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Figure 11.8 Ranking of perceptions of constraints (normalized to 100 for electricity) to
firm growth of manufacturing firms, by firm size (source: Authors’ computa-
tions from 2002 IIC-World Bank Investment Climate Survey data).
variable that takes a value of one when a state implements an amendment to the
IDA that goes in the direction of increasing job security and –1 when labor
reforms go in the opposite direction. Then they add up all these changes, so that
in each period, the measure of labor legislation is the cumulative sum of all
reforms to that given date. Higher positive values indicate that in a given state
and year, job security is high because the reforms in the direction of increasing
job security have not been outweighed by reforms in the opposite direction. An
identical procedure is implemented for measuring reforms on laws that affect the
resolution of industrial disputes.9 During the period of study, some states imple-
mented amendments to reduce the cost of labor disputes while other states passed
amendments that made labor disputes more costly.10 Instead, over time all amend-
ments to lay-off, retrenchment and firm-closure laws were in the direction of
making such actions more costly for the employer. De facto reforms are captured
by the percentage of contract labor in each period and state, which as shown in
Table 11.6, varies considerably across time and states. All these measures are
then related to economic outcomes by estimating an econometric model that
regresses economic outcomes on the labor-legislation measures, state and time
dummies and controls at the state level.11
The results of this analysis strongly indicate that a state amendment that
increases the cost of labor disputes or retrenchment above the cost stipulated by
the Central Act results in declines in registered manufacturing employment and
output in that state relative to the states that do not implement such changes. The
main results are the following:
It is found that legislation both that (i) makes labor disputes costly and
(ii) retrenchment costs high through the VB clause biases economic activity
against registered manufacturing and in favor of sectors such as agriculture, con-
struction or non-registered manufacturing, in which the IDA does not apply.
Within manufacturing, legal amendments that slow down the resolution of
industrial disputes or reduce firms’ labor-adjustment possibilities lead to a
reduction in registered manufacturing output of between 15 and 20 percent, and
expand unregistered manufacturing output between 6 and 7 percent. The former
underscores that while laws intended to increase job security, such as chapter
Vb, draw most of the attention, dispute-related laws can also exert a large, if not
larger, effect on economic outcomes. It is also estimated that both types of laws
have important detrimental impact in manufacturing employment, for both total
persons employed and also for production workers (Figure 11.9). It is estimated
that India may have lost around 1,114,000 due to the introduction of chapter Vb,
another 1,700,000 jobs due to the 1982 amendment of Chapter Vb, and 750,000
jobs due to different state amendments that made state acts more stringent than
the central act.
In turn, results for capital indicate that much of the negative effects on employ-
ment and output are driven by a decline in investment rates and capital stocks,
both in terms of capital per factory and capital per capita. Instead, and contrary to
what is often predicted by economic theory, the capital–labor ratio within each
firm declined. This again suggests that the reduction in investments and capital
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Figure 11.9 Measuring the cost of job security laws on employment by industries (Number of jobs lost due to state amendments in Job Security
Legislation in IDA).
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was driven by a fear that the returns of investments would be appropriation by part
of labor and that this effect more than outweighed the price effect – which would
go in the direction of substituting labor for capital. The effect on capital is much
larger for laws that increase the cost of labor disputes (Figure 11.10).
In line with the results on capital, dispute-related regulations cost more jobs in
capital-intensive industries (Figure 11.9), while retrenchment-related regulations
have a higher job impact in labor-intensive industries. In addition, rather than a
reduction in the number of jobs in existing plants, job losses are due to a decline
in the number of factories. This suggests that labor laws are important in shaping
incentives for new firms to enter the market. It also indicates that any positive
gains in preserving jobs in existing factories were outweighed by the new facto-
ries that were not created.
Job-security regulations can lead to distributive conflicts. It is found that
amendments that increase the cost of retrenchment have a positive effect on
earnings per worker, although they do not have a positive effect on the total
wage bill – that is the amount of resources that goes to workers – or the labor
share – that is, the share of value added that goes to workers. This is because the
increase in wages is offset by a decline in employment. This indicates that while
some individual workers benefit by receiving higher earnings, others are worse
off due to reduced access to manufacturing jobs.
Retrenchment-related regulations affect job losses in more states (Figure 11.10)
than dispute-related regulations. This in part due to the fact that some states
implemented laws reducing the cost of labor disputes, which resulted in employ-
ment gains – while no state implemented reductions in the cost retrench-
ment. West Bengal and Maharashtra pay, by far, the biggest costs in terms of jobs
lost – accounting for more than half of gross job losses. States such as West
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Figure 11.10 Measuring the costs of regulations on employment by states.
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Bengal, Maharashtra, Gujarat and Rajasthan pay the costs in terms of thousands of
factories that do not exist because of IDA regulations. This is because these states
have more stringent labor regulations relative to the rest of states.
Finally, there is also some evidence that the use of contract labor across dif-
ferent states in the 1990s may have helped to reduce somewhat the costs of job-
security regulations in terms of output but it has not done away with all the
effects of regulations.
The adverse effects of labor laws in India do not circumscribe to the IDA.
There are too many laws in place. A relatively large employer in western India
would need to be knowledgeable about, on average, 28 acts. There are inevitably
overlaps, and workers and employers have an incentive to seek protection not
granted in one by recourse to another. The dynamics of legislation has been
politically driven, with the result that a new demand for a specific law has
usually been met by framing a new Act without changing the contents of the old
one. Key concepts such as worker or factory have ambiguous meanings and are
defined differently across Acts. For example, while the IDA excludes a number
of undertakings including educational institutions from the concept of industry,
the courts have held that skilled or unskilled workers in educational institution
are employed by an industry, while teachers cannot be treated as workmen. As
services are becoming increasingly important, it is unclear how the concepts of
industry or workman are applied in the service sector.12
The former analysis is not to say that any labor regulations will have a negat-
ive effect on employment. But laws such as chapter Vb, which, as seen in the
former section are more restrictive than anywhere else in the world, destroy, not
protect, jobs. So it does the dispute-settlement mechanism. There has been a
crowding out of the enterprise-level and local institutions by the state and the
courts. It is not being suggested that firm-level institutions are necessarily more
efficient than industry-level ones. However, the weakening of one of these levels
limits the choice for both employers and workers, and, hence, potentially raises
the costs of disputes. Sometimes legislation bears upon private contracts and
squeeze private negotiations. Mechanisms at the firm level have often not been
allowed to strengthen and grow; rather, these have been stifled. A third problem
is that there is too much uncertainty regarding the interpretation of laws. For
examples, in a 1970 case of a factory closure in Mumbai that progressed from
the labor court to the Supreme Court, the legality of the closure was decided on
the meaning of the word ‘undertaking’, and was decided in favor or the workers.
In Premier Automobiles v. Engineering Mazdoor Sabha, 1971, the Bombay
High Court ruled that the precise provisions of a contract depended on whether
or not the matter under dispute (in this case ‘ex-gratia payment’) was implied by
the parties when a contract was drawn.
The effect of minimum-wage laws
With individual states having as many as 40 or more minimum wages in place
set by both central and state governments, minimum-wage regulations in India
are as complex as other labor laws. Within the agricultural sector alone there are
minimum wages for ploughing, weeding, sowing, transplanting harvesting, win-
nowing, threshing picking and herding. In the construction industry, stone
breaking has eight minimum wages, set by the central government, differenti-
ated by the thickness around an inch of the stone broken. There are also floor
minimum wages set by the state governments for unskilled workers.
One result of this complexity is that minimum wages are not well enforced.
A large share of workers, some 40 percent of agricultural workers and 21
percent of urban casual workers (top panel of Figure 11.11) get wages below the

























































Figure 11.11 Minimum wages and employment (source: Wage data from NSS.
Minimum wage data from Indiastat.com).
Notes
Top panel: Share of workers below state minimum wages for unskilled workers. Bottom panel:
Minimum wages as a % of average wages in NSS regions.
lowest minimum wage (typically the one set for unskilled casual workers). Such
figures, however, are likely to underestimate lack of compliance. Regarding the
level, in most states, minimum wages are considerably below average wages for
casual workers, both in agricultural activities and in urban jobs (bottom panel in
Figure 11.11).
The data suggests a strong effect of minimum wages in supporting wages for
unskilled casual workers in urban and rural areas. Such impact can be seen in
the distribution of casual wages by states, presented in Figure 11.12, which
show an important spike of rural and urban casual wages around the unskilled
workers’ minimum wage. The data also shows an important correlation between
casual wages for agricultural and for urban workers and minimum wages across
regions and over the periods in 1993–1994 and 1999–2000 (Figure 11.13). This
is the case even after controlling for state fixed effects that can take into account
other factors that determine the level of minimum wages.
Preliminary analysis suggests that minimum wages may be supporting the
wages of less skilled workers without apparent costs on employment. A separate
exercise indicate that unemployment (UPS) and underemployment rates (CDS)
in the different states do not appear to be related to minimum wages even after
we allow for fixed effects. A preliminary conclusion of this analysis is that
minimum wages for unskilled workers could be welfare enhancing as they raise
wages for unskilled poor workers without reducing employment or increasing
unemployment significantly. Such a conclusion, however, is only tentative in
that in need to be supported by further analysis. However, it points to an area of
major policy importance that has been greatly under-researched as it can imply
that a streamlined regime of minimum wages could be welfare enhancing for
those in more need.
Conclusions and way forward
Markets need adequate institutional infrastructure to thrive.13 This implies an
appropriate set of regulations, effective law-enforcement institutions and a fair
and efficient mechanism to settle disputes. In India, the labor-regulation debate
is often portrayed as a choice between strict regulations and lawlessness.
However, it should be more appropriately defined as a choice between keeping
arcane regulations and institutions versus adopting a new market infrastructure
that effectively advances the cause of workers. In this chapter, we have
reviewed the system of regulations, law-enforcement and dispute resolution
that supports Indian labor markets and found it to do very little to improve
workers’ welfare. By inhibiting job creation, capital accumulation and techno-
logy upgrades, this system deprives workers from employment opportunities
while sustaining low productivity, low wages and poor work conditions. The
complexity of the legal framework makes it impossible to enforce, which in
turns leads to widespread corruption, a higher cost of doing business and no
gains for workers. Labor disputes take forever to be resolved, creating inordi-
nate amounts of uncertainty for all parties. This is not a status quo worth
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Figure 11.12 Clustering of urban and rural casual wages and minimum wages by state kernel distribution of urban and rural casual wages
(source: Own estimates based on NSS and minimum wage data from Indiastat.com).








































Figure 11.13 Rural and urban wages. (a) Rural agricultural wages and minimum wages
regions in 50th and 55th rounds. (b) Urban casual wages and minimum
wages by regions in 50th and 55th rounds (source: NSS and Ministry of
Labor for minimum wages. Adjusted R squared for the two estimates at
0.85 and 0.75 respectively).
defending. To create a new institutional infrastructure that can truly advance
the cause of workers and promote growth it is necessary to expand the reform
debate beyond labor regulations to areas such as dispute resolution, adjudica-
tion, labor inspections and labor policy. Below, we describe what in our view
would be some of the required transformations:
1 It is necessary to consolidate all Acts into a single law on labor relations
dealing with the following aspects: (i) wages and conditions of work;
(ii) social security; (iii) hiring and termination procedures; (iv) trade unions;
(v) industrial disputes; (vi) health and safety provisions. In addition, key
concepts such workman and factory, whose meaning and coverage is
ambiguous and varies among Acts should be clarified and harmonized.
2 The resolution of industrial disputes should be rationalized in several ways.
First, “right disputes” – that is those disputes that are based on a legal -
right – and “interest disputes” – those which are not based on any existing
rights – need to be distinguished. Only the first class of disputes should be a
matter of adjudication. Disagreements belonging to the second class should be
solved by means of collective bargaining, or if that fails, conciliation and
arbitration mechanisms (Nath 2005). A corollary is that the machinery for
conciliation should be strengthened, by giving conciliator officers powers cur-
rently awarded to the Board of Conciliator, making conciliation a compulsory
step prior to adjudication, giving appropriate training and incentives to
officers so they don’t succumb to pressures from different groups (Hazra
2005), addressing the shortage of well-trained, high-caliber presiding officers
in labor courts and tribunals (Hazra 2005), and eliminating over-regulatory
and impractical clauses and adopting procedures to expedite the resolution of
disputes (i.e., the possibility of adjournments and delays should be limited,
the possibility that cases once rejected can be subsequently referred without
new facts arising should be eliminated). Finally, the possibility of raising old
disputes should be limited to one year (section 10 of the IDA) (Hazra 2005).
3 Regulation needs to evolve from protecting the job to protecting the worker.
Change, transformation and upgradation are the engines of economic
growth, and the legal framework requires to be sensitive to these needs.
This in turn implies transforming current provisions aimed at ensuring job
security into mechanisms that protect the incomes and welfare of those
workers adversely affected by technological change or market fluctuations.
More concretely such reforms would imply the following steps:
a Strengthening compensation for retrenchment and firm closure. The
current compensation contemplated in IDA is well below the standards
of developing countries, and although in line with those prevalent in
developed countries, workers in industrial countries have access to
other forms of unemployment insurance. A compensation of one month
per year of work, with an upper maximum of 8–11 months pay, would
be in line with international standards.14 However, it is necessary to
trade off the insurance properties of such compensation with the pos-
sible disincentives for job creation. To minimize such disincentives,
and quite importantly, to insure that workers receive the compensation
in times of need, additional institutional mechanisms are required. One
such mechanism is to mandate that firms regularly deposit a certain per-
centage of workers’ wages in a financial institution account open for
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that purpose. Compensations to workers would then be paid out of the
funds secured in the account or fund, which would prevent sick or
closing firms from defaulting from their obligations. Building funds for
a rainy day would allow increasing the very meager compensation that
workers now received in case of closure to the same level that compen-
sations awarded for retrenchment. To make these possible, firms who
default from their contributions ought to be considered in serious
breach of the law and penalized. A slightly different alternative, already
in effect in some Latin American countries (Colombia, Peru, Ecuador
and somewhat differently in Brazil), is to create individual accounts for
each worker to which firms deposit a certain percentage of the worker’s
wage every month.15 The funds in the account are the property of the
worker and can be accessed in the event the worker is laid off,
retrenched or quits the job. These funds then act as an unemployment
insurance providing income support while the worker searches for
another job.
b Reduce incentives of parties to recur to adjudication. Section 11-A of
the IDA which gives discretion to labor courts and tribunals to reinstate
the worker should be eliminated. Labor Courts should be endowed with
the power to seek payments from firms to workers but not to direct
reinstatement.
c Eliminating section 25G which stabilizes procedure for retrenchment.
Section 25G establishes that when a worker is to be retrenched, the
employer should start by the last person hired. In the current fast-
changing environment, this section penalizes firms that seek to hire
and maintain workers with the latest up-to-date skills, relative to firms
that rely on experience. It does not do much for incentives as older,
higher-experience workers have their posts secured even if they don’t
perform in their jobs.
d Making job-search assistance and training available to workers
affected by retrenchment. The most successful income-support mechan-
ism for a worker that loses his or her job is to find a similar or better job
as fast as possible. Labor policy should assist workers to that end.
e Eliminating the provisions related to seeking government permission
for retrenchment and closure (Chapter Vb). It has been proposed that
chapter Vb be applicable only to industrial undertakings having 300
or more employees (report of second commission of Labor; Hazra
2005 among others). While such extension would reduce the adverse
effects that this provision creates in the labor market, and make
reform more acceptable to proponents of the status quo, it would still
maintain strong disincentives for firms to grow above this size thresh-
old. Yet, if firms are to seize the opportunities afforded by the global
economy and take advantage of economies of scale, they will need to
grow considerably in size. Inhibiting this process will cost India high
280 A. Ahsan et al.
paid jobs, since it is a well-established fact that wages increase with
the size of a firm.16 More generally, labor laws should avoid penaliz-
ing firms’ growth.
4 Contract labor should not constitute a form of avoidance of labor laws. Con-
tracting out work allows firms to concentrate in their core business and
improve overall competitiveness. However, in very regulated labor markets,
contract labor becomes a form of avoidance. Enacting comprehensive labor
reforms is required to reduce the incentives to over-rely on this type of
employment and improve the welfare of contract labor workers. As compre-
hensive reforms in the labor market take place, the use of contract labor
becomes less distorted. Nonetheless, regulations on contract labor (and
more generally on all those forms of work other than regular indefinite con-
tracts) should strike a balance between the search for efficiency and the
need to provide adequate protection to non-permanent workers. Labor laws
should apply to the contractor in his/her relationship with the contract
worker. Thus, for instance, in a reformed scenario along the lines proposed,
contractors would have to make contributions to a Retrenchment Compen-
sation Fund or to make regular contributions to workers’ individual
accounts. Such funds would be made available to the contract worker in the
event the relationship between the contract labor worker and the contractor
ends (see, however, that if a relationship between a principal employer and
a contract worker ends but the contractor is prepared to place this worker in
another firm at a similar wage then the end of the employment relationship
between the contract worker and the principal employer would not be con-
sidered retrenchment)17 It is also imperative to promote and facilitate train-
ing of contract workers.
5 Strengthen labor inspections and labor-law enforcement. Firms devote
too much valuable time to deal with inspections, while inspectors enjoy
inordinate powers to extract unofficial payments. Inspections should be
targeted and publicly pre-announced. Firms to be inspected should be
selected based on formal complaints raised by workers’ representatives
and for the group of firms where no complains are raised, inspections
should be targeted based on which firms are more likely to evade the law.
Inspectors should focus on technical assistance and not just sanctions,
which in turn requires that inspectors be appropriately trained to be able to
perform. On this issue, the ILO recommends not funding the inspectorate
from revenue generated from fines, as it inhibits the educational/promo-
tional role of the inspector. Some initiatives such as employer-generated
implementation plans (EGIP) have produced good results in other coun-
tries. Employers can tailor an implementation plan and policies to suit
their needs. They report to the inspectorate on progress against self-
defined benchmarks in their annual plan for improving working con-
ditions. Compliance is more likely since employers and often, as
recommended, workers “own” the strategy. Other useful strategies are
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providing special educational components and information provision to
small and medium (SME) firms. Other important measures are to build a
culture of compliance through mass-media campaigns and education in
business schools and professionalize inspections providing adequate train-
ing and compensation.
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12 Strengthening employment and
social security for unorganized-
sector workers in India
Philip O’Keefe and Robert Palacios1
Introduction
This chapter examines two approaches to promoting employment and social
security for the labor force in India: (i) public works programs; and (ii) initi-
atives to provide social security for unorganized workers. A common objective
of both types of interventions is consumption smoothing for unorganized-sector
workers. While the modes of worker protection differ, the common theme is
exploring the potential for public interventions to address market failures which
may contribute directly and indirectly to poor welfare and labor-market out-
comes in India.
The structure of the chapter is: the next section looks at public-works
schemes in India. It first outlines the objectives of public works, before explor-
ing spending trends and employment and other outcomes. A discussion of
factors driving outcomes follows, before a review of the National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act (NREG) and conclusions. The following section
focuses on social security for unorganized workers. It first outlines inter-
national experience in expansion of social protection. A review of recent initi-
atives in India follows. This is followed by review of evidence on membership
of intermediary organizations of unorganized workers. Conclusions and recom-
mendations follow.
The motivation for this chapter includes the following:
• One of the factors driving chronic and transient poverty in India is unin-
sured risks faced by households. There is thus an equity rationale for under-
standing the role for public policy in helping households deal with risks and
shocks related to unemployment, health and death, maternity and sickness,
and unprotected old age.
• Uninsured risks and associated credit and insurance market failures may
contribute to low productivity in the unorganized sector, particularly in agri-
culture. If this is so, there is a dynamic efficiency motive for understanding
the role of policy in risk management.2
• GoI (Government of India) has placed an increased policy emphasis on both
public works and social security for unorganized-sector workers in its CMP
(Common Minimum Program). This makes it important to understand what
are the realistic expectations for public programs, in the light of experience
in India and internationally.
• One objection to greater flexibility in labor regulations in India is the
absence of a functional safety net. Understanding more about public inter-
ventions to provide social-security and employment support to workers may
therefore be relevant to debates on labor regulation.
The objectives of the chapter are:
• To assess the role of both public-works and social-security initiatives in
promoting consumption smoothing by unorganized-sector households in
the face of predictable fluctuations in income-related to seasonal labor
demand, and unpredictable fluctuations due to covariate and idiosyncratic
shocks.
• To draw lessons for initiatives which may help in improving the impact of
public interventions on the social risk-management strategies of unorganized-
sector workers.
Public works schemes3
Objectives of public works
It is important to examine the objectives of public-works programs in order to
assess workfare in India. They include:
• The transfer impact, i.e., direct transfer benefits to participating households.
This impact is often equated with the employment impact, though the latter
is properly considered as an intermediate activity.
• Impacts on overall wage levels, which may be felt by participating and non-
participating households whose incomes are below the post-program area
wage. The positive impact may be offset by negative impacts on labor
demand from higher wages.
• Indirect impacts from the economic benefits of assets created under works
schemes. These would typically be spread among a wider population than
participants, so that the economic returns on assets to the poor will affect
the distributional impact of workfare.
• The consumption smoothing or insurance function that schemes perform by
acting as an effective wage floor. Whether or not households participate in
the program, insurance benefits may promote less risk-averse behavior in
production and portfolio choices.
• Skills development impacts for workfare participants, through work or
training provided.4
• Impacts on gender and other socio-economic relations due to features such
as equal pay for equal work, increased female labor-force participation, etc.
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• Community-empowerment impacts which may arise through reliance on
communities at different stages of sub-project planning and identification,
beneficiary selection, works execution and monitoring.
Evolution of policy and expenditures on public works in India
Since the 1970s, public works have been an important component of the Indian
safety net, with a succession of programs, both centrally sponsored and state-
specific. This assessment focuses on the major central-works programs. While
changes in programs have been frequent, much of the development has been
rebranding rather than fundamental reform. The most significant policy shift in
the 1990s has been the increased role for PRIs (Panchayat Raj Institutions).
However, even this shift, which is clear in the guidelines of workfare programs
(and very thorough in NREG) has been more mixed than policies might indicate.
The more recent policy shift has been from scheme-based provision of works to
a legislatively backed 100-day rural-employment guarantee under NREG.
Figure 12.1 shows spending for recent years on works schemes as a share of
total central government expenditure and GDP, and in real terms. There was a
clear fall in total spending as a share of GDP and government spending between
1995 and 2003–2004, to around a third of spending shares in the early 1990s.
Spending in real terms tracked the decline in government spending share. While
this trend has reversed in most recent years, spending shares remain below their
high point. While the decline and recent reversal is the most notable feature, it is






























































































Figure 12.1 Spending on main public works programs, various indicators (sources: Rural
Development Ministry to 2002/2003; MOF revised budget estimates for
2003–2005 and GoI total spending).
Note
Real 1993 Rs. adjusted by agricultural laborer consumer prince indices (CPI) (RBI series).
interesting to note the upticks in 1993–1994 and 2003–2004, i.e., years preceding
national elections.5
Impacts of public-works schemes
What has been the performance of public-works programs with respect to their
objectives? Unfortunately, both administrative and household data allow only
partial answers. This is due to two reasons:
• Administrative data on employment generated are ‘based only on arithmetic
calculation’ (CAG 1997), i.e., work days generated are calculated back-
wards from total spending on an assumed 60:40 split between wages and
materials. Survey-based assessments throw doubt on these estimates.
• The NSS has to date asked households only about participation in public
works of more than 60 days.6 NSS coverage rates for public works can
therefore be considered the lower bound.
Direct-employment effects
Figure 12.2 shows the administrative estimates of work days from the major
works programs from 1993 to 2004, as well as aggregate rainfall data. As with
spending share, employment-generation performance declined between the mid-
1990s and early 2000s.
The level of public-works employment generated has been far lower than
program objectives would suggest. Average annual employment per BPL
household under SGRY in 2001–2004 came to only around 6.7 days, assuming
that all workdays were for BPL.7 The same work days spread across the
agricultural workforce would mean around two days work per worker.8 Such


















































































Figure 12.2 Work days of public employment and rainfall, various years (source: RD
Ministry; Indiastat.com for rainfall data).
Note
Rainfall is measured by variation from annual mean rainfall.
employment-generation figures are lower than JRY and EAS, which had an
average of 16 days employment per BPL household under JRY and 15 days per
registered EAS worker in 1992–1999. The fall in employment seems broadly
consistent with real spending since the mid-1990s.
Statewise employment-generation figures for SGRY suggest that the aggreg-
ate employment effect of workfare in all states is very low, with even outliers
such as Assam and Orissa generating less than ten days work per agricultural
worker, and none but Assam and Karnataka generating more than 15 days
SGRY employment per BPL household.
At the household level, NSS allows for examination of works coverage. As
noted, NSS is an imperfect source on the issue. Nevertheless, comparisons
across states and time are possible, and include any public works undertaken.
A few observations emerge:
• At the all-India level, the coverage rate is lower in each subsequent period,
from 4.8 percent in 1987/1988, to 4.3 percent in 1993/2004 to 2.9 percent in
1999/2000. Given that works reliance is likely to vary by year depending on
exogenous factors, not too much should be read in by way of a trend. This
can be seen in state-specific coverage rates, which in a number of cases
exhibit more pronounced inter-temporal variance, with a different pattern to
the all-India.
• For 1987–1988, public works were able to respond well to a severe drought
year. Drought data on a disaggregated basis needs to be explored to
examine the responsiveness of works programs to more localized covariate
shocks.
• Average coverage rates in the North-East have remained notably higher,
reaching as high as 22 percent in Tripura and 30 percent in Arunachal
Pradesh in some years.
Targeting of public works
Targeting of public works is more progressive than all other major anti-poverty
programs with the relatively high coverage rate in the poorest quintile and
among ST households.9 Results from a 2004/2005 national survey for
SGRY/FFW indicate progressive coverage across wealth groups, though low
overall coverage even for the poorest. Nonetheless, the high relative coverage
rates in the bottom quintile and among ST households places public works as the
best program performer in distributional terms (see Table 12.1).
The positive targeting performance of public works from national data is
supported by recent evidence from a three-state study in Orissa, Karnataka
and MP in 2006. Particularly for the Food-for-Work program, coverage in the
lowest quartile was relatively high (around 57 percent higher than the
population average), while coverage among ST households was well above
the population average, by almost 80 percent in the case of SGRY (Dev et al.
2001).
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The above analysis assesses targeting in terms of average incidence. This
may be misleading where there are marginal adjustments in budgets. Analysis
from 1993–1994 indicates that average benefit incidence underestimates the
gains to poor households from increased spending on works (Lanjouw and
Ravallion 1999). While the marginal odds of participation are lower for nearly
all groups than averages, the relative reduction in odds is significantly less for
the poor than for higher income quintiles (Table 12.2).
What has been driving employment outcomes in India’s public
works?
What are some of the explanations for such a wide gap between the employment
commitments of public-works programs and outcomes? Several factors appear
to be at work.
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Table 12.1 Coverage of SGRY/FFW by wealth and social group, 2004/2005
Beneficiary % of all SGRY Median daily Benefit incidence 
households HHs from wage rate (% benefit captured)
Poorest 0.7 57.3 50 48.9
Q2 0.2 18.0 50 15.3
Q3 0.2 13.9 52 12.3
Q4 0.1 7.2 80 9.8
Richest 0.1 3.6 220 13.5
Brahmin 0.1 0.7 140 1.9
OBC 0.2 33.9 50 33.3
SC 0.3 23.6 50 23.1
ST 0.9 31.0 50 30.4
Other 0.1 10.9 52 11.1
All-India 0.3 100 50 100
Sources: NCAER HD survey 2004/05; Ajwad (2006) for estimates.
Note
Benefit incidence assumes equal number of work days.
Table 12.2 Average and marginal odds of participation in Indian workfare programs,
1993–1994
Quintile Average odds of Marginal odds of M/A
participation in participation in 
workfare (A) workfare (M)
1 (poorest) 1.23 1.16 94.2
2 1.13 0.93 82.3
3 1.04 0.80 76.9
4 0.86 0.92 107.0
5 0.83 0.55 66.3
Source: Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999).
In employment terms, falling real spending since the mid-1990s has been
reinforced by rising real wages on works in the 1990s (Table 12.3). Between
1993/1994 and 1999/2000, average annual growth in real earnings on works was
3.8 percent, which was higher than growth rates for casual rural laborers in and
out of agriculture (Sundaram 2001). By the late 1990s, public-works wages were
21 percent (for men) and 38 percent (for women) higher than average wages in
casual agricultural labor (Sundaram 2001b using NSS 1999–2000 data). While
public-works schemes generally do not aim at paying less than minimum wages,
around 75 percent of all work days on rural casual labor were below agricultural
minimum wages, with the share above 90 percent in AP, Bihar and Orissa
(Murgai and Ravallion 2005).
Although above-market wages should induce high demand for participation,
budgetary resources are in practice constrained. Indian and international
experience suggests that program wages above market rates result in rationing of
employment on works (Ravallion et al. (1993); re Maharashtra EGS; and Sub-
barao 2003). It is interesting to compare information on wages in public works
internationally, which shows mixed experience on the relationship. Generally,
programs considered to be more successful (e.g., Trabajar; Korea; MEGS pre-
1988) were more likely to have program wages below market wages. However,
the position in India is subject to legal precedent that program wages below
minimum wages are illegal (Papola 2005).
Public-works programs do not appear to have met the 60:40 labor to capital
ratio, although the official method of calculating work days makes this hard to
confirm. However, a survey-based EAS evaluation for 1993–1997 found that no
category of works met the 60 percent wage component criterion, with the
national average share of wages to total expenditure at 47.5 percent. Further-
more, only three of 14 major states (West Bengal, Orissa and Maharashtra) met
the 60 percent wage target across activities. In contrast, several states had much
lower wage shares, with Bihar at 27 percent, Haryana at 30 percent and
Rajasthan at 33 percent (Program Evaluation Organization of Planning Commis-
sion 2002).
Another factor which may impact the labor intensity of public works is the
extent of reliance on contractors. Though little evidence exists of contractors
systematically using more labor-intensive methods, a GoI review of EAS indic-
ates that even a 10–15 percent profit margin for contractors would reduce the
labor budget per unit of spending.10 Evidence in India on the extent of reliance
on contractors in public works is mixed. A 2005 MRD evaluation of SGRY
found use of contractors was substantially lower than previous evidence had
indicated. At national level, contractors were reported to be involved in only 14
percent of assets, with significant state variations (e.g., Rajasthan, in only 2.4
percent of assets created, while Kerala reported for two-thirds of assets and
Karnataka just over a third).
The findings should be viewed in light of other evidence, which seems diffi-
cult to reconcile. A 2005 study for RD [Rural Development] Department in
Orissa found contractors in over 92 percent of SGRY assets (against a figure of
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Table 12.3 Daily wages for various agricultural labor activities, 1993/1994 and 1999/2000
Work type Rural males (Rs/day) Rural females (Rs/day)
1993–1994 1999–2000 Annual rate of 1993–1994 1999–2000 Annual rate of 
(1993–1994 prices) growth (1993–1994 prices) growth
Public works 24.65 30.89 3.83% 18.52 24.87 5.04%
Casual agricultural labor 21.59 25.48 2.8% 15.12 17.99 2.94%
Casual non-agricultural labor 30.15 37.49 3.7% 17.46 23.49 5.07%
Casual labor all activities 23.18 28.65 3.59% 15.33 18.51 3.19%
Source: Sundaram (2001).
25 percent for Orissa in the national study).11 A village study in AP of the state’s
food-for-work program in 2001–2002 found that all works were executed by
contractors, and that, in the large majority of cases, sarpanches were the contrac-
tors.12 Finally, a recent study of SGRY in Kerala, Karnataka, Rajasthan and
West Bengal found regular use of contractors, despite the prohibition in guide-
lines (World Bank 2006).
Despite commitments to full rural coverage, the share of villages covered by
works schemes has been far less than complete. Assessment of EAS for
1993–1997 found that only 53 percent of villages had any works, with some
states much lower. More strikingly, the proportion of villages covered in all
four years was only 5.4 percent.13 Analysis from 2002 NSS village data con-
firms that partial spatial coverage has continued, with only 48.5 percent of vil-
lages (56.4 percent of population) reporting any public-employment program
in the past year (Figure 12.3). Overall, there is substantial inter-state variation
in coverage, with village (population) coverage as low as 20 (25) percent in
Jharkhand and 11 (18) percent in Punjab. In addition, there is for all states
(except Kerala) a higher likelihood of works having been available in the pre-
vious year in larger villages. At the all-India level, rural population coverage is
around 16 percent higher than village coverage unweighted for population,
with the large village effect particularly pronounced in states such as Bihar,
Gujarat and Punjab.
Timing of public works has often not been well matched to seasonal employ-
ment needs, with difficulties in matching peak periods of public-works provision
with periods of lowest market demand. This can be seen in Figure 12.4 for





























































Figure 12.3 Share of villages and village population covered by public-employment
programs in previous year, 2002 (source: NSS 58th round, 2001/2002. Bank
staff estimates).
Maharashtra, which shows public-works employment dropping sharply in the
monsoon when market-based work is least available. Recent analysis of MEGS
indicates that this pattern has continued.14 It is consistent with findings in
Rajasthan that works have typically been carried out during January–March,
when opportunity costs of labor are high.15 Part of the issue is that certain works
cannot be executed during the lean season due to monsoon. This is reinforced by
budgeting practices which concentrate disbursements for works in the final
quarter of fiscal.
The persistence of implementation problems in public works has detracted
from employment (and other) impacts. The problems are in general related to
lack of accountability in workfare design, financing and management. Issues in
GoI’s assessments of public works and external assessments include (CAG 1997
and 2000; PEO 2000; Nayak et al. 2002; World Bank, forthcoming):
• Leakage and parking of funds. CAG reports point both to leakage of funds
and parking of significant funds in deposit and other accounts. Parked funds
show up in public accounts as executed but in fact remain undisbursed.
• Prioritization of works by line departments rather than PRIs.
• Lack of reliable records, in particular muster rolls. Survey evidence on the
NFFW program from six states indicates that unavailable and fudged
muster rolls continue to be a serious issue. At the same time, the study
found that the practice had reduced sharply in Rajasthan in the face of better
public information and community-level activism, suggesting that simple
improvements in access to information can improve outcomes (Roy and
Dreze, The Hindu, August 15, 2005).





































































Figure 12.4 The seasonality of MEGS employment (source: Subbarao, 1993 and 1997).
• Lack of both strong administrative monitoring and evaluation and absence
of “bottom up” monitoring through mechanisms such as social audits.
Other impacts from public-employment schemes
Measuring other impacts of public-employment schemes is more challenging.
For several impacts, there are simply no data available. This includes impacts on
overall wage levels, economic benefits of assets created, community empower-
ment and skill development impacts. On other indicators, research provides sug-
gestions on the direction and scale of impacts, but is typically very much
localized. The evidence on other impacts of works includes the following.
Female labor-force participation in SGRY appears to be lower than general
rural female participation rates. Data from a 2005 evaluation of SGRY16 show
that the all-India share of SGRY female participants was only 12 percent, which
is similar to CAG findings on JRY and EAS of only around 16 percent female
beneficiaries (the target share was 30 percent). In states such as UP, Bihar and
Punjab, females’ participation in public works is very low, at less than 2 percent.
Interestingly, the survey-based results above appear to diverge from administra-
tive data for the same year, which report around 26 percent of person days
generated for women.17 The figures compare unfavorably with estimates of
females by usual status in the rural workforce of around 35 percent in 2000.18
It is difficult to estimate the economic impact from assets in Indian works
schemes. Given the importance of rates of return on assets in assessing program
impact, this is unfortunate, though a common problem in workfare worldwide.
Qualitative evidence available from GoI and other evaluations largely relates to
quality of assets rather than rates of return.19 A common criticism of public
works is that they are ‘washed away the next monsoon’. In light of this view, the
findings of a beneficiary survey are intriguing.20 Both at all-India level and in all
states, beneficiaries finding the quality of works very good or good dominated.
This needs to be interpreted with caution, both because of possibly low expecta-
tions of beneficiaries, and because the survey found that only 31 percent of
respondents were aware of quality specifications for works. Evidence from EAS
also indicates that public-works-assets maintenance is poor, so that even decent-
quality assets may deteriorate quickly (CAG 2000). A challenge for the NREG
will be developing cost-effective methods for estimating quality and rates of
return on assets.
The insurance and associated productivity impacts of public works are also
difficult to measure absent rigorous evaluations. However, what evidence there
is for India suggests a positive insurance function of public works, with atten-
dant impacts on production decisions. A study from the 1980s in Maharashtra
found that income variability among landless agricultural households in villages
where MEGS was available was half the level of villages where it was not
(Walker et al. 1986). Farmer studies in Maharashtra also find greater adoption of
higher risk/return agricultural practices (Devereux 2005), though how much this
can be attributed to MEGS is unclear.
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The national rural employment guarantee (NREG)
GoI has in recent years committed to major expansion in public works, initially
with the National Food-for-Work program from 2004, and since 2006 through
NREG. Overall, it is too early to make conclusions on the effects of NREG on
parameters such as poverty, labor markets and the local economy. Nonetheless,
relative to previous public-works schemes, there are a number of design features
of NREG which are very sensible, and in many states there has been greater
political and institutional commitment to trying to ‘make the scheme work’.
That said, the summary of initial implementation experience suggests that
implementation is highly variable across (and even within) states, and that there
remain major challenges in implementation.
Ex ante estimates of NREG impacts
Given the early stage of implementation, simulations of scheme impacts carried out
prior to initiation remain worthy of consideration to look at the potential impacts of
NREG. The main findings are the following (Murgai and Ravallion 2005).
ESTIMATED LABOR-SUPPLY EFFECTS
In terms of labor supply, an NREG wage rate close to Rs.60 at current prices21
could induce a 5 percentage point increase in lean-season labor supply among
casual rural workers. Interestingly, the incremental labor supply impact of a
wage rate above Rs.60 is negligible for all groups. The overall wage elasticity of
labor supply is estimated to be 0.17.
The estimated labor-supply impact can also be presented in terms of expected
number of rural people presenting for work on a typical day in the lean season,
and this can be broken down by gender. This is presented in Table 12.4, together
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Table 12.4 Estimated labor-supply effects of lean season NREG
Expenditure quintile Pre-NREG lean-season Casual labor supply at NREG 
employment rate wage rate (1999–2000 prices)
Rs.50 Rs.55
Poorest 20% 34.5 41.7 41.8
Quintile 2 28.7 34.1 34.4
Quintile 3 24.5 29.3 29.4
Quintile 4 20.0 24.6 24.7
Richest 20% 12.2 15.6 15.7
Overall 23.8 28.9 29.0
Source: Murgai and Ravallion (2005).
Note
6/2005 equivalents of Rs.50 and 55 at 1999–2000 wages = Rs.63 and 69, using CPIAL index, adjusting
base by 13 percent to allow for differences in NSS casual male agricultural wages and AWI series.
with estimated fiscal costs at three wage rates. Some interesting observations
emerge:
• If the estimated supply response is realized, it would imply a total annual
provision of work days of around 3.9 billion once NREG is rolled out
nationwide. This compares to an annual average in 1999–2004 of closer to
600 million days annually on workfare programs – a more than six times
expansion once NREG reaches scale. Such expansion would not happen
immediately, due to initial implementation in backward districts, and other
factors. NREG thus implies huge additional demands on public-works
delivery systems in India.
• Fiscal costs are potentially substantial for a nationally implemented scheme.
The wage rates for NREG suggest fiscal costs of a nationwide program of
around 1.7–1.9 percent of GDP. The costs estimates are gross, and there
would be netting out of SGRY and NFFWP spending (which nationally ran
to around 0.2 percent of GDP in 2004–2005).
• The benefits of inducing higher female labor supply are fully realized at a
wage rate lower than state minimum agricultural wages. Nonetheless, in
absolute terms, more men than women would be expected to take up NREG
lean-season employment (though predicted female share is higher than
under SGRY) – see Table 12.5.
Poverty and distributional impacts of NREG
The estimated lean-season poverty-reduction impacts of NREG are significant,
and the distribution of gains progressive. At a wage equivalent to Rs.63 in 2006
prices, lean-season rural poverty could be reduced from 37 percent pre-NREG to
23 per cent or from 34 percent to 30 percent on an annualized basis. The distribu-
tion of gains would also be progressive, with around 54 percent of gainers in the
bottom two expenditure quintiles, and less than 10 percent in the top quintile.
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Table 12.5 Estimated labor supply by gender and as share of total casual labor, and
fiscal costs
Wage rate Estimated number of EGS As % of total Estimated fiscal
(1999/2000 applicants on typical day casual labor cost (% GDP)
prices
Males Females Total
Rs.45 24.4 14.0 38.4 35.7 1.5
Rs.50 25.0 14.0 39.0 36.2 1.7
Rs.55 25.3 14.0 39.3 36.6 1.9
Source: Murgai and Ravallion.
Notes
6/2005 equivalents of Rs.45, 50 and 55 1999/2000 wage rates = Rs.57, 63, and 69.
More notably, direct income gains from NREG would be around 51 percent of
pre-NREG lean season income for the bottom expenditure quintile (Murgai and
Ravallion 2005).
How has NREG done so far in practice?
This section presents administrative data on performance, before a summary of
several studies on initial implementation experience with NREG. Looking at
administrative data for the end of 2006 (as given in the organization’s website),
a few points are worth noting:
• NREG generated significant demand from rural households in its first nine
months of implementation, with 33.7 million rural households issued with a
job card, or approaching one quarter of all rural households. Even the lower
figure of 13.7 million households being provided employment approaches
10 percent of rural households. This is a major achievement in program
coverage relative to prior public-works schemes.
• There is a wide gap between those registered with NREG job cards and
those actually demanding work, with the latter around 42 percent of the
former. At the same time, the gap between those demanding and provided
work is negligible. This points to two features of demand manifestation.
The first is that households may register with no current intent to undertake
public works, exercising an implicit insurance function of the program. The
second – and more worrying – is the process through which work is
“demanded” under NREG. While the scheme is framed as on-demand, in
practice worksites have to be opened in a locality before people are likely to
come forward for work. This in turn requires a quorum of people expressing
a demand for work. This ‘chicken and egg’ issue suggests the importance of
the supply side even in such a demand-driven program.
• Program outcomes have been quite variable across states. Coverage of
NREG registration is high in absolute terms largely where one would expect
based on district concentration across states, though AP, MP and West
Bengal stand out on the upside, and North-Eastern states as laggards. Greater
variability can be seen on the supply of actual employment to those regis-
tered, which may reflect both demand - and supply-side effects. Of particular
note is Rajasthan, with easily the highest employment ratio of major NREG
states, reflecting a massive public awareness effort on the part of CBOs.
• Administrative data also indicate impressive inclusion of ST (scheduled
Tribe) households, and of women relative to previous public-works
schemes. Nationally, ST households account for around 39 percent of work-
days generated in 2006 (and as high as two-thirds in Rajasthan), a share that
far outstrips their general population share. In addition, the share of women
in total work days generated in 2006 was around 38.5 percent, and as high
as two-thirds in Rajasthan. This is a major improvement in female participa-
tion relative to SGRY.
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Beyond the administrative data, survey results from initial NREG implemen-
tation experience in a number of states provide useful insights, and identify
several key challenges in ensuring program effectiveness. The studies were
carried out in the first six months of implementation, so should be seen as identi-
fying very initial performance.
In the states surveyed, the composition of households who had received job-
card work under NREG indicates that the program has managed to sustain good
penetration among ST households that is seen in previous schemes. The cover-
age rate among ST households is high in absolute and relative terms (though not
in Bihar, where ST are a much smaller share of the population). Overall, it is too
early to comment reliably on the targeting outcomes of NREG, but the results
are promising.
Apart from the above, the surveys identify several implementation challenges
that are consistent with anecdotal reports from other NREG districts. They
include:
• Program wage rates. There has been tension between the program commit-
ment to payment of agricultural minimum wages and the reliance on piece
rates for wage payment. This has resulted in most states in actual wage pay-
ments which fall short of official minimum agricultural wages (Table 12.6).
This is due to rural schedules of rates for work which assume a level of
capital intensity not appropriate to a labor-intensive scheme such as NREG.
A number of states – e.g., Gujarat, AP, and Rajasthan – are addressing this
issue through general revisions of rural schedules of rates or setting of
NREG-specific rates (based on new time and motion studies), including in
AP a specific time and motion study for disabled workers.
• Role of communities in selection of works. In principle, gram sabhas have a
key role to play in identification of works under NREG. As of mid-2006,
such consultation was happening rarely in MP, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand,
and in AP the GP role was being undertaken by the Village Organization
which operates a CDD initiative (CBGA 2006). In Bihar, most GP-level
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Table 12.6 NREG wages received and agricultural MW by state, 2006
State Wage received Official minimum wage Actual as % of official
Chhattisgarh 15.5 58.8 26.4
Jharkhand 17.5 73.0 24.0
AP 44.5 88.0 50.6
Bihar 60.7 68.0 89.3
MP 18.0 61.4 29.3
Gujarat 49.2 60.0 82.0
Sources: CBGA (Chattisgarh, MP, AP and Jharkhand); IHD (Bihar); CDA (Gujarat), all 2006.
Notes
State averages are unweighted district averages.
sub-projects were selected by the mukhiya without gram sabha consultation,
and in Gujarat, households reported a gram sabha input to works identifica-
tion in only about a third of cases.
• The generally low capacity of PRIs to carry out a range of NREG functions
expected of them is a difficult challenge. Apart from works selection, GPs
are expected to mobilize field assistants and beneficiaries, keep asset, bene-
ficiary and financial records, and play an important role in social audits.
• There is no evidence of any state having paid an unemployment allowance
(UA) in cases where work has not been provided within the specified
period. This is important for two reasons. The first is that the ‘guarantee’ of
the Act is ineffective unless UA is paid in a timely manner. The second is
that states – which have to finance UA from their own budgets – will have
stronger incentives to improve implementation if UA is implemented.
Conclusions and recommendations on public works
Many of the appropriate reforms of public-works policy are reflected in NREG,
which represents the most serious effort to date to address the institutional and
implementation problems encountered in works schemes. Nonetheless, areas
that warrant particular attention as the program matures include:
• Continue and deepen awareness raising efforts on NREG entitlements, in
close collaboration with civil society. Initial results indicate that basic
awareness is still lacking in several states, and even in well-performing
states that knowledge of specific entitlements can be improved.
• Complete time and motion studies in major NREG states to assess the
appropriateness of piece-rate-payment schedules. The experiences of AP,
Gujarat and others are useful.
• Explore options for a wider range of authorized work activities which may
be done under NREG, in particular for those not capable of hard manual
labor. The NREG Act allows for this, but the option of expanding cat-
egories of works has yet to be exercised. As experience grows, this would
be worth looking at from several perspectives. The first is whether ‘softer’
work options – e.g., provision of community services for vulnerable
populations – could be introduced which have high positive externalities.
The second is looking at the needs of sub-groups of job-card holders for
whom special efforts may be needed to provide appropriate work, e.g.
disabled people.
• Deepen the direct involvement of communities in identification of works
undertaken under NREG. While it is understandable that the initial imple-
mentation would rely on shelves of works already identified, it will be
important to ensure that the role of gram sabhas anticipated under the Act is
made a reality, and that groups such as SHG and CBOs (Community-based
organizations) are mobilized to have their priorities reflected through the
gram sabha process.
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• Assess the ways in which demand for work is manifesting itself, and the
constraints – formal and informal – on matching that with supply of work-
sites and employment opportunities. This is probably the most difficult area
of NREG to operationalize effectively, and goes to the heart of what a
demand-driven approach means in practice. This will involve a principled
but practical look at such questions as the minimum number of workers
required at a worksite, how the bureaucratic demands of authorizing work-
site opening can be matched to demand, etc.
• Make states and communities aware of the unemployment allowance provi-
sion in the Act. This is essential if the guarantee function is to be credible.
• Continue to develop the capacity-building function allowed for under
NREG. Under the Act, a portion of funds are available for capacity building
of PRIs and others involved in NREG implementation. To date, this is still
to be developed, but will be a critical element of program success.
• Get ‘baselines’ in place for impact assessment. Unfortunately, there is no
solid pre-program baseline on NREG. However, efforts are being made to
provide for credible impact evaluations of poverty, labor-market and other
outcomes.
• Operationalize the central and state NREG councils to oversee implementa-
tion, and use them to promote exchange of good practice between states.
An additional issue for consideration is whether any element of direct human-
capital formation can be factored into NREG as it matures. Presently there is no
provision under NREG for skill formation among workers. This could be con-
sidered, along the lines of the South African public-works scheme. While such
an approach obviously requires a supply side – probably on a contracted basis –
which can provide useful training, it seems an interesting option to consider.
A final issue is that public works for the poor remain restricted to rural areas.
An issue for the consideration of policymakers is whether an expanded self-tar-
geted public-works program could be designed for implementation among the
urban poor. Such programs exist in the works schemes of a number of develop-
ing countries. While a small scheme (SJSRY) exists, its impacts to date appear
negligible and funding remains marginal (World Bank forthcoming).
Social insurance for the unorganized sector
As in many developing countries, unorganized-sector workers in India face an
array of uninsured risks, making them highly vulnerable to both idiosyncratic
and covariate shocks. While family, jati and other informal support networks
play an important role in smoothing consumption in the face of shocks, the
risk-sharing function they perform is far from perfect (and more effective for
idiosyncratic than covariate shocks, and for small as opposed to catastrophic
shocks).22 Recent work also demonstrates a link between reliance on jati
(caste) networks of mutual informal insurance and low rates of occupational
and geographical mobility found in rural India, with migration and marriage
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outside the jati triggering loss of access to finance in the face of shocks
(Munsi and Rosenzweig 2005). Credit- and insurance-market failures may thus
be limiting the ability of rural workers to seek more productive employment
opportunities.
Survey evidence confirms the impact of uninsured shocks on household
welfare. This is particularly the case for health shocks, and for the poor.23 For
example, at least 24 percent of Indians who are hospitalized fall into poverty as a
result (Peters et al. 2002). There are also concerns that credit-market failures
drive coping mechanisms which may turn transient into long-term and even inter-
generational poverty, e.g. withdrawal of children from school, debt-bondage, etc.
Such effects have been analyzed for countries such as Indonesia, which stress that
the benefits of social insurance in poor countries may come less from the direct
contribution to consumption smoothing than the reduction of coping strategies to
smooth consumption (Chetty and Looney 2005).
International context
Despite efforts, many developing countries have failed to extend insurance
coverage to the majority of workers typically found in the unorganized sector.
At the same time, international evidence since the nineteenth century indicates
that social security spending tends to increase sharply with rising income levels,
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Figure 12.5 Social insurance and assistance spending shares by region, and pension
coverage by GDP (sources: WDR (2006)).
or at least to increase sharply once a threshold level of GDP is attained (Lindert
2004). Important facts on this transition include:
• As countries become richer, the share of social protection spending in GDP
and total public spending tends to increase (Palacios and Paralles 2002;
Lindert 2004).
• Within social protection spending, social insurance typically accounts for an
increasingly higher share of GDP as countries become richer, while the
share of social assistance stabilizes at 2–3 percent of GDP (a level India
already approaches). The transition also involves an increased role for cash-
based interventions relative to food-based.
• Voluntary social-insurance systems have not resulted in major coverage
expansion, indicating that more formalized labor markets – where man-
dated participation can better be enforced – are closely associated with
higher coverage rates. The association between GDP per capita and manda-
tory pension coverage is shown in Figure 12.5.24 Experience with health-
insurance expansion in East Asia conforms to this pattern, with universal
coverage being achieved at income levels between US$5,000 and $10,000
and where formal-sector employment dominates.25
Current status of unorganized-sector social security in India26
Given the high rate of informality in Indian labor markets and level of income,
coverage of social insurance is predictably low and concentrated heavily in the
organized sector. Figure 12.6 provides coverage estimates of different social
insurance types for 2004/2005 across the distribution, showing not only the
failure of formal health and pension insurance systems to expand coverage,
but also the growing penetration of life insurance driven by the commercial-
insurance sector.
Recent approaches to social insurance (SI) for the unorganized sector
In the face of very low SI coverage of unorganized-sector workers, the public
(central and state), non-government and private sectors are all involved in
efforts to expand coverage. Various approaches are being tried with differing
degrees of success, in terms of reaching scale, achieving financial viability, and
providing financial protection to households. Each approach has advantages
and drawbacks, some inherent (e.g. viability in the face of covariate or catas-
trophic idiosyncratic shocks for community-based initiatives), and others a
product of specific design and implementation features. The main initiatives
described are:
• Welfare and provident funds for unorganized-sector workers at central and
state levels, which include both occupation-specific and generalized unorga-
nized sector funds.
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• GoI national schemes for unorganized-sector workers outside the welfare-
fund model.
• NGO and community-based initiatives, which range from coverage of spe-
cific SI types (usually health) to more bundled social-insurance packages.
Welfare and provident funds
Welfare funds (ILO 2004) have traditionally been occupation-specific schemes
providing a range of benefits for members. The earliest fund dates to 1946,
though they have proliferated since the late 1970s. It is difficult to obtain a com-
prehensive picture of funds due to their decentralized nature, both geographi-
cally and occupationally. Despite the lack of comprehensive coverage, patterns
emerge in terms of key features and challenges of welfare funds.
Most attention in discussion of welfare funds has been paid to the Keralan
funds, of which there were more than 20 by 2000. (Dev 2000; Kannan 2002),
and central government funds, of which there are five with central financing and
another with a central act but to be implemented and financed at state level.27
However, in terms of total coverage, funds in other states – initially in southern
and western states, but spreading in recent years to the north and east – have
accounted for an increasing share of participating workers since the 1990s.
The financing of welfare funds follows two basic models: (i) cess-financing,
which is used for all the central government funds, and may be a cess-proper or
excise duty; and (ii) contributory financing, which is either tripartite between






















Figure 12.6 Coverage rates of health, life and pension insurance by quintile, 2004/2005
(source: World Bank (forthcoming)).
government, employers and workers, or from employer and employee only.28 In
cases where government contributes to the second category of funds, the domin-
ant method is direct contribution. Management of the funds is either tripartite or
government only (in roughly equal proportion for documented funds). A few
things are apparent from looking at contribution rates and benefits of funds:
• Contribution rates exhibit dramatic variations across funds, from very low
amounts (e.g. AP and Karnataka Labor Welfare Funds), through more
significant absolute amounts (e.g. Kerala Cashew Workers), to quite sub-
stantial shares of worker compensation more akin to formal sector contribu-
tion rates (e.g. Maharashtra Mathadi Boards). More detailed analysis is
needed of the correlation between contribution rates and benefits offered.
However, initial examination suggests no systematic relationship.
• It appears that no financial/actuarial analysis has preceded the setting of
contribution rates and packages of entitlements. This is likely to show up
more starkly as the membership of funds ages. The long-term finances of
the Beedi Workers’ Fund demonstrate the impacts of membership ageing,
with expenditures in most of the 1980s well below income, but moving into
significant deficits after 1992 (Rajan 2001).
Although welfare funds tend to be characterized primarily as instruments of
social insurance, the picture with respect to benefits and services offered is more
complex. Education is the most commonly provided entitlement across funds,
followed by medical cover and then pensions. The benefits provided spread
beyond typical social insurance, raising concerns about the ability to provide
financial protection in the face of shocks. For the pensions portion of schemes,
the large majority are defined benefit programs, typically with benefits expressed
in nominal rupees and hence subject to deterioration in real value.
There is also major heterogeneity in the generosity of entitlements provided by
different funds. Given this, establishing typical expenditure patterns is not straight-
forward, as detailed spending information is available only for a limited number of
funds. For the central funds, the available data suggest the following (Rajan 2001):
• Health overwhelmingly dominates spending for all central funds except
Mica, where education is significant. This has been the case since at least
the early 1990s also.29
• Administrative costs are extremely high in the smaller funds. This poor
performance is remarkable given that financing is cess or excise based, and
should not demand the intensity of administration of funds based on contri-
butions.
• None of the central funds provide for old age, disability, sickness or life
insurance. The exception is the Building and Construction Workers’ Fund,
which is delegated to states. Below gives a recent example of a state-level
initiative to promote old-age pensions: a defined contribution provident
fund for unorganized-sector workers in West Bengal.
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Since 2001, West Bengal has operated a Provident Fund for workers in the
unorganized sector, not including agricultural workers. In 2006, enrolment
was around 700,000. Membership is open to wage and self-employed workers
in designated industries/activities (which are expanding over time) whose
family income is no more than Rs.3,500 per month (though the means test
appears to be rather informal). The key feature of the Fund is that it is a
defined contribution scheme. Members contribute Rs. 20 per month, with a
matching contribution from the state government. Interest accrues on the
account at a rate designated by government (the EPFO [Employee Provident
Fund Organization] rate to date). Accrued principal and interest is paid to the
worker at age 55 or at death or when there is no account activity for six
months.
Rapid expansion has been driven by a highly decentralized distribution
network and governance structure, with support from trade unions and political
parties in mobilizing awareness and interest. Collection agents are typically
public workers who are incentivized by a one rupee payment for each enrollee.
The state government covers the administration costs of the Fund. While the
West Bengal experience has great promise, particularly given its DC basis, it
remains to be seen whether the promotion and distribution success achieved is
replicable in states with less stable political institutions (LO 2004).
Welfare funds have potential as vehicles for expanding social insurance to
some segments of the unorganized sector, i.e. those amenable to a cess and/or
with strong presence of intermediary organizations which can share the transac-
tion costs of wide membership/low contribution schemes. They provide interest-
ing parallels to occupational social-insurance schemes in OECD countries at
earlier stages of development. Despite their potential, however, the evidence
suggests that they face a number of design and implementation challenges which
may constrain their ability to provide adequate and sustainable financial protec-
tion for members, including:
• The small and occupationally concentrated risk pools of a number of funds
risk driving high administrative costs and weak capacity to absorb signific-
ant covariate shocks. These challenges can be surmounted through group
insurance with commercial insurers, but it remains unclear to what extent
this has been exploited.
• The scope of benefits in many funds is likely to contribute to inadequate
financial protection for any specific type of benefit. This in turn risks bene-
fits becoming supplements to smaller and/or more predictable expenditures
rather than being focused on larger shocks.
• For the insurance-like benefits in welfare-fund-benefit packages, there
appears to be no actuarial basis for contribution determination. In light of
this, the extent to which the schemes can be considered insurance rather
than partial pre-payment schemes is an issue.
• There appears to be no example of a rigorous impact study of welfare-
scheme participation.
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Other government initiatives on social security for the 
unorganized sector
The government has in recent years increased efforts to expand social security to
unorganized-sector workers through non-welfare fund mechanisms (Planning
Commission 2002). This section provides a brief review of initiatives in recent
years.30 By way of context, it is important to note a couple of points on the insur-
ance industry in India. First, public and private insurance companies have
obligations under the IRDA (Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority)
for a minimal level of both social and rural coverage (Breman and Ahuja 2005).
Second, to date life and non-life insurance provision remains separated.
In 2004, GoI introduced a social-insurance scheme for unorganized-sector
workers (excluding agriculture), piloted in 50 districts nationwide and targeting
around 2.5 million workers.31 The scheme was managed by EPFO in collabora-
tion with ESIS for health services. It was voluntary and contributory for those
with monthly incomes under Rs.6,500 and provided for old-age, medical and
accident insurance. GoI contributed around Rs.250 annually per worker. Premia
for workers were Rs.50 per month for workers to 35 years and Rs.100 above
that. Employers were meant to contribute Rs.100 monthly. Workers covered the
employer contribution themselves in addition to their basic contribution when no
employer is identified. The scheme appears to have had negligible penetration,
with an estimated enrollment in mid-2005 of less than 10,000 and the scheme is
now dormant.
Another major initiative was the Universal Health Insurance Scheme (UHIS),
launched in 2003 (Ahuja and Narang 2005). This is a voluntary contributory
scheme for BPL households, covering medical costs of hospitalization, loss of
income during short-term-illness and death. There is a contribution subsidy from
GoI ranging from Rs.200–400, with net contribution from the worker ranging
from Rs.165 to Rs.300, depending on household size. In parallel, a scheme for
unorganized non-BPL households was introduced. Outcomes on UHIS appear
also to have been limited in the initial phases, with only around 400,000 house-
holds covered in the first year of operation (less than 5 percent of them BPL)
and a further 31,000 households up to January 2005.
Another important scheme targeted to the unorganized sector is offered by
the government-owned Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) called the Janashree
Bima Yojana (JBY) scheme. It covers 44 occupational groups, chosen to target
those living near the poverty line. The scheme pays Rs.20,000 for natural death,
50,000 for accidental death or permanent disability and 25,000 for partial
permanent disability. There is also a scholarship of Rs.300 per quarter per child
paid to workers who send their children (up to two) to grades 9–12 for a
maximum of four years. The package is financed by a premium of 200 rupees
collected through ‘nodal’ agencies, i.e., groups that must include at least 25
workers. A number of groups, ranging from SHGs to small occupational groups,
have signed up as ‘nodal agencies’, reflecting a growing tendency to rely on the
partner–agent model.
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As in West Bengal, there is a matching premium payment, in this case subsi-
dized by the central government. Financing comes from a social-security fund at
LIC that was set up in 1989 and has received two grants from the central
government. In 2005, there were approximately 3.5 million lives covered. There
was a massive expansion of the program in mid-2006 when the state government
of Rajasthan purchased the policy on behalf of workers in all 2.2 million Below
Poverty Line (BPL) households.
JBY is undoubtedly the single largest insurance scheme for the informal
sector in India. The design of the scheme is interesting from a policy perspective
in several ways. First, it is an attempt incrementally to increase coverage, in this
case on the basis of occupations or groups considered to have lower incomes,
but with a capacity to contribute. Second, there is a transparent subsidy intended
to incentivize voluntary take up. On the other hand, the target group-size – 25 –
seems small, and financing of the subsidy over the long run does not seem to
have been considered carefully. Moreover, the government subsidy has only
been available to one (state-owned) provider and there is no record keeping
mechanism to allow the government to monitor whether its money is reaching
the intended target.
The above schemes are by no means a comprehensive picture of central and
state government initiatives to expand social insurance. However, even the
selective presentation suggests a few preliminary conclusions:
• The rollover of insurance schemes at central level has been frequent. When
trust in the notion of insurance may be low and information dissemination is
weak, such policy uncertainty is problematic. The frequent introduction of
schemes appears to be driven more by political imperatives than a strategic
approach to expansion.
• While the need is high, taking on health insurance confronts the most chal-
lenging area of social insurance first, where moral hazard risks and adminis-
trative demands are high.
• Most central schemes have to date failed to address the fundamental issue of
high transactions costs and the need for decentralized distribution networks.
• As with welfare funds, it is not apparent that the contributions for various
schemes are based on an informed assessment of claims information from
existing insurance products.
NGO and community-based social-insurance initiatives for the
unorganized sector
Estimates on the scale of social-insurance provision by NGOs and other
community-based actors (e.g. microfinance institutions, health facilities) vary
from around three to around five million (Breman and Ahuja 2005). Given the
very low coverage rates achieved by government initiatives, community-based
micro-insurance (CBMI) initiatives assume significance as a potential channel
for expansion of social security. At the same time, the experience to date is
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mixed, with questions on the capacity to go to scale, given the reliance on subsi-
dies from founding institutions and donors. In addition, CBMI to date have
focused primarily on health insurance, and not yet addressed other types of
insurance, particularly old age. Finally, there are legal issues with respect to
CBMI, as the IRDA Act does not provide for such schemes as part of the
broader insurance market (Devadasan et al. 2004). There are a few basic models
of community-based social insurance:32
• The insurer–agent model, where the NGO/MFI or other founder acts as inter-
mediary between members and the insurer, in India typically one of the
public insurance companies (though SEWA has also involved a private com-
mercial insurer). This model has been relied on by large organizations such
as SEWA and Buldhana, and smaller ones such as Navsarjan in Gujarat and
BAIF in Maharashtra (Acharya and Ranson 2005).
• The founding organization acts as the direct insurer, but is not the
provider of the insured services. This applies both to some NGO schemes
(Yeshasvini in Karnataka; Dhan in TN) and occupationally based pro-
grams (e.g., Tribhuvandas Foundation).33
• The founding organization is the direct insurer and the main provider of the
insured services. Examples include ACCORD in TN, Kasturba Hospital
scheme in Maharashtra; Students’ Health Home in West Bengal.
The different approaches exhibit both common features and differences. They
include:
• In terms of types of risks covered, the primary focus has been health
insurance. Some schemes cover associated costs such as loss of income,
and life and accident insurance.34 However, old-age insurance is not a
CBMI product.
• Nearly all CBMI work on voluntary participation. This approach is consis-
tent with the experience from Asia on coverage of health-insurance schemes
for the informal sector (Bernett et al. 1998).
• In terms of financing, all CBMI schemes require a contribution. However,
there is a range in the level of contribution required and the extent to which
it is subsidized. In the best cases, contributions cover the bulk of medical
claims and administration is covered by donor support (e.g., SEWA Vimo).
At the other end of the spectrum, contributions are covered for many of the
members from the NGO/funder’s own resources. An additional innovation
in some schemes is provision for deposit of a lump sum by the participant,
from which interest generated covers the annual premium.
• Although community/NGO involvement controls administrative costs, most
schemes rely on an external subsidy. The subsidy may come from Govern-
ment, the NGO or donors, cooperatives or other sources. This is very typical
of rural health-insurance initiatives in developing countries, virtually none
of which cover services from contributions only (O’Keefe 2003).
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• The experience on whether benefits are provided on reimbursement or
up-front deduction/exemption is mixed. The majority of schemes are based
on reimbursement, but those that both insure and provide services are cash-
less, as is the Yeshasvini scheme in Karnataka, which uses a third-party
administrator. Experience internationally suggests that reimbursement-
based schemes dominate in community health insurance (Bennett et al.
1998).
• While most of the schemes are relatively small, the largest have achieved
significant membership (e.g., Yeshasvini had around two million farmers
registered in 2004–2005, having started in 2003; the West Bengal Students’
Health Home, which covers around 1.6 million students).
• Many of the schemes are relatively new and yet to be evaluated, both in
terms of short-term impacts and with respect to financial trajectory.
Of the prevailing models, the insurer–agent approach appears to have the
most potential for broadening coverage of social insurance. It appears to
combine the benefits of large-scale pooling of risks (both within the membership
group when group insurance is purchased, and beyond through the risk pool of
the end-insurer), and the cost-reducing benefits of an intermediary organization
close to the client. At the same time, the Yeshasvini experience cautions against
being very prescriptive on a preferred model.
A further important recent development is the ‘micro-pension’ product of
the Unit Trust of India (UTI). The first client in this partner–agent arrangement
was SEWA. In 2006, around 30,000 women joined their DC pension scheme
where contributions of around 200 rupees per month are invested in a balanced
fund invested in bonds and equities. Individuals must maintain a savings
account with SEWA Bank. The SEWA experience may not be easy to replicate
on a large scale, however. First, preliminary analysis shows that administrative
costs are still relatively high given the flows involved. Second, the arrange-
ment relies on one provider, UTI, which is the only asset manager licensed to
offer this kind of product. Nevertheless, the scheme was recently taken up by a
dairy cooperative in Bihar and other groups of unorganized sector workers are
considering it.35
Looking ahead: new GoI initiatives on unorganized-sector 
social security
The GoI in its Common Minimum Program has committed itself to expansion of
social security. To this end, the National Commission for Enterprises in the
Unorganized Sector (NCEUS) produced a report in 2006 on behalf of MoLE,
which recommended the introduction of a national social-insurance scheme
offering old-age pensions, health insurance and maternity benefits, as well as life
and disability insurance.
The NCEUS proposal is ambitious in that it seeks to offer insurance for
several major risks to 300 million informal sector workers in a span of five
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years. The ultimate objective of universal coverage is shared by many develop-
ing-country governments as well as donors. However, such an expansion of
coverage through voluntary participation is unprecedented in terms of inter-
national and Indian experience. The administrative and recordkeeping chal-
lenges alone suggest that the proposed time frame is not feasible (O’Keefe and
Palacios 2006).
In addition to the scope of the proposal, elements of the design require
closer consideration. In the area of old-age pensions, for example, the pro-
posal would pay an indexed monthly pension of Rs.200 to all individuals
aged 65 and over that were BPL card holders. Conceptually, the idea of pro-
viding a transfer to those that cannot afford to participate in a contributory
scheme is sensible and many countries have chosen to implement this type of
program.36
On the positive side, for the first time, there is an effort to grapple with the
issue of high transactions costs in unorganized-sector social security, through
allowing a role for intermediary organizations such as NGO/MFIs, PRIs, unions
and worker associations between the state/insurer and workers in raising aware-
ness of the scheme, identifying and registering workers, collecting contributions
and payment of benefits. The scheme recognizes the need for a significant con-
tribution subsidy to incentivize participation.
Building on the NCEUS report, the GOI is currently considering various
options both in terms of program design as well as sequencing. In some areas,
there appears to be growing consensus. For example, there appears to be
support for scaling up the NOAPS social-pension program so that it would
reach a larger proportion of the elderly in India. There is also an emerging
vision that involves combining government subsidies with provision by non-
governmental entities on a competitive basis, perhaps through the partner–agent
model. For example, MoLE is studying programs like the JBY scheme for life
insurance.
Membership of potential intermediary organizations
One of the key facilitating preconditions for participation in contributory social-
insurance schemes is membership of some organization which could play an
intermediary role between workers and the ultimate insurer. As a result, mem-
bership in potential intermediary organizations is of interest in assessing the
institutional scope for SI expansion.37 Figure 12.7 presents survey-based findings
on membership at the all-India level. Group membership remains low, and
distributional analysis confirms that coverage is concentrated in the upper end of
the distribution for all but SHGs.
Most states also have very low membership of organizations, though with
standouts. The most significant is Kerala, with high union and coop/SHG
membership rates, and higher welfare fund membership. AP also stands out
for the high share of workers in SHGs. There are also a number of states with
higher than average membership rates of specific types of organization,
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including West Bengal for unions/associations, and Orissa and Chattisgarh on
coops/SHGs.
Conclusions and recommendations
While the market failures that suggest a role for public intervention in social
insurance for unorganized-sector workers are clear, it is not axiomatic that
‘more is better’. Badly designed schemes can have negative impacts for the poor
(Gertler 1998). A common problem is health-service-cost escalation if moral-
hazard problems among users and providers are not controlled. The losses from
moral hazard are higher where the price elasticity of demand for services is
significant, which international evidence suggests is the case in developing
countries.38
With respect to types of social insurance, there is a tension between house-
hold needs, and operational feasibility of rapid expansion coverage for differ-
ent types of insurance. The profile of household shocks reveals a high demand
for income smoothing due to health shocks. However, due to supply-side con-
straints, moral hazard and adverse selection, as well as the complexities of
administering health insurance, this type of scheme is the most difficult to
implement. In India, experience with the Universal Health Insurance Scheme
illustrates these difficulties. In comparison, life insurance and defined contri-
bution pensions are easier (and with life insurance, cheaper) to design and
implement. The contingencies involved, age and death, are easier to monitor
and less subject to moral hazard and adverse selection. Unlike health care, the
benefits are simple and standardized cash payments. Disability insurance lies
somewhere in between, given the need to verify the condition and potential for
moral hazard. GoI has implicitly recognized the relative difficulties in its























Figure 12.7 Membership rates in organizations, all workers and by organized/unorganized,
2004 (source: ADB/MOF survey, 2004. Author estimates).
2007/2008 budget, which seeks expansion of social security starting with life
and permanent disability insurance for rural landless workers under the pro-
posed Aam Admi Bima Yogana (though the scheme does not unfortunately
have a clear strategy on aggregation of workers through groups to control
transactions costs and raise awareness).
In addition, large-scale coverage expansion will require government subsidies
to address the question of affordability, and oversight to mitigate fraud and/or
mismanagement. However, this does not necessarily suggest a ‘top-down’
approach whereby new layers of bureaucracy are created to implement schemes.
On the other hand, given likely economies of scale, the need for portability of
benefits and the exigencies of supervision, the government’s role may include
creating robust and harmonized record-keeping and payments/collection infra-
structure.
The second dimension of sequencing to be considered relates to the target-
covered population. In this regard, it is necessary to recognize that some indi-
viduals are past the point where insurance or savings instruments are useful. For
households with disabled, elderly, widows and already suffering from catas-
trophic health shocks or disease, the appropriate intervention is to alleviate
poverty through direct transfers and other types of assistance. This distinction
between those too poor to contribute and others is less obvious in the case of
certain approaches to health insurance.
For most households with unorganized-sector workers, insurance is possible,
at least with a degree of subsidy. However, voluntary schemes that require indi-
viduals to make contributions or pay premia in order to be eligible for coverage
may not be easily expanded to the lowest income workers unless they are
heavily subsidized. At the same time, experience of NGO and other schemes in
India and internationally suggests that some small contribution even for the
poorest is an important tool in improving the accountability of schemes to their
beneficiaries.
The main alternative to direct public provision and administration is to
use existing non-governmental entities and restrict the role of government to:
(i) providing targeted subsidies; and (ii) regulating these entities and setting
basic standards. This model already exists in India in several forms. In addition,
many CBMI schemes could be incorporated under an umbrella program that
provided matching contributions or premia but set standards in terms of
minimum-benefit targets, eligibility conditions, investment policy and record-
keeping, among others.
This coordinated partner–agent approach has recently become more attractive
due to financial-sector reforms that have resulted in dynamic asset-management
and insurance sectors as well as supervisory agencies that are becoming more
experienced. There are several potential advantages to this approach. First, by
harnessing existing groups including SHGs, cooperatives and MFIs, transaction
costs could be kept low, especially where individual recordkeeping is already
taking place. A second advantage would be the promotion of competition on the
basis of cost and quality of services. Third, many unorganized-sector workers
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have no experience with formal financial-sector institutions so that groups can
serve as an effective intermediary.
For health, pension, life and disability insurance, a viable plan to extend
coverage based on unorganized-sector workers paying premiums or making con-
tribution would need to meet the following criteria:
• long-term financial sustainability;
• transparent costing based on actuarial principles;
• reasonable incentives to encourage widespread take up on a voluntary basis;
• ability to cope with irregular income streams;
• harmonization, in terms of incentives and portability, with formal-sector
programs;
• low transaction costs;
• accurate and timely record-keeping;
• effective risk pooling (in the case of insurance);
• effective asset management (in the case of long-term savings/pensions);
• accessibility on a national scale.
Perhaps the greatest challenge for any approach will be that of tracking particip-
ants and the financial flows associated with each of them. While universal
national registration in India in the near future appears unlikely, alternative solu-
tions could be explored in the meantime. Computerized record management
makes any program more transparent and flexible. Programs with systematic
personalized record-keeping provide much greater capacity for adding new
benefits and improving existing schemes. The access gap can further be reduced
by means of various technological innovations.
Cash-collection and disbursement systems in the unorganized sector pose
serious challenges. Conventional financial intermediaries are often ill prepared
to deal with mass transactions of very small amounts in remote, disbursed and
poorly educated communities. Penetration of commercial banks in the rural
areas in India remains low. While India’s extensive postal system operates in
almost every corner of the country, the adequacy of its accounting mechanisms
and capacity to assume new tasks remains to be evaluated. Both in India and
abroad, a number of interesting and relevant innovations provide lessons for
adapting to the needs of both public and private sector in extending the coverage
of financial services.
Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed evidence on two tools for promoting consumption
smoothing among unorganized-sector households in India. While public works
and social security for unorganized workers have considerable potential, this has
yet to be realized for the large majority. Moving from the big picture of policy
initiatives to the ‘nuts and bolts’ will remain the biggest challenge in realizing
this potential and the benefits it may hold for the poor. At the same time, even
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well-designed and executed programs will remain only some tools in a much
wider array of policy initiatives needed to improve the lot of unorganized-sector
workers.
Appendix 1
Major central rural-employment programs
• Jawahar Rozgar Yogana (JRY – from 1989–1999), a CSS targeted to BPL
households in rural areas, with preferences for SC/ST and women, and
80:20 financing split between centre and states. The wage/material ratio was
60:40, and DRDA/ZP the main implementing agencies through line depart-
ments and GPs.
• Employment Assurance Scheme (EAS – from 1993–2001), a CSS initially
focused on 261 districts, and gradually extended to nationwide rural cover-
age by 1997. EAS committed to 100 days of lean-season employment for up
to two adults per rural family, and was also financed on an 80:20 central and
state split. As with JRY, the wage/material ratio was 60:40 and DRDA/ZP
the main implementing agencies through line departments and GP.
• In 1999, JRY was restructured into the Jawahar Gram Samidhi Yogana
(JGSY), with the main difference being that creation of demand-driven
community infrastructure moved from being a secondary objective to the
primary objective, with rural-employment generation conversely becoming
the secondary objective.
• From 2001, the EAS and JGSY were merged into Sampoorna Grameen
Rozgar Yogana (SGRY), which had a target of 100 days employment (per
rural household). Financing is split 75:25 between the centre and the states,
and PRIs have in principle been given an increased implementation role.
• In late 2004, the National Food for Work Program (NFFWP) was intro-
duced in 150 backward districts, with a massive increase in funding to
Rs.5,400 crore in the 2005–2006 budget.
• The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREG) was passed in
August 2005 and implemented from 2006. It initially covers 200 backward
districts, with commitment to national rural coverage within five years. This
is the first legislated national rural-employment program, and commits to
100 days guaranteed employment per rural household annually. The
funding split is 90:10 between centre and states, and PRIs are considered
the primary implementing agencies.
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Appendix 2
Abbreviations used in this chapter
BAIF Bharatiya Agro Industries Foundation
CBMI Community-based Micro-insurance
CBO Community based Organization
CMD Centre for Management Development
EPFO Employee Provident Fund Organization
ESIS Employee Social Insurance Scheme
GoI Government of India
GP Gram Panchayat
IRDA Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority
MFI Microfinance Institution
MoLE Ministry of Labor and Employment
NCEUS National Commission in Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector
OBC Other Backward Castes
RD Rural Development





UHIS Universal Health Insurance Scheme
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13 Epilogue
The analysis presented in much of the book made use of the detailed unit-level
data available from the ‘thick’ rounds of the NSS. The last of these quinquennial
rounds which were available to us was for the year 1999–2000 (the 55th round).
Thus we were unable to cover the current trends in the early years of the
century. Another ‘thick’ round of the Survey was completed by the NSS for
2005–2006 (the 61st round). At the time of completing this manuscript (April
2007) the unit-level data sets from this survey are available only in part. But the
NSS has released two reports on the some basic tables both for the Employment
and Unemployment (EUS) part and the Consumer Expenditure (CES) part of its
survey. In what follow we have made use of these published reports to discern
some of the trends emerging in the most recent years and see how they fit into
the picture emerging from our detailed work for the period ending 1999–2000.
Trends in employment and earnings
India’s growth rate accelerated towards the end of the period between the 55th
and the 61st rounds. While the average growth rate over the decade 1992–1993
to 2002–2003 was 5.9 per cent, it touched 8.5 per cent in 2003–2004 and 7.5 in
2004–2005 (World Bank 2006, Table 1.2, p. 14). As in the late nineties the
service sector continued to lead the growth process. Also the lagging growth in
the agricultural sector persisted. If anything the growth in the agricultural sector
decelerated from 3.2 percent in the period 1980–1992, to 2.4 per cent in
1992/1993 to 2002/2003 and even lower in the last few years. However, industry
recovered somewhat from the slump of the second half of the 1990s. Manufac-
turing grew at the rate in excess of 6 percent per annum. But the basic structural
problems of manufacturing, identified in the book continued to be significant,
posing serious problems for sustained growth. These include the persistence of
‘dualism’ and employment stagnation in the formal (organized) sub-sector.
Recovery of participation rates
The new evidence suggests a major development on the labor-market front
between the 55th and the 61st rounds. This is the recovery of participation rates
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which affect the trends in employment. The slow-down in employment growth
in the 1990s discussed in Part I of the book was traced to: (i) a withdrawal of
labor of principal status in the young-age groups because of expanded school-
ing; but (ii) more importantly to the withdrawal of female labor of subsidiary
status, particularly in the rural labor market. A good deal of attention was paid to
the possible reasons for this withdrawal (Chapter 4). While no definitive conclu-
sion could be reached, there was a strong suggestion that this decline in PRs was
due to a shift in demand conditions in the agricultural economy. The 1980s had
seen an upsurge in the demand for labor due to the second phase of the green
revolution spreading to the eastern states. Prime-age females were pulled into
the labor market due to a sudden upsurge of labor. With the passing of this wave
of technological change the labor market adjusted to a more stable pattern: the
subsidiary workers who met the upsurge in labor demand seem to have been
substituted by more permanent labor arrangements, such that while there was a
pronounced fall in PRs of subsidiary females, the principal status females
increased their participation to some extent.
What caused the recovery in participation in the latest period between the ‘thick’
rounds? An overview of the changes in broad categories of labor is presented in
Figure 13.1. A perusal of the bar chart and the figures attached to it suggest that,




























































































































Figure 13.1 Labor-force participation rates, 1999–2000 and 2004–2005 (source: NSS
Report number 515, 2007).
contribution has been made by females – and more so in the rural areas. The
increase in female participation has been both in the principal and subsidiary cat-
egories. Subsidiary females played a bigger role in the increment to the participa-
tion rate in the rural sector but in the urban areas it is the female principal workers
who are more important in the change. Subsidiary females are, however, a substan-
tial part of the change in the urban areas as well. The following graphs depict the
age profiles of participation rates of females of subsidiary status for all three of the
last quinquennial rounds of the NSS.
We see that there is an interesting difference between the changes in the pro-
files in the rural and the urban areas. In the rural sector the increase in the sub-
sidiary participation in the 61st round is concentrated in the prime-age group,
and the recovery brings the profile up but not as far as the level of the 50th
round (1993–1994). Figure 13.2 depicts it. In the urban areas by contrast the
increase in participation is stronger among female subsidiaries of the younger
age groups, and in fact their PRs in the 61st round exceed what had been
achieved in 1993–1994 (Figure 13.3). Generally, the age-profile of female
participants of subsidiary status has shifted to the left in the 61st round. It sug-
gests that in the urban sector young females are tending to enter the job market
more strongly than in the earlier rounds.
It is not possible with the summary data available so far to examine the proxi-
mate causes of the change described above. It is doubtful if the shift in the
demand for labor in agriculture, which apparently explained a significant part of
the decline in female participation in the 1990s, could be the cause of the recent
recovery. As we have already pointed out the agricultural sector has continued to
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Figure 13.2 Female subsidiary labor-force participation rate (in %) across age groups,
rural areas (source: Same as Figure 13.1).
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the non-agricultural, and particularly the service sector, which has propelled the
demand for female labor inducing an increase in PRs? The fact that females of
principal status and of the younger age groups are important in the increase in
participation in the urban economy might give some strength to this hypothesis,
since non-agriculture is of much greater importance as a source of job growth in
the latter.
The change in participation rates is of course not the same as the change in
employment rates. The gap between the two is accounted for by any change
in unemployment rates. Here the evidence as far as males are concerned is that
there has been little change in unemployment rates in the UPS count but that the
unemployment rate in the CDS count has increased only in the rural sector.
Much the more important change has been in the female labor market. The rates
for females have gone up significantly. This is true of both the rural and urban
sectors, and also for the longer-term unemployed (as measured by the UPS
count) and the shorter-term ones (the CDS count). The figures are given in the
Table 13.1.
It seems very likely that the increase in female PRs and the increase in unem-
ployment rates are parts of the same phenomenon. As women job seekers enter
the labor market their job search pushes up the unemployment rate. The increase
in the unemployment rate is, however, less than the increase in participation rate.
As discussed at length in Chapter 3, this development might be due to
supply- or demand-side changes, or to both. The problem now, however, is to
explain the change in the direction opposite to what was discussed in the
chapter. The movement in participation is in the upward direction – which might
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Figure 13.3 Female subsidiary labor force participation rate (in %) across age groups,
urban areas (source: Same as Figure 13.1).
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Table 13.1 Unemployment rates (per 1,000) for three rounds (UPS)
Rural Urban
Males Females Males Females
Usual status
1993–1994 (50th) 20 13 58 83
1999–2000 (55th) 21 15 48 71
2005–2006 (61st) 21 31 44 91
Current daily status
1993–1994 56 56 67 104
1999–2000 72 70 73 94
2005–2006 80 86 75 116
Source: NSS Report Number 515, 2007.
Table 13.2 Absolute change in the share of the self-employed among principal-status
workers
Year Rural Urban
Male Female Total Male Female Total
1983–1993 –2.8 –2.8 –2.7 0.9 –0.1 0.7
1993–1999 –2.3 –1.3 –2.0 0.1 1.2 0.3
1999–2004 3.2 6.4 4.1 3.4 2.0 3.1
Source: NSS Report Number 515, 2007.
upwards, or to both. No conclusion on this issue is possible without detailed
work with unit-level data. We will now discuss the changes in employment
structure, wage rates and household welfare levels to come up with some plausi-
ble hypotheses for future research.
While the period of the 1980s and the 1990s had seen an increase of the share
of casual workers – more so in the rural areas – the latest period saw a decline in
this share in both sectors, and both for males and females (Table 13.4). In fact,
the decline in the share of casuals in female employment has been going on in
the urban sector for a long time, and gathered momentum in the latest period.
What is a new development is the decline of the casual share among rural
females and among males in both sectors. What type of employment did
increase to compensate for the decline in the casual share? Females in the urban
labor market increased the share of regular wage workers – reinforcing again the
trend which had already been under way since the 1980s (Table 13.3). All other
groups – males in both rural and urban areas, and females in rural areas –
increased their share in self-employment (Table 13.2).
While the movement from casual to regular workers among the body of female
urban job seekers signifies an improvement of labor-market conditions, the same
cannot be said unambiguously about the increase in the share of self-employment
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without further information of incomes earned (Table 13.2). It might represent the
growth of a dynamic informal sector, or alternatively could signify accumulation
of job seekers at the low end of the earnings spectrum.
Changes in the structure of employment by industry
It was seen in earlier chapters that in Indian economic development the tertiary
sector had led the way in absorbing labor which had been increasingly diverted
from the agricultural sector. Further, even the limited amount of labor finding
employment in the secondary sector was mostly absorbed in its informal sub-
sector. What is the evidence in the recent period while the post-reform changes
had some time to take root? The relevant data are presented in Table 13.5. It is
seen that the increase in employment share in the secondary sector in the recent
period has been higher than in the tertiary. However, the secondary sector in
the table includes construction – and this sub-sector accounted for fully half of
the incremental share of employment. Further, the dominance of the informal
sector in the growth of manufacturing employment has persisted.
Table 13.6 gives the figures given by the DGE&T (Labor Bureau) for the
latest years available. They show an absolute decline in employment in the
formal sector as a whole – even taking the private sector on its own. The per-
centage decline in manufacturing – including the private part of it – is much
higher, two-and-half times as much.
Table 13.3 Absolute change in the share of the regular workers among principal-status
workers
Year Rural Urban
Male Female Total Male Female Total
1983–1993 –1.9 –0.3 –1.3 –1.8 3.7 –0.8
1993–1999 0.3 0.5 0.3 –0.8 3.0 –0.1
1999–2004 0.1 0.9 0.3 –1.1 3.7 –0.3
Source: NSS Report Number 515, 2007.
Table 13.4 Absolute change in the share of the casual workers among principal-status
workers
Year Rural Urban
Male Female Total Male Female Total
1983–1993 4.7 3.1 4.0 0.9 –3.6 0.1
1993–1999 2.0 0.8 1.7 0.7 –4.2 –0.2
1999–2004 –3.3 –7.2 –4.4 –2.3 –5.7 –2.8
Source: NSS Report Number 515, 2007.
Educational upgrading: the role of college graduates
We would expect significant upgrading over time of the labor force in terms of
formal education. This is indeed what we see in Table 13.7. But a striking
feature of the table is that the expansion is relatively more pronounced for
college graduates. There is indeed a curious dent in the middle level of educa-
tion. There is a decline in the share of workers with middle to higher secondary
education in most of the groups distinguished in the table. Even the rural
females, the sole group to register an increase in its share in the recent period,
did so only to a minuscule percentage. By contrast the increase in the share of
workers who are college graduates is large and impressive – particularly for
urban females. This is an important development in the labor market, and obvi-
ously related to the strong growth of skilled tertiary-sector jobs, particularly in
the urban economy (and more for females).
Wage trends
Consistent with the above developments in job trends – and the shifts in the
demand for labor – we find that the wage structure in the recent period has tilted
in favor of the relatively well educated. Their higher returns to education –
which has already been noticed in the 1993–1999 period (see Chapter 3 above in
particular), would of course affect the regular wage workers, who also show
diversity in educational attainment. The data presented in Table 13.8 bear this
out. It suggests an increase in wage inequality in the recent period, reinforcing
the trend in the previous period analyzed in Chapter 3.
A rather striking and perhaps disturbing result in the table is the decline
overall of real wages. The more educated groups have indeed had a positive
trend but it is quite low. The growth rate of mean earnings for the illiterate and
those with less than middle level education has been substantially negative. This
trend in mean earnings does not necessarily imply that there has been absolute










Source: NSS Report Number 515, 2007.
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Table 13.6 Employment in organized sectors, 1999–2003 (in hundred thousand)
Industry groups Public Private Total Growth of employment (in %)
Year 1999 2003 1999 2003 1999 2003 Public Private Total
Agriculture 5.15 5.06 8.71 8.95 13.86 14.01 –0.44 0.68 0.27
Mining and quarrying 9.26 8.47 0.87 0.66 10.13 9.13 –2.20 –6.67 –2.56
Manufacturing 15.69 12.6 51.78 47.44 67.47 60.04 –5.34 –2.16 –2.87
Electricity, gas and water 9.62 9.13 0.41 0.5 10.03 9.63 –1.30 5.09 –1.01
supply
Construction 11.07 9.48 0.71 0.44 11.78 9.92 –3.80 –11.27 –4.21
Trade 1.63 1.82 3.23 3.6 4.86 5.42 2.79 2.75 2.76
Transport, storage and 30.84 29.39 0.69 0.79 31.53 30.18 –1.20 3.44 –1.09
communication
Finance, insurance and real 12.95 13.77 3.58 4.26 16.53 18.03 1.55 4.44 2.20
estate
Community, social and 97.94 96.09 17 17.56 114.94 113.65 –0.48 0.81 –0.28
personal services
Total 194.15 185.8 86.98 84.21 281.13 270.01 –1.09 –0.81 –1.00
Sources: DGE&T, Labor Bureau, Ministry of Labor, Government of India.
decline in all wage groups. We do not have the distribution of wages within each
educational category. The decline in mean earnings would be consistent with a
shift in the distribution to the lower end – as with the development of a bi-modal
structure with relatively more jobs being created at the low and the upper end of
the distribution. Further examination of these possibilities must await the avail-
ability of unit-level data which will enable us to study the shapes of the wage
distribution within skill or education groups.
Table 13.9 presents the data on trends for casual wage earners. The rate of
growth although positive only in the rural areas, shows a marked deceleration
relative to the previous period and indeed relative to the 1980s as well (see
Chapter 3).
Interpreting the wage–employment trends
The clear evidence about the deceleration of the wage rate at the same time
when participation and employment rate increased is a puzzle which needs
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Table 13.7 Absolute change in employment share in UPS workers (15+) across education
categories
Educational level Rural male Rural female Urban male Urban female
50th to 55th to 50th to 55th to 50th to 55th to 50th to 55th to 
55th 61st 55th 61st 55th 61st 55th 61st
Not literate –4.4 –5.8 –4.4 –7.6 –2.3 –3.1 –4.8 –6.0
Literate and up to –2.0 2.2 1.3 3.0 –4.0 0.9 –1.4 2.7
primary
Middle 2.7 1.9 2.0 2.3 1.5 0.6 2.0 1.2
Secondary 2.0 –0.2 0.8 0.9 1.6 –2.0 0.9 –1.8
Higher secondary 1.0 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.7 –0.2 0.7 –0.9
Graduate and above 0.7 1.6 0.2 0.8 2.5 3.8 2.6 4.8
Source: NSS Report Number 515, 2007.
Table 13.8 Levels and growth of average daily earnings of regular workers (15–59)
across education level (at constant 1999–2000 prices)
Education Level Rural Urban Growth rates
55th 61st 55th 61st Rural Urban
Not literate 62.4 54.5 75.3 63.7 –2.7 –3.3
Literate and up to middle 99.6 82.3 101.0 86.6 –3.7 –3.0
Secondary and higher 145.3 145.1 165.2 165.6 0.0 0.1
secondary
Graduate and above 212.7 228.5 272.4 277.8 1.4 0.4
All 125.3 120.8 165.1 159.5 –0.7 –0.7
Source: NSS Report Number 515, 2007.
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careful analysis. It contrasts dramatically with the experience of the previous
period between the 50th and the 55th rounds, when decline in employment rates
was associated with a higher rate of wage growth. At first sight both these phe-
nomenon might suggest significant shifts in the supply curve of labor. The
observed trends are consistent with a shift upwards of the supply curve in the
1993–1999 period followed by a reverse movement of the function upwards in
the 1999–2004 period. Quite apart from the fact that these opposite movements
of the supply curve need explanation, two points need to be emphasized which
need to form part of any composite hypothesis:
1 The cyclical behavior of the demand for labor. Evidence has been produced
in Chapter 3 that the 1993–1999 period saw a contraction in the demand for
labor, particularly in the rural sector. It followed the passing of the second
wave of the green revolution in agriculture, particularly in the rice-growing
states, and was also accompanied by a shift to the use of labor of principal
rather than subsidiary status. We have now seen in this Epilogue that there
is strong suggestion in the data that the latest period between 1999/2000 and
2004/2005 has witnessed another upsurge in the demand for labor – this
time most likely caused by the growth of the non-farm sector both in the
rural and urban labor markets. There has also been a significant change in
the composition of labor demand – with a marked shift to regular and more
educated labor, and away from market for casual labor.
2 It is difficult to distinguish the movements along a fixed supply curve of
labor and a movement of the supply curve itself when demand is fluctuat-
ing so much in a cyclical pattern. This is because labor is offered in the
market – particularly by female workers who have alternative use of their
time within the household – not only by changes in the wage rate (move-
ments along the supply curve) but also by changing expectations about
employment in the labor market (movements of the supply function itself).
Demand and supply curves are interrelated. It is possible that stronger
expectations about the labor market might cause rightward shift in the
supply curve of labor which might compensate partly for the upward pres-
sure on wage rates.
Table 13.9 Average wage earnings per day received by casual workers (15–59) at
2004–2005 prices
Category 55th round 61st round Growth rate
Rural male 52.5 55.0 0.96
Rural female 34.7 34.9 0.16
Rural person 47.2 48.9 0.72
Urban male 76.8 75.1 –0.46
Urban female 46.4 43.9 –1.13
Urban person 70.4 68.7 –0.51
Source: NSS Report Number 515, 2007.
3 The last point is related to the wider issue of the response of labor supply
to the period of time over which wage earnings are being considered. An
important statistical issue needs to be stressed in this connection. The
daily-wage rate in casual labor market reported by the NSS (and used in
this work) is really the derived daily earnings calculated by dividing the
total labor earnings over a longer period of time (a week), and hence
depends on the number of person-days of employment obtained during the
week. Thus the data might show higher growth rate of weekly earnings
than that of daily earnings (or what has been called the wage rate in some
parts of the discussion). The supply function of labor might be related to
earnings over a longer period if time (week, month or season) than the
average day.
The upshot of this discussion is that the rate of growth of earning per week or
season might show a different trend than that of average daily earnings, and
indeed might have been higher in the recent 1999–2004 period. This should be
reflected in higher incomes over the month for agricultural laborers. The NSS
does not collect data on income. But the trends might be reflected in the data on
expenditure per household collected by the NSS. Since agricultural laborers are
at the bottom of the income ladder and suffer disproportionately from the inci-
dence of poverty, a relevant variable to examine is the trends in poverty as cal-
culated from the NSS data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES). This
is the topic to which we now turn.
Trends in household expenditure, poverty and inequality
The summary report of the NSS, giving selected tables from the Household
Expenditure Survey, has given a rough idea of changes in household welfare
(mean expenditure per capita) for different parts of the distribution.
Table 13.10 reveals that for the five-year period between the 55th and the 61st
rounds there has been an increase in MPCE for all percentile groups, but that the
increase is equalizing in the rural sector, but non-equalizing in the urban. In the
rural areas the percentage increase is highest in the poorest slab, and declines
gradually from 13 to 14 percent increase in the ‘5 percent or less’ group to 6
percent or less in the 80–90 and the 90–95 groups (although the highest slab
shows an increase of more than 10 percent). By contrast in the urban areas the
percentage increase in MPCE is low in the bottom slab. In fact it is only 2–3
percent for the poorest group (based on column 7 of the table) for the lowest five
groups rising to 7–9 percentage for the 80–90 and 90–95 slabs.
The overall impression from these figures and graphs is that the trend
observed in the 1990s between the 50th and the 55th rounds is continuing
steadily, with a decline in low incomes and the incidence of poverty, but an
increase in inequality in the urban areas.
Mahendra Dev and Ravi (2007) in fact have used the 61st round to 
calculate poverty ratios over the two periods, using the official poverty line and
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mixed-reference periods (Table 13.11).1 The data bears out the surmise men-
tioned at the end of the last section. There has indeed been a reduction in
poverty ratios, and it is seen that at least one estimate from the new data suggest
that there has been an increase in the rate of poverty reduction in the latest
period in both sectors, but more so in the rural areas.
The results given above are based on the consumer expenditures based on the
‘mixed-reference period’, There is, however, the presumption that for an assess-
ment of trends over longer periods of time, there is some case for ignoring the
change in the reference period introduced for the first time in the 55th round.
Sticking to the original NSS practice of the 30-day reference period it is possible
Table 13.10 Comparison of APCE between 55th and 61st rounds
Percentile APCE at constant (1993–4) prices % change 
group between 
of population Rural Urban 55th and 61st
55th 61st 55th 61st Rural Urban
0–5% 121 137 159 164 13.2 3.1
5%–10% 153 169 203 210 10.5 3.4
10%–20% 176 193 242 248 9.7 2.5
20%–30% 203 220 288 294 8.4 2.1
30%–40% 228 245 334 342 7.5 2.4
40%–50% 252 271 385 396 7.5 2.9
50%–60% 281 299 447 461 6.4 3.1
60%–70% 313 333 523 545 6.4 4.2
70%–80% 358 380 628 657 6.1 4.6
80%–90% 433 455 800 854 5.1 6.8
90%–95% 537 569 1052 1144 6.0 8.7
95%–100% 849 938 1912 1985 10.5 3.8
All 307 331 532 555 7.8 4.3
Source: NSS Report number 508, 2007.
Table 13.11 Percentage of poor in rural and urban areas (survey of mixed-reference period)
Poverty ratios Changes in poverty Changes in poverty 
(% points per annum) (per annum changes 
as % of base year)
1993– 1999– 2004– 1993– 1999– 1993– 1999–
1994 2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005
Rural 31.6 27.5 21.9 –0.7 –1.1 –2.2 –4.1
Urban 28.5 24.3 20.7 –0.7 –0.7 –2.5 –3.0
Total 30.8 26.6 21.5 –0.7 –1.0 –2.2 –3.8
Source: Mahendra Dev (2007), Table 5.
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to compare the trends over two decades – the first over the period 1983 and 1993
(between the 43rd and the 50th rounds) and the second between 1993 and 2004
(the 50th and the 61st rounds). Along with many other authors Mahendra Dev
considers the first period to be the ‘pre-reform’ one, and the second the ‘post-
reform’ years. Although based on simple applications of the official poverty
lines and on data published by the NSS rather than the original analysis of unit-
level data the differences in the trends between the two decades is intriguing.
Mahenrda Dev’s figures are reproduced in Table 13.12.
The difference between the rural and the urban sectors is confirmed in this
table. The reduction in the rate of poverty decline (normalized by base-year
values) increased marginally in the rural sector in the post-reform decade, but it
was distinctly reduced in the urban. Consistent with results obtained in the book,
the increase in inequality was much more pronounced in the urban sector in the
post-reform decade (ibid., table 3, p. 510).
Further confirmation of this and other suggestions emerging from the
summary tables must await detailed analysis of the unit-level data from the 61st
round of the NSS.
Table 13.12 Percentage of poor in rural and urban areas (survey of 30-day reference
period)
Poverty ratios Changes in poverty Changes in poverty 
(% points per annum) (per annum changes 
as % of base year)
1983 1993– 2004– 1983– 1993– 1993– 1999–
1994 2005 1994 2005 1994 2005
Rural 45.7 37.3 29.2 –0.8 –0.7 –1.8 –2.0
Urban 42.3 32.6 26.0 –0.9 –0.6 –2.2 –1.8
Total 44.9 36.0 28.3 –0.9 –0.7 –1.9 –1.9
Source: Mahendra Dev (2007), Table 1.
14 Conclusions
The book is concerned with the impact of growth on poverty reduction and
inequality. The experience of India in the post-reform years of 1993–2000 – in
the period covered by the 50th and the 55th rounds of the NSS – has been exam-
ined in detail against the backgrounds of trends in earlier periods. As in studies
in other countries and periods, growth is the key factor in poverty reduction. The
growth rate of mean household income (or expenditure) – which is the more
proximate factor in poverty reduction – can be expected to be less than growth
rate in GDP in periods of expansion since savings and investment typically
increases in such periods. The other factor is the trend in inequality. An increase
in inequality not only slows down the growth of income of the poorer groups,
but it might have an adverse impact on growth itself. Quite apart from increasing
social tensions, a growth pattern that exacerbates inter-regional, inter-sectoral as
well as intra-regional inequality create bottlenecks which put a drag on sustain-
able growth.
The post-liberalization period in the nineties saw a continuation of the trend
in poverty reduction – at about the same rate as the previous six-year period. It
was accompanied by an increase in inequality, particularly in the urban sector.
The evidence for the rising inequality came both from the data on household
expenditure per capita (household welfare level) as well as those on wage earn-
ings. This scenario is no different from that of China (although the magnitudes
are much larger in China), and perhaps several other newly developing countries
of Asia, though it differs markedly from the ‘East Asia model’ of growth with
equity.
The increased inequality in the urban sector has exacerbated rural–urban
dualism, which was already a feature of Indian development, in spite of the
marked tilt of urban growth towards smaller towns. The share of the urban sector
in poverty reduction, however, has gone up, not because of increased rural-to-
urban shift of labor, but because of the higher rate of growth in this sector. An
interesting difference was found between states which had a greater FDI inflow
and the others – in spite of the generally low level of FDI in India compared with
China, for example. FDI seems to have had two opposite effects on poverty
reduction: it enhanced the process through higher growth, but seemed to have less
of a ‘trickle-down effect’ as its impact was felt disproportionately on metro
towns, Thus some states with higher than average FDI inflow appears in the list
of high poverty decline states like Karanataka and Tamil Nadu, but others like
Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh are not.
The higher return to education – particularly in college education – is a major
cause of the rising urban inequality, but other features of the evolution of the
employment structure are also of importance. Particularly significant is the
extreme dualism in the manufacturing sector – with the striking phenomenon of
the ‘missing middle’ which has been highlighted in this study as a distinguishing
feature of Indian industrialization.
It is only to be expected that a big country like India has vast regional differ-
ences. Although the degree of inter-regional inequality is not as great as in
China the evidence suggest a certain inertia and persistence of spatial differ-
ences. Labor-market outcomes are widely different – in terms of earnings levels,
employment rates and female participation – across the major states and regions
of India. The econometric exercise presented in Chapter 5 has a strong message
that state-level GDP and economic growth has significant impact on employ-
ment rates, particularly of females. While higher incomes might lead to some
withdrawal of females from labor-market activity, regions that can provide
greater economic opportunities have significantly higher participation rates.
In Chapter 6 a novel attempt has been to demarcate India into seven ‘broad
regions’ based on agro-ecological differences – an attempt which goes beyond
the political demarcation of ‘states’ to more meaningful regions distinguished by
factors which have a persistent effect on land productivity in particular. Our
analysis of the components of the difference in mean consumption per household
across regions, and in the trends over time, do bring out the quantitative import-
ance of inter-regional differences in land productivity. It was seen that the low-
poverty region of the North-West (region 1) was in fact losing in advantage over
the other regions in terms of the growth of land productivity in the period
1983–1993, but that this equalizing trend has been reversed in the post-reform
years of 1993–1999. Over the entire 1983–1999 period the maintenance of the
leading role of region 1 in poverty reduction has not been entirely due to differen-
tial growth in land productivity (relative to the offsetting trend in land–man
ratio). The growth of off-farm employment, both in the rural and the urban areas
of this region, has contributed at least half of the differential growth in rural
income (household expenditure) relative to regions 2 and 3. While the process of
cumulative growth, in which agricultural growth seems to stimulate non-farm
growth, is the dominant scenario in much of North India, somewhat different out-
comes are observed in the South. The rural non-farm and urban sectors played a
larger role in determining the level of rural incomes in the Southern regions in the
55th round. These sectors grew at a relatively high rate over our period not
because of, but to compensate for, the low growth of land productivity.
Part III of the book turns to an examination of the issues in the major indus-
trial sectors of the economy. Agricultural productivity, as we have just men-
tioned, holds the key to growth of incomes. The reform process has not gone very
far in the agricultural sector, and it is a matter of concern that agricultural growth
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actually slowed down in the post-reform years. Major breakthroughs in this
sector, like the green revolution of the sixties and the seventies, are not yet in the
horizon. While accelerating growth in agriculture remains a key concern of
policy, it would be wrong to assume that such growth would increase the gainful
absorption of labor in agriculture. The evidence analyzed in Chapter 7 suggests
that employment elasticity is higher in regions of low agricultural productivity,
implying that the greater degree of labor absorption is really due to agriculture
serving as the sponge for labor with no viable alternative. The role of high agri-
cultural growth is to stimulate off-farm employment – both in the rural and the
urban sectors – through the process of cumulative development. Our econometric
work in this chapter confirms that this relationship of complementarily between
agricultural productivity and off-farm employment (and incomes) for All-India,
although, as we have mentioned, some land-poor regions in the South have suc-
ceeded in developing off-farm employment as an alternative to agriculture. One
other important result from the chapter on agriculture is worth re-emphasizing.
There is some disturbing evidence supporting the widespread concern that the
post-reform years has seen a deterioration in the conditions of smaller and land-
less farmers relative to larger farmers. The warnings about ‘distress inducing
growth’ given in the literature with respect to some cash crop oriented districts in
Andhra Pradesh do seem to have some validity at the all-India level.
Employment growth outside agriculture in the Indian economy has been led
in recent decades not by manufacturing but by the tertiary sector. This is a
pattern historically observed in today’s developed countries at a much later stage
of their development. On the other hand, the relatively larger role of the tertiary
sector in labor absorption in the nineties have been observed, not only in the
more developed countries of Asia like Korea and Taiwan, but also in Thailand,
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. But the other developing Asian coun-
ties, with the possible exception of the Philippines, have not shown the domi-
nance of the tertiary sector in the absorption of labor in non-agriculture that
India does. The pertinent question from the employment angle is to ask: is labor
being pushed or pulled into the tertiary sector? Our detailed exploration of this
issue in Chapter 9 shows that the marginal absorption of labor in the tertiary
sector has been taking place at the two ends of the earnings spectrum – the first
and the last quintiles.
Comparing, however, mean income per worker in the major sectors for a
number of Asian countries we find that India is an outlier in terms of a higher
productivity of the tertiary sector relative to the industrial. Furthermore the pro-
ductive differential in favor of the tertiary sector in India seems to have increased
between 1960 and 2002, while it has fallen in all the other comparator countries.
It shows that service-sector growth in India has been productivity led and not
employment led contradicting views of some economists that employment grew
in services because this sector has been a repository of low income labor “pushed
out” of agriculture. The heart of the employment problem in India would thus
seem to be not an excess absorption of labor in the tertiary sector, but the low
productivity of the manufacturing sector, and its persistence over time. It is this
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low performance of manufacturing which has prevented it from being the
dynamic sector – playing a central role in productivity growth as well as the real-
location of labor as in other countries in the history of successful economic devel-
opment. It has been argued that this disappointing role of the manufacturing
sector can be traced, at least to a significant part, to the persistence of dualism in
the sector. It is this which perpetuates the tremendous difference in relative labor
productivity between the small and large size groups. The very low level of labor
productivity in the manufacturing sector can be traced to this dualism.
Chapter 8 analyzed the various factors explaining the low employment elastic-
ity in the high-productivity formal sector of manufacturing. Thus, in spite of a
healthy growth of output in this sector, employment growth has been very low.
Much of the labor in Indian manufacturing has been absorbed in the informal and
the small-scale part of the modern manufacturing sector – the so-called DME
sector employing between five and ten workers. It was shown in Chapter 10 that,
quite apart from the informal sector, the distribution of employment in formal
manufacturing is bi-polar with strong modes at the 6–9 and 500+ size groups, and
a marked “missing middle”. It was also seen that this is very much a peculiar
phenomenon of Indian manufacturing development – and not seen in other com-
parator countries in Asia. The relatively low productivity of the Indian manufac-
turing sector – even if we look specifically at the formal part of it – and its lack of
dynamism can be traced in a significant way to this problem. Historically this
problem arose partly from past policies, particularly the way the policy of reser-
vation for the small scale was handled, and the bias in education policies towards
the development of tertiary education at the cost of more general development at
the lower end of skills. The problem of the missing middle, however, continues
even after reforms have mitigated the more adverse effects of these policies.
Apart from the persistence of labor and capital market segmentation, trade and
infrastructure links which have supported the older system are slow to change.
A relevant set of considerations on this point is the complexity and rigidity of
labor legislation protecting workers in large factories. The low employment
elasticity of the large-scale manufacturing sector (the so-called ASI sector), ana-
lyzed in detail in Chapter 8 demonstrates the prevalence of an effective tax on
increasing the number of workers employed per unit of output. Chapter 11
examined the issue of labor legislation. While it is sometimes argued that this set
of legislation cannot be that important for it affects only a small portion of
India’s total labor force, the pertinent point to emphasize is that it is a serious
impediment to the entry of new workers into the protected sector, and ultimately
is detrimental to the process of raising income levels of workers outside the pro-
tected sector. It is, however, recognized that reforms of labor laws in the formal
sector is not likely to be acceptable politically unless more attention is paid to
labor institutions that might affect the conditions of workers in India’s vast
informal sector. Recent initiatives on this point, which are very much in the
forefront of public discussion in the country, are critically reviewed in the last
chapter of the book.
Notes
1 Introduction: an overview of globalization, reforms and macro-economic
developments in India
1 There is a large literature on this subject. Here it is sufficient to note that, while institu-
tional factors might exacerbate the wage differential between the formal and the infor-
mal sectors, the original cause of the emergence and persistence of the differential are
likely to be economic (see Mazumdar 1989).
2 Poverty, growth and inequality in the pre- and post-reform periods and the 
patterns of urbanization in India: an analysis for all-India and the major states
1 We are thankful to Niranjan Sarangi for decomposition exercises done from NSS Unit
Level Data.
2 The quinquennial rounds are known as thick surveys constituting hundreds of thou-
sands of households that allows analysis to be taken down to major state level as well.
3 We adopted the procedure followed by Sundaram and Tendulkar (2003a). We could
reproduce the APCE figures by fractile group for URP for both rural and urban areas as
presented in their revised calculations (Sundarm and Tendulkar 2003a). The changes in
APCE by fractile group due to changes in the reporting period of five items from 30-
day to 365-day (MRP) differs marginally. The details of the difference are given in
Appendix 2. In this appendix we also discuss briefly the revised estimates of head
count ratio (HCR) as obtained by Sen and Himanshu (2004).
4 This point was made by Professor Angus Deaton in correspondence with us.
5 Unlike the official price index, the Tornqvist price index is calculated using the
information from the consumer expenditure surveys itself, and, hence, it allows for
substitution behaviour as households adapt to relative price changes over time. It is
also considered superior to Laspeyre’s or Paasche’s index as it satisfies both time-
reversal and factor-reversal tests. These indexes, however, differ from official
indexes in a number of ways. In particular, they rise somewhat more slowly over time
than do the official price indexes, especially in the rural sector. This implies that
poverty estimates will remain below that of the official estimates in subsequent
periods.
6 Equation (Figure 2.5): y = 2.72 + 0.21*** x; R2 = 0.386; Equation (Figure 2.6): y = 3.41
+ 0.06 x, R2 = 0.015. (2.97)
(0.47)
Equation (Figure 2.7): y = 3.57 + 0.37*** x; R2 = 0.859; Equation (Figure 2.8): y = 0.22
+ 0.29** x, R2 = 0.253. (9.26)
(2.17)
Figures in parentheses () are t-values and *** and ** denote significance at 1 and 5 per
cent levels respectively.
7 Datt and Ravallion (1992) had criticized an earlier formulation by Kakwani and Sub-
barao (1990) in which the change in poverty was decomposed into the growth and
inequality components by taking the former as resulting from a change in mean income
between the two years of comparison. The difference between this and the actual
change in poverty was assumed to be that due to change in inequality. This procedure is
equivalent to assuming that the Lorenz curve of the initial period is constant in calculat-
ing the growth component. Datt and Ravallion correctly point out that in this formula-
tion the decomposition is not an exact one, but contains a residual term – which has
been arbitrarily allocated to the redistribution component. It is shown that the residual
vanishes if the Lorenz curve remains unchanged.
3 Trends in employment and earnings 1983–2000
1 In some official statements (e.g., the Economic Survey 2004) employment is calculated
on the basis of numbers estimated by the NSS on the basis of ‘current daily status’
(CDS). This gives a much sharper decline in the growth rate of employment. But this
procedure is inappropriate because the CDS measures person-days not persons (see the
Appendix 1 to this chapter).
2 Gordon and Gupta (2003) also reached similar conclusions. They found that compared
to the general trend in developing countries, India’s service sector absorbed far less
labor (relative to other similarly placed countries in Asia). In terms of services’ share
in GDP, India moved slightly above the general trend during the nineties. This was
accompanied by a fall in the share of services in gross capital formation (Chan-
drasekhar and Ghosh 1999). Labor productivity increase without any increase in
capital intensity in services might have occurred because of a faster rise in sub-sectors
that depend on skilled labor (Gordon and Gupta 2003). Hansda (2001) found (from
input–output tables) that the proportion of intermediate use of services output to be
declining slightly between 1978–1979 and 1993–1994. There also exists a widespread
view (Virmani 2002) that the increase in the salaries of public administration and
defense contributed substantially in increasing contribution of services in GDP in
India. In other words, it is largely spurious. But this interpretation has been challenged
by Nagaraj (1999, 2000). He did not find that these components made any positive
contribution to the acceleration in service-sector growth during the nineties.
4 Accounting for the decline in labor supply in the nineties
1 The age-specific LFPR are explained in detail in Appendix 2.
2 In West Bengal, there is clear evidence of increased absorption of labor in the 1980s as
evident from workforce data of both NSS and Census. NSS also reports substantial
contraction of employment in agriculture in the 1990s in this state. For Madhya
Pradesh, under oilseed development program in the 1980s, there was huge expansion
of oilseed cultivation. In the 1990s it faltered and downturn in oilseed was further com-
pounded by allowance of import of cheap palm oil.
3 There might be an ‘endogeneity problem’ in this analysis in that a fall in PR itself
reduces the household welfare level as measured. In this case, in the classification by
household expenditure levels for the 55th round, there would be relatively more house-
holds in the lower welfare groups with less participation of females. But in this case we
would expect to see a relative increase in the higher welfare groups for the participant
households – not a fall as we in fact find.
5 Some implications of regional differences in labor-market outcomes in India
1 Ahmad Ahasan and Carmen Pages are staff members of the World Bank and the
Inter-American Development Bank respectively, both working at their headquarters
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in Washington DC. The findings, interpretations and conclusions of this chapter are
those of the authors and should not be attributed to the World Bank, its Executive
Directors, or the countries they represent. All errors are ours. The authors thank
Sergiy Biletsky, Zhaoyang Hou and Mikhail B. Oslmolovski for excellent research
assistance and the World Bank’s Human Development team for providing the NSS
region map coordinates, and members of the India Labor and Employment study team
for their valuable comments in discussions held in September 2005.
2 The latest thick round data is from the 2004–2005 survey.
3 Employment rates are defined as the share of workers (i.e. with status codes of 11 to
51 in Question 3, Block 5.1 in Schedule 10 questionnaire of the NSS) in the age
group of 15 to 59. Participation rates are defined as the share of worker and popu-
lation looking for jobs (i.e. with status codes from 11 to 81) in the 15 to 59 age
cohort. Finally, unemployment rates are defined as the ratio of those unemployed but
searching for jobs (Code 81) as a proportion of the population participating in the
labor market, i.e. those working and unemployed but searching for jobs.
4 As the fourth section explains, most of these estimates have taken into account endo-
geneity of labor-market outcomes, wages, earnings and GSDP.
5 For instance, Duryea, Edwards and Ureta (2004) find that increases in education
explain 30 percent of the increase in female participation rates in Latin America.
6 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Geographic Mobility: March 2000 to March 2001
7 Mohan and Dasgupta (2004).
8 It is true though that part of the answer may lie in the lack of updating of rural areas
due to which many actually urban areas may be classified as a rural area – such as
environs of Delhi. Thus higher “rural” wages may be partly reflecting this misclassifi-
cation and the migration may be being under-reported. Still, it would be hard to
ascribe all the changes to this fact.
9 We account for differences between urban and rural areas by including an urban
dummy. In addition, we account for the fact that output only varies at the state and
not at the regional level by computing robust standard errors clustered at the state
level.
10 We estimate specifications of the following kind:
(1)
Where Eijt denotes log of employment in state i, region j, round t, Yjt is log of state
GDP, wijt denotes log of wages and Xijt is a vector of additional controls. We also
control for aggregate, round effects by means of time (round) dummies, denoted as τt.
11 As in the first differences estimates, we account for the fact that GDSP only varies at
the state level by computing robust standard errors clustered at the state level. We
also account for a likely endogeneity of GSDP and wages by instrumenting wages
and GSDP with the following set of variables: share of industry in the state economy,
log of state credit to industry per capita, log of state credit to agriculture per capita,
log of power (measured as percentage of villages that are electrified) and log of km of
roads per 100 square km per state. These variables capture differences in state devel-
opment and output that are uncorrelated with contemporaneous labor supply.
12 We estimate specifications parallel to specification (1) but substituting employment at
the regional level by average regional weekly earnings. As usual, we compute robust
standard errors clustered at the state level to account for the lack of within state vari-
ation of GSDP.
13 The difference between the predicted increase and the actual decline indicate that a
part of the participation decline is not accounted for by substitution effects and that
other causes, beyond lack of opportunities or increased husband incomes, are behind
the participation decline. Understanding which additional factors are behind should
be an important priority for future research.
Eijt  tt  bYjt  dwijt  gXijt  εijt
6 Trends in the regional disparities in poverty incidence: an analysis based
on NSS regions
1 For 1972–1973, Jain and Tendulkar have obtained the poverty line a) by using a
poverty line of Rs.15 per capital per month at 1960–1961 prices and b) by converting
this poverty line at 1972–1973 prices by using the consumer price index for the agri-
cultural laborers (CPIAL). For 1999–2000 we have used poverty line as obtained by
Deaton (2002). He has taken poverty line of each state separately obtained from
‘expert group on poverty line’ by planning commission for the year 1987–1988. He
updated it to the current (1999–2000) year from the higher prices that rural consumers
pay in 1999–2000 for various items (obtained from unit level data) compared with
1987–1988.
2 For the triennium ending 1982 and 1992 value of output and net sown area figures at
district level (1961 classification) was obtained from Bhalla and Singh, 2001. From
district level we aggregated to NSS region level and further to broad-region level. For
the late nineties we managed to get district-level crop-wise season-wise data for two
years 1997–1998 and 1998–1999 from Govt. of India, Ministry of Agriculture, Dis-
trict-wise Area and Production of Crops in India, 2001. These production data of dif-
ferent crops were converted to value by using crop wise price data (for the year
1993–1994) used by Bhalla and Singh (2001) to maintain comparability. These were
aggregated to all crop NSS region level and further to broad region level. For two
crops, rubber and coffee, we collected value of output and net-sown area from the
Rubber Board of India and Coffee Board of India. For net-sown area we collected data
from several issues of IFFCO, Agricultural and Fertilizer Statistics. The two years data
were aggregated to get data for 1997–1999.
7 Agricultural productivity, off-farm employment and rural poverty: the
problem of labor absorption in agriculture
1 The non-specified activities could be irrigation, spraying of fertilizer and pesticides,
post harvesting operations, etc.
2 First we distinguished rural households dependent on agriculture in two categories
cultivators and agricultural-labor households, on the basis of main source of earnings –
labor income and self-employment in agriculture. Households whose main income
comes from self-employment in agriculture (i.e. cultivators) are further divided on the
basis of operational landholding size. These are divided into marginal (0–1 hectare),
small (1–2 hectare), medium (2–4 hectares) and large (more that four hectares).
Vakulbrahmanam’s (2005) land classification is based on landownership whereas our
land classification is based on operational landholding.
8 Employment elasticity in organized manufacturing in India
1 See, e.g., Eichner (1973). The author notes the affinity of the theoretical tradition to the
empirical literature which has found from surveys of business-pricing decisions that
firms set prices on the basis of the ‘cost plus’ concept. The ‘plus’ margin is in its turn
set by the necessity to generate the profit share which finances the investment ratio.
The affinity of these ideas to the Kalecki models of the firm has been stressed by Asi-
makopoulos (1971) among others.
2 See Mazumdar (2003b) for a more extended discussion of the labor-market theories
relevant to this set of decisions.
3 We are grateful to Ahmad Ahsan of the World Bank for providing the ideas and calcu-
lations for this sub-section.
4 The data period of this section ends at 1994–1995.
5 Our data period for this section ends at 1994–1995.
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9 Dualism in Indian manufacturing: causes and consequences
1 The term “directory” and “non-directory” establishments presumably refer to the ‘sup-
posed’ registration practice of the government that never materialized.
2 Data on average earnings for the two countries can be found in the same national
sources as are cited for Table 9.1.
3 It is apparent that the reason why the difference in value added per worker between the
largest and the smallest size groups in Taiwan is larger than that in wages per worker is
because Taiwan has a fair presence of large conglomerates, with a large share of
capital, along with the small- and medium-scale firms. Such conglomerates play a
smaller role in Hong Kong’s manufacturing economy.
4 It should be emphasized once again that the sets of data considered here exclude the
very large household and other parts of the informal sector in establishments employ-
ing less than five workers.
5 But under WTO agreement India was under obligation to remove quantitative restric-
tion by 1 April, 2001. So by 2001–2002, all remaining 799 items reserved in the SSI
list has been put under OGL. However, through a series of de-reservation over the
years, the number of reserved items in small scale has been pruned to 239.
6 For more detailed examination of the origins and consequences of the Indian industrial
policy affecting the small-scale sector see Mazumdar (1991) and Little et al. (1987)
7 For a poor country spent and still spends much more on tertiary education. In
2000 India spent 86 percent of per capita GDP per student on tertiary education,
and only 14 percent on primary education. The corresponding percentages for
China were 10.7 and 12.1 respectively. The Indian level of expenditure on ter-
tiary education was even higher than Korea or Indonesia.
(IMF, WP 06/22 2006, pp. 6–7)
8 The contents and impact of this set of policies have been discussed in detail in Little et
al. (1987). See also Mazumdar 2003b.
10 Growth of employment and earnings in the tertiary sector
1 The APCE (Average Per Capita Consumption Expenditure) that we have used for the
55th round comes from employment schedule. It is an abridged questionnaire
compared to the consumption-expenditure schedule. Consequently APCE in
abridged employment schedule is underestimated. When APCE of both these ques-
tionnaires was compared across percentile APCE distribution, APCE from employ-
ment schedule was uniformly lower by 9–11 percentages compared to
consumption-expenditure schedule. The distribution of APCE in both these series
would be similar.
11 Legislation, enforcement and adjudication in Indian labor markets: 
origins, consequences and the way forward
1 Ahmad Ahasan and Carmen Pages are staff members of the World Bank and the
Inter-American Development Bank respectively, both working at their headquarters
in Washington, DC. Tirthankar Roy is a Professor at the Gohkale School of Eco-
nomics in Poona. The views expressed in this chapter are the personal views of the
authors, and in no way represent the position of their respective organizations.
The authors would like to thank Gautam Mehta for valuable research assistance,
Farah Zahir for her indispensable help in gathering the data used in this study, and
K.V. Ramaswamy for very helpful discussions. The authors also thank the Labor
Bureau and the Central Statistical Organization for kindly sharing their data.
2 There was a surge in the share of factories inspected in the year 2001. Given the exis-
tent data is impossible to determine whether this is a short-term reversion or a more
permanent effect.
3 If a firm did not report a change in behavior, the reduction in the number of visits is
zero. To compute the adjusted number of inspections the reported number of inspec-
tions is divided by (1 percent reduction in visit due to unofficial payments/100).
4 Notice, however, that a positive relation between the number of inspections and the
perceived stringency of labor laws is not sufficient to conclude that inspections
increase compliance. This is because inspections could concentrate in firms for which
the law is more binding.
5 Conversations with Labour Commissioners in a number of states suggest that the grip
of Chapter Vb is still very high. In the year 2004 there were six applications for per-
mission to retrench in Karnataka, out of which only one was granted. In Tamil Nadu,
there were three. One was granted, one was denied and the other one was still
pending. In West Bengal, only one case was granted out of 20 applications.
6 Systematic data on the use of contract labor is only available from the Annual Survey
of Industries (ASI) which only covers the manufacturing sector.
7 At the time of this study, the Investment Climate Survey data (ICS) provided firm level
information for 25,582 firms from 55 emerging countries, but data for additional coun-
tries are periodically added to the data set. Surveys are administered in each country to a
sample of firms stratified by size, sector and location, following a common framework.
The surveys contain a number of questions regarding firms’ characteristics, outcomes
and perceptions about the business environment. The sample size for each country
ranges from less than 100 establishments, for countries with a small private sector like
Bhutan and Eritrea, to more than 1,500 for China, India, and Brazil. Information on ICS
data can be obtained at http://rru.worldbank.org/external/cicic/portal.htm.
8 Firms’ perceptions about labor-market legislation may be colored by the overall degree
of optimism or pessimism about the economic outlook in each country. However,
accounting for this factor by measuring each employer’s response in relation to her
average response to all other obstacles does not change the results. India still remains
among the countries in which labor legislation is perceived to be more binding.
9 See Ahsan and Pagés (2006) for further details.
10 For example, in 1988, Tamil Nadu introduced an amendment increasing the power of
conciliation officers in terms of enforcing attendance, compelling the production of
documents and issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses. Other examples
of laws that reduce the cost of disputes are (i) eliminating the need for the parties to
refer labor disputes to the government prior to referring them to a Tribunal. or (ii)
granting the government the power to transfer any industrial dispute pending before a
tribunal to any other tribunal constituted by the state government for adjudication.
11 They relate labor regulations to economic outcomes, by estimating the following
specification:
Yit = τi + τt + βXit + φaLit−1 + εit (1)
where Yit is an economic outcome such as manufacturing output, employment or wages
in state i in period t, Xit is a vector of state controls, and τi and τt denote a state and time
dummy, respectively. Lit-1 is a vector of legislation measures, which refer to the accumu-
lated sum of amendments in a given type of laws over time in a state up to period t. In
some specifications, outcome variables vary at the industry–state level. They lag regula-
tory variables one period to account for the average lag between enactment and imple-
mentation of the law and to reduce the possible endogeneity of labor laws.
12 For instance, there is a large degree of uncertainty and ambiguity regarding whether
business processing operations, calling centers or software companies are included in
the definition of industry.
Notes 339
340 Notes
13 The term market infrastructure is adopted from Rajan and Zingales (2003).
14 It should be noted that a level of compensation of 45–60 days of compensation per
year of service in case of a restructuring sick industries or profit-making companies,
respectively, are above the norm in both developing and developed countries.
15 For more information on the operation of these schemes see Heckman and Pagés
(2004), IADB (2004), Kugler (2004, 2005), Saavedra and Torero (2004) and Paes de
Barros and Corseuil (2004).
16 See for example Brown and Medoff (1989).
17 An example is useful to clarify this issue. Assume a certain firm hires a contractor to
run a cafeteria. Workers employed in the cafeteria are the employees of the contracted
firm, which would then be responsible for abiding by all labor regulations with its
employees. Nonetheless, the contracting firm could have a subsidiary responsibility if
it hires a contractor that is not abiding by the law.
12 Strengthening employment and social security for unorganized-sector 
workers in India
1 Philip O’Keefe and Robert Palacios are currently working at World Bank office in
New Delhi. The views expressed in this chapter are the personal views of the authors,
and in no way represent the position of their respective organizations.
We are grateful to Ihsan Ajwad, Corinne Siaens and Sangeeta Goyal for analysis of
NCAER, NSS and ADB/MOF data respectively, and to Rinku Murgai and Martin
Ravallion for discussions of their work on NREG. Thanks also to Dipak Mazumdar
for comments on an earlier version.
2 WDR 2006; Munshi and Rosenzweig (2005) for empirical evidence of credit and
insurance-market failures driving limited mobility in rural areas in India.
3 For summaries of international experience, see Ravallion (1991); Devereux (2002);
Subbarao (2003).
4 South Africa’s Special Public Works Programme (SPWP) provides a good example
of the latter, with participants required to undertake two days training for every 22
days worked, and 2 percent of each sub-project budget allocated to worker training
(Devereux and Solomon 2005).
5 This did not happen in the lead-up to the 1999 national election, though spending may
have been unusually constrained in the aftermath of the 5th Pay Commission.
6 This is to change in the 62nd round, which has revised questions on participation in
works.
7 Based on estimates of around 65 million BPL households in 2000 (Indiastat.com).
8 Based on a usual status (PS+SS), workforce of just over 300 million. Sundaram, 2001.
9 This is consistent with international evidence of targeting of public works. For
example, in Argentina’s Trabajar program, 80 percent of beneficiaries were from the
poorest quintile, while in Chile the share was close to 100 percent. In Bangladesh,
around 70 percent of beneficiaries of the Food-for-Work Program were in the lowest
income bracket, while in Indonesia, the post-crisis public works program was more
likely to reach household who had suffered large shocks (Subbarao 2003).
10 CAG 1997. The CAG report on EAS from 2000 estimated that 10.9 million workdays
were lost due to contractor margins, assuming a 10 percent margin.
11 AFC SGRY program assessment for Orissa, 2005.
12 Deshingkar and Johnson (2003). The statewide figure for AP for 2002–2003 in the
MRD evaluation was 25.3 percent of works with contractor involvement.
13 In the last year of the period, the village coverage rate for EAS was 32 percent.
14 Acharya (2005) for seasonal MEGS employment data up to 2002–2003.
15 IDS for Planning Commission (2002) which found 80 percent of works occurring in
this period.
16 CMD evaluation of SGRY on behalf of MRD, 2005.
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17 The two shares are not necessarily inconsistent, but one would need to assume that
female participants worked more than twice as many days.
18 General rate based on Sundaram revised estimates from 2001. Swamy (2003) on
gender and workfare schemes internationally.
19 CMD study for MRD on SGRY (2005); PEO EAS evaluation (2000); and for Rajasthan
an IDS evaluation of employment programs (2002).
20 CMD for MRD 2005.
21 This is a rate of Rs.50 in 1999–2000 prices, scaled up for subsequent movements in
the CPI for agricultural and rural laborers (RBI series).
22 Townsend (1994); Munshi and Rosenzweig (2005); Ravallion and Chauduri (1997).
Gertler and Gruber (1997) re Indonesia.
23 Peters et al. (2002); Dev et al. (2001); World Bank, op. cit.; and Duflo (2005).
24 Though note the collinearity between society ageing and country income levels.
25 Gertler (2001) re Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Japan. O’Keefe and Palacios (2006).
26 Dev et al. (2001); Jhabvala and Subrahmanya (2000) and World Bank, op. cit. This
section focuses on contributory schemes. Dev et al. demonstrate the value of a wide-
ranging consideration of social security.
27 The central funds are: Mica Mines Welfare Fund (1946); Limestone and Dolomite
Mines Labor Welfare Fund (1972); Beedi Workers’ Welfare Fund (1976); Iron Ore,
Manganese Ore and Chrome Ore Labor Welfare Fund (1978); Cine Workers’ Welfare
Fund (1981); Building and Other Construction Workers’ Welfare Fund (1996). ILO,
op. cit., and Rajan (2001).
28 Among funds based on contributions, 12 had tripartite financing, ten were funded
from employer and worker contributions, and two from employer contributions only.
See ILO (2004).
29 In contrast, for the Karnataka and AP Labor Welfare Funds, education has been the
dominant expenditure – in Karnataka, accounting for around 98 percent of non-
administration spending in 1997–2000, and in AP for 74 percent in 1998–2001. Rajan
2001.
30 In addition to central initiatives, many states and specific national ministries have
schemes of social insurance. They are not addressed here.
31 Berman and Ahuja 2005; Gupta and Trivedi (2005).
32 Devadasan et al. 2004, gives a typology; Ahuja and Narang (2005).
33 Kuruvilla et al. (2005) re Yeshasvini, and ILO (2005).
34 There are also revolving funds, often for drug costs, but these are not covered here.
35 Another limitation is the regulatory obstacles for deposit taking. SEWA did not face
this problem because it is also licensed as a banking institution.
36 For a review of international experience with social pensions, Palacios and Sluchyn-
sky (2006).
37 Other factors such as savings capacity, risk preferences, and other demands on dis-
posable income are also crucial (Palacios and Goyal forthcoming).
38 Gertler and Hammer (1997), which finds price elasticities of demand for health ser-
vices in developing countries of –0.5 to –1.0, again an average of around –0.2 from
developed countries.
13 Epilogue
1 The published report for the 61st round does not give expenditure distribution for the
MRP at the state level. Therefore the authors 
estimated the MRP poverty ratios using the Lorenz curve method based on URP
distribution of persons and MRP per capita expenditures. This assumes that MRP
expenditure levels are monotonic with URP levels for all observations. Since this
is unlikely to hold strictly, it may marginally affect the poverty estimates.
(Ibid., p. 509)
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